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GLOSSARY
ad valorem Latin, meaning “according to the value”. Ad valorem tax is a tax
based on the estimated value of the goods or transaction con-
cerned.
agar-agar a gelatinous substance obtained from certain red seaweeds and
used as a biological culture media and as a thickener in foods.
aloe bitter juice from a succulent plant with a rosette of thick taper-
ing leaves and bell-shaped or tubular flowers on long stems, used
as a strong laxative.
arrack Arabic araq, the strong spirits distilled mainly in South and
South-east Asia from fermented fruits, grains, sugarcane, or the
sap of coconuts or other palm trees.
bankzaal the Bengali bankasala derived from Sanskrit, meaning “trade
hall”. A large storage shed which European companies paid to be
built on the sandbank at Whampoa.
Barra Fort the southern fortification of Macao , of strategic importance
in defending Macao’s inner harbour.
Batavia Committee the committee of the Dutch supercargoes for the China trade 
(Bataviase commissie) under the leadership of Batavia between 1735 and 1756, dealing
with the Company’s business in Canton .
Bay of Praia Grande a bay south of the Macao Peninsula.
blue dye a kind of well-known dyestuff of which a principal element is
cobalt dioxide in the form of fine blue powder, used to colour
something blue.
Bocca Tigris a narrows, also known as the Bogue, meaning “Tiger’s Mouth”
, thirty miles below Whampoa, at the estuary of the Pearl
River .  
calico all-cotton fabric woven in plain or tabby weave and printed with
simple designs in one or more colours. Indian calicoes had origi-
nated in Calicut by the 11th century, if not earlier, and in the
17th and 18th centuries were an important commodity traded
between India and Europe (and China).
camphor a white volatile crystalline substance with an aromatic smell and
bitter taste, occurring in certain essential oils distilled from Cam-
phora officinarum. Baros camphor, of a very high quality, origi-
nates from Baros on West Sumatra.
carat a unit of weight. 24 carats of pure gold valued c. 373 guilders in
the Netherlands Indies in the period under study.
Casa Branca a large white fortress on top of the hill at Qianshan where
the military garrison was stationed.
catechu a vegetable extract containing tannin, especially one obtained
from the heartwood of an Indian Acacia catechu, used for tanning
and dyeing. Also called gambier.
Channel Islands a group of British-dependent islands off the coast of Normandy,
France, in the English Channel.
chickpea an edible leguminous plant, Cicer arietinum, bearing pea-like
seeds. It can be eaten in salads, cooked in stews, ground into a
flour called gram flour, and also can be used as a green vegetable.
China root the dried root of the Smilax China, used for medicinal purposes. 
(Radix China) The root is astringent and slightly tonic; the parched and pow-
dered leaves have been used as a dressing on burns and scalds.
xiii
chinoiserie refers to an artistic European style which reflected Chinese influ-
ence and is characterized by the use of elaborate decoration and
intricate patterns. Its popularity peaked around the middle of the
eighteenth century.
chop Hindi chhäp, an official stamp or permit, by extension any offi-
cial document bearing a seal-impression or stamp; a trademark,
or mark of quality in East Asia.
clove oil an aromatic oil obtained from the buds, stems, or leaves of the
clove tree, used in flavouring and perfumery.
Co-hong the guild of Chinese merchants authorized by the Chinese 
(Co-hang ) authorities to trade with an exclusive privilege with Western mer-
chants at Canton prior to the First Opium War (1839-1842).
Such firms often were called “foreign trade firms” (or (Yang-hang
) and the merchants who directed them were known as
“Hong merchants”.
comprador a native-born agent in Canton employed by European traders to
serve as a provisions purveyor in the Canton trade.
cubit an ancient unit of linear measure. See the Explanation of the
Units of Measurements.
ducat gold coin.
Dutch Republic also called the United Provinces. The Dutch confederation of
seven provinces, which had their own independent provincial
governments and were governed directly by the States-General
between 1581 and 1795.
East Indies House the logistic headquarters of the VOC in Amsterdam where the 
(Oost-Indisch huis) board meetings took place, the administration was kept, the
wages were disbursed, goods were sold, profits were calculated,
and dividends were paid. 
ell a European measure of length, used in the Asian trade as a cloth
measure. See the Explanation of the Units of Measurements
en route on the way.
Estado da India the Portuguese State of India that exercised the jurisdiction over
Portugal’s Indian colonies.
Fooyuern Governor or Inspector, the subordinate colleague of the Viceroy 
( or ) in matters at the provincial level.
galingale Arabic khalanjär, an aromatic rhizome of the ginger family; prob-
(galinga) ably a distortion of Chinese “mild (or excellent?) ginger”, widely
used in herbal medicine and cookery. 
gamboge a brownish or orange resin obtained from several trees of the 
(gommegutte) genus Garcinia, used as a pigment (yielding a golden-yellow
colour) or medicinally as a purgative. 
grijnen camlet, fabric made of a mixture of wool and camel or goat’s hair
or pure wool.
guanxi Chinese social “connections” and “relationships”, describing the
basic dynamic in personalized networks of influence.
Guia Castle the castle built approximately in 1637 on the hill of Guia, the
highest hill in Macao. 
Hague Affairs preparatory committee of the VOC directors, which met in The 
(Haags Besogne) Hague.
Hanover a kingdom and province in north-western Germany which was
an electorate of the Holy Roman Empire from 1692 to 1805.
High Commissioner namely the “Imperial Envoy” dispatched from Peking. He was 
( ) delegated directly by the Emperor to put the latter’s will into
effect should the Viceroy or Governor hesitate or be unable to
carry out the Imperial Orders.
xiv
Hoppo of Canton the Imperial Commissioner of the Customs, with headquarters in 
( ) Canton.
Hoppo of Macao customs officer at Macao, sent by the Hoppo of Canton to levy 
( ) dues on all in- and outgoing Chinese junks and Portuguese ships.  
imperialen a sort of high quality textile.
ipso jure Latin, meaning “by the law itself ” or “by operation of law”, used
as an adverb.
Jan Compagnie a servant of the Dutch East India Company.
kapok a fine, silky fibre obtained from the fruit of the silk-cotton tree,
used as padding in pillows, mattresses, cushions, etc.
koban also called as cobang, coubang, coupan. Small 6.5x3.2 cm shaped 
( ) gold coin in Japan, weighing 18 grams.
Koxinga the popular name of Zheng Chenggong        (1624-1662), a 
( ) prominent leader of the anti-Qing movement and a general who
recovered Taiwan from Dutch colonial rule in 1662.
laken woollen cloth, the major commodity of the Netherlands import-
ed by the Dutch in Canton.
Mexicanen Mexican silver coins. See the Explanation of the units of measure-
ments.
mother-of-cloves ripe clove fruit, containing one seed or rarely two seeds. The
ovary and sepals constitute the specific part marketed as cloves.
musk a substance with a strong, penetrating odour obtained from a
small sac under the skin of the abdomen of the male musk deer,
used in perfume and medicinally.
myrrh a fragrant gum resin obtained from certain trees, used in per-
fume, medicine, and incense.
nachoda from Persian na-khuda. Captain of an Asian vessel, especially
Chinese junk. Also called anachoda or annakhoda.
Nanhai Court the Justice Court, which was called “Yamen” in Chinese, 
( ) of Nanhai County .
Nanking linen a kind of finely woven, shiny linen.
old tea tea left over from the past trading season, called “old tea” by the
Dutch, was called “Yadong Cha” ( ) in Chinese, and “win-
ter tea” in English.
olibanum an aromatic resin, yellowish in colour, obtained from trees of
genus Boswellia sacra or Boswellia carterii, used in incense and
perfume. 
op recognitie on recognition. The VOC received commission for the auction of
teas on recognition.
op vracht at freight. The VOC received commission for the auction of teas
at freight.
patria Fatherland or home country.
pearl dust pearls of the smallest size, sometimes ground into dust and used 
(stampparel) as a cardiacum, a medicine for weak hearts.
perpetuaan perpetuana (everlasting), a durable woollen fabric, imported by
the Dutch in Canton.
piaster silver coin.
pig an oblong ingot of lead from a smelting furnace. The term was
sometimes used for other metals such as iron and copper.
polemieten durable, smooth woollen cloth.
principal shareholders Those who owned or held the principal shares of the VOC stock. 
(hoofdparticipanten) Their representatives could be present at important meetings of
the VOC management.
putchuck Hindustani pachak, dried, fragrant, spicy root of Saussurea costus,
a species of thistle, used for burning as incense or in medicine as 
a stomach tonic, diuretic, and expectorant. 




so that the hair cannot be seen. 
rattan Malay rütan, canes obtained from the long stems of the Calamus
climbing palm throughout South-east Asia. More pliable than
bamboo, they could be split and twisted to make thick ropes and
hawsers for ships and woven into sails for junks, as well as a whole
variety of building and domestic uses similar to bamboo.
red ochre a red earth pigment containing ferric oxide, typically with clay.
Ochres vary widely in transparency; some are quite opaque, while
others are valued for their use as glazes.
régulateur de la regulator of the English policy.
politique anglaise
rhubarb the dried, bitter-tasting rhizome and roots of Rheum grown in 
(rhabarber) China, used medicinally as a purgative and laxative. 
Sadras a fortress town 70 km south of Chennai in Tamil Nadu state.
“Sadras” is the anglicized form of the ancient town of Chadhu-
ranga Pattinam.
sago Malay sügü, the flour-like foodstuff produced from the stems of
the palm genus Mebroxylan, found throughout South-east Asia.
It formed a bulk commodity for the Dutch and in its round pel-
let form was often shot straight into the hold of a ship to fill all
the spaces between other cargoes.
sampan a small boat or skiff, possibly from Chinese sanpan, “three
boards”.
sandalwood the fragrant red wood of the Pterocarpus santalina, native to
South India, used for carvings, cosmetics, and incense.
sang-froid self-confidence or self-assurance.
sapanwood the red dye-wood of the Caesalpina sappan, found in South-east
Asia, used for medicine and for dying cotton products. 
schuitje ingots with the shape of a small boat. Silver, copper, gold, and tin
cast in the shape of a boat for trade.
security merchant Baoshang in Chinese. The merchant who was held respon-
sible by Chinese authorities for the foreign ships, the crews, and
the duties that were owed.
Senate of Macao the municipal council of Macao, the voting members of which 
(Senado da Camara comprised three councilmen (vereadores), two judges (juizes ordi-
de Macao) narios), and a procurator (procurador).
Spanish rial Spanish silver coin. See the Explanation of the Units of measure-
ments.
spelter zinc alloyed with small amounts of copper, lead and a few other 
(spiauter or spiaulter) metals, usually found in the form of ingots, slabs, or plates.
St Jan Shangchuan Island , west of Macao.
star anise also called Bajiao in Chinese. A small star-shaped fruit with
one seed in each arm from the Illicium verum. It has an aniseed
flavour and is used unripe in cookery.
States of Holland the representation of the three estates: Nobility, Clergy and 
and West Friesland Commons to the court of the Count of Holland. After the 
(Staten van Holland United Provinces were formed they continued to function as the 
en West-Friesland) government of the Province of Holland (1572-1795).
States-General the supreme authority of the Seven United Provinces established 
(Staten-Generaal) in 1593 and seated in The Hague. It consisted of representatives of
each sovereign provincial estate for the general government of the
United Provinces. The VOC was under its general supervision.
storax a rare fragrant gum resin obtained from an eastern Mediterranean
tree, used in medicine, perfumery, and incense. Liquid storax is a
liquid balsam obtained from the Asian liquidambar tree.
Taipa ( ) island south of the Macao Peninsula.
tare the deduction from the gross weight of commodities to allow for
xvi
containers, wrapping, packing, etc; or to determine or indicate
the tare of commodities.
tea van particulieren tea owned by private individuals.
test-needle also called “touch-needle”. A small bar of gold and silver, either 
(toetsnaald) pure or alloyed in some known proportion with copper, for try-
ing the purity of articles of gold or silver by comparison of the
streaks made by the article and the bar on a touchstone. 
Tiger Island the island situated at the entrance to Bocca Tigris, commanding
the entrance of the Pearl River.
touch both gold and silver were rated according to their alloy content,
or “touch”, as it was known. 
trepang a large sea cucumber (Holothuria edulis) from the southern
Pacific and Indian Ocean which is eaten as an ingredient in soup
especially in China. Also called bêche-de-mer.
Tsongtu styled Viceroy (Governor-General), the highest civil official over 
( ) the province.
turmeric a widely cultivated plant of China (Curcuma longa), having yel-
(kurkuma) low flowers and an aromatic, somewhat fleshly rhizome. The
powder and fresh root of this plant is used as a condiment and a
yellow dye.
Whampoa the outer port of Canton, in the Pearl River, c. 15 km south-east 
( ) of Canton.
Zoet-Zoet-Ham an anchorage downriver from Canton and just above Bocca
Tigris.
xvii
EXPLANATION OF THE UNITS OF MEASUREMENTS
Weights
1 Chinese picul = 100 catties = 1600 taels
 1 “Company” picul = 122½ pounds*
Lengths
1 Dutch ell  69 centimeters
1 Indian cubit  70 centimeters
Currencies
1 Chinese tael = 10 maces = 100 candareens = 1000 catties
= 88 stivers = 4.4 guilders
1 guilder (gulden) = 20 stivers (stuivers) = 320 pennies (penningen)
1 Zeeuws pound (pond) = 20 shillings (schellingen) = 240 pennies (groten)
 6.05 guilders
1 tael (of Spanish rial) = 72 or 74 Chinese candareens
 2.5 guilders
1 mark Mexicanen = 9.13 Spanish rials
 6.75 Chinese taels
 23 guilders
1 mark piaster  1 mark Mexicanen
1 rix-dollar  2.4 guilders
1 Dutch Indies rupee = 1.5 guilders
1 Dutch gold ducat  5.25 guilders
* “pound” used in this book is Dutch pound, unless otherwise indicated.
Sources: NA 1.04.02, VOC 4543-4547; M. Kooijmans & J.E. Oosterling, VOC-
Glossarium. Verklaringen van termen, verzameld uit de Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën,
die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Den Haag: Instituut voor
Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2000); K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade; H. Enno van Gelder,
De Nederlandse Munten (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2002); Het Woordenboek der Neder-
landsche Taal (AND Electronic Publishing B.V., 1999).
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INTRODUCTION
In the years 1792-1793, the British King George III sent George
Macartney as his envoy to the Manchu court in Peking. The main pur-
pose of this appointment was to establish trade and diplomatic inter-
course on the basis of equality with the Empire of Qing China. Some his-
torians argue the Macartney mission failed because of the clash between
the Chinese and the English attitudes toward the Chinese court etiquette,
which required all visitors to kowtow before the Qianlong Emperor. This
argument may be acceptable from the cultural point of view, but the
deeper reason behind the Emperor’s refusal to accede to the English
requests was his persistently dismissive attitude about foreign trade, which
was undoubtedly representative of the basic policy of the Empire. This
was clearly expressed in his reply to the British King: “The productions of
Our Empire are manifold, and in great abundance; nor do We stand in
the least need of the produce of other countries” and “China in particu-
lar affords tea, and fine earthen ware, silk and other materials. All these
are in great request, both in your own and the other Kingdoms of
Europe.”1
The tone may have sounded arrogant and the “We need nothing” for-
mula is a standard phrase in imperial rhetoric, but the facts the Emperor
stated were simply true at one level. The two sentences more or less sum-
marize the commercial situation between Europe and China in the eigh-
teenth century. There was an imbalance in the European trade with
China. The Manchu government considered the permitting of European
trade in Canton a beneficent indulgence towards European countries. It
did not particularly value the European trade, although its contribution
to the imperial treasury was not to be sneezed at.2 China was not to pur-
chase enough foreign commodities to balance the trade until the import
of opium mushroomed in the early nineteenth century.3 For their part,
the European countries needed the China trade dearly. After their infatu-
ation with spices and Indian calicoes in the seventeenth century, the
Europeans turned their gaze to China in the eighteenth century.4 The
“China craze” showed itself in a passion for Chinese silk, porcelain, and
tea, but it was tea which took pride of place. In Europe, the widespread
vogue for chinoiserie and the concomitant development of the porcelain
industry, and later in the nineteenth century the design of the fast tea-
and opium-clippers were all linked to the craze for tea. It takes no great
stretch of the imagination to realize that tea indeed gave shape to the
course of the European-China trade.5
1
The influence of this rise in consciousness was especially significant to
the China trade of the Dutch United East India Company (Verenigde
Oostindische Compagnie, hereafter the VOC) from 1729, when the VOC
initiated its direct trade with China, until 1794 when the directorate of the
Company was dissolved. Notwithstanding the fact that the VOC traded
with China for tea, porcelain, raw silk and silk textiles, China root and
galingale, rhubarb, star anis, spelter and so on, the tea trade exclusively
occupied by far the most important proportion of the VOC China trade.
The growing perception of the importance of its tea trade by the VOC
administration stimulated the Gentlemen Seventeen (Heren Zeventien),
the central administrative board of the VOC, to carry out no less than
three times a drastic change of policy towards the trade route to China.
Before the present study, little attention has been paid to the impor-
tance and the relative value of tea as a commodity within the VOC trade
or to the management of the tea trade itself. The more meticulous the
research into the records of the China trade of the VOC, the more indeli-
bly the idea takes root that tea was indeed the cornerstone of the China
trade. This affirmation makes a case study of the VOC management of its
tea trade with China a worthwhile proposition.
Outline of the VOC tea trade with China
On 20 March 1602, in order to reorganize the burgeoning Dutch over-
seas trade with Asia, the States-General (Staten-Generaal) of the Republic
of the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands (Republiek der Zeven
Verenigde Provinciën, hereafter the Dutch Republic or the Republic)
issued an exclusive charter for the foundation of the VOC, in which all
the existing East India Companies of six different cities in the coastal
provinces of Holland and Zeeland were merged into one company.6 Not
many years passed before the China trade emerged as an important com-
ponent of the Dutch trade with Asia.7
The Dutch were the first to take tea from Japan and China to Europe
at the beginning of the seventeenth century,8 but during most of the sev-
enteenth century the China trade of the VOC was focusing on the trade
in silk, gold, and porcelain. From the beginning of the eighteenth centu-
ry onwards, as European consumers familiarized themselves with tea-
drinking and tea entrenched itself as an indispensable article in European
daily life, the significance of tea as an important article of trade began to
dawn on the Company directors. In the meantime, the VOC tea trade
with Japan dwindled, and China became the only source of supply.
Initially tea was a luxury article reserved for the wealthy, but it was not
long before it became a popular drink among the general public. Well
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aware of the European infatuation with tea, the VOC saw itself obliged
to reorganize its trade relations with China.
Until the second decade of the eighteenth century, the VOC used to
purchase tea in Batavia to where it had been brought by Chinese junks
from such Chinese ports as Canton , Amoy , and Limpo .9
In the face of the mounting demand for tea, which went hand-in-hand
with a growing perception of the quality of the product, the shortcomings
of this tea trade based on Chinese shipping to Batavia was thrust under
the nose of the Company directors. They were acutely conscious of their
rivals, having to contend with fierce competition from the Ostend mer-
chants in the Austrian Netherlands, whose ships first appeared in Canton
in 1715,10 and from the English East India Company (hereafter the EIC),
which managed to establish a regular tea trade between Canton and
Europe in the 1710s.11
The circuitous Chinese tea trade via Batavia suffered from various
shortcomings. The worst impediment was that it took a considerable
amount of time to deliver tea to the European market because the Dutch
merchants had to await the arrival of Chinese junks in Batavia. The tea
they brought from China had to be discharged, purchased, and finally
transferred to the homeward-bound Company ships. The second draw-
back was that the supply of tea to Batavia was neither consistent nor
dependable, causing the purchase price of tea to fluctuate. Cogently, the
purchase price of tea in Batavia was often much higher than it would have
been in China. Another impediment was the impossibility to guarantee a
constantly high quality of tea because the Dutch could not select this arti-
cle themselves in China in the same way as their competitors did. The
combination of all the above factors forced the VOC management to
reconsider its commercial policy towards the tea trade with China.
Therefore, after giving the matter due consideration, the Gentlemen
Seventeen decided to reorganize their purchasing policy and in 1729 they
established a direct trade link with China.12
The ensuing period of the tea trade with China which lasted sixty-five
years can be divided into three quite distinct phases (see Map 1): the
direct trade between the Dutch Republic and Canton managed by the
Gentlemen Seventeen themselves in a short trial period between 1729
and 1734; the trade directed by the Governor-General and Council of the
Indies in Batavia (Gouverneur-Generaal en Raad van Indië, or the Hoge
Regering te Batavia, hereafter the High Government) for the following
twenty or so years (1735-1756); and finally the direct trade conducted by
the so-called China Committee (Chinasche Commissie, or Commissie voor
de vaart naar China) from 1757 to 1794.13 During this sixty-five-year
period, tea became the lifeblood of the China trade, since it made up on
average 70 per cent of the total purchases on the Canton market.14
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Map 1  Sailing routes of the China ships between the Dutch Republic and China,
1729-1794
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The High Government stubbornly refused to fit out ships for the pur-
chase of fresh, high quality tea for the European market in Canton. It pre-
ferred to acquire all Chinese goods via the Chinese junks in Batavia,
whose shipping profited the economy of this town enormously. In answer
to this defiant attitude the Gentlemen Seventeen decided in 1727 to
organize the China trade themselves and dispatched ships directly to
Canton from the Dutch Republic, bypassing the Asian headquarters. In
this early phase, it transpired that the China trade was unsuccessful
because, with the exception of precious metals (mainly silver), sheet lead,
and textiles from the Republic, the VOC ships carried none of the tropi-
cal products from the East Indies region which were in demand in China.
Furthermore, the trade suffered on account of smuggling by the crews,
who should have been supervised more strictly. In order to restore the
imbalance in the trade, it was decided that from 1734 two ships would be
sent annually from Batavia to Canton where the Company delegates were
to purchase fresh tea and other such Chinese goods as porcelain and raw
silk. When the transactions had been satisfactorily completed, one ship
would sail directly back to the Republic without calling at Batavia again
but the other would return to the Asian headquarters, where her cargo
should be regulated.15 In order to sustain the advantageous Chinese junk
trade with Batavia, permission was granted to continue the purchase of
lower quality tea from the Chinese junkmen, which was then shipped to
the Republic. The management of the China trade by the High
Government protracted the swift transport of tea to Europe; consequent-
ly these teas were less fresh upon arrival than those varieties imported
directly from Canton. The last change was made in 1757 when the China
Committee, an independently functioning department directly under the
supervision of the Gentlemen Seventeen, dispatched ships to Canton
from the Republic, putting in at Batavia outward-bound to load the
sought-after goods from the East Indies. On their return voyage, these
ships had to sail back to the Republic from Canton without putting in at
Batavia again to ensure the swift transport of the tea. In comparison with
the first two phases, the tea trade in the last phase was indisputably more
stable and successful, owing to the more flexible and satisfactory manage-
ment of this trade at home.
Previous research
Although there are several excellent, detailed studies on the VOC trade
with China in the eighteenth century, these studies do not really reveal
the significant proportion assumed by the tea trade in the overall com-
mercial activities of the Company in Asia. In the past decades more atten-
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tion was paid to the problematic Dutch-Chinese tea trade as it was run
until the 1750s, rather than to the flourishing trade during the last four
decades of the existence of the VOC.
As the pioneer in research on the history of the Dutch-China trade
Johannes de Hullu demonstrated in a 1917 article, the existing source
materials from the VOC factory in Canton can be applied not only to the
study of the transport of Chinese tea to Europe, but they are also highly
informative about the circumstances under which tea was purchased in
China. De Hullu was initially interested in the debates which were pur-
sued on the board of the Company directors concerning the profit maxi-
mization of the China trade during the first thirty years of the eighteenth
century.16 In 1923, in another article he focused on the debates which
were waged about the reorganization of the direct China trade and the
circumstances surrounding the establishment of the China Committee in
the second half of the 1750s.17 He understood how important the China
Committee’s intervention was to the more successful direction taken by
the China trade from the 1750s and therefore devoted his full attention
to the study of the preparations leading up to the reorganization of this
trade. The purpose of the present study is to follow up the discussion
started by De Hullu almost a hundred years ago and to show how the
direct China trade of the VOC, after having been subjected to several
reorganizations, was successfully managed in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century.
After De Hullu, the China trade of the VOC has been touched upon
by a number of other scholars who each have contributed to a better
understanding of how the China trade was organized.
In his pioneering study of the Dutch trade with Asia, Kristof Glamann
analysed the commerce in a number of representative commodities. In
dealing with the Chinese tea trade, he compared the composition of
Dutch and English cargoes of tea, the Dutch and English purchase prices
of Bohea tea in Canton, and the sales of tea in the Dutch Republic and
Britain at the auctions organized by the respective East India Com-
panies.18 Comparing the tea trade of the EIC with that of the VOC, he
demonstrated how important the Chinese tea trade became to the VOC.
Nevertheless, his focus is restricted to the period 1720-1740 which, as I
mentioned above, is not illustrative at all of conditions prevailing in the
heyday of the VOC tea trade with China. Quite apart from his limited
time frame, the statistical material Glamann adduces for this period is far
from complete and is merely illustrative of his argument.
Christiaan J.A. Jörg is the first to have compiled a clear chronicle of the
China trade of the VOC. Since his dissertation focused on the export of
porcelain, he did not spill much ink on a discussion of the Company’s tea
trade with Canton, although he recognized the fact that the tea trade was
INTRODUCTION6
the most important component of the Company’s trade with China.19 He
acknowledges this by pointing out that the tea trade not only had a big
influence on the Company’s porcelain trade but it was actually directly
connected with it. The main value of his work to the present study is that
he has clearly shown that tea actually dominated the Dutch Company’s
trade with China, since it comprised on average 70 per cent of the total
purchase in value from China, as shown in Appendix 8 of his book. In
this respect, it may be said that Jörg’s dissertation constitutes an open
invitation to engage in a detailed case study on tea, the principal com-
modity the VOC exported from China.
Very recently Els M. Jacobs drew her conclusions on the rise and
decline of the VOC Chinese tea trade in a brief description of the tea
trade within the larger context of her masterly survey of the Dutch intra-
Asian trade during the eighteenth century. As she mentions, the tradition-
al viewpoint is that, owing to its late entry in the Canton trade, the VOC
could not catch up and compete with the other European companies, and
consequently the English had stolen a march on the Dutch after 1750.
Jacobs, however, concluded that the results of the Chinese tea trade of the
Dutch Company in no little measure depended on the performance of its
rivals. She points out that although the VOC kept a large share of the tea
market, its main trade was in the cheaper sorts of tea on which it could
realize relatively little profit.20 Jacobs maintains that the Dutch had to take
a step backwards in the second half of the eighteenth century because
their standard trade practices were by then successfully being duplicated
by their competitors. Nevertheless, she does not show in detail how she
reaches this conclusion. Incontrovertibly, the VOC was outpaced by the
EIC in the Chinese tea trade in the second half of the eighteenth centu-
ry, but in comparison to the volume of trade in the earlier period the
Dutch trade in Chinese tea did, in fact, increase considerably.
It is also impossible to overlook three other works touching on the
VOC tea trade with China. In his pioneering work on the English China
trade, Hosea Balou Morse also devoted attention to the Chinese tea trade
of the VOC on the basis of the English source materials derived from the
EIC archives.21 Louis Dermigny has made use of the data in his magnum
opus about the European Canton trade, but the VOC trade occupies only
a small part of this scholarly narrative about the export of and contraband
trafficking in tea from Canton.22 The third contribution is an interesting
article by Frank Broeze on the end of the Dutch trade in Chinese tea,
focusing on what happened after trade relations were restored in 1813.23
Curiously enough, in order to present a retrospective to his study, he
relied heavily on the data which Morse derived from the EIC archives but
does not refer to the copious archival records of the VOC.
Apart from the above-mentioned research on the Dutch trade in
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Chinese tea, Hoh-cheung Mui and H. Lorna Mui’s study of the conduct
of the EIC tea trade with China in the years 1784-1833 must be men-
tioned for it has been the main source of inspiration for the present study.
This very well-researched work highlights the ins-and-outs of the man-
agement of the EIC monopoly on the Chinese tea trade, by counterbal-
ancing the English and Chinese sides of the tea trade through an analysis
of such aspects as the total quantities, average bid-up prices, and the
assortment of tea sold by the EIC, the put-up prices of tea at the EIC auc-
tions, the deliveries of tea from the EIC warehouses, the EIC accounts of
profit and loss with estimates of interest on investment and insurance on
cargoes, prime cost and freight charges of tea sold by the EIC, the stan-
dard purchase prices of several kinds of teas in Canton and so on.24 Their
highly refined research placed alongside Morse’s overall survey of the
English Company’s tea trade in many respects holds up a perfect mirror
revealing various possibilities of how the VOC tea trade with China
should be studied.
Since the present study focuses not only on the way the VOC conduct-
ed the tea trade with China but also deals with the production, transport,
and delivery in China, and the distribution in the Dutch Republic, some
other publications on the tea-cultivating areas in the uplands and the
transport of tea from there to Canton, the business life in the port of
Canton, and the distribution of the tea, plus the taxes imposed on this
commodity, and the consumption of tea in the Dutch Republic have been
consulted. 
In 1976 Robert Paul Gardella defended his thesis on the tea industry
of Fujian Province and trade in both Qing China and the Republic
of China. In his thesis, some chapters deal with the tea production in
Fujian Province and some other areas of China. He locates the Fujian tea
industry and trade in the context of the Canton System (1760-1842) and
the relations between the European tea trade and the Canton System.25
His research probably is the first specific case study on the Fujian tea-
growing areas and their relationship with the Canton trade,26 and sets the
present study a good example for examining the other tea-growing areas
from where the VOC procured teas: the south-eastern part of Anhui
Province .
In 1989, Ch’en Kuo-tung presented a paper at a conference on the
transaction practices in the export tea trade of China in 1760-1833. In
this article, which is restricted to the transaction of the teas for the EIC,
he discusses the structure of the transaction system. He investigates the
practicability of that system – namely the routes and means of transporta-
tion used to bring the “EIC teas” from the areas of cultivation to Canton
as well as the mode of transacting business pertaining to teas among the
various business parties involved in this trade. This leads him to an assess-
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ment of the profitability and the possible stimuli for making changes in
the existing system.27 Since there was no big difference between the VOC
and EIC in the routes and means of transportation of teas from the areas
of cultivation to Canton, and the mode of transaction among the parties
for the “EIC teas” offers a good comparison with the “VOC teas”, Ch’en’s
work is a fine point of reference for the present study on the “VOC teas”,
the “VOC tea”-supplying agents, and the procurement of tea by the VOC
trade representatives in Canton.
Concentrating on the local organization of the port city of Canton and
the Pearl River Delta,28 Paul A. Van Dyke has recently published a mono-
graph on the Canton trade, specifically the day-to-day operations in the
port, during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. His
book provides a fresh look at the successes and failures of the trade by
focusing on the practices and procedures rather than on the official poli-
cies and protocols. In his book, the daily lives of all the players in the
trade, covering such diverse groups as sampan operators, pilots, com-
pradors, and interpreters, to country traders, supercargoes, Hong mer-
chants, and customs officials, are meticulously unravelled. This research
shows that, contrary to popular opinion, the Canton trade was stable,
predictable, and secure, and the huge expansion of trade was actually one
of the factors which contributed to its collapse as the increase in revenues
blinded the Chinese authorities to the long-term deterioration in compe-
tence of the lower administrative officials. In the end, the Canton System
was indeed overthrown but the principal reason for this was that it had
already defeated itself.29 Basing his research on an extraordinarily wide
variety of European and Chinese sources, Van Dyke has enriched our
knowledge of the daily business affairs in China’s gateway to the outside
world, Canton. The detailed narratives in his descriptions of supercar-
goes, Hong merchants, and customs officials have facilitated the research
for the present study in its discussion of the negotiations between the
VOC trade representatives and their tea-supplying agents.30 Importantly,
the main argument of Van Dyke’s book – that the Canton trade was sta-
ble, predictable, and secure in the eighteenth and the first half of the nine-
teenth century – was an inspiration to the author of the present study to
check how the Dutch Company’s China trade, which of course was but
one part of the Canton trade, was conducted in the second half of the
eighteenth century.
Up to the present time, publications on tea in the Dutch Republic are
still scarce. The only one which can be mentioned is J.R. ter Molen’s 1978
museum catalogue for a special exhibition on the history of tea-drinking
in the Netherlands.31 This catalogue touches on almost every aspect con-
cerning tea in the Republic. For example, it covers the import of tea into
the Netherlands, the use of tea as a medicine and a stimulant, tea in the
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decorative arts, tea services, tea shops, taxes on tea and other aspects, but
there is still plenty of room for further research. Some topics which can
certainly yield interesting information are tea shops, taxation on tea, and
the auctions of tea by the VOC Chambers. Information gathered from
the source materials pinpoints the lacunae in Ter Molen’s publication.
Subject and framework
If one looks carefully into the extant archival records of the VOC con-
cerning the Company’s tea trade with China, there can be no possible
doubt that, after the direct China trade had been completely reorganized
at the end of the 1750s, the second half of the eighteenth century
emerged as the heyday of the VOC tea trade with China. An even closer
look tells us that during the period from the end of the 1750s to the
beginning of the 1780s the tea trade reached its zenith because the quan-
tities of tea the VOC exported from Canton each year were comparative-
ly large and stable, yielding much higher annual profits for the Company
than they had done in former days.
This conspicuous change raises the question of what was the reason
behind this. Or, in other words, how did the Company which had tried
for so many years to develop its trade with China, finally manage to make
its Chinese tea trade flourish, ushering in a “Golden Age” after nearly a
century of striving? How did the VOC conduct this trading link in the
phase 1757-1781 – the longest and most profitable phase in the VOC
trade with China – and how did this successful trade quite suddenly come
to an end in the 1780s? In my study, I hope to provide satisfactory
answers to these questions. My aim is not to focus solely on the develop-
ment of the VOC Chinese tea trade itself, but also to examine the VOC
response to the external factors which had a decisive influence on the
development of the European-China trade in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century. This leads neatly to an explanation of the period chosen:
1757-1781, that is between the official commencement of the manage-
ment of the China trade by the China Committee and the outbreak of
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784).
This study commences with the preparations of the Gentlemen Seven-
teen to reorganize the direct China trade and the establishment of the
China Committee. This will be followed by a discussion of the instruc-
tions issued by the China Committee to the Company servants on the
China ships and in China and those sent to the High Government; the
selection of trade goods and the gathering of funds to be sent from the
Dutch Republic; and finally the China Committee’s demands specifying
the “VOC teas”.
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The next subject is Batavia, as it is essential to investigate the little
understood role of the High Government in the direct China trade. This
examination will bifurcate, looking first at the contributions of the High
Government to the direct trade under the management of the China
Committee and then underlining the benefits the former derived from
this trade.
With this organizational background in mind, the focus changes to the
transaction of the tea trade between the VOC trade representatives and
the tea-supplying agents in Canton. Attention will be paid to the variety
of the “VOC teas”, the component of the “VOC tea”-supplying agents,
and the process of tea procurements by the VOC trade representatives.
The often confusing relationship between the European merchants, the
bureaucratic apparatus of the Qing regime, and the Macao Government
is the following subject. It will deal with the vagaries of daily business life
in the Pearl River Delta by highlighting three representative events which
occurred in the period under study, namely the protest against the estab-
lishment of the Co-hong in 1760; the purchase of the Herstelder in 1772;
and the recapture of the Goede Hoop in 1781.
Having looked at the dynamic interaction in Canton, the attention
shifts to the sales of the “VOC teas” in Europe: beginning with the set-
ting of auction dates; the selling prices; the quantities as well as the value
of the “VOC teas” which were auctioned off by the chambers.
Subsequently, the distribution of the “VOC teas”, after the Company
auctions, from the tea-dealers to the shopkeepers and eventually to the
consumers will be studied; finally, the re-export of the “VOC teas” by
Dutch traders to other European countries will be discussed.
Finally an attempt will be made to draw up the balance sheet of the
“Golden Age” of the VOC tea trade, by comparing the internal and exter-
nal factors which initially turned the China trade into a great success and
finally led to its abrupt end. 
Source materials
Since the present study is principally based on a research into primary
source materials, it is necessary to give a brief explanation of the main
source materials which were consulted. 
There are several sets of archival data available in the VOC archives as
preserved at the National Archives in The Hague.32 These sources are
remarkably well organized and hence lend themselves well to the present
study. I have classified them as follows.
Record Type A – The records of the China Committee (NA 1.04.02,
VOC 4542-4582).
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These documents are comparatively independent of the larger corpus
of the VOC archives and deal with the VOC China trade in the second
half of the eighteenth century. Two sources have been of great importance
to the present study: the “Report of the China Committee to the
Gentlemen Seventeen, 1756” (NA VOC 4543, Rapporten van de Chi-
nasche Commissie aan de Heren Zeventien, 1756) and the “General and
Particular Instructions of the China Committee” (NA VOC 4543-4559,
Generale en particuliere instructies van de Chinasche Commissie). 
The records of the China Committee provide information concerning
all aspects of the Chinese tea trade outside Canton. Among the data they
provide are the instructions which the China Committee issued each sea-
son to the authorities on the China-bound ships, to the trade representa-
tives serving in Canton, and to the High Government in Batavia. This is
a marvellous way to discover all sorts of commercial data, such as infor-
mation about the capital sent on the China-bound ships, the detailed
orders for the purchase of tea in Canton, the sales of the tea cargoes in the
Dutch Republic and other such basic information. 
Record Type B – The collected records of the “Resolutions of the
Gentlemen Seventeen” (NA VOC 172, Resoluties van de Heren Zeventien)
on the China trade; the “Reflection by Jacob Mossel” (NA VOC 172,
Bedenking van Jacob Mossel) on the China trade; the “Answer of the
Gentlemen Seventeen to Jacob Mossel’s Reflection” (NA VOC 172,
Rescriptie van de Heren Zeventien op Mossel’s bedenking); the “Letter from
the Gentlemen Seventeen to the High Government” (NA VOC 333,
Brief van de Heren Zeventien aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden).
These records deal with the preparation for an improved management
of the China trade and the establishment of the China Committee in the
1750s. 
Record Type C – The “Annual Statements of the Goods Sold by all the
VOC Chambers, 1731-1790” (NA VOC 4584-4597, Jaarlijkse staten van
de verhandelde goederen bij de VOC ter alle kamers, 1731-1790). 
These records give a survey of the bookkeeping of each chamber relat-
ing to sold and unsold goods; outstanding debts; published obligations;
advances given to the VOC to buy products; and inventories of the ware-
houses of the chambers recording the equipage, armament, and provi-
sions. In these records, data can be found on the tea auctions, namely the
quantities and value of the teas traded at the Company auctions of all
chambers each year.
Record Type D – The “Lists of the Deliveries, with the Names of the
Buyers and Prices Paid at the Sale by the Zeeland Chamber, 1724-1776”
(NA VOC 13377, Lijsten van de leveranties, met namen van de kopers en
betaalde prijzen op de verkoping van de kamer Zeeland, 1724-1776).
Over the period 1758-1776, the auction dates, the origins of the teas,
INTRODUCTION12
the names of the tea-buyers, the quantities of teas purchased by various
tea-buyers, and the auction prices fetched by teas as well as the total
amounts paid by the tea-buyers at the auctions organized by the Zeeland
Chamber are clearly recorded in the lists.
Record Type E – The “Letters and Documents sent from China con-
cerning the factory in Canton to the Gentlemen Seventeen, the Amster-
dam Chamber, and the China Committee 1729-1794” (NA VOC 4381-
4447, Overgekomen brieven en papieren uit China betreffende de factorij in
Canton aan de Heeren XVII, de kamer Amsterdam en de Chinase commissie,
1729-1794).
This record complements the information of Record Type F about the
trade representatives’ activities in China and the communication between
the Dutch factory in Canton and the Company administration in the
homeland.
Besides the VOC archives, there are some other sets of impottant
archival data relating to the VOC China trade in tea at the National
Archives in The Hague.
Record Type F – The records of the Dutch factory in Canton (NA
1.04.20, Nederlandse Factorij te Canton (NFC) 1-388).33
The documents from the trading factory in Canton contain various
kinds of official resolutions and daily records, documents and papers on
financial and other special affairs, registers of notarial documents,
accounting records of the Dutch factory, and official and private corre-
spondence between the servants of the Canton factory, Batavia, and the
Dutch Republic.
These records chiefly give information about the tea purchases, show-
ing how the VOC trade representatives contracted for and purchased the
“VOC teas”; how they interacted with their Chinese trading partners, the
Chinese local authorities, and the other European traders in Canton to
solve the business problems in the Pearl River Delta; how they tackled the
competition from other companies; and how they corresponded with the
High Government. Besides these highly pertinent data, the records also
offer information about business dealings such as the selection of trade
goods in both the Dutch Republic and Batavia for the Canton market.
Record Type G – The “Prices of Teas, 1670-1695 and 1777-1782” (NA
1.11.01.01, Collectie Aanwinsten 1820-1992 (Aanwinsten 541), Prijzen
van de Theen, 1670-1695 en 1777-1782).34
In the section relating to the years 1777-1780, the records yield infor-
mation about the assortments of imported teas; the variations in selling
prices at auction; the names of the China ships which carried these teas;
and the auction dates set by various chambers.
Record Type H – The “General Journal” (Generaal journaal) in the
“Archive of the Bookkeeper-General in Batavia” (NA 1.04.18.02, Archief
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van de Boekhouder-Generaal te Batavia, 1700-1801 (hereafter BGB)
10767-10800).35
In the “General Journal”, data can be found regarding the transporta-
tion of tea between Batavia and the Dutch Republic between 1730 and
1790 and the quantities and value of teas sent to the VOC Chambers in
the Republic from Batavia.
Record Type I – The “Hope Collection 1602-1784” (NA 1.10.46,
Collectie Hope 1602-1784).36
This archive, assisting Records Types A and B, enriches our understand-
ing of how the VOC administration reorganized the China trade in the
middle of the eighteenth century.
In a less obvious place to search for relevant Dutch data, the Brabants
Historisch Informatie Centrum (Brabant Historical Information Centrum)
in ’s-Hertogenbosch, the records of the “Plakkaten” (BHIC, Plakkaten
1607, 2157, and 2237) were found. These explain in detail the excise that
was levied on tea in the Dutch Republic at different moments in the eigh-
teenth century. In the Gemeentearchief Utrecht (GAU, Municipal Archives
Utrecht), municipal records (Inventory II, N 354 (5 vols) and N 355 (2
vols)) contain such useful material on the sale and consumption of tea in
the Republic as the registers of acts of permission concerning the sale of
tea as well as the registers of the wholesalers and licensed victuallers of tea
in Utrecht and its surrounding areas in 1752-1811. The Gemeentearchief
Amsterdam (GAA, Municipal Archives Amsterdam) also contains records
pertaining to the tea business in this city (Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, N
40.03.012.24, and N 61.01.016.33), including instructions on how the
tea-dealers and the shopkeepers should run their business. The Collectie
Atlas van Stolk (CAS, Collection Atlas van Stolk 3873) in the Historisch
Museum Rotterdam (HMR, Historical Museum Rotterdam) possesses
printed tax imposts on tea in the Dutch Republic dating from the late
seventeenth century and early eighteenth century.
In addition to the research in the Dutch archives in the Netherlands, I
also consulted the archival records of the English East India Company in
the British Library (India Office Records (IOR)) and in the National
Archives of the United Kingdom (Public Record Office (PRO)) in London.
The diaries and consultations of the EIC trade representatives in
Canton (BL IOR-G/12 and R/10) were perused to glean information
about conflicts between the English and Dutch Company servants. Many
private letters between the EIC and VOC servants were discovered which
revealed that there was, as only to be expected, intense rivalry, but also
sometimes unexpectedly close co-operation whenever this was necessary.
The PRO archives yield information about the British response to the
smuggling of the Continental, particularly Dutch, teas to Britain in the
late eighteenth century.
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Finally, the contribution of the Chinese sources available to the present
study is to offer general information about the administration of the for-
eign trade by the Qing Imperial Government, the local legislation affect-
ing international traders and the activities of the domestic merchants by
the Canton authorities, and the various ways in which the Chinese admin-
istration kept contact with the Western merchants in that port: see for
instance the Shiliao xunkan and the Yue haiguan zhi .37
Unfortunately, detailed Chinese source material pertaining to the
Chinese-European daily business activities in Canton is scarce. This is
attributable to quite distinct political and cultural factors. During the past
century, a series of revolts and considerable political unrest have thrown
Canton into turmoil. From a cultural point of view, it has never been the





THE CHINA COMMITTEE AND ITS MANAGEMENT
OF THE CHINA TRADE
Introduction
In order to achieve a more flexible and efficient management of the trade
with China, after several years of reasoning, the Gentlemen Seventeen
decided in 1755 to regain control of the China trade, taking it out of the
hands of the High Government of Batavia.1 One year later, they appoint-
ed an exclusive committee, which was known as the China Committee,
authorizing it henceforth to make decisions on the China trade and to
supervise all affairs connected to the setting up of a new shipping route
linking the Dutch ports with Canton. The China Committee held its first
meeting in November 1756, and dispatched the first China ship from the
Dutch Republic at the end of the same year. After this ship arrived in
Batavia in June 1757, the High Government effectively relinquished its
management of the China trade. From then on, the direction of the VOC
trade with China assumed a very different hue to that which it had had
previously.
Right from the start, the China Committee began to issue various
annual written instructions to the Company servants who were serving on
the China ships or were working at the Company’s establishment in
Canton, plus a set specifically for the High Government in Batavia. The
instructions destined for the officers on the China ships and the trade
representatives in China were of a general nature. Those sent to the High
Government and the Dutch chief,2 the leader of the trade representatives
in China, respectively were very specific.
The China Committee fixed the number of the China-bound ships
and their crew members, the sorts and amounts of trade goods, and the
amounts of funds to be sent from the Dutch Republic on these ships to
China each year, and also briefly listed the goods from the East Indies
which should be supplied by the High Government.
Preparations for the improved management of the China trade
In the Spring meeting of 1755, the Gentlemen Seventeen discussed the
current state of the Company’s China trade and its future. Because the 
17
directors were clearly displeased with the management of this trade by the
High Government, they decided to take the bull by the horns and regain
direct control of it.
This decision was not made on the spur-of-the-moment but was the
outcome of a discussion which had rumbled on over the past few years.
As early as November 1752, in his “Reflection on the Intrinsic State of
the VOC” the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, Jacob Mossel,
confessed his anxiety about the critical state of the Company business in
Asia to the Gentlemen Seventeen.3 In this document he analysed the pos-
sible causes of the decline of the Company trade in Asia in detail. He
reported he believed that one excellent remedy to revive its ailing com-
merce should be to stimulate the China trade. He had noted that many
other European nations were sending ships directly to Canton where great
profits could be made. None of these nations, however, enjoyed such an
advantageous position as the Dutch Company, Mossel wrote, since the
High Government was in a position to dispatch considerable quantities
of tin, pepper, cotton, wax, spices and other goods to Canton from the
East Indies. The ships of other nations which sailed directly from Europe
to Canton had to rely on cargoes of bullion to pay for Chinese commodi-
ties. Weighing up the situation, he suggested that four ships per year
should always be reserved for the Dutch-China trade, since the profits
from this trade were so great. Appraising the aggregate profits on the sale
of tropical goods sent to China from Batavia and the Chinese merchan-
dise shipped to the Dutch Republic, he estimated the total at about
500,000 guilders (5 tons) per year.4
After due consideration, in March 1754 the Gentlemen Seventeen sent
their comments on Mossel’s proposals.5 In reaching their conclusion, they
had first scrutinized the causes of the precarious situation of the
Company in the East Indies. They were convinced that one of the prin-
cipal causes for the troubles of the Company in Asia was the heavy
expenses incurred by the High Government. Although Batavia, as the
Company headquarters in Asia, was absolutely essential to the survival of
the Company and its business in the East Indies, the Gentlemen Seven-
teen condemned the expenses incurred in sustaining the general
rendezvous, which they deemed outrageously high and therefore no
longer to be tolerated. Many reasons were cited for the costly upkeep of
Batavia. Among these were the defence of the Moluccas whenever trouble
brewed there. At times of rebellions and uprisings, sea and land forces sta-
tioned in Batavia were to be dispatched to help quell the turmoil and
restore peace in those remote islands. Because it obviously cost the High
Government a fortune to offer military assistance over such a large dis-
tance, it was suggested that these forces should be stationed locally on
Ambon and in Banda. With such assistance ready at hand, the neighbour-
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ing establishments in Makassar and Ternate would then also be in a bet-
ter position to defend the islands and the Company trade.
The Gentlemen Seventeen was also censorious about the Company
trade with Sumatra. The High Government had delegated the running of
this commerce to a commercial society in Padang because the expenses
incurred by the annual dispatch of a Company ship to Sumatra from
Batavia were too high.6 They pointed out that to the west of Malacca
other European competitors were involved in much bigger business than
the VOC, without the burden of the upkeep of such expensive headquar-
ters. Assessing this situation, the Gentlemen Seventeen wondered what
the use of Batavia to the Company really was and whether it served the
Company’s Asian trade optimally.
Turning their attention to the management of the trade in Bengal, the
Gentlemen Seventeen uttered the suspicion that the trade directors there
had for many years not served the Company well but had dealt with the
possessions and interests of the Company as if these were their own prop-
erty. They contended that Jan Compagnie in Bengal arbitrarily forced up
the purchase price of goods there and that its representatives broke the
rules drawn up by the Gentlemen Seventeen concerning the purchase of
linen and other articles at random.
Having criticized Bengal so scathingly, the Company directors
(bewindhebbers) set their sights on the management of the China trade by
the High Government. The Gentlemen Seventeen remarked that, in com-
parison with the profitable sales of the import goods enjoyed by other
European companies in China, the Dutch Company could not even
make a 40 or 50 per cent profit on the selling price. Caustically, the
Gentlemen Seventeen doubted whether they should leave the manage-
ment and the execution of the trading activities at the Company’s subor-
dinate establishments in the Asian trade in the hands of servants whose
performance was so disappointing. In their opinion, the European rivals
of the Company surpassed the VOC in its navigation and trade in all the
“Western settlements of the East Indies”.7
Having reached the understanding that the current trading practices of
the VOC were lagging behind, the Gentlemen Seventeen wondered
whether they should bring the management over all these subordinate set-
tlements in the East Indies under their own direct control, so that these
could be managed by more obedient, honest, and able servants. All other
European companies had headquarters in the areas to the west of Malacca
which were self-governing and they also engaged able servants, whose
behaviour, administration, and responsibility could be closely monitored
for the direct trade between Europe and India.8
After their scorching appraisal of those matters, the Gentlemen
Seventeen finally focused on the China trade. They had entrusted the
THE CHINA COMMITTEE AND ITS MANAGEMENT 19
conduct of the China trade to the High Government because of the fre-
quent claims made by the authorities in Batavia that the VOC had
achieved a widely acclaimed superiority over its competitors in this trade.
They had attributed this felicitous circumstance to the fact that the
Company’s China ships could find plentiful cargoes in Batavia while the
ships of other companies had nothing else to offer on the Canton market
but payments in bullion. To ascertain the truth of this claim, the directors
took a closer look at the China trade to discover whether there was indeed
some evidence of this superiority in the China trade via Batavia. They
questioned whether the High Government’s management really was so
effective and wished to be informed why, if this were the case, the Dutch
Company still had to pay higher prices in China and reached only 40 or
50 per cent of the profits made by its competitors at the sales. The unre-
liable purchase price in China and the low returns in Europe could only
be explained by the fact that the trade representatives in Canton had to
sell goods which were not highly sought-after, such as cinnamon. They
cut a sorry picture compared to their competitors who brought precious
metals from Europe which, as could be easily seen, were well received in
China. Having weighed up the pros and cons, the Gentlemen Seventeen
urged the High Government to acquiesce in their decision to bring the
direct China trade under their own administration.
In July 1754, the “Hague Affairs” (Haags Besogne)9 of the VOC direc-
tors took an equally dim view of the management of the China trade by
the High Government. The authorized principal shareholders (hoofdpar-
ticipanten) who attended the “Hague Affairs” meeting, as this meeting
reported to the Gentlemen Seventeen, “[…] recognized that several salu-
tary corrections should be made in this particular branch of trade by the
High Government, if the Company desires to continue the trade on the
present basis.”10 They also believed that a thorough investigation should
be launched into which goods and effects, other than precious metals,
would prove beneficial to the China trade, so that the highest profits
could be reaped on the sales in Canton, and many sorts of Chinese goods
of the highest quality could be acquired at the lowest price. It was lament-
ed that it often happened that the Company gained 10 per cent on the
sale of an article but lost 20 per cent when purchasing the return cargoes.
In order to make this point clear, the principal shareholders referred to
several cargoes on ships which had recently been sent to China by the
High Government.11 The cargoes consisted of articles from the homeland
or elsewhere in Europe (hereafter the “Home goods”) as well as from the
East Indies (hereafter the “Batavia goods”). The “Home goods”, such as
miscellaneous English and other foreign draperies, lead, cochineal and
precious metals, besides a number of Dutch woollen fabrics and ras de
Marocco, were more expensive than those of the competitors because they
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were sent first to Batavia and stored in its pernicious climate, and then
traded and surcharged again with all the extra expenses accrued in
Batavia. These operations had cost the Company 15,081.9.8 guilders.
These “Home goods” sent to Canton via Batavia obviously were less prof-
itable than those sent directly from Europe.
It was noted that the China-bound “Batavia goods” had consisted of
20,707 pounds of cloves, 9,060 pounds of nutmeg, 2,000 pounds of wild
cinnamon, 2,350,000 pounds of pepper, 777,676 pounds of tin, 23,215
pounds of copper, 60,000 pounds of sapanwood, and 612½ pounds of
camphor and rattan per year.
The fly in the ointment was that the spices sent to China had fetched
the same price in Canton as in Batavia. When only 40 piculs of nutmeg
and 40 piculs of cloves were sent to Canton annually, this supply had
already exceeded Chinese demand, so that the trade representatives in
Canton were forced to exchange the surplus with Chinese merchants for
tea, porcelain or silk. Wild cinnamon from Ceylon, the highest quality
cinnamon, turned out to be unsaleable in China because the Chinese
could obtain fine cinnamon in their own country where it was valued at
only three stivers per pound.
The principal shareholders agreed with the current import of
2,350,000 to 3,000,000 pounds of pepper to Canton. According to the
“yields” (rendementen) over the past years presented by Batavia, pepper
had assured the Company 120 to 160 per cent profits. Unconvinced, the
principal shareholders questioned the veracity of these statements and
asserted that the profits were not nearly as large as they had been claimed
to be. Time and again in its calculations, the High Government had
raised the value of the tael in China to 88 stivers whereas it was effective-
ly valued only at 71 or 72 stivers. In order to solve the conundrum of
whether it was more profitable to sell pepper in Canton than in the
Dutch Republic, the principal shareholders launched an investigation
into how it had been valued in Dutch currency in China since 1734. The
results of this inquiry demonstrated to the Gentlemen Seventeen that the
intrinsic value of the tael in China had never been more than 72 stivers.
Their case was that pepper had been sent to China from Batavia in place
of silver, because the High Government argued silver was then in weak
demand. The inevitable conclusion would seem to be that the High
Government had obviously preferred to sell pepper in China at a loss
rather than nothing at all, so that the homeward-bound ships could at
least return with Chinese tea (instead of with ballast), although this tea
was of a poorer quality and more expensive than that of other companies.
The principal shareholders placed a big question mark after the so-
called importance of copper to the China trade, for the simple reason that
the Chinese received a much larger share of the Japanese copper trade
THE CHINA COMMITTEE AND ITS MANAGEMENT 21
than did the VOC. Even though the Dutch Company succeeded in buy-
ing 10,000 chests of copper every year in Nagasaki, the Chinese secured
at least 16,000 chests only part of which they could use in China so that
they hawked the remainder elsewhere wherever they could find a buyer.
The upshot was that China required no copper from the VOC. As a mat-
ter of fact, on various occasions in the past the Gentlemen Seventeen had
even proposed that Japanese copper should be purchased from China
rather than the present rigmarole of it being sent to China from Batavia.
Even if copper were a popular and profitable item in China, a sale of only
20,000 or 30,000 pounds in a full year was not a justifiable reason to call
at Batavia with four or five ships and to sojourn there for several months,
since the incidental costs of each ship lying in the Batavia roads devoured
double the value of such a small amount of copper.
Tin was deemed to be a proper commodity for the trade with China.
The High Government had already been engaged in selling this article to
Chinese junks which sailed to and from Batavia. In the opinion of the
High Government, selling tin to the Chinese junks in Batavia reaped a
safe profit and did no harm to other branches of the Company’s Asian
trade. The directors of the “Hague Affairs” begged to differ on this mat-
ter and thought it would certainly be better to transport and sell tin on
the Company’s account in China, since the sales price of tin in China was
much higher than in Batavia. They were not sure how much tin could be
sold in China, but it should be more than the 700,000-1,000,000 or
1,500,000 pounds which had changed hands there in the past. Cannily,
the principal shareholders felt that although the export of tin was advan-
tageous to the China trade, they might be deceiving themselves if they
believed that the last sale of 1,447,549 pounds of tin in China had
actually realized 703,161.8.8 guilders, considering that the sales price
amounted to 48 guilders per 100 pounds. If the ducat was valued at 78
stivers instead of 88 stivers, the sales price would actually have amounted
to barely 39 guilders. Their deliberations were also swayed by the fact that
tin fetched a high price in the Dutch Republic, making it an attractive
proposition to use it as ballast for the return ships, a move that would
avoid the shipment of such useless cargoes as sugar and Persian red ochre
to the Republic.
In the final analysis, the “Hague Affairs” therefore insisted that the
China trade should be managed from Europe and that the ships should
return directly to the Low Countries from Canton, as they had done ear-
lier during a brief trial period between 1729 and 1734. Because the prin-
cipal shareholders agreed that the trade with China should not be engaged
in from Europe and Batavia at the same time, the “Hague Affairs” advised
the termination of the management of the China trade by the High
Government in 1756, citing the reorganization of this trade as its reason.
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At the same time, it proposed to appoint a separate committee to run this
branch at the next meeting of the Gentlemen Seventeen, in view of the
great importance of this matter: “[…] the aims of the Company should
be promoted and executed in the best possible way”.12
Establishment of the China Committee
In the Spring meeting of 11 April 1755, the Gentlemen Seventeen decid-
ed that the China trade should again be managed at home. They agreed
to hand the management of the direct trade over to a separate committee
the members of which they would nominate at their next gathering; in
the meantime, they resolved to inform the High Government of their
decision and of its further implications for Batavia.13 On 14 October, the
so-called China Committee was established to comply with the resolution
of the Gentlemen Seventeen. Three Amsterdam directors – Jan Calkoen,
Reijnier Bouwens, and David de Wilhem, the Company’s advocate
Cornelis van der Hoop, and two Zeeland directors – Samuel Rader-
macher and Johan Constantin Matthias were designated to form the
China Committee in January 1756.14 In consideration of the commercial
interests of the Company, all these arrangements were kept secret.15
The China Committee had the power to request as many ships, crew
members, and funds from the chambers as it judged necessary to pursue
its task; furthermore, it was qualified to assign to the ships those persons
whom it deemed suitable to conduct the trade in Canton. Finally, the
Committee should provide the ships with all the goods which could be
sold advantageously on the China market. Of course, all the goods, per-
sonnel, and funds were sent on board at the behest of the chambers them-
selves, which acted on the recommendation of the China Committee.
The committee members were further authorized to give instructions
concerning the forthcoming journey and the conduct of trade to the
ship’s officers and the trade representatives in Canton. Rather heaping
insult upon injury, the Gentlemen Seventeen informed the High
Government that it should honour the instructions of the China
Committee.
In order to avoid further delays in this important business, the dele-
gates of the Presiding Chamber16 in conjunction with the principal share-
holders and the advocate of the Company asked the China Committee to
draft as quickly as possible a practicable plan, by which the trade from the
Dutch Republic to China could be undertaken and conducted. Once the
plan was ready and approved, the China Committee would appoint a
gentleman to effectuate it. Shortly afterwards, the eminent Amsterdam
banker, Thomas Hope, who had attended the meeting of the “Hague
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Affairs” in July 1754 as principal shareholder and had written the report
of the “Hague Affairs”, was also added to the members of the China
Committee on account of his extensive commercial experience and
because he was, after all, the person who had prompted the reorganiza-
tion of the China trade.17 All these decisions, which ran directly counter
to the continual effort of Batavia to steer the Company’s China trade via
its roadstead, were recapitulated in a letter to the High Government.18
On the advice of the China Committee, in 1757 the Gentlemen
Seventeen voted unanimously to restart the direct trade from the Dutch
Republic to China. To avoid a situation in which ships would be sent to
China from both Europe and Batavia at the same time, the Committee
ordered the High Government to desist in dispatching ships to China
after 1756. The Gentlemen Seventeen wrote to the High Government
that: “[…] since you [the High Government] usually plan ahead in
February and March and the Batavian ships are wont to leave for China
in June and July, we have preferred to err on the safe side and also,
secondly, to give you an opportunity to show and prove to us that you are
truly disposed to co-operate with us in the reforms needful in the admin-
istration and management of the East Indies. You will have enough time
left after the receipt of this to make such arrangements that we shall find
in these, your last return shipments of the year 1756 that the short
weights in the Company’s returns, which are lamentable in contrast to
those of the Company’s competitors, and about which we have com-
plained for many years to no avail, have been corrected and improved. If
we find that no such correction has been made, after we have given you
such serious warnings, we shall be forced to decide that we should not
expect that you will contribute anything to save the Company. But should
this not be the case, as we are willing to believe for the time being, you
can give us proof of your good intentions at this last opportunity and with
this, your last shipment to China.”19
Presumably the warning was not heeded. In a letter sent to the High
Government some one and a half years later, the tone was far from effu-
sive: considering the complaints lodged by the trade director and super-
cargoes castigating the bad shape and inferior quality of goods which were
sent to them from time to time from Batavia, and considering that the
trade representatives had paid little heed to the choice and care of the
goods which they had sent home, in spite of the Gentlemen Seventeen’s
earnest and frequent admonitions and notwithstanding the promises
made by them to seek improvement, the Gentlemen Seventeen were once
again displeased with the inferior quality tea brought home in 1754. The
tea bore little resemblance to the samples sent from there; likewise, the
porcelain had also been packed so haphazardly that much of it had been
damaged. Having given these shortcomings due consideration, the
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Gentlemen Seventeen felt strengthened in their resolve to take the sailings
to and trade with China under their own supervision and administration,
beginning in 1757.20 Obviously, the Company management could hard-
ly expect a “provisionally respectful answer” from Batavia to this bluntly
worded letter. As was to have been expected, the High Government tried
to defend itself against the accusation in a more “disrespectful” tone than
it had adopted in the previous letters. When this “disrespectful” answer
reached the Dutch Republic by the homeward-bound ships in the sum-
mer of 1756, the China Committee still had not settled all the arrange-
ments for the direct China trade. Such steps could only be taken after it
had received the requisite information about how much money the rival
European companies planned to invest in their sailings to China for the
coming year. Not until the end of 1756 had the picture become clear
enough to commence concrete preparation.
At its first meeting in Amsterdam on 9 November 1756, the China
Committee discussed how many ships and of what charter (size) should
be fitted out for the direct trade to China from the Dutch Republic.21 It
concluded that the prospects for expanding the China trade did not seem
very favourable. According to the latest intelligence the Swedish, Danish,
and Emden22 Companies were to send fewer ships and the French no ship
at all to China in 1756 because of the Anglo-French War (1755-1763);
and, even if the price of tea recently had declined considerably there was
still a large amount in store. The latest news from Asia was that at least
four Dutch ships were on their way to the Republic from Canton. Their
cargo would certainly increase the stock of Chinese merchandise and keep
prices down. Therefore, the China Committee suggested to the Gentle-
men Seventeen that the Company should exercise all possible thrift, in
view of its weak financial position, and use its financial resources princi-
pally for the trade with which it could gain the most profits.
Under these conditions the China Committee judged it proper to send
only two ships of the 150 feet charter to China, namely the Slooten and
the Spaarzaamheid, which were declared ready to sail by the Amsterdam
Chamber. Both ships were manned by 100 able-bodied sailors and one
drummer. The Committee gave orders that the trade in Canton should be
negotiated by the trade director Michiel Graa and five supercargoes,
Johannes Dionijs van der Burgh, Martin Wilhelm Hulle, Egbertus
Genits, Jan Hendrik Knibbe, and Nanning Wijnberg, who would sail to
China on board the ships. They would be duly recompensed. The trade
director was offered 2 per cent of the yield of the return cargo of one ship
and 1 per cent of that of the other ship, as well as a premium of 4,000
guilders; the supercargoes Johannes Dionijs van der Burgh, Martin
Wilhelm Hulle, and Egbertus Genits each received a salary of 150
guilders per month; and Jan Hendrik Knibbe and Nanning Wijnberg
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each 80 guilders per month. Over and above this, the five supercargoes
were jointly offered 1 per cent of the yield of all the return cargo, of which
the first three supercargoes would each receive one quarter and the last
two one-eighth each. Over and above these provisions, the supercargoes,
assistants as well as the other servants were permitted to transport some
baggage or chests with Chinese goods such as tea or porcelain on board
the return ship for the use of themselves or their friends in the home
country. This privilege was however very restricted.
The Committee fixed the capital for the ships at 1,200,000 guilders of
silver plus a certain amount of lead which was also used as ballast. Besides
this, 400,000 pounds of tin, 5,000 pounds of nutmeg, 5,000 pounds of
cloves, and 100,000 pounds of sapanwood were required to be supple-
mented by the High Government. The Committee ordered that the
return cargoes from China should consist of tea, raw silk, silk textiles,
porcelain, China root and galingale, rhubarb, turmeric, sago, star anise,
camphor, aloe, gamboges, and spelter.23
As the Spaarzaamheid was not ready for departure because of the unex-
pected descent of a dense fog,24 the Slooten finally sailed alone. On 8 De-
cember 1756, she left the roadstead of Texel with a cargo of silver and
goods, as well as the missives, instructions, and orders of the China
Committee to the High Government. The Slooten arrived in Batavia on
6 June 1757. The personnel and goods destined for that port disem-
barked and at the same time the ship was supplied with the specified
amounts of tin, spices, and sapanwood. The voyage to Canton was con-
tinued on 22 June, and one month later, on 31 July, the Slooten anchored
in the roadstead of Whampoa. There she remained at anchor for six
months until 21 January 1758, when she set out on her return voyage to
the Dutch Republic. The Slooten returned home on 6 September 1758
with a cargo of 713,459 pounds of tea, 4936 pieces of silk textiles, 2,000
pieces of Nanking linen, 6,366 pounds of raw silk, 10,163 pounds of
China root, 5,079 pounds of galingale, 3,137 pounds of rhubarb, 10,072
pounds of turmeric, 1,451 pounds of sago, 2,553 pounds of gamboge,
61,751 pounds of spelter, and a considerable quantity of porcelain. This
first voyage set the pattern for all the subsequent sailings of China ships.25
Instructions of the China Committee
From 1756 onwards, the China Committee maintained total control of
the Canton trade until the dissolution of the directorate of the VOC in
1794. During those years, the members of the Committee held a meeting
every year in which all the general and particular instructions were drawn
up for the officers on the China ships pertaining to their China-bound
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and homeward-bound sailings; for the Company personnel in Canton
regarding the sale and purchase of goods; and for the High Government
setting out the supply of provisions. The Committee gave the Company
servants who participated in this special business more or less the same
kind of instructions from one year to the next during the last four decades
of the eighteenth century.
Figure 1  Organizational structure of the VOC China Trade, 1757-1794
To comply with the instructions of the China Committee, several coun-
cils were established on the China ships and in the trade factory in
Canton. These councils acted in several ways: as the Company’s adminis-
trative deputies on board seeing to it that the daily rules were enforced
and that all matters about the ship and crew were settled; as the
Company’s commercial deputy dealing with all the Company business of
selling and purchasing merchandise in Canton; and acting as the
Company’s general administrative deputy for all matters concerning the
Company servants both on the China ships and in China. If necessary,
these councils could also call upon the High Government to offer all
kinds of assistance. All persons involved in this trade had to behave them-
selves strictly according to the instructions laid down by the China
Committee, which generally referred to earlier regulations for VOC ser-
vants confirmed by the States-General in 1742.26










of the China Ships
1. To the Company servants on the China ships and in China
Before 1759, the China Committee instructed the Council of Naval
Officers (Scheepsraad), the Full Council of Naval Officers (Volle scheeps-
raad), and the Broad Council (Brede raad) to be established for both the
ships’ officers and the trade representatives, and it retained the Batavia
Committee (Bataviase commissie)27 manned by the trade representatives of
the Company business in China previously in accordance with the
instructions of the High Government.
On the voyage, the regulations applied to the trade director, the cap-
tain, the supercargoes, the first and second mates, the other officers and
the sailors on board of each ship. The supervision of the daily rules on
board was commonly the duty of the captain and his deputy. Whenever
a disagreement about these daily rules flared up, it was submitted to the
Council of Naval Officers, which was normally composed of the captain,
the most junior supercargo,28 the first mate, the second mate, and the
boatswain. The most junior supercargo serving as the clerk drew up a true
and proper written version of the resolution of the Council of Naval
Officers. As a rule, the captain acted as the president of the Council, but
all the judgements had to be passed by a majority of votes.29
During the voyage at sea or during the sojourn in China, except for
matters concerning the ordinary rules on board, extraordinary matters
might crop up with regard to the equipage, the passengers, the distribu-
tion of the daily rations, an unforeseen call at some port in the case of dis-
tress or an emergency, and problems with the supply of victuals during
the sojourn in China. If under these conditions the Broad Council, which
will be discussed later, could not be summoned, the trade director, or the
captain of the fleet, was charged with the duty of convening the Full
Council of Naval Officers.
The Full Council of Naval Officers consisted of the trade director, the
captain, the supercargoes, the first and second mates, and the boatswain.
The trade director presided over the Full Council of Naval Officers on the
ship on which he sailed, and on other ships it fell to the captain to pre-
side. The Full Council of Naval Officers settled all civil and criminal mat-
ters by a majority of votes, taking account of the ship’s articles and of the
common law, and in the future it would ask the Broad Council whether
it had done so properly or not. Also in this case the most junior super-
cargo served as clerk, and should some capital crime or other criminal act
be committed, the junior supercargo ranked directly above the clerk
assumed the function of public prosecutor, so that all the resolutions by
the Full Council of Naval Officers could be enacted and executed imme-
diately in order to assure good order on board.30
When at least two ships were together during the voyage at sea or dur-
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ing the sojourn in China, the place of the Full Council of Naval Officers
was taken by the Broad Council, and the latter would settle all the report-
ed matters mentioned before. The Broad Council consisted of higher-
ranking persons such as the trade director, the captains, the supercargoes,
the first mates, the second mates and the boatswains of all ships. The
trade director presided over the Broad Council, or a captain would replace
him in the event of illness or death. If one or several members died, a per-
son of the same rank was to be admitted to the Broad Council and replace
the one who was indisposed or had passed away. Should some of the
members not attend the Broad Council because of illness or other legiti-
mate reasons and the remainder could not make up the required quorum
of nine persons, as many of the ships’ officers of rank as necessary on all
the ships were summoned to take part in the Broad Council. To defuse a
situation in which disputes about the precedence of ships’ officers might
be raised, the China Committee ordered that the officers of the flag ship
always ranked above those of equal rank on the other ships. The majori-
ty vote and the supercargoes’ services as clerk and public prosecutor in the
Full Council of Naval Officers were repeated in the Broad Council.31
The Broad Council, or the Full Council of Naval Officers in the
absence of the former, was in charge of seeing that the articles and special
regulations of the Gentlemen Seventeen as well as the general and partic-
ular instructions of the China Committee were strictly adhered to. All the
placards, orders, and regulations were shown to the respective servants.
Before the arrival of the China ships in the roadstead of Batavia, on each
ship particular care was taken to post up the placards forbidding the car-
rying out of private business and the regulations on the baggage of the
China-bound and homebound people. Before the ships weighed anchor
at Canton, the Broad Council was convoked by the trade director and he
would read out all the instructions, placards, and regulations laid down
by the China Committee to remind the crews once again of their duties;
the placards and regulations were published once again by being posted
up on the mainsails, and left there until the ships were on the high seas.32
Disagreements might arise about the scheduled departure of the ships
from China if, during the commercial dealings in Canton, some Com-
pany servants were plunged into debt, sold or purchased some goods
privately, or engaged in selling and buying with the local dealers, shop-
keepers, and smugglers who turned out to be impecunious on the receipt
or the delivery of the goods, which meant that dues were not paid on
time. It was the task of the Broad Council to keep its personnel out of
such troubles. Notices were posted both on the ships and in the factory,
warning Chinese and other European merchants that the Dutch Com-
pany would not be responsible for the credits or the debts of its servants.
Simultaneously, the trade representatives were informed that they should
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pay all the tolls and other duties exacted on exports and imports punctil-
iously to take heed of the interests of the Company.33
In accordance with the instructions of the China Committee, on the
China-bound voyage the China ships did not call at ports other than the
Cape of Good Hope and Batavia; on the homeward voyage, they did not
anchor at ports other than the Cape of Good Hope, unless the High
Government especially ordered them to call in to deliver gold purchased
in China on the account of the High Government. The instructions even
recommended the China-bound ships sail straight to Batavia without
stopping at the Cape of Good Hope so that they could shorten the length
of the journey and arrive in Canton sooner.34 The homeward-bound ships
were allowed to call at other places should trouble or a disaster at sea
strike,35 and were also allowed to skip a visit to the Cape of Good Hope
if they were not carrying goods for that colony.36
On each ship, the captain or an officer of equal rank was responsible
for the cargo and capital until delivered into the hands of the trade repre-
sentatives in China. After business was concluded in Canton, the readily
prepared Chinese products that had already been marked with branding
irons in the factory were brought on board after the weight had been
ascertained and entrusted to the care of the ship’s officers. Some more
goods might be unmarked if so allowed by the regulations. Two identical
receipts for every delivery were made for the goods bought, clearly stating
the date, the year, the quantity, and quality of such commodities with the
designation of the same trademarks, names and so on. The captains who
received the goods and the person who delivered them on behalf of the
trade representatives should sign the receipts and take charge of them
respectively. The captains were expected to deliver the receipts, plus the
bills of lading upon their arrival home.37
In 1759, a revolution was effected in the above-mentioned organiza-
tional structures. The Council of Naval Officers and the Full Council of
Naval Officers were replaced by the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers
(Ordinaire scheepsraad) and the Extraordinary Council of Naval Officers
(Extraordinaire scheepsraad) respectively, and the Broad Council was fre-
quently called the Full Council (Volle raad).
All the ordinary matters on board each ship were settled by the
Ordinary Council of Naval Officers, and the main functions of the pre-
vious Broad Council, or the Full Council of Naval Officers in the absence
of the former, during the ocean voyage were assumed by the Ordinary
Council of Naval Officers over which the captain presided. The trade
representatives, namely the supercargoes, assistants, or bookkeepers who
sailed on the China ships, were no longer included in the Ordinary
Council of Naval Officers, by the instruction of the China Committee.
Should the trade representatives decide to take up some extraordinary
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matters, the captain of the fleet who presided over the Ordinary Council
of Naval Officers had a duty to summon the Extraordinary Council of
Naval Officers to deal with all such matters. This Extraordinary Council
of Naval Officers consisted of the members of the Council of Naval
Officers plus the trade representatives. The captain presided over the
Extraordinary Council of Naval Officers, and the trade representative
serving as the clerk drew up a proper written record of the resolutions of
the Council. After the arrival of the China ship(s) in China, the place of
the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers was taken over by the Full
Council, and all civil and criminal matters as well as the other affairs out-
side the jurisdiction of the ordinary administration of the ship or the con-
ducting of the trade would be settled by the Full Council presided over
by the Dutch chief.38
In the same year the China Committee ordered the trade representa-
tives to set up a new council, known as the Trade Council (Commercie
Raad), in place of the former Batavia Committee, in Canton as the delib-
erative organ to make the resolutions germane to the Company business
there.39
The Trade Council consisted of several supercargoes and their assis-
tants. Each supercargo had one conclusive vote, while the assistants had
an advisory vote. Should one or more supercargoes be absent from the
meeting of the Council for whatever reason, the assistant next in rank
might be selected to cast a conclusive vote.40
All the business concerning the sale and purchase of goods in Canton
fell under the control of this council. Contracts were made or approved
in the presence of all its voting members, unless some of them were not
able to attend because of sickness or some other unavoidable reason. The
Trade Council was ordered to resolve all sale and purchase contracts and
the acceptance of the goods properly, and whenever the Council members
took a particular decision the reason should also be clearly stated. Not all
the trade representatives in Canton could attend the Trade Council, but
according to the instructions of the China Committee they were given
definite assignments by the Council.41
The Trade Council took decisions about the disbursement of funds and
deliveries of goods after the process of the sale and purchase, taking due
care each time to explain why such a decision had been taken. If not all
the members present agreed, a decision could be taken by a majority of
votes. In that case, the reasons for taking this decision had to be noted
down, including the particular reasons brought forward by the dissenting
members in support of their own sentiments. In the event of the votes of
the two opposing sides being equally divided, the Dutch chief, who
presided over the Council, always had a double vote to ensure a definitive
conclusion. The Dutch chief therefore had a special position in the Trade
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Council: in the deliberations and in the management of all other busi-
ness, he was authorized to take the lead and nothing could be undertak-
en without his foreknowledge.
In consideration of the Company’s commercial interests, all the mem-
bers of the Trade Council present swore a solemn oath that they would
discuss the Company business with nobody except those who had indis-
putable acquaintance with it. The Council members should fully disclose
the state of affairs and report directly or indirectly, before deliberating on
or resolving the sale and purchase of goods, the disbursements, the mak-
ing of contracts with Chinese merchants and so on.
When the supercargoes engaged in negotiations with the Chinese sup-
pliers or other persons in Canton, they were often urged by the Chinese
to accept some presents. The Trade Council decreed that, according to the
instructions of the China Committee, none of its members might accept
these presents from the Chinese merchants. They should refuse such pro-
hibited articles, although they were allowed to give presents to the
Chinese. Should it really prove impossible to refuse such gifts without
prejudicing the Company business, the members might accept them and
would then be obliged to explain the reasons for their action. Such gifts
should be delivered with the Company goods, to be placed at the dispos-
al of the China Committee upon their arrival home. Come hell and high
water, every Company servant should be assiduous in their care of the
interests of the Company.42
In the factory, the members of the Trade Council paid close attention
to the storage of the Company stocks during their sojourn in Canton.
Normally, when the ships were in China, the supercargoes asked the ship’s
officers to dispatch one efficient petty officer with one drummer and as
many crew as possible ashore and that these be provided with any arms
which the Council deemed necessary for the safe-guarding of the factory
and the stocks inside it. The Council could require that more personnel
be placed at its disposal according to the conditions prevailing in the cur-
rent business climate. Another very specific point was the ready money in
the factory. The China Committee made a special arrangement that each
chest containing ready money should be furnished with four different
locks and keys and the Dutch chief and three other subordinate super-
cargoes in descending rank kept a different key under his own charge, so
that any money had to be taken out in the presence of the said super-
cargoes.
During the sojourn in Canton, the supercargoes and the assistants were
ordered by the Trade Council to keep a note of the commerce as well as
of the housekeeping by means of a daily record. In particular and with
great accuracy, the daily record noted the arrival of any foreign ships, their
names, who the supercargoes and captains were, from where they had
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sailed, in what business they were engaging, and what merchandise they
took on for the return voyage. All this information could be useful to the
instructions the China Committee would issue with relation to the sale of
European, Indian, and Chinese goods which had been brought to
Canton.43
The general trade books, which include the ledgers, journals, and cash-
books were also kept in Canton by one person who was ordered to
append his signature after balancing these books. All the information
contained in these books would be of help to trade representatives fulfill-
ing the same function in later years. It would aid them to understand how
their predecessors had fared, what the conditions at the lodge were, and
if some debt had to be paid back on the Company’s account, where and
in whose hands the contracts had been signed and so on.
The bookkeeping was likewise strictly controlled. It was decreed that
the books should be kept not only in the Chinese species of tael, mace,
candareen, catty and the like but also in the Chinese weight units of picul,
catty, tael and so forth, in which the supercargoes negotiated and settled
with their Chinese trade partners. To comply with the orders of the China
Committee without too much ado, the Trade Council was instructed to
take the piece of eight44 in the trade books as follows: 100 marks Mexi-
canen were equal to 913 pieces of eight and 74 Chinese candareens to one
piece of eight, as these were generally taken in the trade. Besides this, the
Trade Council was ordered to convert the Chinese weights to the Dutch
pound when dealing with Chinese merchants on the sale and purchase of
goods, at the ratio of one picul to 122½ Dutch pounds in an ordinary
season.45
Every year, the Trade Council also ordered that, upon finishing their
business in Canton, the supercargoes draw up an ample memorandum
replete with the necessary instructions to enlighten those who would leave
for China the following year. In this memorandum, the state of the fac-
tory with an inventory of the furniture and so on could be found. Above
all, they had to note meticulously the principal things that had happened
to them, with which merchants they had transacted business, what goods
and at what price they had sold and purchased these, and what they
thought about the business in Canton and other such commercial mat-
ters. The memorandum was also useful to later successors in continuing
their business successfully.46
In the instructions to the trade representatives in China, the China
Committee likewise added several particular orders to the supercargoes,
assistants, bookkeepers and other individuals. The first rule was that none
of the supercargoes and assistants, who were repatriating to Europe and
who, of course, received their monthly pay as well as the premium from
the return goods which would be sold in the home country, might bring
THE CHINA COMMITTEE AND ITS MANAGEMENT 33
along more chests or baggage than was stipulated for the storage on
board. These persons should behave themselves decorously and with the
strictest propriety, as offenders would inexorably be punished according
to the general articles issued against the transportation of forbidden items.
The second rule covered correspondence. Should some private letters be
sent home by the Company servants in China on board the ships of other
nations, in these letters the Company servants should not mention any-
thing in relation to the state of the Company business in China, which
might prove detrimental to the VOC; as an additional guarantee of the
delivery of the letters, the sender was to inform the Gentlemen Seventeen
under cover with which ship the letters had been sent and to request them
to dispatch the enclosed letters to the China Committee.
Finally, upon their arrival home with the return ships, the repatriated
trade representatives from China were ordered to remain on board until
one member of the Gentlemen Seventeen had come on board and given
them permission to go ashore; upon their disembarkation, they should
not take along anything other than the clothes they stood up in, and their
other belongings and baggage were to be taken to the East Indies House
for examination, whereupon they would be either returned or confiscat-
ed.47
2. To the High Government in Batavia
After the Gentlemen Seventeen resumed control of the China trade, the
High Government became subsidiary to the China Committee in this
trade. In antithesis to the instructions to the authorities on the China
ships and the trade representatives in China, those issued to the High
Government grew simpler each season, since this government was no
longer a direct operator in the trade.
In its annual instruction, the China Committee usually commenced by
informing the High Government about the ships it proposed to send to
China. According to the instructions of the China Committee, it was the
duty of the High Government to ensure that an equal number of ships
would be ready to continue the voyage to China as a stand-by, should any
of the China ships run into trouble when they arrived in Batavia or were
delayed en route, by replacing those disabled with ships of the High
Government. In the initial years, the China Committee also ordered that,
if the business in China could not be concluded in time, the ships might
sail back to Batavia where all the ship’s officers and sailors, together with
the ships and their cargoes, should be put under the orders and at the dis-
position of the High Government.48 This was a more precautionary meas-
ure and such an occasion never arose, since the trade representatives
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began to make it a custom to remain in Macao during the off-season from
the beginning of the 1760s.
The most important part in the instruction to the High Government
was the demand for the goods of East Indies origin. First of all, the China
Committee set down how much capital in precious metals (see Appendix
1) and what “Home goods” would be sent from the Dutch Republic on
the China ships, and then gave a brief list of the “Batavia goods” which
should be supplied by the High Government. The assortment and
amount of the goods required might usually be given, but were not as pre-
cise as the “Assessments of the merchandise” (Bevinding der goederen or
koopmanschappen) on the China ships drawn up by the trade representa-
tives in China upon delivery (see Appendix 2). During the two-week
sojourn of the China-bound ships in Batavia, the High Government was
expected to load the ships as quickly as possible.49 Should there not be
enough tin available, the High Government would be obliged to make up
the deficiency with silver coins to ensure that there would be enough
“general funds” for the purchase of return cargoes in Canton.50 In the
period under study, such an occasion never arose and it is interesting that
the High Government, in fact, quite often made use of tin or pepper to
supplement the general funds allotted to the direct China trade.51
The China Committee also instructed the High Government to load
the China-bound ships with the provisions and other necessities which
were required to supply the factory in Canton. Usually the Committee
was uncertain about what the factory needed exactly, so it asked the High
Government to inquire of the officers on the China ships about the
requirements upon their arrival in Batavia. The High Government itself
was supposed to have received this information from the correspondence
sent to Batavia from Canton on the homeward-bound China ships,
Chinese junks, or other European private vessels.
As early as 1759, the China Committee issued a special instruction
concerning the private China trade conducted from Batavia.52 The
Committee declared that all private trade should be forbidden absolutely,
since the Company had a sufficient amount of export and import goods
to send on the ships it proposed to dispatch to China. Any private trade
would be disadvantageous to the Company’s China trade if it were
allowed to be pursued simultaneously. If the goods concerned were not
those in which the Company dealt itself, it would not hurt the Company’s
China trade were a trade by a few Dutch private individuals in Batavia to
be permitted. Yet it was remarked that as long as the trade in these kinds
of private goods could be pursued to some advantage, the Chinese junks
plying between Batavia and China would definitely already be trading in
them. Since the founding of Batavia, the sailing of Chinese junks to and
from the city had been very advantageous to this colony, therefore the
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Chinese junk traffic should be promoted by all proper means and no
Dutch private trade by Batavia should be permitted over and above this.
If the High Government judged that the Dutch private trade could be
carried out without hurting the direct China trade of the Company and
at a profit for this colony, the High Government should offer an explana-
tion of what kind of private trade this might be, what profits the
Company or this colony might enjoy, under which constraints it would
be permitted and which precautions could be taken to ensure those con-
straints were observed.
On 3 September 1762, at the request of the High Government the
China Committee informed this government about its decision to lift the
prohibition on the private trade under certain conditions. In June 1763,
the High Government thereupon resolved to allow trade between Batavia
and Canton by the private residents in Batavia on two vessels annually.
Intending to keep a firm grip on such trade, the High Government issued
very strict regulations, complying with the instructions of the China
Committee. Hence, such vessels should not call elsewhere; spices, tin, and
pepper53 might not be exported on these vessels; no foreign nations might
have any portion in the loading of the ships, to which the crews of the
vessels should make a declaration under oath before their departure,
under penalty that the ships and their cargoes could be confiscated ipso
jure. The trade representatives in Canton were ordered to keep an eye out
for possible infringements committed by the private traders. If there was
any evidence of illicit commerce, the offending vessels should be sent
back to Batavia under convoy with a Company ship.54 According to the
source materials studied, no vessels were even sent directly to Canton
from Batavia by Dutch private merchants, but a number of Chinese
junks, and in some years ever Portuguese ships, were employed for this
purpose by Dutch residents in Batavia.55
Trade goods and funds sent from the Dutch Republic
As mentioned earlier, the China Committee requested the chambers to
furnish the China-bound ships with sufficient trade goods and funds for
them to undertake the voyage. All these goods and funds were sent on
board by the chambers themselves in compliance with the instructions of
the Committee.
At Texel, the “Home goods”, which ordinarily consisted of lead (some-
times referred to as “Dutch lead”), laken, printed laken, polemieten, print-
ed carpets and so on were loaded onto the China-bound ships together
with the bullion. Lead, laken, and polemieten were the most frequently
recurring export items. The quantities of the “Home goods” were laid
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down by the China Committee not only in its instructions to the High
Government, but also in those issued to the trade representatives, and in
the particular instruction to the Dutch chief in Canton.56 It should be
pointed out that the amounts of the “Home goods” supplied may also be
found in the records of the “Assessments of the merchandise” on the
China ships (see Appendix 2) in which their end-result in Canton was
also mentioned in the usual meticulous detail.57
On the China-bound ships lead served more as ballast than as mer-
chandise, and in Canton a big portion of it was exchanged with the
Chinese merchants for a cheaper return ballast of spelter.58 On the
Chinese side, lead could be used not only to alloy spelter, but also to alloy
tin to make the “tea lead”. This was used to line the tea chests to preserve
the aroma and taste of tea more effectively and keep the wooden tea chests
dry during the transportation of tea.59
Dutch laken was not highly sought after in Canton, and only the best
grades and finest types of smooth, napless, and closely-woven textiles were
marketable there for a few years in the 1760s and 1770s, but this picked
up a little in the 1780s and 1790s. Laken with a printed pattern could be
sold only in small quantities in the 1760s and in 1789, 1790, 1791, and
1793. The polemieten, which had a Turkish cotton warp and were there-
fore stronger than the English product with a woollen warp, were quite
saleable so that they were brought by the China ships nearly every year in
the periods 1763-1780 and 1783-1793, with the exceptions of the years
1766, 1771, and 1772.
In the contemporary textile industry in the Dutch Republic, Leiden
was a very important place. In 1742, the Amsterdam Chamber resolved
to purchase half of all the cloth it needed from Leiden drapers, and later
in 1776 the Company directors signed a contract with them agreeing to
order all the cloth the Company needed for Asia in Leiden.60 In 1787, the
manufacture of polemieten for China became the most important source
of income for some Leiden factories.61
According to the “Assessments of the merchandise” on the China ships,
however, the total amount of laken, printed laken, and polemieten import-
ed into Canton by the VOC was by no means large in the period 1758-
1793. The reason for this should probably be sought in the fact that
Canton was the only place where the VOC, as well as other European
companies, could sell European-made textiles in China during the second
half of the eighteenth century. The upshot was that the market there for
the European cloth was quite limited. Given that Canton is a sub-tropi-
cal city it was not exactly the right place to market European coarse cloth,
in particular woollen fabrics. Potential Chinese customers also had the
choice of buying various types of coarse fabrics made in other areas of
China such as Nanking linen, which was even regularly exported to
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Europe in the eighteenth century. The VOC imports of cloth to Canton
also had to compete strenuously with other European companies, espe-
cially the EIC which offered the Canton market any amount it might
demand at lower prices.62
From the late 1750s to the early 1790s, precious metals, the so-called
“general funds” for China, formed the most important import commod-
ity and was brought regularly as clockwork each season on the Company
ships from the Dutch Republic (see Appendix 1). Among the precious
metals silver bullion usually preponderated. Over the thirty-seven years
from 1758 to 1795, the silver bullion brought to Canton was definitely
in the form of Mexicanen in twenty-two years, as piaster in four years, as
Spanish rial in three years, and partly as piaster and partly gold ducat in
two years. It is curious that in the years of 1764-1781 and again in 1783,
a fair amount of silver bullion from the previous trading season remained
unsold (see Appendix 1). This is very interesting because during almost
the same period, the trade representatives spent enormous sums of money
on the return shipments every year.63 Therefore, other than might have
been expected at first glance the annual excess of silver bullion did not sig-
nify the failure of the Company business in Canton; on the contrary, it
meant instead that the trade representatives had profited greatly from the
goods imported into Canton by the VOC.
The China Committee’s demands for the “VOC teas”
In its annual instructions to the Company personnel in Canton, the
China Committee devoted several pages to a detailed explanation of the
various return goods it desired from Canton, such as tea, porcelain,
unbleached Nanking linen and silk, rhubarb, star anis, China root, lac-
quer ware, and spelter, but among these the explanation about the “VOC
teas” of course took pride of place. For each kind of tea in demand, except
Bohea, the desired amount was noted down, with further specifications
about the various grades of tea.
The quantities of various “VOC teas” required by the China Com-
mittee are listed in Appendix 4. These data show that, with the exception
of Bohea, the total amounts of the “VOC teas” bought in Canton basi-
cally matched the demand from the Dutch Republic, allowing for some
discrepancies between the demand and supply of each sort. Such irregu-
lar discrepancies appear nearly all the time in the period concerned.
The China Committee clearly stated that each kind of tea, Bohea
excepted, should be divided into good (puik goede) or ordinary grade, bet-
ter (fijner & beter) or second grade, and best (super fijne) or first grade. In
accordance with differentiation in quality, the quantity of each sort
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decreased from ordinary to best. Occasionally, the Committee just
ordered one grade or perhaps two of a particular sort of tea. This occurred
mostly in the demands for the low-quality black tea.
Only with the very best Bohea did the China Committee never give
the exact amount required, for it always let the trade representatives in
China decide how much should be purchased, depending on the situation
on the Canton market in the coming trading season. To lighten the bur-
den of the personnel in Canton, the Committee always sent some infor-
mation about the market situation of tea in the Dutch Republic, stating
the sales price, the tea-buyers’ demands for the various grades and even
their complaints about the low quality they had received. It was hoped
that this manoeuvre would improve the trade representatives’ purchases in
Canton.
There were years in which the trade representatives in Canton did not
buy some of the sorts of tea which the China Committee required;64 in
others the situation was reversed. It also occasionally happened that the
trade representatives bought more quantities of tea than the China
Committee had required (see Appendix 4). It is believed that this was a
fairly common occurrence because it was virtually impossible to predict
the fluctuation of the price and the supply of tea on the Canton market
with any accuracy.
Conclusion
From the end of the seventeenth century, when trade and shipping
increased tremendously between Europe and Asia, the VOC had gradual-
ly lost its unique position in the Asian trade,65 and the profits the
Company earned from it had been insufficient.66 This became more ob-
vious towards the 1750s. One of the reasons of the weakening share of the
VOC in this trade was that other companies which were better managed
entered the field, another was the enormous expenditure the High
Government was put to in internal Asian affairs, and a further reason was
that control was too centralized in Batavia. The High Government often
acted in internal Asian affairs as if it were all powerful. It sometimes
behaved as if it was beyond the authority of the VOC directors in the
home country, and concentrated more on its own interest in Asia. As a
result, the scale of opportunities for intra-Asian trade managed by Batavia
and private corrupt dealings from the management and administration in
the various settlements increased. All this encroached on the interest of
the Company, diminished the Company’s core concentration on the
European-Asian trade, and hindered some branches of the European-
Asian trade to magnify their value to the fullest extent, for example, the
essentially lucrative trade with China, Surat, and Bengal. In order 
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to recover the Company, these trades were proposed to be expanded.
Dissatisfaction with the manner in which the High Government con-
ducted the China trade paved the way for the Gentlemen Seventeen’s
decision to regain control of and revamp this important trade, by hence-
forth sending ships directly from the Dutch Republic to China. The
Gentlemen Seventeen suspected that the High Government delayed the
ships unnecessarily at Batavia, and saddled them with some unmarketable
“Batavia goods” for Canton. The upshot of its procrastination was that
the VOC paid higher prices in China and received lower returns in
Europe than did its competitors.
As something had to be done, the China Committee was established to
reorganize the trade with China to tailor it more closely to the wishes of
the Gentlemen Seventeen. Although disappointed by this decision, the
High Government had no option but to obey it. After the direct trade
between the Dutch Republic and China was inaugurated, the trade with
China no longer benefited Batavia as it had done in the past but prima-
rily served the interests of the Company at home. As a conciliatory ges-
ture, the China Committee did not completely ignore the profits Batavia
made from the China trade but allowed some involvement on condition
that the fundamental interests of the Company be guaranteed.
Almost thirty years earlier, in 1727, the Gentlemen Seventeen had also
tried to inaugurate a direct shipping link between the Low Countries and
China. Within a few years, corruption and mismanagement had brought
that experiment to an ignominious end and Batavia retrieved its control-
ling position. With this disaster still rankling, when it began to organize
the direct China trade, the China Committee issued various stern and
highly detailed instructions to the ship’s officers, the trade representatives
in China, and the High Government. The boundaries of every partici-
pant’s functions and powers were clearly circumscribed, ensuring all the
participants would be able to co-operate with each other under the lead-
ership of the China Committee. Once everything had been arranged, the
regulations remained basically the same from its beginning to the end of
the trade. This implies how well controlled and stable the direct China
trade became under the management of the China Committee. With
regard to the selection and purchase of the return cargoes, especially the
“VOC teas”, the instructions left the trade representatives in Canton
enough room to manoeuvre to decide themselves upon the quantities,
value, and prices of the goods bought for the home market.
The China Committee made sure that marketable trade goods were
sent to Canton on the China-bound ships. More attractive commodities
did indeed give a fillip for the trade representatives’ negotiations in
Canton, but the most tradable item for the Canton market remained the
precious metals sent from the Dutch Republic.
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All things considered, the China Committee was a unique type of insti-
tution within the structure of the VOC for it focused exclusively on the
trade in one single commodity with one single region for nearly half a
century.67 Close study of the China Committee’s management of the
VOC China trade shows that in an age of the decline of the Company as
a whole, the reorganization of the VOC China trade was a smashing
success for the stockholders.
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CHAPTER TWO
BATAVIA’S ROLE IN THE DIRECT CHINA TRADE
Introduction
Since the Gentlemen Seventeen brought the management of the China
trade back under their own control by installing the China Committee,
entitling it to take full charge of the China trade in the late 1750s, the
High Government was relieved of direct control of the trade.
Nevertheless, despite the catalogue of incompetence cited as the reasons
for the Gentlemen Seventeen to have taken this step, the China
Committee still could not ignore the crucial importance of Batavia to this
trade, for without the participation of the High Government it would
have been impossible to obtain better results than in the previous years.
First and foremost, the goods which the China Committee could send
from the Dutch Republic to Canton were precious metals (see Appen-
dix 1), the only commodity really attractive to the Chinese merchants,
supplemented by a quantity of lead and some textiles in limited varieties.
Most of the consumer goods which were in demand on the Canton mar-
ket were available only in the East Indies and therefore had to be supplied
by the High Government. Then, when the China-bound ships arrived in
Batavia for a short sojourn after their seven-month-long voyage, Batavia
was on hand to offer all kinds of aid to refit these ships and ensure their
seaworthiness before they set course to China. Finally, on behalf of the
China Committee, the High Government could also supply the
Company servants in China with additional information which might be
useful for them.
The situation was also advantageous to the High Government as it was
permitted by the China Committee to order the trade representatives in
China to buy goods for Batavia on its behalf. The High Government
could actually ask the Company’s China ships to transport the goods from
China to Java, but in that case it had to send ships to transfer the goods
out at sea so that the homeward-bound ships would not be delayed on the
way. Although the opportunity was there, in most cases, it was easier for
the High Government to entrust this kind of transport to Chinese junks
or the vessels of other nations. As in previous times the High Government
was also allowed to continue its trade in Chinese gold, but this activity
was soon discontinued because it was no longer profitable.
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Batavia’s contributions to the direct China trade
Batavia, the general VOC rendezvous in Asia, was in a privileged position
to collect all kinds of merchandise from the East Indies that were in
demand on the Canton market. Moreover, in those years that the China
Committee might find itself short of funds for the direct China trade,
there always was the possibility that the High Government could make
up the deficiency. Nor did the services stop there. The China Committee
could also rely on the assistance of Batavia in other areas, such as the sup-
ply of personnel, provisions, and equipment for the China-bound ships
and for the factory in Canton.1 Another important aspect was that Batavia
was in a position to send advice on the spur of the moment to the
Company servants in China should any problem arise there for which the
instructions of the China Committee did not give a clear-cut answer.
Considering the two-year lapse in communication between China and
the Dutch Republic, this “short cut” in decision making was indeed a use-
ful service.
1. Supply of trade goods
After arrival at Batavia, the China-bound ships took on their cargoes of
such East Indies commodities as tin, pepper, and, if required, sapanwood,
rattan and other products as quickly as possible. This operation would
usually be completed in twelve to fourteen days so that the ships could be
dispatched without a protracted delay for the next leg of their voyage to
Canton. When taking delivery of these goods, the ships’ officers were
required to adhere to the general regulations concerning the sales placards
warning against underweight and insufficient goods which were issued by
the High Government in 1752.2
Among the East Indies commodities supplied by the High Govern-
ment, tin took pride of place, comprising one-half to two-thirds of the
total value of the “Batavia goods”. Tin was classified as Bangka (or
Palembang) tin or Malacca tin.3 Since the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the High Government had tried to gain monopoly rights to the tin
from Perak, the oldest known producer of tin. Perak had supplied the
metal as tribute to the Sultan of Malacca as early as the fifteenth century,
but the High Government was not able to sign a contract with the Sultan
of Perak until 1746. On the other side of the Straits of Malacca, the
Sultan of Palembang had already granted the VOC the sole rights to the
purchase of all the tin from Bangka in 1722. The VOC procured more
than 80 per cent of its tin from South Sumatra, and perhaps about three-
quarters of this was exported to China.4 Neither treaty, however, was
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faithfully observed by these Malay rulers when they found out that 
others were willing to pay higher prices than the VOC. In this respect,
Sinnappah Arasaratnam has spoken of “the hopelessness of relying on
contracts and pretended allies”.5
Generally speaking, the supply of tin for the direct China trade of the
VOC was relatively stable in the second half of the eighteenth century,
although in some years the purchase of tin by the Company was threat-
ened by the contraband trade pursued by Chinese junks – those which
sailed not only from China but also from Tonkin, Siam or other parts of
South-east Asia – and European country traders in Johore and elsewhere.
An increasing number of Chinese junks, their masters seeing a lucrative
profit in it, engaged in the contraband trade of tin. These vessels sailed
straight to the tin deposits of the Malay world (see Map 2), and so did
private Portuguese and English traders who passed through this region on
their way to Canton. The High Government could enforce a limitation
on how much tin and pepper Chinese junks carried to Canton from
Batavia and Palembang,6 but when it had to clamp down on the Malay
tin-producing areas, which were actually not wholly under Dutch con-
trol, the only means to which the High Government had recourse was to
send cruisers to the Straits of Malacca to blockade the transport of tin
from this region to Chinese junks and the vessels of other nations. The
penalty for any transgression was confiscation. Such blockades, in opera-
tion from the 1760s until 1780, were to say the least not very effective.7
A Dutch report of 1777 estimated that the English “[…] took over
500,000 pounds of tin from the Malacca Straits which was about 78,000
pounds more than the Dutch brought in that year”.8 As a result of the
afore-mentioned situation, it needs no stretch of the imagination to
understand why in the second half of the eighteenth century nearly 85-
90 per cent of tin brought on the Dutch China ships for Canton was
Bangka tin. Especially during the years 1790-1793, all the tin the High
Government offered was Bangka tin (see Appendix 2).
The VOC fixed the price of tin from Palembang at 10 Spanish rials per
“Company” picul in the 1720s but by around 1780 the price hovered
between 11 and 15 rials.9 In Canton, the selling price gradually rose from
the 1760s to 1781. In 1764, the Dutch trade representatives sold tin at
11.1 taels of silver per (Chinese) picul of 122½ pounds with a profit of
about 1113/16 per cent. In 1774, the Chinese merchants paid 12 taels per
picul, despite other European companies selling at a price of 11.4 taels.
Two years later, the Dutch price jumped to 12.3 taels and one year later
to 13.4 taels. In 1779, the Dutch price hovered around 14.6 to 15.5 taels,
and in 1780 it was set at 14.8 to 15 taels.10
Tin was a readily saleable commodity in Canton. Upon its arrival part
of the tin sold remained in Canton and the rest was transported to the 
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Map 2  Tin and pepper supplying areas of the VOC China trade
Source: Reinout Vos, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince, ix.
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inland provinces. In China, tin was used for various purposes. Its most
popular employment was as foil from which to make devotional offerings,
known as sacred paper. This paper was pasted on to a backing of very fine-
ly beaten tin foil and burnt every morning and evening.11 But in the busy
commercial centre of Canton, apart from being used to back the sacred
paper, tin also had another important use in the European tea trade. In
the eighteenth century, a large quantity of the imported tin was beaten
into foil for use as the lining of tea chests.12 Before the teas for the
European market were packed in airtight wooden chests, the chests had
previously been lined with the “tea lead”, an alloy of tin and lead, on the
inside to preserve the aroma and consequently taste better, besides this it
also kept the damp out.13
It should also be noted that, as can be seen in Appendix 2, in many
trading seasons the imported Company goods were not handed over com-
pletely to the Chinese merchants. Of course, the bulk of the commodities
were delivered to the Company’s trading partners. Yet, some quantities
were either transferred to the warehouse at the factory, most likely for the
next trading season, or remained on board the homeward-bound ships as
ballast. This happened regularly in the case of tin and rattan. From 1765,
all rattan remained on the homeward-bound ships each year for use on
board (see Appendix 2).
Pepper was the other principal article in the trade. As was the case with
tin, the High Government controlled most of the pepper sources of sup-
ply, as it had the monopoly on the purchase of pepper from Palembang
and Banten (see Map 2). In 1642, the VOC concluded a contract with
the Sultan of Palembang, and from that year the VOC enjoyed the
monopoly on the export of pepper from this Sultanate. For Palembang
pepper, the VOC fixed the purchase price at 3.75 Spanish rials per
“Company” picul14 in its contract with the Sultan. As a general rule, the
Sultan of Palembang sent the pepper to Batavia, but when there was a sur-
plus the VOC sent extra vessels to Palembang to collect the pepper.15 In
1680, the VOC concluded a contract with the Sultan of Banten stipulat-
ing that all Banten pepper should be delivered to the VOC at about 4.73
Spanish rials per picul. From the 1760s and thereafter, these two kinds of
pepper were sold on the Canton market by the VOC. Again this com-
modity was subject to a great deal of leakage and considerable quantities
of the pepper production were sold to the rivals of the VOC.16
It is intriguing to note that in the “Assessments of the merchandise” on
the China ships, there is a great difference in the VOC shipments of pep-
per to Canton between the periods before and after the year of 1778.
During the earlier period, the VOC shipped no pepper to Canton in
1759, 1767-1769, and 1773; in 1763 and 1772 only Banten pepper was
sent, and in 1777 and 1778 only Palembang pepper; in 1764, the share
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of Banten pepper was 71.05 per cent and that of Palembang pepper 28.95
per cent; in 1765, the share of Palembang pepper was 70 per cent and that
of Banten pepper 30 per cent; in 1766, Banten pepper’s share increased
to 71.3 per cent and that of Palembang dropped to 28.7 per cent; in 1774
and 1775, the kind of pepper is not specified.17 After 1778 until 1793, it
is not possible to make these distinctions for the assortments of pepper
sent to Canton each year relying on the “Assessments of the merchan-
dise”, since only the general term “pepper” was used. Why there should
have been such fluctuation in the choice of pepper-producing areas has to
remain a mystery for the present. The most likely reason was the varia-
tions in the annual yield.18
On taking delivery of the cargoes of pepper, the Dutch trade represen-
tatives in Canton sometimes complained about the quality. It was
befouled with dust and stones which were probably mixed inadvertently
with the pepper either when it was originally sold to Batavia by the Malay
Sultans or during the loading in Batavia and the unloading in Canton. In
1764, for example, the supercargoes were loud in their criticism that the
pepper they received was of the worst possible quality, full of stones and
seedless corns, although in the following year, in its reply the High
Government insisted that the pepper had been packed with only 1 per
cent of dust.19 Despite such lapses in quality, the profits on pepper were
still 200 per cent on average.20
Apart from tin and pepper, relatively small quantities of other spices
were in real demand in China such as nutmeg, cloves, and mother-of-
cloves, which yielded astronomical profits of even up to 1,000 per cent.21
Other merchandise such as camphor, sapanwood, sandalwood, blue dye,
arrack, clove oil, rice, pearl dust, bird’s nests, Surat cotton, catechu, and
putchuck also frequently found a ready sale (see Appendix 2). Although
these other commodities were not in the same league as tin and pepper,
they were also not negligible commodities which could be exchanged for
the desired tea, porcelain, and others Chinese goods.
The China-bound ships also transported the imported Japanese cop-
per from Batavia to Canton, where it was sold at a profitable price to
the Company’s trading partners.22 But this happened only in the years
1765-1766, 1783-1784, and 1787. On the eve of the establishment of
the China Committee, when the principal shareholders discussed what
trade goods would be useful to the future direct China trade, they had
no appreciation whatsoever of the importance of copper to this trade.
Their reasoning was that the Chinese themselves had a much larger
share in the Japanese copper trade than did the VOC. There was anoth-
er important reason why China declined its desire for Japanese copper:
China very much increased its domestic copper production in the eigh-
teenth century. From 1738 to 1810, copper mines in the south-western
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province of Yunnan produced an average of 6,000 tons of copper
annually.23
In the records of “Assessments of the merchandise” on the China ships,
it is very easy indeed to obtain basic information about the persons to
whom the “Batavia goods” and to whom the “Home goods” were sold.
The bulk of the Company goods were delivered to the Hong merchants,
in particular the Company’s security merchants, who, as we know, were
also the chief tea-supplying agents for the VOC. These trading partners
of the Company dominated the reception of the principal import com-
modities of tin, pepper, and lead.
2. Supplementing trade funds
As discussed earlier, throughout the second half of the eighteenth centu-
ry the China-bound ships carried trade funds to cover each season’s trade.
As luck would have it, in some years the trade funds proved insufficient
and the High Government had to supplement the amount needed. The
High Government made up the deficiency in two ways.
Initially, the High Government often instructed the supercargoes in
Canton to use the remainder of the funds left from the Batavia-Canton
gold trade to supplement the general funds for the direct China trade. As
will be discussed in detail later, the High Government sent separate funds
for the purchase of gold on its own account. Depending on the market,
these funds could not always be actually dispensed by the trade represen-
tatives. Since 1763 it had often happened that the High Government told
the supercargoes to keep the funds in China either for the gold trade of
the next season or to supplement the general funds.
This scheme appealed to both the High Government in Batavia and
the trade representatives in Canton, because it provided the latter with the
opportunity to plug the holes in the payment of export tea and porcelain.
Simultaneously, the High Government neatly avoided the double risk of
having the funds for the gold trade shipped back and forth. Despite its
advantage, this scheme was short lived because an end was put to the gold
trade in 1765.
Subsequently, the High Government supplemented the deficit in
Batavia. In 1777, it was informed that, although the China Committee
had in the previous year increased the general funds to 36,800 marks
Mexicanen, which converted to 248,628.1.6 taels of silver, this money was
not enough to cover the trading season. This meant that the High
Government had to supplement a sum of 337,500 Spanish rials, or
249,750 taels, of silver. It could happen that cash supplements were not
readily to hand. In such cases the High Government would resort to tin
and/or pepper to meet the requirements. When some extra funds were
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requested for the direct China trade in 1778 and fortuitously the price of
pepper in China stood high at 13.5 taels per picul, the next year the High
Government decided to send a larger quantity of that article to Canton.
In 1780, because of the high selling price of tin, the High Government
made the rational decision to use tin to supplement the funds, which
meant that the general funds for the off-season amounted to
200,898.1.4.9 taels.24
Although such a practical system was in place, the transfer of ready
money to Canton from Batavia did not always go to plan. In 1778,
according to the instructions of the High Government to the supercar-
goes in Canton, the former sent 223,824 rupees to Canton, at the express
request of the Trade Council in Canton. The next year, the Trade Council
reported to the High Government that a loss of 3,304.4.5 taels had been
made on the sale of these rupees. Having been hit in its pocket, the High
Government felt extremely disgruntled by such an exorbitant loss and
indignantly asked the Trade Council to give a more detailed elucidation.
Smarting from the set-back, henceforth it decided to send no currency
other than Spanish rials to Canton.25 In the report of the Trade Council
in 1780, the amount of 3,304.4.5 was reduced to 1,744.0.5, which some-
what appeased the discomfiture of the High Government. When the
Trade Council requested the High Government to send a quantity of
ducats to supplement a short fall in funds,26 the High Government
replied, although the amount demanded was not great, it was not able to
satisfy this requirement, because it had no supplies of that particular coin
at that moment. The High Government therefore suggested that, should
the Trade Council judge that the ducats really would be useful in future,
it should address itself to the China Committee on this matter.27
3. Complement of equipment and personnel
Throughout the whole of the eighteenth century, the voyage from the
Dutch Republic to Batavia took the VOC ships 245 days on average.28
Small wonder that after such a long voyage, during which illness on
board, bad weather, faulty navigation, or structural defects often plagued
the VOC ships, many problems with the equipment and crew of the ships
were bound to appear upon arrival in Batavia. All these matters had to be
straightened out on the spot, if this were humanly possible, during the
two-week sojourn of the China ships in Batavia, so that they would be
able to continue the voyage to Canton in fresh heart.
Although most ships were still structurally sound, they often required
some repairs to the rigging and damaged equipment always needed to be
replaced. The High Government would provide all kinds of assistance by
supplying carpenters to assist in the repairs or in making new equipment 
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on the island of Onrust in the roadstead of Batavia (see Illustration 1),
where most of the “Batavia goods” for the China trade were also stored in
the warehouses.29 Whenever it was obvious that a China-bound ship
would not arrive in Batavia on time, or when a ship was very unseawor-
thy on arrival, according to the instructions of the China Committee the
High Government had to replace these ships with ships of its own, in
order to make up the required number of the China-bound ships and
hereby avoid the Company suffering a loss on the trade. From the 1760s
to 1794, incidents of this kind occurred at least ten times, the years 1771-
1775 being particularly bad.30
After the China-bound ships anchored in Batavia, an assessment of the
situation often revealed that a number of ship’s officers and crew had died
during the voyage, or that some of them were seriously ill, either suffer-
ing ill health because of rigours of the voyage or stricken upon arrival by
some of the tropical diseases rife in Batavia,31 rendering them unfit for
duty. In order to man the ships properly for the rest of the voyage, the
positions of these people would be taken over by men recruited in Batavia
by the High Government. Sometimes the China Committee asked the
High Government to complement the crew with extra carpenters and
sailors. When this happened it was probably prompted by a dearth of
recruits in the Dutch Republic.32 Such requests for complementary per-
sonnel could also come from the Dutch factory in Canton. Instances of
this kind were not frequent, but a few references can still be found in the
NFC records. In 1765, for example, the Trade Council in Canton
requested the High Government to send ten soldiers for the factory, a
request with which the High Government complied.33
4. Assistance with instructions
Theoretically, the trade representatives in China fell under the authority
of the China Committee in the Dutch Republic and they carried on the
Company business each trading season in compliance with the instruc-
tions which the China Committee had laid down drawing on the expe-
rience of the past Company business with China. In practice, however,
circumstances in China had often changed from the time at which the
China Committee had drawn up the instructions to the moment at which
they were handed to the Trade Council almost a year later.
Given the enormous distance and the time lapse in communication, it
is understandable that the instructions of the China Committee could
never cover all aspects of the problems which the trade representatives
came across each season. Such matters could touch upon the Company
business but their daily life in China also raised a number of perplexing
situations. Some common problems could best be dealt with by the 
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Illustration 1  View of the Island of Onrust, near Batavia, from at sea in 1779
Etching by Mattheus de Sallieth in 1779, with ships in the forefront, the shipyard on the
left and the walls of a fort on the right, 328x418 mm. 
Source: Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, inventory number RP-P-1911-293.
CHAPTER TWO52
supercargoes on their own authority, but other complications could not
be solved without further instructions from their directors. If and when
such tricky situations presented themselves, the High Government was
obviously the nearest authority which the supercargoes in China could
consult.
Before 1760, the Chinese authorities forced the trade representatives of
the European companies to leave China after the trading season. This
proved very inconvenient for the servants of these companies if they had
been unable to finish their business in time. The solution hit upon by the
China Committee originally was to instruct the trade representatives to
sail back to Batavia, as they had done in the past. Should this be the case,
all the ship’s officers and crew in Batavia would fall under the command
of the High Government. The regulation extended to the ships and their
cargoes. This meant in effect that the supercargoes and their assistants
should adjust themselves to the regulations of Batavia and write their
business report to the High Government.34 As it so happened, this even-
tuality never materialized, because shortly after 1759 the Chinese author-
ities granted the European supercargoes permission to stay in Macao dur-
ing the off-season.35 As a result, after 1760 the Dutch trade representatives
in China changed their custom of writing a business report yearly to the
High Government to writing an annual missive.36 The responses of the
High Government to the supercargoes’ missive were communicated via
what was known as an “instruction”, which supplemented the instruc-
tions of the China Committee to the Trade Council in China.37
Usually, the supercargoes’ missives and the instructions of the High
Government were considered regular business correspondence carried on
between the two places, and the contents covered such matters as the
prices for which the goods sent by the High Government were sold in
Canton, how much tin or pepper the High Government should send for
next season and so on. In case of an emergency, the supercargoes in China
would send a report to Batavia and await the instructions of the High
Government. These reports were transported either on the homeward-
bound China ships, Chinese junks, or other European private vessels.
Most often, the replies of the High Government were sent on Chinese
junks or Portuguese private ships.
In 1776, for instance, the supercargoes in Canton reported that, at the
behest of the Estado da India in Goa, the Senate of Macao planned to
expel the Dutch supercargoes from their rented accommodation in that
city in the following off-season. The Dutch Trade Council, therefore,
requested the High Government to intervene and solicit the Government
of Goa not to carry out its design. The High Government resolved not to
take this step but instructed the supercargoes to submit a memorial to the
Macao Government. Simultaneously, the High Government gave an ulti-
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matum to the captains of the Portuguese ships from Macao, lying at
anchor in Batavia. It declared that should the Macao Government treat
the Dutch trade representatives badly during their annual stay in Macao,
it would no longer allow the Macao ships to trade at Batavia in future.
The High Government also wrote to the trade representatives in China
suggesting they should make their representations to the Macao
Government in “a modest and fitting manner”, intimating that the High
Government favoured the Portuguese traders from Macao in Batavia,
especially those trading with Timor who stopped over at Batavia, with
facilities and conveniences, above all other Europeans. Batavia therefore
also expected the same favours would be extended to its Company ser-
vants in Macao.38 This had the desired effect. Had it not, the High
Government would not have sent a letter to the Trade Council in 1779
informing the latter that it had continued to deal benevolently with the
supplying and transporting of the crew of the wrecked Portuguese ship
the Estrela de Aurora.39
In 1779, the Trade Council informed the High Government that an
affray had occurred between English and Dutch sailors at Whampoa on
29 November 1778. The Dutch spoke of “a big national dispute”, while
the English considered it just an insignificant quarrel between “a pack of
drunken seamen”.40 The conflict arose after the sale of arrack to English
sailors by Dutch sailors at what was known as the bankzaal 41 on the
Danes Island in the roadstead of Whampoa near Canton. The drunken
English sailors chopped down the Dutch flagstaff and towed it on board
one of the English ships. The Dutch supercargoes took this as a national
affront and insisted that the flagstaff should be replaced and the flag
should be hoisted by an English officer, otherwise they would report the
affair to the authorities in Batavia as well as those in the Dutch Republic.
The English supercargoes agreed to compensate for a new flag and staff,
but since, in their opinion, the Dutch were the aggressors, they refused to
make any further “honourable reparation”.42 Having read the supercar-
goes’ account, the High Government, probably considering it as an
affront as well, referred this affair to the Gentlemen Seventeen and
ordered the supercargoes not to offer people on the incoming ships any
arrack in future and to ban the sale of arrack at the Dutch bankzaal.43
No later than July 1780, the High Government had heard rumours
about an imminent war between the Dutch Republic and Britain. In July,
the High Government instructed the Trade Council that should the
supercargoes receive confirmation that indeed a war had broken out
before the departure of the four Dutch China ships, they should let all
four ships sail from Whampoa in convoy at the end of December; if the
departure of the ships was a number of days earlier or later, the vessels
should anchor together with the ships of those nations with which the
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Dutch Republic was at peace. But if the supercargoes received no further
news of any war before the ships were due to sail, these ships should
depart at the usual time and the ship’s officers should proceed very care-
fully along their customary route, flying no flags or pennants until they
found themselves in the vicinity of the islands off Malacca, where the
High Government would send cruisers to meet them.44 In July 1781,
upon having received confirmation of the outbreak of the war, the High
Government at once informed the supercargoes in China that the English
had already launched hostilities in the Indian Ocean as well as the South
China Sea, and instructed them to do their utmost to protect the
Company servants and goods in China. Mindful of its responsibilities,
the High Government looked for opportunities to send provisions and
other necessities for the Canton factory on the Portuguese ships from
Macao.45 This was deemed essential because no China ships were expect-
ed from the Dutch Republic and Chinese junks also ran the risk of being
attacked by English ships as the English captains knew that Chinese junks
often shipped goods on the account of the VOC.46 In the following years,
it transpired even the Macao ships were not safe from English attacks.47
Benefits to Batavia from the direct China trade
In return for the substantial contribution by Batavia to the direct China
trade, the China Committee permitted the High Government to direct
the trade representatives in China to purchase the Chinese merchandise
ordered for this colony. These goods were essential not only to the daily
supplies in Batavia itself and local use, but were also highly necessary to
the intra-Asian trade. The most sought-after commodity was Chinese
gold which was crucial to the Indian textile trade. Payment for these
goods by the High Government was delivered in two kinds: silver bullion
and goods. The bulk of the silver bullion was taken from the general cap-
ital which was sent out to the East Indies from the Dutch Republic every
season. The goods which were collected in Batavia by the High
Government could include exceedingly pricey articles for which there was
a ready market in China such as trepang, agar-agar, shark-fin, and bird’s
nests from the East Indies, pearl dust from Ceylon, or blue dye and tex-
tiles from India.
1. Commodities for use in Batavia
The commodities which the High Government desired to receive includ-
ed medicinal materials, porcelain,48 Nanking linen, spelter and other
minor articles.49 All these commodities generally served for the use of the
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High Government itself but could be resold to such local shops in Batavia
as the apothecaries, small china shops as well as grocery shops.50
The medicinal materials were rhubarb, musk, China root, and galin-
gale. In the eighteenth century, rhubarb was used as a laxative. The best
quality was harvested at the end of winter and was purported to possess
numerous curative properties. Because it was grown in northern China,
its price in Canton tended to be quite high.51
Musk is used as the basis of numerous perfumes. Good musk is a dark
purplish colour, dry, smooth, and unctuous to the touch, and bitter in
taste. It dissolves in boiling water to the extent of about one-half; alcohol
takes up one-third of the substance, and ether and chloroform dissolve
still less. The musk imported from China was most valued.52
China root was used by apothecaries in the seventeenth century and
was already regarded as an outstanding remedy for all sorts of health prob-
lems caused by colds, such as gout, headaches, a weak stomach, the shiv-
ers, and so on. It was also supposed to possess the inestimable quality of
conferring immunity from smallpox. The essential oils extracted from
galingale were used in the making of liqueurs and the brewing of beer.53
The medicinal materials were in high demand in Batavia, because it
was a large town whose population was crammed together in a relatively
small space. It was also a bustling port which attracted numerous overseas
visitors. Adding to its unhealthy living conditions was the fact that it was
located in a low, swamp area, which had an oppressively humid climate,
and after 1733 the fishponds built by the Batavian residents on the silted
up coastal strip in front of the town formed the ideal breeding ground for
the malaria mosquito.54 It had earned a dubious reputation as the “grave-
yard of the East”.55 The Chinese medicinal materials were very efficacious
in helping to treat the tropical diseases which plagued the East Indies and
were in popular use in contagion-ridden Batavia.
Compared to other textiles, Nanking linen was a much cheaper and
lighter cloth and was therefore also attractive to the Chinese in South-east
Asia. During the 1760s and prior to 1775, Nanking linen was ordered by
the High Government a couple of times in its natural colour, but from
1775 to 1781 it was shipped almost every year and the buff or yellow-
coloured textile constituted the major part of the purchases. Most proba-
bly the population increase around Batavia in the 1770s had a bearing on
this soaring demand for this cloth.56 The reason for the yellow colour is
an interesting topic for speculation.
Spelter is also called tutenague. The crude spelter was extracted in
China by open-cast mining. Later it was smelted down with the other
metals just mentioned in Canton and cast into ingots in the form of
“pigs”, which weighed about 60 pounds.57 One of the main uses of spel-
ter was to cast coins, but it was also essential to the making of brass for
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the manufacture of all sorts of utensils. Spelter also proved useful as bal-
last.
After the China Committee had taken charge of the direct trade with
China, the High Government was instructed to organize its own trans-
port of the goods destined for Batavia. There was no direct prohibition on
using the Company’s China ships for transport, but the China
Committee probably considered that the transfer of goods for Batavia
from Company ships onto cruisers sent from Batavia might slow down
the homeward-bound China ships as they passed through the Sunda
Strait. Because time was an essential factor, it encouraged the High
Government to employ Chinese junks for this transport, as the shipping
traffic of Chinese junks between Batavia and China was a time-honoured,
satisfactory custom, which was very advantageous to this colony.58
Obviously, when it came to dealing with actual conditions, the High
Government did not put all its eggs in one basket but made use of the var-
ious means of transport at its disposal. During a couple of seasons in the
first half of the 1760s, only Chinese junks were employed to transport the
goods from Canton to Batavia. In January 1764, for example, two
Chinese junks, named the Sam-con(g)-hing and the Sweehing, left Canton
bound for Batavia with porcelain, rhubarb, musk, China root, and galin-
gale, Nanking linen and other minor articles.59 And in January and
February 1765, the junks the Eckthaaij 60 and the Sweehing each carried
similar goods and general letters from the Dutch supercargoes plus their
reflections on the business in Canton to the High Government.61 In
1767, the Company ships the Vrouwe Margaretha Maria and the Geijn-
wensch were used to transport the goods for Batavia on their return
voyage.62
After 1768, the High Government started to make use of both the
Company’s China ships and of Chinese junks or Portuguese vessels to
transport the goods demanded. In September 1768, the Company ships
the Willem de Vijfde and the Paauw carried China root and galingale,
musk and rhubarb;63 and in February 1769, the Chinese junks the
Eckthaaij and the Honka 64 brought the same articles, supplemented by
porcelain and spelter, to Batavia.65 Late in the same year, the Company
ship the Oostcapelle and the Portuguese ships the St Catharina and the
St Louis, which sailed between Macao and South-east Asia, in particular
Batavia and Timor, were used to transport the “Batavia” goods.66 After-
wards, the Portuguese vessels were frequently used in 1772 and 1777-
1781,67 and English private ships also did their stint to transport the
goods for Batavia in 1773, 1774, and 1776.68
When Chinese junks were engaged to undertake the transportation, as
a rule the nachoda was requested by the Dutch supercargoes to sign a con-
tract pertaining to the shipment and delivery of goods. In the contract,
BATAVIA’S ROLE IN THE DIRECT CHINA TRADE 57
the assortments and quantities of the goods were listed in order, and the
nachoda then declared that he promised to hand over all the goods listed
dry and in good condition in Batavia on the completion of a safe journey.
Should the goods be found in any way deficient on arrival at Batavia, the
nachoda would be obliged to make up for the loss. Two identical contracts
were drawn up and should the one be fulfilled, the other would automat-
ically become void. After delivery of the goods, the nachoda would receive
the freight fare in Batavia.69 And, in the contract signed between the
supercargoes and the captains of the Company ships, the captains
declared that, on their safe arrival in the vicinity of the Northern Islands
near the Sunda Strait, they would transfer the goods to the waiting cruis-
ers, which would be dispatched from Batavia.70
As early as 1763, the High Government sent a regulation to the Trade
Council in Canton stipulating that, in order to relieve the traffic between
Batavia and Canton all the more, it banned the export of trepang, bird’s
nests and agar-agar by all foreign Europeans, as well as the import of all
sorts of Chinese goods claimed by other foreign Europeans into Batavia,
under penalty of confiscation. There was an extra warning to the nachodas
of the Chinese junks sailing from Batavia that they were forbidden to
carry any goods at freight for other European nations on their return to
Batavia. Should they be in breach of the regulation, their junks and their
cargoes would be impounded by the High Government.71
Fourteen years later, in 1777, such a violation was discovered. When
the High Government took delivery of the goods which it had ordered
from the English private ship the Nancy, the authorities discovered many
packages, cases, chests, and bales on board this ship, which had been
brought on the account of the private residents in Batavia. The High
Government took immediate action and announced that it would not
tolerate any such trade between foreign Europeans and the Dutch citizens
in Batavia.72 It banned the import of all sorts of Chinese goods which
were claimed by the foreign Europeans either for themselves or for 
others, at freight or on order, under penalty of confiscation. The trade
representatives in Canton were also strictly instructed that no company or
private goods which were the property of foreign Europeans should be
sent to Batavia and that those goods for Batavia should either be trans-
ported on the Company’s China ships, or on the Chinese junks or Macao
vessels which headed to Batavia annually for trade.73
The demands for the commodities for use in Batavia were generally
fulfilled by the trade representatives in Canton, but in some years the
smooth running of the system was hampered by problems with the trans-
portation of the goods. As they were subject to the vicissitudes of winds
and weather conditions and to the whims of nature, some vessels were
either delayed on arrival or captured by inimical ships. In the early spring
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of 1770, the High Government received the goods demanded, consisting
of 255,658 pounds of spelter and twelve chests of porcelain, from the
junk the Honka. But the other expected junk, the Eckthaaij, which also
left Canton in 1769 with the demanded 244,341 pounds of spelter and
fourteen chests of porcelain, did not arrive in Batavia on time. The same
fate had befallen the Wonchan (or Wongsong),74 which had already left in
1768 with forty-two chests of porcelain.75 On 27 April 1782, Daniel
Diederick van Haak, Chief Clerk of the General Secretary,76 reported to
the High Government that the Cantonese junk the Thaij-an, bound for
Batavia, had been captured by captain John McClary of the English pri-
vateer the Dadoloy in the Bangka Strait, and all its cargo had been seized
as prize under the pretext that these goods belonged to the VOC.77 In
1784, the supercargoes in Canton were informed that the Macao ship the
St Antonio with the goods demanded for Batavia had been plundered by
the same captain on 27 February of the previous year.78
2. Gold for the intra-Asian trade
Gold played an important role in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC.
Optimizing its position in the intra-Asian trade, the VOC purchased and
sold gold in several regions in Asia. It is impossible to extrapolate a com-
plete picture of the movement of gold from the general trade ledger of
Batavia,79 but generally speaking, as far as its sources of gold were con-
cerned, the High Government procured this metal in three ways – by
sending Company ships to Japan; by purchasing it in Batavia from
Chinese junks from South China; and by exploiting its own gold-mines
in Sumatra. Naturally, the next question is what became of this gold but
the answer is not as straightforward as it would seem at first sight. It is no
secret that the High Government sent the gold to India (the Coromandel
Coast) to pay its way in the textile trade.
Of all the gold suppliers of the VOC, Japan was the prime source in
the seventeenth century. Initially there had been more interest in silver,
but in 1668 the Tokugawa government issued a decree banning the export
of silver. Relying on a fund of precious metal to finance its Asian trade,
the VOC then turned to the Japanese gold coins, the so-called koban,
which could also be used profitably on the Coromandel Coast. Up to that
time the VOC had mainly purchased gold coins by trading with the
Chinese via Formosa, but Koxinga’s conquest of this important commer-
cial centre in 1662 had put a stop to this trade.80
Towards the end of the 1660s, discoveries of large deposits of gold were
made in Japan, and the VOC acquired great quantities of gold at low
prices. An export boom in gold developed in the years around 1670. But
all good things come to an end: the Japanese raised the price of koban
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from 56 to 58 maces in 1670 and from 58 to 68 maces in 1672. This
price hike slowed down the VOC export and a marked decrease in the
quota of gold in the export figures can be traced in the years which fol-
lowed. The next hurdle which presented itself was a temporary ban on the
export of gold in the years 1685-1686. This measure was taken because
the Japanese feared that the large amount exported would cause a short-
age of their currency. Despite such hindrances, it should be noted that the
VOC export of gold from Japan never dried up completely, even though
during the following decades, it mainly set its sights on the third coining
metal in which Japan was rich, copper.81
The Japanese debased their gold coins from 85.69 to 56.41 touch82 in
1696, without any reduction in its silver price.83 The new gold koban con-
tained a lower percentage of gold than had the old coins, but was kept at
the same weight. The Company had no option but to accept them at the
same price as before. This meant that the koban, which had previously
been sold at a profit on the Coromandel Coast, now made a loss of about
15 per cent. A further debasement of the gold coin in 1720 caused this
figure to rise to 37 or 38 per cent. In spite of the loss, the Company still
continued the export of koban from Japan right down to 1752, albeit with
an interruption from 1739 to 1742. Although at first sight this did not
make good economic sense, the Company seldom made such a decision
without good reason. In this instance the consideration was that the coins
provided a steady supply of money for the trade with the Coromandel
Coast, and the course was partly adopted because, apart from copper, the
Japanese commercial restrictions meant that no other good alternatives
were available. The compromise seems to have been satisfactory for a
while at least. During the 1730s there was a distinct slump and export
figures fell drastically. For the period 1701-1724, the VOC had exported
an amount of slightly below 300,000 koban to the Coromandel Coast
from Japan and, by doing so, had sustained a total loss of more than 1½
million guilders, which was handsomely compensated by the profits made
on the trade in Coromandel textiles.84
In 1752, the High Government found a substitute for the Japanese
gold to pay for its Indian textile trade, namely Chinese gold, in Canton.
Until 1756, each season one (or two) of the homeward-bound ships
unloaded this gold for the High Government when they put in in
Batavia.85 It is not surprising that this practice ceased shortly after the
High Government transferred the control of the China trade to the China
Committee. Nevertheless, the High Government was not left high and
dry for it received permission to continue the gold trade in another way,
by asking the trade representatives to buy gold in Canton. Unfortunately,
the relief at this respite was short lived. The Chinese gold trade lasted a
short period of thirteen years and was abandoned in 1765 because against
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the expectations of the High Government every year the price of gold in
Canton rose spectacularly.
The instructions of the China Committee spelled out that should some
capital be left over after the purchase of the return cargoes in Canton, the
supercargoes could spend what remained on purchasing gold for Batavia.
If it was impossible to buy as much gold as the High Government
required, the remaining funds should be taken back to Batavia with the
gold purchased. It was one of those instances in which the wish was the
father to the thought and reality provided cold comfort. After the late
1750s, the supercargoes did keep the remainder of the capital for the pur-
chase of gold, but they seldom spent it in full before the departure of the
Company ships. When this happened they held the money in reserve for
the next trading season.86 For example, when they were sent 427,876.18.9
guilders from Batavia in 1763, the supercargoes still had funds remaining
from the previous season, plus a stock of clove oil, Ceylonese pearl dust
and blue dye. They were ordered to spend these on the purchase of 4,500
taels of gold.87
In contrast to the transport of other goods for Batavia, gold could only
be shipped by the homeward-bound China ships, as stipulated in the
instruction of the China Committee. There are two feasible explanations
for this: a lack of trust in the seaworthiness of foreign vessels and the hon-
esty of their crews or the fear of pirates in the South China Sea. These
China ships carrying only goods for Europe and gold for Batavia were
under orders to head straight for the Netherlands on the homeward-
bound journey without stopping at Batavia. In order to obtain its gold,
the High Government sent a well-armed cruiser to the Northern Islands
near the Sunda Strait, through which the homeward-bound China ships
would definitely pass. There it would heave to and wait to tranship the
gold and transfer it to Batavia as quickly as possible.
After this discussion of the capital reserved for gold and its transport, a
short history of the gold trade between Canton and Batavia is in order to
fill out the picture. In the season 1758-1759, the trade representatives
experienced no difficulty in contracting with the Chinese merchants in
Canton for gold at 123 taels of silver of 90 touch per 10 taels of gold, but
in 1760 they realized that the high price demanded and the scarcity of
gold would make it impossible to satisfy the High Government any
longer and none of the Chinese merchants was willing to deliver the gold
below 146.2.5 taels of silver of 90 touch per 10 taels of gold, which was
18.9 per cent more expensive than in the year 1758. But in November
1760, the security merchants of the Dutch Company, Tsja Hunqua, in
conjunction with Semqua, Tan Chetqua and Swetja, offered 100 schuit-
jes 88 for 130 – later decreased to 120 and then 118 – taels of silver of 80
touch per 10 taels of gold. The supercargoes considered the price to be
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2.61 per cent higher than in 1758 and 1759 and refused to accept the
offer, although they had received an instruction of the High Government
to buy more than 50,000 silver taels worth of gold at any price. The Trade
Council disobeyed the instruction of the High Government, reasoning
that the High Government would never have expected such an extreme
increase in the price of gold and that the purchase of gold at such a high
price would be disadvantageous to the Company. There was yet another,
added danger. Purchasing gold at so high a price might lead the Chinese
to imagine that the Dutch could still make money on its sale elsewhere
even at such an excessive price. Finally, after laborious negotiations on
19 November, the trade representatives made a contract with Tsja
Hunqua stating that, in the following year on 1 November or before the
departure of the last ship, Tsja Hunqua would deliver 4,500 taels of
Nanking gold of 90 touch at a price of 117 taels of silver for 10 taels of
gold to the Dutch, a deal which was roughly equal to 54,263.2.3.8 taels
of silver.
In accounting for the 4,500 taels of gold which were purchased in 1760
and sent to Batavia in 1762, the trade representatives explained in their
report to the High Government that they had not valued 100 touch of
gold at 24 carat or 373.2.51/3 guilders, as the High Government had
ordered, but appreciated 90 touch equal to 22½ carat or 349.15.15
guilders, because they had been forced to agree to this with the Com-
pany’s trading partners during the negotiations in the season 1758-1759.
Simultaneously, they had to assay with test-needles how the Chinese per-
centage in touch compared with its Dutch counterpart in carats. Each
time before entering into a contract, the Dutch supercargoes reminded
the gold merchants that they would test the value of the gold with the
Dutch test-needles. Despite such solemn warnings, they discovered that
the Chinese never gave them a true report of the exact percentage of gold
and therefore they still needed to reforge the gold by themselves.89
After delaying the conclusion of the contract for the 7,750 taels of gold
of 90 touch demanded by Batavia in 1763, at the end of 1764, during a
meeting of the Trade Council the supercargoes resolved to contract the
gold of 90 touch at a price of 125 taels for a sum of 80,000 taels of silver
for the forthcoming season. But no Chinese merchant was willing to
enter into such a contract. The supercargoes finally persuaded their secu-
rity merchants, who owed the Dutch Company 139,178.6.9.2 taels of sil-
ver, to accept a contract for gold of 90 touch at 114.5 taels for the 45,000
taels of silver, and wrote to Batavia for approval.90 In July 1765, the High
Government in its instruction replied that this deal was very much against
its expectations because the price was too high for it to make any reason-
able profit on the trade.91
This spelled the real end to the gold trade. After 1765 practically no
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more gold was purchased for the High Government,92 although for sever-
al years in a row it still kept on reminding the trade representatives to
keep the purchase of gold in mind should the opportunity arise. It was a
forlorn hope, as the supercargoes declared there was not even the slight-
est hint of a drop in the price of gold. On the contrary, it even rose much
higher.93
Conclusion
As far as the High Government was concerned in the new setup of the
direct China trade under the management of the China Committee, it
rather reluctantly had to play two painful roles: one of a great contribu-
tor and the other of a poor beneficiary. None the less, from the angle of
the Gentlemen Seventeen, the loss of the local interest of Batavia actual-
ly worked out well for the general interests of the Company.
As a great contributor, the High Government was cast in the role of
supporting the direct China trade by offering and supplying all kinds of
assistance which would ensure the successful management of its own erst-
while responsibility by the China Committee. All this assistance was
indispensable and essential. Of course, the most significant contribution
was in the supply of trade goods. The East Indies goods supplied by the
High Government, in conjunction with the precious metals and other
European goods sent from the Dutch Republic, was the fundamental
guarantee of the boom in the VOC tea exports from the Canton market.
Considering how much the High Government contributed to the China
trade, it came off a poor second. The goods demanded for Batavia were
more often than not sent on Chinese junks or the vessels of other nations
than dispatched on the homeward-bound China ships of the VOC, and
the Chinese gold trade between Batavia and Canton was but a short-lived
enterprise, quenched by the steep increase in the purchase price of gold in
Canton. In fact, this change in value, of course, could not be blamed on
the administrative reforms of the Company but was a cogent reflection of
developments in the Chinese economy itself.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PURCHASE OF THE “VOC TEAS” IN CANTON
Introduction
Before the establishment of the China Committee in 1756, the trade
representatives of the VOC did their business in Canton on the orders of
the High Government, which had organized the China trade for two
decades since 1735. After the conclusion of their transactions in Canton,
they would return to Batavia on the China ships. All this changed the
moment the China Committee took control of the direct China trade in
1756. From that time on, the trade representatives were obliged to com-
ply with the instructions of the China Committee. After the Canton trade
had been fully institutionalized following the official confirmation of the
Canton System in 1760,1 the trade representatives were no longer obliged
to sail back to Batavia but were permitted by the Chinese authorities to
spend each off-season in Macao.2
Under these new conditions two significant changes in the China trade
occurred. As a matter of course, the trade representatives in Canton now
received their ultimate instructions directly from the China Committee
in the Dutch Republic and in their turn reported back all the information
on the Canton market more quickly than they had been able to before.
Their local situation also changed for the better because, as the trade rep-
resentatives no longer had to leave China on the China ships upon their
departure, they were now supplied with more opportunities to negotiate
the tea business with the Chinese supplying agents during the off-season.
The most advantageous aspect of this new approach was that it made it
possible for the trade representatives to sample and test a greater range of
teas. Consequently their selection was much improved. Inevitably, the
longer the trade representatives remained in China, the more closely they
found themselves involved in the tea market. Ultimately this was of the
greatest possible help to the China Committee when it was drawing up
more apposite instructions for the purchase of the “VOC teas” in the next
season.
The long and the short of the story was that the trade representatives’
business in Canton entered a more favourable conjunction which contin-
ued unbroken until the early 1780s when the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
(1780-1784) broke out and the British Commutation Act (1784) was put
in effect greatly to the detriment of the Dutch. For the time being, 
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during this halcyon period, a well functioning mode of transaction was
established between the trade representatives of the VOC and the Chinese
tea-supplying agents in Canton.
The “VOC teas”
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, China remained the only major
supplier of export tea to the world market.3 The tea exported from China
for the world market can be divided into three general sorts: green tea; black
tea; and oolong tea. At the beginning of the trade towards the end of the
seventeenth century, China exported only green tea. This changed at the
beginning of the eighteenth century when black tea, which can be preserved
much longer since the moisture has been removed during the process of
manufacture, began to claim a slice of the market in the wake of increasing
demand by the European companies. With this kind of tea, spoilage would
be avoided on the months-long homeward voyage to Europe. In later
years oolong tea also emerged as a much sought after variety and began to
claim an important role in the tea export of China.
All teas come from the same plant: Camellia sinensis (Illustration 2).4
After it is planted, the tea tree needs little care; and when it is three or four
years old, it can be plucked three or four times annually, in other words,
its production is seasonal. The first picking takes place in mid-spring;
after two or three weeks, the second picking starts, and then follows a
third and sometimes a fourth. All these pickings must be completed sev-
enty to eighty days before autumn begins. The freshly plucked tea leaves
must be cured by heating (under the sun to encourage fermentation, if it
is for black tea), roasting, and rolling. Leaf-curing usually takes place on
the night of the day the leaves are picked. The quality of the tea depends
on whether the picking and curing are completed within a certain period
of time. The best tea comes from the first leaf-picking as long as the har-
vest is cured on time.5 Green tea, also known as unfermented tea, appears
green because the chlorophyll (or green-plant pigment) still remains in
the tea leaves and retains some of their moisture. The primary processing
of green tea includes fixation, rolling, and drying. Black tea is 100 per cent
fermented during the process of manufacture, which includes four proce-
dures: withering, rolling, fermenting, and drying. Oolong tea is a partially
fermented tea with 20 to 50 per cent of fermentation, combining the best
qualities of green and black teas. It encapsulates the clarity and fragrance
of green tea, with the refreshment and strength of black tea. True to its
merits, the processing of oolong tea includes no less than six procedures:
sunshine withering; tedding the fresh leaves; rocking green; stir-fry green;
rolling; and drying.6
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The teas purchased by the trade representatives of the VOC in Canton
during the period concerned were the green and black teas of the afore-said
three kinds. Their principal sources of supply were two regions, namely the
south-easternmost part of Anhui Province and the Wuyi Mountains 
stretching along the border of the Provinces of Fujian and Jiangxi .7
Chinese black tea originates from the Wuyi Mountains. Originally,
Bohea (the local pronunciation of Wuyi) evolved in Chong’an
County ( , Wuyi Mountain City in what is now Fujian Province) in
the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).8 Compared to other varieties Bohea
was dismissed as a black tea of an inferior sort. Despite the disdain of con-
noisseurs, it still occupied the biggest part of the European purchases in
Canton because of its cheap price. Souchong , a unique black tea
of high quality from the Wuyi Mountains, had a fragrance of smoked
pine which put it into an altogether different class to Bohea. The finest
quality Souchong was made of large leaves of great succulence and
extreme delicacy gathered in fine, clear weather during the greatest heat
of the day.9 Congou was a refined sort of Souchong, and was
obtained from the fifth and largest leaf gathered from shoot tips of the
branch of a tea tree. The processing of Congou, which required time and
patience, was meticulously carried out, making sure to eliminate any dust,
fannings, or twigs. Pekoe was a very fine black tea, rivalling
Souchong, and much sought after by the VOC.10 It was made from the
leaves around the buds at the end of the stem. The unopened leaf was
often covered with a silvery dawn for forty-eight hours after it opened.11
Besides this range of teas, small quantities of Ankay , a low-quality
black tea from Anxi County were also often bought by the trade rep-
resentatives to blend with Bohea, Congou, or even Souchong, in order to
maintain an even quality.12
The bulk of the green tea sent to Canton to be sold to the European
companies was processed in two areas in the south-eastern part of Anhui
Province. One was the district forming the shape of a reversed triangle
with its apex at Wuyuan at the southern tip of the province13 and its
base extending from Xiuning in the east to Qimen in the west,
where the teas known as Hyson , Hyson skin originated.
Hyson was processed in twisted, long, thin leaves which unfurled slowly
to emit a fragrant, astringent taste. It has been defined as warm, sunny,
and spring-like, reflecting both the colour and the season in which Hyson
was harvested;14 Hyson skin was processed from the light, inferior leaves
which were separated from the better quality Hyson by a winnower.
The other green tea area was a belt of territory stretching north-west from
Tunxi , located slightly south-east of Xiuning, through the Yellow
Mountains (or Huangshan ) and Taiping to the northernmost point









Map 3  The “VOC tea”-producing areas and the routes of transporting teas to Canton
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derived.15 Songlo was one sort of green tea with a thick blade but a thin
vein, which was produced since the early Ming Dynasty and was well-
known for its dark green colour, lasting pure aroma, and strong but mel-
low taste.16 Twankay, which was compared to “Green Gold”, was devel-
oped on the basis of Songlo but was of a much higher quality. It was orig-
inally produced in the areas adjacent to Tunxi. Gunpowder tea ( ,
Joosjes in the Dutch records) was known as “pearl” tea because it was
rolled into small balls resembling gunpowder pellets of a dark green
colour. It has a mellow but tangy taste.17 Imperial tea ( , Bing in
the Dutch records) had a stunning, distinctively bright green colour and
an unusual spiky appearance. Its striking leaves emitted an enchanting
floral aroma and an unexpected depth of flavour which “[…] can be craft-
ed just once a year and only then if all aspects of climate, cultivation, har-
vesting and manufacture come together to produce just the right combi-
nation of conditions needed to produce the ultimate expression of green
tea art”.18 Gunpowder tea and Imperial tea most likely originated from
both areas with a long history.
The “VOC teas” in the period under study consisted of all the above-
mentioned black and green teas. The origin of the names of the teas var-
ied. Bohea, Ankay, Songlo, and Twankay were called after their produc-
tion sites: the counties of Wuyi, Anxi, and Tunxi, and the hills of Songluo.
Souchong (Xiaozhong, or “small sort”) and Congou (Gongfu, or “elabo-
rately prepared tea”) were designated according to their different process-
ing methods. Hyson and Hyson skin were named after the inventor of
this method of processing green tea. Pekoe (Baihao, or “white hair”) and
Gunpowder tea (Zhucha, or “pearl tea”) derived their nomenclature from
their colour and shape. Imperial tea was acclaimed for its exceptional use
– excellent-quality green tea worthy of being served to the Imperial fam-
ily.
Before the teas destined for the European market arrived in Canton,
they had already made a long journey from the tea-cultivating areas all the
way to the south. The first stage of their travels began when the processed
tea was collected by tea peddlers who went from village to village. They
did so either on their own initiative or as intermediaries for the whole-
salers. The collected tea was then sold to the latter, who also acquired sup-
plies directly from the tea cultivators. It was the wholesalers who mixed,
blended, and packed the teas in their stores in the tea-distributing centres.
They sold the tea on to merchants who had contacts with the Canton-
European market and who had their own guilds and special warehouses
in Canton. Sometimes the distinction between the wholesalers and tea
merchants was blurred.
When the teas were ready for transport, they were shipped to Canton
along traditional as well as alternative routes (see Map 3). Along the tra-
(
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ditional route, black tea was first transported by river raft from the mar-
ket town of Xingcun in the heart of the Wuyi Mountains to
Chong’an County, and then the porters carried it over tortuous mountain
roads to the Qianshan River in the neighbouring province of
Jiangxi. Via the Qianshan River, the tea was shipped down to Qianshan
(or Hekou ) and then on to Poyang Lake via the Yu River 
Crossing Poyang Lake , the tea boats sailed up to Nanchang 
on the Gan River . From Nanchang, they sailed upstream to Dayu
County . From there, the tea cargoes were carried over the Meiling
Mountains to Nanxiong in the north of Guangdong Province
. At Nanxiong, the tea was again loaded on boats and shipped down
to Canton via the Bei River .19 Green tea was first assembled and
transported to Wuyuan, the southernmost county of Anhui Province, and
shipped from there to Nanchang, where it joined the transport network
for black tea. This transport via the traditional route was a very arduous
one as we learn from a complaint made by the green tea merchants in
1819:20
[…] in transporting, seven times is it transhipped to different boats and at
three different passes does it pay duty; on its way it passes thro’ many dan-
gers, and it has difficulties to surmount which make the removal of it from
place [to place] a painful task.
An alternative route for black tea went from Chong’an to Fuzhou 
via the Min River , and then onwards to Canton by sea along the
coast. In the VOC time, this was not a frequent practice, as the then-
existing laws banned the exportation of black tea via Fuzhou or any other
port of Fujian Province.21 Another transport route for green and black tea
followed intermittently in the Qianlong period (1736-1795) led to
Hangzhou via the Fuchun River , and from there to Canton
by sea. Because in later years this route was often threatened by pirates
lurking along the coast, the tea merchants had no option but to return to
the inland route, which was also the most expensive, once again in 1797.22
Both black and green teas fell into the category of “VOC teas”, but the
difference of the proportion between the two kinds was strikingly great.
From 1760 until 1780, black tea consisting of four sorts (Bohea, Congou,
Souchong, and Pekoe)23 occupied of all exports 90.89 per cent on average.
Lagging far behind, green tea of which there were five or six sorts (Songlo,
Twankay, Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea, and Gunpowder tea for a
couple of years) only amounted to 9.11 per cent (see Appendix 4). As has
been said earlier, because of its dubious honour of being cheapest, Bohea
was the most favoured purchase of black tea for the Dutch, taking up
80.5 per cent of black tea. Congou, Souchong and Pekoe represented 13,




88 in 1760-1770 to 73 per cent in 1771-1780; while that of Congou rose
from 7 to 20 per cent (see Table 1). Among the green teas, in the period
1760-1780 Songlo (48.7 per cent) and Twankay (21.6 per cent) together
represented about 80 per cent of the exports, and the other 20 per cent
was made up by various other sorts (see Table 2).
Table 1  Percentage of black teas purchased by the VOC in Canton, 1760-1780
______________________________________________________________________________________
Type of 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770
black teas______________________________________________________________________________________
Bohea 87.61 86.83 89.29 88.90 91.50 86.26 86.60 82.67 89.41 87.61 85.58
Congou 6.84 7.70 6.19 6.13 4.88 7.62 8.12 11.19 4.10 5.14 8.92
Souchong 4.60 5.10 4.22 3.78 2.95 5.33 4.50 5.01 4.97 4.70 3.87
Pekoe 0.95 0.37 0.30 1.19 0.66 0.79 0.78 1.13 1.52 2.55 1.63______________________________________________________________________________________
Type of 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780
black teas______________________________________________________________________________________
Bohea 76.36 64.39 82.33 84.36 77.10 71.42 62.66 63.81 70.81 74.75
Congou 16.65 27.53 10.88 9.20 17.43 24.03 30.43 25.44 19.74 16.01
Souchong 5.73 5.69 5.33 5.11 4.43 3.11 4.50 7.91 6.74 6.54
Pekoe 1.26 2.39 1.46 1.33 1.04 1.44 2.41 2.84 2.71 2.70______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Appendix 4.
Table 2  Percentage of green teas purchased by the VOC in Canton, 1760-1780
______________________________________________________________________________________
Type of 1760 17611 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770
green teas______________________________________________________________________________________
Songlo 51.61 57.03 53.46 53.22 50.55 55.99 45.30 36.31 51.88 48.07 42.85
Twankay 24.81 21.81 23.79 16.30 23.82 28.00 18.69 30.22 18.92 20.37 28.29
Hyson 12.55 6.31 13.84 14.72 13.53 15.57 15.85 14.27 11.78 9.86 10.01
Hyson skin 7.57 10.37 6.71 11.25 9.05 — 18.86 13.85 15.59 19.48 16.19
Imperial tea 3.46 4.40 2.20 4.51 3.05 0.44 1.30 5.352 1.83 2.22 2.66______________________________________________________________________________________
Type of green teas 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780
green teas______________________________________________________________________________________
Songlo 55.55 53.80 53.44 55.21 59.91 50.30 49.12 44.43 48.38 50.43
Twankay 17.38 16.02 18.94 17.72 16.56 20.99 16.96 21.86 32.52 21.08
Hyson 11.02 15.46 9.21 9.42 10.30 16.08 15.84 12.96 9.94 12.39
Hyson skin 16.05 14.72 18.41 17.65 13.23 12.63 18.08 20.61 8.44 15.24
Imperial tea — — — — — — — — — —
Gunpowder — — — — — — — 0.14 0.72 0.86______________________________________________________________________________________
1 In this year the VOC also purchased 112½ pounds of Linchinsing tea which occupied
0.08 per cent of black teas.
2 This 5.35% includes 3.81% for Songlo-Imperial tea and 1.54% for Imperial tea.
Source: Appendix 4.
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The “VOC tea”-supplying agents
According to the Chinese regulations applying to the Canton System, tea
merchants were forbidden to pursue their business directly with the for-
eign traders in Canton. As a result, in Canton there were three customary
ways of delivering the teas into the hands of the VOC trade representa-
tives: the tea merchants sold tea to either the Hong merchants (or hangis-
ten); the shopkeepers; or even to the clerks (or schrijvers) of the Hong
merchants; and they in turn sold the tea to the VOC trade representatives.
Sometimes the tea merchants sold tea to the VOC trade representatives
via the Hong merchants as intermediaries.24
The Hong merchants, the security merchants of the VOC in particu-
lar,25 were the principal tea-supplying agents throughout the second half
of the eighteenth century. However, there was a change in the late 1760s,
even more marked after 1772, when the Co-hong (or Co-hang) was dis-
solved.26 From that point, more and more supplying agents, especially
shopkeepers, took the opportunity to join the Hong merchants in supply-
ing service on the Canton-European tea market. Most of the shopkeepers
were proprietors of porcelain shops, to which Bohea had been sent, prob-
ably to be used as a packaging material for the porcelain during trans-
portation. Besides these, some of the Hong merchants’ clerks often took
advantage of their position as intermediaries between the Hong mer-
chants and the European supercargoes to do business with the European
companies on their own account. They capitalized on the fact they could
easily acquire information about the demands for tea from the supercar-
goes as they went about their legitimate business and could therefore con-
veniently compensate for the lack of some teas from their own supply.27
Not all business required the intercession of go-betweens. What could
be qualified as more or less direct deliveries by tea merchants and peddlers
can be traced in the Dutch records of the years 1763, 1764, and 1776 at
the very least. For instance, in 1763 a certain black tea merchant, Uhn-
Sam-Ja, offered the Dutch supercargoes Bohea and Congou in the name
of Tan Chetqua, via whom he also sold his tea to the English.28 In 1764,
the country people in the tea districts were said to have sent the best
three-tenths of the tea for the Canton-European market on their own
account and to have sold the worst tea to the agents sent thither by the
Co-hong.29 In 1776, in addition to these country people, a few tea ped-
dlers also offered Bohea and Congou to the Dutch.30
Not to be outdone, the Hong merchants also sent their own agents into
the tea districts to purchase tea, in order to guarantee the tea supply for
their own businesses, bypassing the tea merchants. It is known that Swetja
annually sent his brother into the tea districts to purchase tea.31 In 1764,
Poan Keequa, Tsja Hunqua, Chetqua, and Inksja (Swetja’s successor), the
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four chief Co-hong members (or Co-hangisten) at that moment, each sent
two or more people to the Wuyi Mountains for the same purpose, and
other small members of the Co-hong sent one man each at the behest of
the Co-hong.32 On 28 January 1770, Tsja Hunqua informed the Dutch
that his son had returned from the tea districts, after having spent a part
of the capital of 100,000 taels which Hunqua had given him for the pur-
chase of the new harvest. He claimed that Bohea was amply available in
the tea districts this year, but since the quality was unsatisfactory, he had
not purchased more tea than the 6,000 piculs contracted for with the
VOC.33
Now that we have classified the various types of the “VOC tea”-supply-
ing agents in Canton, the right moment has arrived to introduce some of
the outstanding tea-supplying agents (see Appendix 3).
Swetja34 (1720-1763, Yan Ruishe , but properly Yan Shirui 
) was the first-born son of Texia (Yan Deshe , but properly Yan
Liangzhou ), one of the prominent Cantonese merchants in the
1740s. He owned and managed the Taihe Hang and died in 1751.
Swetja took over the family business in 1751 and ran it over the next
decade, with the help of his brothers. Swetja died in 1763 and was suc-
ceeded in his business and in the capacity of security merchant for the
VOC by his brother Inksja.35
Tsja Hunqua (d. 1770, Cai Ruiguan ) was involved with the
Jufeng Hang and associated with the Shunli Hang and the
Yihe Hang (probably ), but he did his main business through the
Yifeng Hang . At least five of his sons were involved in his busi-
ness, in the trade itself and helping behind the scenes: Anqua, Teonqua,
Tayqua, Sequa, and Tsjonqua, some of whom sooner or later started their
own business with the Europeans. Tsja Hunqua, in partnership with
Semqua, did much trade with the Dutch, and became the leader of the
three security merchants for the VOC until his death in May 1770.36 In
the eyes of the Dutch, Tsja Hunqua was: “The most upright of all the
Chinese who have ever passed through this world” and “[…] has never
misled us [the Dutch]”.37
Tan Chetqua (d. 1771, Chen Jieguan ) was another of the secu-
rity merchants working with the VOC. He had the unenviable reputation
for being known as an indecisive person who would take exception to
even the smallest matter.38 The name of his trading company was the
Guangshun Hang . Making his debut in 1742, Chetqua appears
fairly consistently in the Dutch records, recording his trade with them.39
He is thought to have taken over the family business sometime in 1758
or 1759, probably because of the advanced age of his father Tan Soequa
(Chen Shouguan ).40 By 1758, it was obvious he was handling the
Dutch trade by himself.41 From 1759, Chetqua’s name appears regularly
THE PURCHASE OF THE “VOC TEAS” IN CANTON 75
,
in the sources as a security merchant trading with the EIC, the VOC, and
the Danish Asiatic Company (hereafter the DAC). In the 1760s, his
youngest brother (Tan) Quyqua and another person by the name of
Houqua served as his clerks.42 The management of the family business
passed to one of his brothers named (Tan) Tinqua (Chen Dengguan
) after Chetqua died in late 1771.43
Inksja (?-1792, or Yngshaw or Ingsia, Yan Yingshe , but proper-
ly Yan Shiying ) was the second son of Texia (Yan Deshe ).
Inksja succeeded to the management of the Taihe Hang after
Swetja’s death in 1763, and became one of the VOC security merchants.
In the eyes of the Dutch supercargoes, Inksja, even though he appeared
younger than Tan Chetqua, was a man with a reputation of courageous-
ness and resoluteness,44 to whom all the companies with which he worked
accorded great credit.45 Inksja traded extensively with the EIC, the DAC,
and the VOC, and remained active until late 1779, when the Taihe Hang
went bankrupt. As punishment for his debts the unfortunate Inksja was
then exiled to Yili in the far western regions of China, along with
another merchant Kousia.46
Poan Keequa (1714-1788, Pan Qiguan , but properly Pan
Wenyan ) spent in his early years a considerable time in Manila
with his father, where they were involved in the trade to Quanzhou, and
where young Keequa learned to speak Spanish. Later, he began trading on
his own account under the business name of Tongwen Hang , and
the earliest appearance of his own business with the VOC was probably
in 1751.47 In the 1760s, Poan Keequa was appointed the head of the Co-
hong and held that position until it was dissolved in 1771. Despite the
fact that all other Co-hong members revolted against Poan Keequa in the
1760s, he made himself master of the European trade until his death in
1788.48 Although Tsja Hunqua recommended him to the Dutch for a
Bohea contract in 1764, he was rejected by the Dutch.49 Therefore it
seems that Poan Keequa did not start to sell tea to the Dutch until 1768.50
Tan Tsjoqua (1706-1789,51 Chen Zuguan , but properly Chen
Wenkuo ) probably took over the Zhengfeng Hang from his
father, “Mandarin Quyqua” (Chen Kuiguan ), who was active on
the Canton-European market from at least the 1720s to his death in
1742. Apart from his sales under the aegis of the Zhengfeng Hang,
Tsjoqua also sold tea via the Yuanquan Hang ( , or Juun Suun Hang
as it is noted in the Dutch records). When he died on 27 March 1789,
his eldest son, Locqua, succeeded to his business.52
Tsjobqua (?-1776,53 Cai Yuguan ) took over the Jufeng Hang
) after his elder brother, Tswaa (Tsja) Suyqua (Ruiguan ), died
in 1761. It was a thorny legacy as he inherited Suyqua’s enormous debt.





well. This was the year in which he stopped offering the “VOC teas”, and
1769 is the last year in which he is found in the Dutch records actively
trading in Canton.54
Monqua (?-1796, Cai Wenguan , but properly Cai Shiwen 
) was an interpreter (linguist) in Canton before his appointment as a
Hong merchant in 1761 when his father, Teunqua, died sometime in
1760 or 1761. Monqua also assumed his father’s debts. There seem to
have been several firms affiliated to Monqua’s branch, including the Yihe
Hang , the Fengyuan Hang , and the Wanhe Hang .
Certainly, he regularly traded through the latter two businesses.55 In 1767,
his tea warehouse caught fire and he lost about 900 casks of tea which
were lying ready for the Danes. Surmounting this blow, Monqua man-
aged to survive as well as to circumvent the debt crisis which plagued the
Hong merchants in the late 1770s. He was appointed chief Hong mer-
chant in 1788 after Poan Keequa died.56
Semqua (Qiu Kun ) was Tsja Hunqua’s partner. He shows up in
the 1730s and 1740s as Hunqua’s partner “Felix” (or other spellings) and
later adopted the name Semqua. He was active in the trade from at least
1729 to 1774. He, not Hunqua as is often mentioned in the foreign
records, was the real owner of the Yifeng Hang . The two men
traded with this firm until Hunqua died in 1769, whereupon Semqua
and Anqua (or Hanqua, Hunqua’s second son) took over the business.
The new partnership lasted for a couple of years, but then experienced
financial difficulties. The firm not only took care of the Dutch trade in
Canton but also ran the Portuguese trade in Macao. By 1774, the Yifeng
Hang was deeply in debt, at which point Semqua transferred the rights of
the firm to Hunqua’s son Tayqua.57
Tayqua (?-1775) was Tsja Hunqua’s third or fourth son. He and his
elder brother, Anqua, in conjunction with their father’s partner Semqua,
used to go to Macao to supervise the trade with the Portuguese.58 From
1752 until his death in 1775, Tayqua shows up frequently in the Dutch
records. From 1763 to 1774, he sold various teas to the VOC on his own
account. Tayqua died in 1775 and his youngest brother, Tsjonqua (Cai
Xiangguan , but properly Cai Zhaofu ), took over the reigns
of the Yifeng Hang. Tsjonqua managed to keep it limping along for a few
more years, but it finally failed in the early 1780s and was closed by order
of the Emperor.59
Consciens Giqua (?-1765, Ye Yiguan ), also known as
“Conscientia” Giqua, was from the Ye family, which had been active in
the trade in Canton from the very early years of the eighteenth century.
Consciens Giqua shows up in the companies’ records connected to three
different businesses, the Guangyuan Hang , the Houde Hang
, and the Fengjin Hang .60 After the Co-hong was estab-
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lished in 1760, he became one of the small Co-hong members and seem-
ingly also was a tea-supplying agent for other Europeans, such as the EIC
and the DAC.61 Consciens Giqua died in 1765 and his son Huyqua took
over the family business until his death on 3 July 1775, when the
Guangyuan Hang was closed as well.62
Kousia (Zhang Tianqiu ) succeeded his brother Foutia (Zhang
Fushe ) as a Hong merchant when the latter died in 1761. The
name of his business was the Yuyuan Hang . Kousia was also land-
ed with a sizeable debt by Foutia, which was a burden to him for many
years. Kousia first appears in the VOC records selling porcelain in 1764
and selling tea and other goods from 1772 to 1779.63 In the 1770s,
Kousia was also the partner of a member of the Yan family, Limsia (Yan
Linshe ). In 1773, Kousia’s warehouse, which was located at
Limsia’s factory, caught fire and the damage was supposedly estimated at
about 7,000 taels. He gradually began to fall behind in his obligations
after this, and by the late 1770s his business was foundering in serious
trouble. In 1779, another fire broke out which set him back an addition-
al 10,000 to 15,000 taels. At the end of that same year, he was declared
bankrupt. His business was then closed, and as punishment for his debts
he was exiled to Yili with Inksja.64
Pinqua (Yang Bingguan , but properly Yang Cengong )
was the owner of a porcelain shop, trading with most of the European
companies in Canton during the 1760s and 1770s. The name of his busi-
ness was the Longhe Hang , and he also sold his porcelain through
Consciens Giqua’s Guangyuan Hang . Besides porcelain, Pinqua
also sold black tea, mostly Bohea, to the VOC. In 1782, he was appoint-
ed a Hong merchant, and after that he traded in a wide range of products
of which tea was the most important. Two years later, he had to assume
part of the huge debt of the failed merchant Tsjonqua. As part of the set-
tlement, Pinqua was obliged to purchase the Dutch factory from
Tsjonqua. By 1791, Pinqua’s business was in serious trouble. He was
indebted to several foreign companies, and was also in arrears to the tea
merchants. In 1792, his business collapsed.65
Apart from Pinqua, the other small porcelain shops with which the
Dutch contracted in the 1760s included: Lisjoncon (Li Xianggong 
, but properly Li Zhengmao ), Quonsching (Guangsheng Dian
), Quonschong (Guangchang Dian ), Habjak (Heyi ),
Houqua (Guangyin ), Pontonchon (Tongchang ), Neyschong
(Yichang Dian ), Tonchon (Yaochang ), Soyschong (Juchang
), Suchin Kinqua (Liangchang Ciqi Dian ),66 Soyqua
(Xiuqua ), Conjac, Taxion, Boohing, Tonhang, Winschong
(Yongchang ), Tongfong, Konqua, Hapwoa, Jauqua, Chonqua,




Corree, and Affu.67 The porcelain shops which were involved in the VOC
tea trade during the 1760s and 1770s were Pinqua, Suchin Kinqua,
Lisjoncon, Conjac, Exchin, Echong, and Foyec (see Appendix 3).
The “VOC tea” procurements
As we know, collecting the “VOC teas” in the tea districts and transport-
ing them to Canton for the Canton-European market was a laborious
business, which occurred totally out of the hands of the Dutch trade rep-
resentatives. After the teas arrived in Canton, there was yet another tax-
ing process, which was partly under control of the Dutch trade represen-
tatives. This was the rigmarole of the purchase of tea before the commod-
ity was eventually loaded aboard the Company ships. This was the “VOC
tea” bring-and-buy transaction between the Chinese tea-supplying agents
and the Dutch trade representatives. The latter had three options to col-
lecting the “VOC teas” from the tea-supplying agent. The first was to
conclude a deal by off-season contract. The second was to make off-sea-
son purchases after the departure of the Company ships.68 Finally there
was the additional trading-season purchase on the free market.69
Most “VOC teas” were supplied through contracts concluded with the
tea-supplying agents, of whom the Dutch trade representatives’ regular
trading partners, mainly their security merchants, formed the majority;
some small Hong merchants made up the minority. As far as the Dutch
were concerned, there was plenty of hard work involved in the whole
process from the negotiations with the tea-supplying agents to the load-
ing of the teas purchased aboard the Company ships. The handling of this
business can be divided into five steps: the negotiation of a contract; the
conclusion of the contract; the examination of the tea samples; the pack-
ing of the teas which were ready; and the loading and stowing of the teas
bought-in on the Company ships.
The negotiation of a contract was the most strenuous task for both the
Dutch supercargoes and their trading partners. It ordinarily began after
the departure of the Company ships in the first quarter of each year,
sometime in February or early March.70 On paper it seemed simple.
During the process of negotiation the trading partners presented the tea
samples with their asking price, and then the Dutch supercargoes put in
their bidding price after checking the samples. Finally both parties came
to an agreement and fixed a price. But in practice, it was an extremely
protracted process and there was a great deal of ostensibly polite to-ing
and fro-ing between the two parties, which was a true mirror of Chinese
and Dutch commercial astuteness and shrewd trading.
How much profit the tea-supplying agents could earn on average from
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the fixed price is shrouded in obscurity, but, according to the Dutch
records, the price of tea on the Canton market and in the tea districts was
to a certain extent comparable. On 4 July 1765, the members of the Co-
hong proposed the price of the new Bohea on board ship should be 18.5
taels per picul, as the price in the tea districts had risen to 15.5 taels per
picul that year.71 The Dutch supercargoes finally paid 19.6 taels (of
Spanish rials at 72 Chinese candareens) per picul on average to diverse
agents (see Appendix 4). In August 1766, the Co-hong members asked
the slightly lower price of 18 taels per picul for the new Bohea, and this
was the price the Dutch supercargoes paid on average to the various
agents. The marginal reduction was because the price which the Co-hong
merchants paid in the tea districts had dropped to 14.5 taels per picul.72
The next year, the price of Bohea rose to 14.8 or even 15 taels per picul
so the three security merchants of the Dutch claimed. In a knock-on
effect they demanded 19 taels, of which 3 taels for their expenses in
Canton and 1 tael for the charge by the Co-hong. Later, they themselves
dropped the asking price to 18.5 taels, but with much difficulty the
Dutch persuaded them to accept 18.2 taels (of Spanish rials at 72 Chinese
candareens).73 In 1768, the Co-hong fixed the price of new Bohea at 18
taels,74 but Tsja Hunqua, the Hong merchant most trusted by the Dutch,
thought the price was unreasonable and suggested it should be around
15.5 or 16 taels, as the price in the tea districts was only 10 or 10.4 taels.75
All these examples give information about some of the detailed individ-
ual cases, and the whole gamut of the diverse prices offered by different
tea-supplying agents for both old and new teas can be compared in the
Appendix 4. One more example of the tedious negotiations between the
Dutch trade representatives and their four trading partners in 1779 can
be presented in the table below:
Table 3  Comparison between the asking, bid, and fixed prices (taels/picul) of several teas
by the Dutch supercargoes and their trading partners, 1779
______________________________________________________________________________________
Tea Asking price Bid price Fixed price______________________________________________________________________________________
Bohea 13.5 12.5 12.5
Twankay 24.5 23 23.5
Songlo 22.5 21 21.5______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: NFC 42, Resolution of the Trade Council, 1 February 1779.
Once the negotiations had got under way, the tea-supplying agents usu-
ally urged the Dutch trade representatives to accept their offer as early as
possible. They hinted that the earlier the Dutch accept their offer, the bet-
ter the quality of the tea the Dutch could obtain at a lower price and the
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sooner they could pack up the teas. The Dutch took a slightly different
view of the matter, reasoning the earlier they did so, the less opportunity
they would have to put pressure on the sellers and the higher the price
they would actually pay. This principle was also applied to the negotia-
tions with other companies. Shrewdly, the tea-supplying agents also knew
how to take advantage of their negotiations with other companies, above
all the EIC, to urge the Dutch to take the plunge. The fear that their com-
petitors would steal a match on them was the real reason the Dutch trade
representatives hastened to conclude the negotiations, not so much
because they were really satisfied with the Chinese offer, but more because
they were acutely aware that other competitors also had their eye on the
same goods or had already put in a higher bid price. In such a situation,
he who hesitates is lost! In January 1763, the Dutch supercargoes agreed
to take Souchong from Tjobqua at 32 taels per picul, as the latter swore
that this sort of tea was always bought up by other companies without the
slightest hesitation at 45 taels, and the Danes and Swedes had already
accepted his asking price of 32 taels.76 In February 1772, the Dutch super-
cargoes were unwilling to wait and made an agreement with Inksja at 18
taels per picul for Twankay, because the stocks of Twankay were very low
and especially because the English had earlier paid that same price.77 On
19 January 1775, after persistently trying day after day the Dutch failed
to persuade Inksja and Tinqua to accept the price of 14 taels per picul for
Congou, for which both the English and Swedes were offering 15 taels,
and finally surrendered and decided to offer 15 taels.78 Sometimes, in
order to drive up the asking price, the tea-supplying agents even pushed
their luck, for example in early 1764 when they were expecting the arrival
of more English ships and insisted on not commencing negotiations with
the Dutch until the English ships arrived.79
Although it would seem that the Dutch were occasionally caught
wrong footed, they often could surpass their competitors in their bids for
the price of tea. The basic reason for this financial advantage was that the
Dutch trade representatives nearly always possessed enough capital,
including a sufficiency of cash brought from the Dutch Republic and left
over from the former trading season in Canton (see Appendix 1), and this
fortunate pecuniary position was bolstered even more by the ample sup-
ply of East Indies goods from Batavia, which they had at their disposal
(see Appendix 2).80
In some years, the price fixed by other companies appeared to be lower
than that set by the Dutch but, as a matter of fact, taking into consider-
ation all the additional terms of the contract, this was actually higher. For
example, in February 1769 the Swedes and again the English in April of
the same year contracted for Bohea at 13.2 taels (of Spanish rials at 74
Chinese candareens) per picul, while the Dutch paid Tan Chetqua 14
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taels. Yet, since they also had to pay what amounted to a 20 per cent inter-
est both from 12 February and from 7 April until 7 July respectively for
the delay of payment, these doughty competitors actually paid 14.3.3 and
14.0.6 taels respectively in the end.81 Besides the competition from the
Europeans rivals, for many years the Dutch and all the other companies
also had to contend with another competitor, namely the operators of the
Chinese junks destined for South-east Asia. According to Canton custom,
such merchants could always easily obtain a lower price from the tea-sup-
plying agents than their European rivals could. On 30 January 1764, for
instance, the tea-supplying agents sold Souchong and Congou to the junk
people at 20 taels and 17 to 18 taels per picul respectively, for which the
Dutch paid 22.5 taels and 19.5 to 20.5 taels.82 Again on 9 January 1769,
Tan Tsjoqua offered part of his Congou to the Swedes at 19.5 to 20 taels
per picul and another part to the junk people at 17.5 taels, which to no
avail he had earlier offered to the Dutch for 18 to 19 taels.83
Besides the actual price of the tea, the means of payment for the pur-
chase of tea was included in the negotiations of the contract as well. There
were different detailed cases for each year during the period under study,
but some conventions do seem to have been honoured. Because all the
tea-supplying agents either had to advance money to the tea merchants in
Canton or send this to those in the tea districts, not unnaturally these
supplying agents in their turn desired an advance payment from the
Dutch and the supercargoes of other companies. In their dealings with
the small agents, who were always pressing for cash, the companies usu-
ally presented an advance payment of about 70 per cent in cash and 10
per cent in spices on the arrival of the first Company ship, and around 20
per cent in cash after the teas were on board.84 When it came to dealing
with the great trading partners, the VOC customarily agreed with them
that an advance of up to 80 per cent of the payment should be handed
over, of which one-eighth in spices at the Company prices and seven-
eighths in cash, while they would accept the remaining about 20 per cent
of the payment in tin, pepper or other Company goods (except the
spices), at the market rate on the arrival of the Company ship.85
Following the negotiations, on the basis of the demands for the quantity
and assortment of tea by the China Committee, the Dutch trade represen-
tatives went ahead and concluded the contracts with their trading partners
for much of the export order. This could be done as early as March, but more
probably in April or May, before the departure of the Company servants for
Macao. In the contracts, the amount and price of teas which were going to
be delivered to the Dutch, the due date of delivery of teas by the trading
partners, the means of payment by the Dutch supercargoes, and the com-
pensation for breach of contract were meticulously noted. The following
contracts concluded in 1763 and 1769 may serve as practical illustrations.
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On 15 May 1763, the Dutch chief signed a contract with Tsja Hunqua
& Co., Tan Chetqua, and Inksja for 9,000 pounds of Bohea at 15.4 taels
(of Spanish rials at 74 Chinese candareens) per picul (namely 122½
pounds), under the following six conditions:86 if the English were to con-
tract at less than 15 taels with an advance payment of 10 taels at 72 can-
dareens, the tea-supplying agents, who also did the business with the EIC,
would demand the Dutch pay one penny (for which the Dutch always
counted four maces) more than the English or anybody else would give.
If the English, by such strategies as delaying the contracts or by seizing
other opportunities, were forced to pay more than 15 taels at 72 canda-
reens per picul, the Dutch would never have to pay more than the above-
mentioned 15.4 taels at 74 candareens. The Dutch agreed to pay 8.5 taels
per picul, or 76,500 taels in total, immediately and an additional 1.5 taels
per picul, or 13,500 taels in total, on the arrival of the first Company
ship, plus the interest on the 13,500 taels at 2 per cent per each thirty
days. The intervening period from the date of receipt of the 76,500 taels
until the payment of the 13,500 taels was considered as if the Dutch had
paid 10 taels. If later the English could not advance 10 taels in cash in
default of funds, the tea-supplying agents would compensate the Dutch 20
per cent for the interest on the money paid more in advance. The tea-sup-
plying agents would agree not to pack the new Bohea for any other nation
until the Dutch had completely packed three chests at the premise of each
of the tea-supplying agents; the Dutch might then pack turn and turn
about with the English until they had stored the 9,000 piculs of teas. The
tea-supplying agents promised to pack the 9,000 pounds of Bohea in
chests smaller than the usual containers,87 at the behest of the Dutch pro-
vided that the Dutch compensated them once again with five maces extra
above the price agreed the last year. Should only two VOC ships arrive in
Canton in that year and the Dutch not be able to ship the whole quanti-
ty of 9,000 piculs properly, the remaining teas would be divided fairly into
two parts, of which the Dutch should accept one part at their own risk at
the agreed price for the next year, and the other part would be kept on the
tea-supplying agents’ account;88 for their part, the tea-supplying agents
would compensate the VOC the interest of the advance payment at 10
taels per picul for six months or 2 per cent per month.89
On 18 March 1769, the Dutch trade representatives and the above-
mentioned three merchants agreed on contracts for purchasing
Souchong, Congou, Songlo, and Twankay (without defining the price
exactly, agreeing to regulate it in the light of the current circumstances):
The tea-supplying agents had 230 days, or until 4 September 1770, in
which to fix the first shipment, and the other shipments of the teas
demanded over 250 days, or until 24 September 1770: 570 piculs of first-
grade Souchong; 730 piculs of second-grade Souchong; 650 piculs of
THE PURCHASE OF THE “VOC TEAS” IN CANTON 83
first-grade Congou; 1,140 piculs of second-grade Congou; and 2,240
piculs of third- or lower-grade Congou to be packed in whole chests and
mixed with Bohea. For their part, the three Chinese merchants who were
to deliver together the afore-mentioned teas promised to do so on condi-
tion that they would bear responsibility for the quality, according to the
assortment; if on reception the Dutch judged the teas unsatisfactory or if
the three Chinese pressed them to receive the teas as the first grade, while
they were convinced they were second or even a lower grade, they were
free to reject the teas; in that case, the Chinese should be obliged to fur-
nish such money from their capital for the imported Company goods des-
tined for them, providing that the Dutch judged it necessary. The tea-
supplying agents should deliver 650 piculs of first-grade Songlo repacked
in ordinary half chests at 22.2 taels (of Spanish rials at 74 candareens) per
picul in two parts on the date as above-mentioned, on condition that the
Dutch should pay them on account 14 taels per picul in cash on the
arrival of the Company ships and 320 piculs of first-grade Twankay in
two parts, which was to be sent in casks, at 24 taels per picul on the same
condition as that of the Songlo.90 Regarding the additional terms of the
contracts, it was also agreed that the tea-supplying agents would guaran-
tee completely against fire, water, and any other damage until all the teas
had been loaded aboard the Company ships.91
These two illustrations are more than enough to show the standard
mode by which the Dutch trade representatives contracted both black and
green teas with their supplying agents. In these win-win contracts, how
either side, the sellers as well as the buyers, should abide by the articles and
how they would suffer if the contract was breached was stipulated in detail.
Except for the large shipments of tea which were contracted in the man-
ner discussed above, the rest of the tea was mostly purchased during the
off-season. After the ships of all the European companies had departed and
their delegates had concluded their current business, there were usually still
a number of “old teas” remaining unsold on the market. The trade repre-
sentatives of the VOC, as well as those of other companies, seized the
opportunity to buy these leftover teas at a lower price, not only from their
individual trading partners but also from other small Hong merchants and
sometimes even, indirectly, from tea merchants and peddlers (see
Appendix 3). This kind of purchase, of course, had to be completed before
their departure for Macao. For example, in view of the fact that they would
have the opportunity to buy the remaining fine teas in mid-February
1764, earlier or later the Dutch purchased several sorts of “old teas” from
the following Hong merchants in February, March, and April: Inksja
(Hyson at 28 taels per picul); Tsja Hunqua (Bohea at 13.5, Congou at 17,
and Souchong at 20); Tjobqua (Bohea at 13.5); Fet Hunqua (Congou at
18); and Consciens Giqua (Ankay-Souchong at 13).92
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Besides these opportunities, there was the possibility of the additional
purchase on the free market during the trading-season. This purchase was
governed by several factors. In some years, having accumulated the teas by
contract and off-season purchase, the Dutch found themselves in a
quandary as they were still unable to load all the homeward-bound ships
fully. To solve their dilemma, they forced themselves to look for some sur-
plus on the free market. In August 1765, the Dutch decided to increase
the contracted quantities of Twankay from 40,000 pounds up to 90,000
pounds, and simultaneously to reduce the Songlo and Hyson skin from
240,000 and 60,000 pounds down to 184,000 and 30,000 pounds
respectively.93 The reason for the change was that the price of Twankay
had risen considerably in Amsterdam and Middelburg in the past year;94
while the supply of Songlo and Hyson skin to Canton was apparently
scarce because of the fierce competition from the English and French and
accordingly their prices rose sharply that year.95 In November 1780, the
Dutch agreed to buy an extra 833, 833, and 834 pounds of Bohea respec-
tively from Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, and Tsjonqua at 13.5 taels, instead of
the 12 taels which they had bid, after protracted negotiations, in order to
adapt themselves to the current circumstances.96 But more frequently, at
their own convenience the Dutch made additional purchases at local
shops, especially the porcelain shops, in the second half of the period
under study. As mentioned before, when the porcelain was delivered to
the Dutch by the shopkeepers, a number of teas, mostly Bohea, was also
included (see Appendix 3).97 The quantity of this is not clearly mentioned
in the sources, but the price must have tallied with those on the current
market.
Irrespective of how the Dutch trade representatives purchased the
“VOC teas”, all the teas arrived in Canton in October and/or November.
After having made their own preparations, the tea-supplying agents pre-
sented some tea samples from each chop of different kinds of teas to be
tested by the Dutch. The examination focused on the aroma, taste, infu-
sion quality, and the colour of the tea. In 1762, the Company ships
arrived in Canton with an instruction to the supercargoes from the China
Committee concerning tea: “[…] for apart from the fact that the quality
of each particular type of tea must be of the very best and, as they say, of
the first and finest leaf, because experience has taught that in this coun-
try a greater differentiation is made in types than in China, it must there-
fore be remarked which additional qualities are regarded as virtues in tea
in this country and for which a higher price is paid by the buyers.
According to the present taste of the buyers, it is regarded as a prime
virtue in all types of tea that it is soft, smooth, and pure in taste, and
moreover is clear when poured out, and that in this, the Bohea of some
foreign companies has particularly excelled of recent years.”98 In 1765, the 
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Illustration 3  The packing of the “VOC teas” in Canton
Saucer and teacup, Chine de Commande, diameter of rim 12.8 cm, Qianlong period, c.
1750; decorated with overglaze enamels and gold, showing Dutch and Chinese merchant
in Canton overseeing the packing of tea at a warehouse.
Source: Courtesy of Princessehof Leeuwarden/Nationaal Keramiekmuseum, inventory
number: BP 79.
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Dutch trade representatives once again received a specific demand from
the China Committee exacting that the quality of Bohea be accompanied
by a reasonable good leaf as well as an absolutely pure taste, as this was
always to be preferred.99
In the ordinary run of things, the standard of examination was not only
strictly complied with by the Dutch trade representatives, it was also
respected by the tea-supplying agents. Incontrovertibly the Dutch super-
cargoes had to be very responsible in heeding the interests of the VOC,
but inevitably should an agent’s teas be rejected by the Dutch, this would
bring great shame on him and count very heavily against him in obtain-
ing future credit in the European trade. All these precautionary measures
notwithstanding, accidents still might occasionally happen. Should the
Dutch discover a breach of contract with respect to the quality of tea dur-
ing their examination, they would take the necessary action in respond-
ing to this according to their earlier agreement with the tea-supplying
agents. On 23 October 1764, for example, while examining the Bohea
samples from Tan Chetqua, Tsja Hunqua, and Inksja, the Dutch rejected
the samples of Hunqua and Inksja because of their inferior quality. They
felt constrained to accept Chetqua’s because his tea was somewhat better,
and at that time Bohea was in short supply and all the tea offered to the
Europeans was poor that year. Later, the Dutch selected some substitute
canasters (or baskets) of Bohea from Hunqua and Inksja, but demanded
a subsidy from all three merchants citing as their reason the unsatisfacto-
ry quality of all the Bohea received, for which the merchants were only
willing to pay 6,000 taels. Eventually, after a long hard bargaining, a sub-
sidy of 9,000 taels was agreed upon by both sides on condition that it
remained secret and would not be disclosed to all other Chinese and
Europeans.100
After having carefully examined and tasted the samples, the Dutch
decided on their purchase and agreed on what was known as the final
price for each chop with the tea-supplying agents. Thereupon they had
the accepted teas tared and packed, complying with the instructions in
the demand stipulating how the teas were to be graded and packed (see
Illustration 3).101 The majority of the teas purchased in these three ways
(mainly the teas by contract) were examined, tared, packed, marked, and
numbered on the premises of the tea-supplying agents, while the minor-
ity (mainly the teas acquired by off-season purchases) were stored in the
warehouse of the Dutch factory awaiting the arrival of the Company ships
for the next trading season. This was not the end of the story. What was
known officially as the final price still could be changed. This could hap-
pen should the Dutch, who had the right to re-check the chests after
packing and/or before loading the chests aboard the Company ships,102
once again discover some inconformity between the chops and the sam-
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ples they had tested during the random re-checking. Theoretically, the
price could be increased if the chests were superior to the samples after the
re-checking. But, in practice, it seems that only inferior chests were
encountered on a few occasions. In March 1770, for instance, the Dutch
bought 450 chests of old Congou from Quyqua, one of Tan Chetqua’s
clerks, at 18 taels per picul, which became 433 chests by further allot-
ment. After receipt, the Dutch found a great portion did not conform to
the samples. They had no choice but to check all the chests one after
another and consequently ascertained that 277 chests were eligible, but
that 153 chests were of an inferior grade (there were also three chests
missing). They resolved to demand a discount of almost two taels per
picul on the whole chests. On the 31st, they succeeded in obtaining the
discount at 2.2 taels per picul from Chetqua, and stored all the chests in
the warehouse of their own factory.103
This is an apt juncture to make some remarks about the tea packing
under the supervision of the Dutch assignees. During this exacting work,
the most pertinent duty of those assigned by the Trade Council had
always been to ensure as far as this was possible the prevention of the
adulteration of the tea by dust, particularly Bohea. To assist them in this
task, since 1760 the China Committee had a set of regulations drawn up
as guide to the weight of the Bohea chests following complaints by the
tea-buyers in the home country objecting to the dustiness of tea.104
Especially after it received a strong admonition by the China Committee
because of the dustiness in Bohea chests in 1764, the Trade Council tight-
ened up the regulations guiding its assignees’ work. As resolved by the
Council, the supervision of the packing and weighing of the chests was
assigned each year to various supercargoes, assistants, and bookkeepers as
a team supplied to each of the tea-supplying agents. Both in 1765 and
1766 three teams were sent to Tsja Hunqua, Tan Chetqua, and Inksja; in
1779 four teams were sent to Tan Tsjoqua, Inksja, Tsjonqua, and
Monqua; and in 1780 three teams to Tsjonqua, Tan Tsjoqua, and
Monqua respectively.105 The supervision of the assignees appointed by the
Trade Council was believed to be the answer to reducing the dustiness of
the tea during the packing, although even by making a super-human
effort it was impossible to prevent it completely.
After all the above-mentioned work had been completed, eventually,
the tea chests were loaded onto sampans, which were ordinarily hired by
arrangements made by either the Hong merchants or the interpreters, to
transport them to the Company ships in the roadstead of Whampoa.
Year after year, by and large the afore-discussed series of transactions in
the tea trade carried out by the Dutch trade representatives in Canton
proceeded smoothly. This can be deduced from the large quantities of the
teas the VOC purchased in this period. The VOC archival data reveal that
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the quantity of the teas bought annually in Canton by the Company for
the home market from the season 1758-1760 fluctuated from 2,500,000
to 3,000,000 pounds in the seasons from 1758-1760 to 1761-1764, and
from 3,000,000 to 3,900,000 pounds in the seasons from 1762-1765 to
1778-1781 (see Table 6 in Chapter Five). In comparison with the previ-
ous thirty years the quantity of the teas sent every year from both Canton
and Batavia only three times reached 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 pounds. In
the last twelve years until 1794, the quantity never exceeded
3,011,706.25 pounds in as many as six years (see Figure 2 in Chapter Five
and Appendices 4 and 5).
Conclusion
The period chosen for this study was an outstanding phase of the VOC
tea trade with China. Three final remarks can be made on the transactions
in the purchase of tea in Canton by the VOC.
The first of these concerns the sort of tea purchased. The “VOC teas”
consisted mostly of sorts of black and green tea, of which black tea, in
particular Bohea, was the firm favourite. The reason it seems was that the
price of black teas was much cheaper, although their quality was inferior.
This was a direct reflection of the demand on the home market: the low-
quality tea with a low price catered to the mass of society, whereas the
high quality tea at a higher price satisfied the more discerning palate of
the upper classes.
The second and third points refer to the actual buying. During the
twenty years studied three and later four principal tea-supplying agents
acted as the regular trading partners of the VOC. The Dutch chose them
because they were great Hong merchants armed with the essential capac-
ity and credit. They were not the only parties involved. Small Hong mer-
chants as well as local shopkeepers, and sometimes even the clerks of the
Hong merchants, were also employed for two reasons: this could create
some measure of competition among the Chinese and it could also make
up for any shortfall in the supply.
Among these three ways of purchasing tea, contract purchase from the
Company’s regular trading partners, who also were the chief recipients of
the Company import goods, was the principal method which basically
secured the stability of the quantity of supply and the purchase price. In
the meantime, the two other ways were both indispensable complements
to the first. The combination of all the three ways, allied with the
Company’s ample supply of capital, coalesced to favour the success of the
VOC delegates’ business in Canton.





On 12 April 1760, the Chinese Imperial Court officially introduced what
was to become known as the Canton System (1760-1842).1 By imperial
decree, all the European companies were ordered to do their business at
one port only, Canton. Simultaneously with this decree, several regula-
tions relating to the European trade in Canton were also issued by the
local authorities of Canton. One of the decisions was no longer to force
the representatives of the European companies to leave China during the
off-season, but to allow them to sojourn in Macao.2 Following the intro-
duction of the Canton System, the conditions, under which representa-
tives of these companies were obliged to be stationed together on a small
strip of land outside the walls of Canton would last until the conclusion
of the First Opium War in 1842.
Under the Canton System, the European trade in that city was metic-
ulously organized and followed an invariable pattern. Each step was strict-
ly controlled by Chinese officialdom. Each company had to engage one
or more Hong merchants, who had been designated by the Chinese
authorities to trade with the European companies as an appointed securi-
ty. The Hong merchants acted as guarantor for the payment of customs
duties by the Europeans, but their role and responsibilities were much
wider. The Chinese authorities also held them responsible for the behav-
iour of the foreigners. The various functions of this system were put into
practice on the orders of the mandarins in Canton: the Tsongtu (Zongdu
( ) , Governor-General),3 the Fooyuern (Fuyuan or ( )
, Governor),4 and the Hoppo (Hubu or Yue Haiguan Jiandu ( )
, Superintendent of Maritime Customs)5. Obliged by the con-
straints of this strictly regulated trade system, the supercargoes of the
European companies had no choice but to negotiate with their Chinese
partners about the sale and purchase of goods, always locked in fierce
competition with the delegates of the other companies.
Nor was this mediation restricted to business affairs. In daily life, all the
relations of European traders with Chinese officialdom were mediated by
the Hong merchants and the interpreters, since the Confucian adminis-
trative elite of China held the merchant class in great disdain. This con-
descension was even more marked when they had to deal with foreign 
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(barbarian) merchants. The Hoppo was the only relatively high official
with whom foreign traders were able to get in touch on a regular basis, as
he was directly in charge of the customs administration and of supervis-
ing the Canton trade.
The activities of all the European and Chinese participants and the var-
ious kinds of guanxi, or Chinese “networking”, in terms of economic
interests among them in this bustling emporium generated an extremely
lively atmosphere during the business season. The process of negotiation
between the Dutch trade representatives and the tea-supplying agents has
already been discussed. This is then the juncture at which to give a
description of other aspects of life in Sino-European interrelations. It is
quite difficult to ascertain how the Dutch interacted with the Chinese
and other Europeans at that time, but it is possible to find some clues
from a close scrutiny of the records of the various companies.
Protests against the establishment of the Co-hong
In 1759, the English supercargoes in Canton sent James Flint to the
northern port of Tianjin to deliver the local authorities a memorial
listing the grievances they held about the administration of the Canton
trade. The memorial was subsequently forwarded to Peking. When the
High Commissioner was dispatched to Canton to investigate the Hoppo’s
alleged misconduct, his subsequent investigation confirmed that the com-
plaints were largely justified. Even so, the Chinese authorities responded
unfavourably to the demands voiced by the Europeans requesting a liber-
alization of their trade. The municipal authorities ordered the European
merchants to limit their business dealings in China, and to instruct the
Hong merchants to establish a united association of their members which
would be privileged to decide the prices of import and export goods. The
task of this so-called Co-hong corporation was to regulate the Canton
trade of their respective members and to consolidate their monopoly on
the European trade.6 The European trade representatives were vociferous
in their fervent objections to this modification of the trade at Canton.
At the beginning of 1760, as matters were not yet properly sorted out,
the atmosphere in Canton could be cut by a knife because the Hong mer-
chants refused to engage in any business for more than six months ahead,
as they were at that time deliberating the establishment of the Co-hong.
Faced with this delay, compounded by the uncertainty of what the new
arrangement would entail, the European trade representatives were like
cats on hot bricks, anxious that they would not be able to conclude any
contracts for the purchase of tea in time.
In July, the Hong merchants were still deep in discussions about how
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to establish the Co-hong most efficaciously, but had not yet been able to
reach a consensus. Smarting at the uncertainty, the English threatened the
Hong merchants from time to time, stating in no uncertain terms that
they would not deal with them if they set up “such a pernicious associa-
tion”, and that they would seek co-operation from the other European
nations in thwarting its establishment.7 On 4 August, the Hong mer-
chants asked the English why they had not begun to unload their ships.
The answer was that they should ask the mandarins the reason. When
they were asked whether they would trade with the Hong merchants as a
company, the English replied that they were not free to do so. Naturally
they were aware of the contents of the Emperor’s edict which decreed that
the Europeans should do their business through the Chinese Hong mer-
chants, but they pointed out that the Emperor had not ordered the Hong
merchants to join together in a unified body. This being the case, they
were determined to continue to deal with the Hong merchants as they
chose.8
The joint Hong merchants immediately reported the rejoinder of the
English to the Hoppo on 8 August, and debated with each other about
whether or not a meeting should be called to discuss the negative attitude
of the Europeans.9 When the Dutch returned from Macao around this
time, they had very little or no chance to discuss these matters with the
Hong merchants, although they sedulously visited the principal among
them every day. None of the Hong merchants dared to come into the
Dutch factory, with the exception of Tswaa (Tsja) Suyqua who was the
owner of the Dutch factory and resided in the front part. The Dutch
never gave him credit because he was the joint protector of the Co-hong,
along with Poan Keequa. During this time the Dutch did not see Swetja,
Tsja Hunqua, or Poan Keequa, because the first two merchants deliber-
ately chose to go into the city all the time to avoid being apprehended and
beaten up because the officials might assume them collaborating with the
Europeans. As president of the Co-hong Poan Keequa was busy with
preparations for its establishment and simply had no time to spare.10
When the merchant Tan Tinqua (Chen Zhenguan ) was
detained at the Nanhai Court on 10 August, these merchants, who had
seemed willing to talk to the Europeans, were now so discouraged that
they also held themselves aloof. Tan Tinqua had been arrested on account
of a few proposals which he had submitted to the Hoppo protesting about
the establishment of the Co-hong to oblige the European merchants and
to mediate in these matters. The Tsongtu distrained the effects of Tan
Tinqua’s family members, including their houses and other chattels as
security for a debt of circa 2,400 taels which he owed to the Chinese
authorities. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, Tan Tingqua
was declared a risk to the peace and prosperity of the region, and his
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Hong chop was withdrawn. With his family, the unfortunate merchant
was sent back to his birthplace, Quanzhou, in Fujian Province in dis-
grace.11
As no Hong merchants came to the Dutch factory, the Dutch chief,
Martin Wilhelm Hulle, went to the Hongs of the most prominent mer-
chants on the 12th because he did not want to lose time. He said that
from its inception, the Dutch had been led to understand that the mer-
chants were holding discussions about how they would interact together
within the legal confines of a company. He, however, was convinced that
the Emperor had not ordered the Europeans to do business with a com-
bination of eleven Hong merchants. If the Tsongtu wished to order the
setting up of such an association on his own authority, he should inform
the Europeans and give them the opportunity of whether to engage in
trade or to refuse to comply with the new order and leave for Europe. It
was impossible for the Dutch to commence trade or to leave on no firmer
grounds than the Hong merchants’ rumours. For such weighty matters, a
chop or proclamation should be issued by the mandarins. Were this not
forthcoming, he would lodge a formal complaint about the Hong mer-
chants’ conduct in a petition submitted to the Tsongtu and ask that they
be punished.12
When the Hong merchants failed to give an unambiguous reply, the
next day the Dutch chief hurried to the Swedish and English, fully
resolved to clear up the matter once and for all. He requested his erstwhile
rivals co-operate with him in finding a solution which would be accept-
able to all of them. They should delay no longer but lead the Chinese to
believe that they mutually disagreed with each other and, at the same
time, secretly confer about what they should do. He said that because he
had not received the desired mandarin’s chop, he would summon all the
eleven Hong merchants to his factory and ask them whether and on what
conditions they were willing to trade with the Dutch this year. There-
upon, he proposed presenting a petition to the Tsongtu asking him to
abolish the Co-hong. Hulle asked both the English and Swedes to send
him one or two people to attend his meeting with the Chinese merchants,
and subsequently, having hopefully learned the state of play, the three
Companies could talk about the delivery of the request. Both nations
promised to do so.
On the morning of 14 August, the Dutch chief went to see the mer-
chants but heard nothing about the decree from the Tsongtu on this mat-
ter. On his return, he immediately sent the interpreters accompanied by
the Dutch fiscal and clerk around to all eleven Hong merchants and asked
them to present themselves at the Dutch factory for further discussions at
eleven o’clock the next morning. When Hulle received a speedy reply inti-
mating that the merchants would indeed attend at the appointed time, he
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informed the English and Swedes of the positive response and arranged
with them that two supercargoes of each nation should be present at that
time to hear the merchants’ answer; later, in the afternoon, they could
meet again at the Dutch factory to deliberate on what further steps to take
and how to deliver their requests.13
After all his preparations, the Dutch chief organized a meeting at his
factory with the Hong merchants in the presence of two English and two
Swedish supercargoes on 15 August. Since it was highly unlikely that the
merchants would have already reached a firm decision, and to ensure the
Hong merchants understood what he had in mind, Hulle acquainted the
latter of the general content of the request which he planned to write to
the mandarins in Chinese. This is what he told them:
To their great surprise the Dutch had learned that ten of the eleven
Hong merchants,14 who enjoyed the exclusive privilege of trading with the
Europeans by order of the Emperor, had been forced to unite at the
behest of and with the full approval of the mandarins. Dealing with such
an association would be the same as dealing with one Chinese merchant.
All the European companies had sent ships from so far away with only
one intention to trade with as many Chinese merchants as seemed suit-
able to them. The free trade in which the Europeans had been engaged so
far with the Emperor’s permission greatly deviated from the manner of
trade which they now wanted to introduce. If the Co-hong were to be
established as they were planning, the Chinese merchants would be able
to purchase the imported goods from the Europeans at a low price, but
sell their own products at a high price. Such a policy would totally ruin
the trade which was already on the decline.
The Dutch would beseech the Emperor to cast his beneficent gaze on
them and to ensure that the freedom of trading with different Chinese
merchants would not be abolished. The corporation of Chinese mer-
chants which threatened to cut off the artery of all European traffic soon-
er or later should be abolished. The Hong merchants should be permit-
ted to deal separately with the Europeans as they had done in the past.
Only under these conditions would the Dutch be able to obtain some
profit for their directors and maintain the shipping link to Canton.
During the fifteen days he had spent in Canton, he had assiduously
made repeated efforts to discuss the matter with some of the Hong mer-
chants, but had only succeeded a few times then by exerting the utmost
effort and had never received any answer to his inquiry, namely: who
would guarantee the customs fee and payment of the goods? Who would
be members of the association and would pay any debt incurred should
the association become insolvent or the members split up; and who
should the Dutch address were the association not to fulfil its contracts
and obligations in the stipulated time or not respect the contract, or pro-
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duce shoddy wares when the goods were delivered? Were such a person
not produced to set the minds of the Dutch at ease, who would resolve
all disagreements between the Europeans and this association with
absolute impartiality? He had added that were their questions not
answered, they would be pertinently unable to enter into negotiation with
the Hong merchants. The Dutch could not entrust goods or money to
this association unless high-ranking mandarins were to stand guarantor
for it, because on many occasions of two or more merchants the one had
signed the contract for the other, but in the event of death of one of them,
the other had been constrained to pay only his own portion under
Chinese law, although under the terms of the contract he was also obliged
to stand guarantor and pay for the other. This being so, he had good rea-
son to fear that this association would not pay in proportion to its share
at best and comply with this afore-mentioned judgement with respect to
other members who did not have a penny to their names. Therefore, it
was only reasonable the Dutch should do their best to obtain an explana-
tion of the points just raised before they decided to take the plunge with
this association “christened with whatever name or dressed in whichever
garment.”15
Having described the situation in general, the Dutch chief put his spe-
cific questions to the Hong merchants present:
1) Whether or not the Dutch could do any business at present.
The Hong merchants answered that the Dutch could do business with
one or more of them as they wished.
2) How was it such an association that had been created among the Hong
merchants?
The Hong merchants answered that the Emperor had issued various
regulations about the Europeans and European trade in Canton. As
example they stated, the Chinese should pay the Europeans’ debts
promptly to ensure the latter could depart at the stipulated time.
Therefore, the Tsongtu had settled the matter as beneficently as possible,
believing that the establishment of a corporation among the Hong mer-
chants had been the best means to achieve such a purpose.
3) Whether this association had been created by order of the Emperor or
by that of the Tsongtu, or simply on the initiative of the Hong merchants.
At that point, the Hong merchants fell silent. Although Hulle had
asked them individually one after the other for an answer, they just said
that they would have to read through all the chops again before they
would be able to give a reply. When Hulle insisted on a response, they
promised to answer his question the following evening.16
Around two o’clock in the afternoon on 16 August, the interpreters
arrived at the Dutch factory with a communication of the Hoppo. In this
chop was stated that all the foreign goods should be confided to the
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administration of security merchants approved by the mandarins, and
matters pertaining to trade be settled in a lawful way. The Tsongtu in con-
junction with the Fooyuern and the Hoppo had presented a memorial to
the Emperor and everything was now properly regulated. If the foreign-
ers wished to engage in trade as they had done before, they should abide
by the fixed regulations. Perhaps they were unaware that particular shop-
keepers and all unapproved merchants were now banned from trading
with them; those who erred against this prohibition would be punished.
The interpreters and Hong merchants were ordered to be exceptionally
diligent in their observance of these rules. Ill-natured merchants had been
covert in their action and others spun webs of subterfuge and deception.
Fortunately some of these had been detected and punished. The officials
had established the corporation with no other purpose than to prevent
the knavish tricks and deceptions of these malicious Chinese. Now, the
officials had selected benevolent and sincere merchants in whom the
Europeans could trust. The Dutch ships had already lain at anchor for a
long time without unloading their goods. The Dutch were invariably con-
sidered honest men who should not be led astray by the false stories of the
English. Now they should deal with the Hong merchants they preferred.
They would do well to begin their business if they wished to return home
in time. If they chose not to, it would be on their own heads and not that
of the Hoppo. The foreigners should hasten to address themselves to the
approved merchants and not delay the trade any longer, if they were not
to risk losing out on the weather for their return voyage. Foreigners who
behaved themselves and did not oppose the regulations would be treated
with indulgence, but those who persisted in their obduracy would risk
shame and find every reason to repent at leisure afterwards. The rules had
already been issued to the Hong merchants, and the Hoppo would address
the Hong merchants again urging them to remind the English and Dutch
emphatically and with the utmost sincerity of the rules, granting them
plenty of leeway to conduct themselves accordingly. The Hong merchants
had given an unequivocal indication that they had understood the prem-
ises on which the officials had based the reasoning and had given assur-
ances. They would not act against them, pleading ignorance as justifica-
tion for their lapses. The Hoppo gave the interpreters three days to explain
everything thoroughly and to make certain that the English and Dutch
wished to submit themselves to the new rules.17
When the ten Hong merchants showed up at six o’clock in the evening,
the Dutch chief, Hulle, demanded the promised answer from the mer-
chants, with the English and Swedes as witnesses. In the name of all the
merchants Swetja announced that vexed by the troubles with the
Europeans which had occurred last year,18 the Tsongtu had submitted sev-
eral proposals to Peking. The imperial approval had now arrived, intimat-
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ing that the Hong merchants should take care of all business in agreement
with the requirements laid down by the mandarins in order to set the
minds of the Europeans at rest. In order to be able to take care of the busi-
ness imposed on them as effectively as possible, at their own request with
the sanction of the Tsongtu the Hong merchants had agreed to unite into
one business corporation. Their petition had been passed through several
Courts of Justice and had obtained the approval of each court.19
As Hulle felt discomposed by the Hoppo’s letter, he again summoned
the English and Swedes to his factory that same evening. They made a
joint agreement that each nation should present a petition to the Tsongtu,
arguing that an association such as the Co-hong would be extremely
detrimental to the Europeans. Their trade should not be transacted with
the association as a whole but with the Hong merchants individually, as
had been the case in the past. The Swedish delegates excused themselves,
saying that they needed further consultation with their factory and prom-
ised to give an answer either the same evening or the next morning. They
returned to the Dutch factory early on the 17th and declared themselves
opposed to the presentation of a petition before the arrival of their other
ships, because for the moment they had no business to transact. At their
factory, the English also debated the predicament of whether or not they
should present a petition to the Tsongtu. Since the Swedes had cried and
because there had been insinuations that the Hoppo’s chop in a very par-
ticular manner was a very clear indication of why the Dutch were not
doing business, the English thought that all these arguments were spe-
cious and contradicted the interpretation they had received from the
interpreters. They resolved to send for their security merchants and ask
them ingenuously to explain the chop. In the meantime, they informed
the Dutch that they needed more time to consider whether or not to pres-
ent a petition. They said that the Dutch should go ahead without waiting
for them, because they had heard the mandarins suspected the English of
inciting the Dutch. They could not resolve to do anything at all as they
feared the mandarins might again misconstrue their actions.20
This unexpected situation forced the Dutch to take action alone. They
wrote the petition immediately and asked the security merchants to take
it to the city. In this petition, Hulle announced that the Dutch had decid-
ed to postpone their business transactions because they had been told that
the united Hong merchants were going to trade as a corporation. On the
21st the ten Hong merchants had solemnly declared at the Dutch facto-
ry that they united in a corporation to conduct all sorts of trade at the
instigation of the high-ranking mandarins, but that the Dutch were still
free to negotiate with those members with whom they wanted to deal. It
mattered not one jot to them whether the Dutch traded with the corpo-
ration or one particular member since all the eggs were in the one basket.
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On these grounds, the Dutch believed that the Hoppo should pronounce
according to the usual legal provisions about all the disagreements which
had arisen between themselves and the Hong merchants, now that he had
been fully informed of their complaint. The Dutch were grateful for the
beneficence, favours and kindness which high-ranking mandarins had
bestowed on them for many years. Pertinently they had come to Canton
with no intention other than to trade. They also wanted to unload their
goods as soon as possible, but now that they had been informed about the
formation of the Co-hong, they had some inhibitions about opening
negotiations. They had appealed for permission to engage in business as
before and continue to pursue their trading activities unhampered, but
had been informed that they would be obliged to deal with the merchants
in the association as a body. These new arrangements would be an insur-
mountable obstacle to pursuing negotiations, because the new association
would be in the position to fix the price arbitrarily. In their petition the
Dutch stated they were in the dark about whether it was the Hoppo who
had ordered this association to be formed or whether it was a decision
which the Hong merchants had taken on their own initiative. They
believed that the knavery and deceit so prevalent in business could only
be halted by the Hoppo and not by the formation of such an association.
Therefore, they requested the Hoppo to issue orders which would be ben-
eficial to the foreigners’ interests and to take pity on their plight, and they
begged the latter to disband this association because it benefited their sit-
uation not one iota. If the Co-hong were to be set up, they anticipated no
more Dutch ships would be sent in the coming year.21
On the 22nd, the Dutch received a communication from the Chinese
officials, saying that:
The Europeans have traded here for a number of years without any damage
on either side. But at present, shopkeepers and other members [of the pub-
lic] are deceiving the Europeans in all sorts of ways, making contracts, then
reneging on them, borrowing money without repaying it and misleading
Europeans by suggesting ruinous schemes to their greatest detriment, […];
We, the Tsongtu, Fooyuern, and Hoppo, have sought the assistance of His
Imperial Majesty and have beseeched Him to decree that the Europeans shall
only be permitted to trade with the present Imperial Merchants; […]; there-
fore you should realize without entertaining a single shred of doubt that
everything had been done for your own benefit; if the merchants do not
behave magnanimously under the present conditions, we shall punish them
severely and our unfailing scrutiny will certainly make their deeds known to
us in good time [for steps to be taken].
You people say that should you not have your own way, you will not be
able to come here again and will lose absolutely on the trade. Be free to do
what you think fit! The meagre duties which this far-flung Empire receives
from your trade can be counted as nothing compared to those enormous 
sums which it raises for its Emperor every year and to all which pertaining 
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to the life and enjoyments which abound in His lap.
It will be best that you proceed with your affairs and deal with those of 
the Mandarin’s Merchants whoever pleases you in fairness to both sides,
without raising further objections to a company or concerning the connect-
edness of the merchant’s circumstances, and it should be sufficient for you
that we shall protect you in all cases against your enviers, while you will
return to your home country sooner, &c.22
Obviously the answer the mandarins gave to their petition was not at all
what the Dutch had expected. In order to take further action, the Dutch
chief now again summoned the members of the Trade Council on 25 Au-
gust. He announced that this association of Chinese merchants had been
assembled, whether covertly or openly, in such a cunning and effective
way that it would not be easy to shake its foundations unless other more
emphatic means were planned. Since the European merchants had done
everything to stop the formation of this association but had failed to
achieve their end, they should seek to reach an accord as to how they
could continue to carry on their trade as propitiously as possible.23
After a long discussion, the Council resolved to do all the business of
selling and contracting Bohea with three security merchants, Tsja
Hunqua and Semqua in association, Tan Chetqua, and Swetja, on condi-
tion that each of them stood surety for the others in every aspect, because
the Dutch would rather give these three partners credit than to all the
other seven members of this corporation. These three merchants were,
after all, the most honest of their confreres who were favourably inclined
towards the Europeans. Hulle suggested that business be commenced
with these appointed merchants. Without further ado, the very next day,
Hulle informed the English that he had already proceeded to do busi-
ness.24
In the month of September, the Dutch sold their goods and contract-
ed for teas. The Swedes, and Danes began their negotiations in October
and the English followed in December.25
In this case, the Dutch, who all along were disinclined to oppose the
mandarins in public, at first planned to lead this protest, and wanted to
engage in an open dispute with the Hong merchants to persuade them
into relinquishing their intention. After some mature reflection, they sen-
sibly gave in at once after they had received the Chinese authorities’ final
confirmation, as they knew that foreign traders should never confront the
authorities of this vast Empire if they wanted to do successful business in
China. It was the English who raised the first protests about the inten-
tions of the Hong merchants and it was their rumours which induced the
Dutch to follow suit. Later, when they were planning to lead the protest
against the establishment of the Co-hong, the Dutch expected the
English to co-operate. The latter did so at the beginning, but when they
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learned about how angry the Chinese authorities were with them, they
beat a quick retreat, leaving the Dutch in an uncomfortable dilemma.
Purchase of the Herstelder
On 10 July 1772, the Macao ship the St Luz arrived in Macao from
Batavia bearing news that the Dutch Company ship the Rijnsburg,
assigned to Canton by the High Government, had sailed from there on
8 June. This Macao ship also carried Governor-General Petrus Albertus
van der Parra’s missive, saying that owing to the delay in the arrival of the
Company ships from Europe the High Government had resolved to fit
out the ships the Rijnsburg, the Bodt, the Prinses van Oranje, and the
Veldhoen for Canton. The Rijnsburg had already sailed and the loading of
the other three was in progress and would probably be finished by the
middle of June. If no ship from Europe were to arrive in Batavia, the High
Government would send the other three ships to oblige the Company.
On 16 July, the English in Macao received news of the arrival of the
ship the London, under the command of captain Webb. A terrible
typhoon which had blown up that same night forced the London to put
out to sea. From the topmast a crew member of this ship had seen a ship
aft of them and suspected that was the Rijnsburg.
On 21 July, an English country ship and a Macao ship, the St Simão,
from India arrived in Macao. The crew of the English ship, as said, had
seen a Dutch ship at the latitude of St Jan, which, as they supposed, had
anchored there to ride out the storm but shortly after had disappeared.26
In the afternoon of the 22nd, the Dutch ship the Bodt, under the com-
mand of captain Staring, arrived in the outer roadstead of Macao. That
captain was surprised that the Rijnsburg, which had sailed three weeks
before he had, had not arrived.27
On 1 August, the Dutch supercargoes, who had returned to Canton on
30 July, heard that five men had entered into the toll house and these were
survivors of the wreck of the Rijnsburg. These people would remain where
they were until the mandarins had prepared a chop addressed to the
Tsongtu. While awaiting this august document the Dutch supercargoes
sent food and some refreshments to the men and were then informed that
they were actually the first mate and four sailors from that ship. The same
afternoon, these five people entered into the Dutch factory.28
As early as 2 August, the Dutch supercargoes considered replacing the
Rijnsburg with another ship. They knew of nothing better than the St
Simão, belonging to the Governor, or Captain-General, of Macao, so they
wrote to him asking whether he would be willing to sell his ship. Five days 
later, the Governor replied that he was prepared to do so and he would 
send two people to bargain over the purchase in order to strike a deal, 
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thereby avoiding a lengthy correspondence. The Dutch chief, Anthony
Francois L’Heureux, immediately answered that he could not sign a con-
tract until he had inspected the ship to judge whether she was seaworthy
enough to be sent to Europe. The upshot was that the supercargo,
Andreas Everardus van Braam Houckgeest, and the assistant, Jan van den
Bergh, went to Macao to bargain with the Governor. More professional-
ly perhaps the first and second mates and the chief carpenter of the Bodt
were also commissioned to inspect the Macao ship and its rigging.
On 15 August, L’Heureux received news from Van Braam in Macao
informing him that the St Simão, 65.9 cubits long and 25.4 cubits at the
beam, had been found to be sturdy and seaworthy according to the report
of First Mate Justus Hendrik Pheil and the others. He had asked the
Governor, Diogo Fernandes Salema e Saldanha, to proceed with the sale
of the ship as soon as possible. His efforts were in vain because the
Governor asked 43,000 taels of Spanish rials for the ship, for which Van
Braam offered only 24,000 taels. The difference was so big that the
Governor thought it superfluous to continue the negotiations and called
the sale off. Not to be outdone L’Heureux ordered Van Braam to abandon
the negotiations because he thought the Governor simply wanted to take
advantage of the predicament, convinced that the Dutch would buy his
ship at any price. On 19 August, L’Heureux again instructed Van Braam
to bid as low as possible a price.29 Eventually, on 21 August Van Braam
reached an agreement with the Governor and bought the ship for 38,000
taels of Spanish rials, to be paid in October. The next day the formal
transfer took place and the name of the ship was changed to the
Herstelder. Poan Keequa was invited to be the security merchant of the
Herstelder, a position which he accepted.30 On the evening of the 28th,
Van den Berg accompanied by Second Mate Weever and Chief Carpenter
Jan Fredrik Smith left for Canton, and First Mate Pheil and Van Braam
remained in Macao to sail for Canton on the Herstelder.31
On the morning of 31 August, the Governor of Macao informed Van
Braam that the Hoppo of Macao had assembled some malevolent Macao
people to prevent the ship from leaving the roadstead for Canton. As he
wanted to be absolutely sure of his information, he requested Van Braam
to inquire personally about the matter with the Hoppo. Van Braam imme-
diately set off to see the Hoppo pretending to know nothing about what
was afoot and applied for a chop for the pilot who would navigate the
ship to Canton. The Hoppo replied that he could not give the ship a chop
because she was a Macao ship and therefore should be loaded there. Van
Braam objected to this explaining that the ship was no longer the proper-
ty of the Governor of Macao but was now owned by the Dutch Company.
Consequently the ship should sail for Whampoa (see Map 4) to take on
cargo because the Company could not load her at Macao. The Hoppo
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haughtily replied that this was none of his business, and the Dutch should
not have bought a ship which belonged to Macao. Since nothing could be
settled, Van Braam said that he would write directly to Canton to request
a chop from the Tsongtu. The Hoppo answered that Van Braam was free
to do as he pleased and that he would immediately give a chop if Van
Braam received permission from Canton. Accordingly, Van Braam at once
sent a report to Canton. Shortly after this, the procurator (procurador)32
of the Senate of Macao sent an interpreter to Van Braam to explain that
the Hoppo had ordered him to interdict the departure of the Herstelder.
The ship was not to leave before a chop had been received from Canton
in order to avoid any possible imbroglio between the Chinese administra-
tions with the Senate of Macao.33
With this message in hand, Van Braam went to see the Macao procu-
rator to find out what was going on. The procurator began by asking Van
Braam to ignore the message sent. He had been forced to send it in his
official capacity as a precautionary measure because the Chinese, as “great
rascals”, sought any excuse to lodge an attack against the Senate. Van
Braam replied that he had talked to the Hoppo in person that same morn-
ing and had already been forewarned that he was seeking to hold the ship
up. As he had already sent an express message to Canton to ask for a chop,
he was confident that it would be dispatched soon. Van Braam also asked
the procurator whether there might not be some other request or docu-
ment which would have to be presented to the Senate in connection with
the departure of this ship. He was authorized to act in the name of the
Dutch Company in his capacity of deputy-president of the Trade
Council. He was most adamant that he did not want to infringe any for-
malities and was determined to avoid any kind of argument with the
procurator. The latter answered that with regard to the purchase of this
ship, he could do nothing more than he had already done. The ship could
leave as soon as he was in receipt of a chop from Canton. Nobody could
then stop Van Braam from sailing it to Whampoa.
Van Braam went on to ask whether it was advisable he should also pay
the Senate some money to muster the crew. The procurator answered this
was unnecessary as this was one of the responsibilities of the Governor. If
the latter gave Van Braam permission to sign on the sailors, that would be
enough. Van Braam said that he had expressly requested information
about what he was supposed to do because he did not want to be found
wanting in anything that was required. He also expressed the hope that
the Senate would not create any more hindrance which would detain this
ship and block her departure. He also asked the Senate to be mindful of
the fact that this was not private but Dutch East India Company business.
Should any more obstacles be strewn in the path of this ship’s departure,
it was always still in the power of the Dutch Company to give tit for tat
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with territorial Macao ships if they were to enter Dutch territorial waters.
The procurator replied that there was no reason for any anxiety. He
assured Van Braam that the Senate would gladly co-operate with the
Dutch Company and that there was nothing for the Dutch to fear.
When Van Braam visited the Governor again, the latter inquired about
his conversations with the Hoppo and the procurator. He was indignant
about the Hoppo’s announcement, and declared that such a message was
unacceptable because the matter of whether a ship was bought in Macao
and whether it was sent full or empty to Whampoa was wholly out of the
jurisdiction of the Chinese government. This was a matter solely for the
ship-owner, and the Hoppo should not pretend otherwise and exact any
more than the usual toll and tonnage fees. The Senators maintained their
privileges by such chicanery whenever they saw a chance to put their
power against him into effect. He accused them of offering the Chinese
mandarins decisions which would undermine the laws in Macao. Mean-
while, the Governor had assured Van Braam that he feared no more
trouble, because he had performed all his duties most astutely and he had
no need at all to ask the procurator if anything else should be done.
Subsequently, Van Braam wrote a report to the Trade Council in Canton
explaining the situation in which he found himself and requested a chop
from the Hoppo of Canton to obviate all the trouble. At the same time,
he reported that he had already signed on sixty-seven ordinary ratings and
three ship’s officers.34
After receiving Van Braam’s report, L’Heureux immediately went to
Poan Keequa on 1 September, informing him of the state of play and
requesting him to deliver a chop as soon as possible. Poan Keequa prom-
ised to attend upon the Hoppo early the next morning.
He was as good as his word. On 2 September, Poan Keequa informed
the Dutch that he had spoken to the Hoppo and the latter had informed
him that it was necessary to submit two requests, one to the Tsongtu and
the other to himself. If these conditions were fulfilled, he might be in a
position to receive a chop for Macao. Poan Keequa promised that he
would visit the Tsongtu again the next afternoon. Meanwhile, in Macao 
Van Braam sailed the ship into the outer roadstead and anchored her there. 
Then, he went to see the Governor and asked permission for the ship to
pass the Barra Fort so it could enter the Bay of Taipa.35 The Governor said
that he would inform Van Braam of the answer the next day.36
Back in Canton, Poan Keequa came to the Dutch factory on 3 Sep-
tember, and reported what he had done at the office of the Tsongtu. He
had explained in detail that the ship had been bought in Macao as a
replacement for the wrecked ship the Rijnsburg. The Dutch chose not to
load the ship in Macao because of the high expenses involved, but pre-
ferred to load at Whampoa as they used to do with all their ships.
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Therefore, a chop was requested granting the ship permission to sail
upriver. The Hoppo of Macao, who was also present, took good measure
of how anxious Poan Keequa was. He said that the Dutch had no urgent
need to move the ship from Macao. If this ship were to sail, there would
not be more than ten ships remaining at Macao which in effect meant a
loss of income for him. Last year one had been burnt and two others had
been forced to return without completing their journey. In these straits he
would be distressed to see yet another ship taken away from Macao. Poan
Keequa then turned to the Tsongtu, who promised to discuss the business
with other mandarins and to announce the result the following day. He
intimated that all this should be not much of a problem and that the only
reason which might prevent the ship from entering the Bocca Tigris
would be the fact that it arrived empty and therefore deprived the Hoppo
of Macao of any fee from its cargo. This might arouse some suspicion at
the Imperial Court that he might be retaining the impost on the cargo.
Nevertheless, there was still room for a reciprocal discussion.37
In Macao, Van Braam received the answer from the Governor telling
him to go to the procurator to find out whether or not some trouble
might also be stirred up with the Chinese government if the ship was
moved to the Bay of Taipa. Van Braam did as he was bid, but the procu-
rator explained that, in his opinion, no obstacle could be thrown up by
the Chinese side, because this business was completely out of their hands
and that nothing could prevent Van Braam from moving the ship to Taipa
if he had permission from the Governor to pass the Barra Fort. When Van
Braam notified the Governor of this, the latter declared that Van Braam
should present a request only on this subject to him, whereupon he would
give the order to let the ship pass. Van Braam immediately followed this
up and made the request.38
However, in response to Van Braam’s request the Governor sent him
the order that the ship still had to remain and could not sail outside that
day. This confused Van Braam, so he went directly to the Governor and
asked the reason why the ship might not depart for Taipa. The Governor
clarified his decision by explaining that it would be better for the ship to
remain inside until the coming Monday when Van Braam would receive
a message from the Senate. Now it really no longer made any difference
if the ship did remain inside longer, because Van Braam could not possi-
bly leave without the promised message from the Senate. The Governor
announced that he could not take any risk with the Senators who were
suspicious of him. As far as the protestations of the Chinese administra-
tion were concerned, he grumbled that they had been unjustifiably made
and it was therefore a scandal that the procurator had responded to this
protest. Despite this acknowledgement he was careful not to get into
trouble with the Senate which would happen were the ship to leave with-
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out awaiting its permission. Van Braam replied that he did not intend to
inconvenience the Governor by organizing a hasty departure and would
not leave Macao before he had received the message from the Senate. His
purpose in sending the ship to Taipa was to muster the crew and to round
up any absentee while the ship was still in the bay. The Governor said that
if Van Braam departed after having received the assent of the Senate, he
would not procrastinate but sign Van Braam’s request and send an order
to the Barra Fort to let the ship pass.39
On the evening of 4 September, Poan Keequa came to the Dutch fac-
tory with bad news concerning the granting of a chop which would allow
the Herstelder to go to Whampoa. He explained that the Hoppo of Canton
had summoned him and informed him that he had discussed this busi-
ness in detail with the Tsongtu and other mandarins. They had advised
him not to grant a chop if he wanted to be sure of not receiving an impe-
rial reprimand. The Emperor undoubtedly would be convinced that they
had embezzled the Hoppo money or import duties on the goods brought
on one of the Dutch ships and that the mandarins had lined their own
pockets. Even if there was a formal statement to the effect that one Dutch
ship had shipwrecked and that another ship had been bought at Macao as
a replacement, it would still be impossible for the Imperial Court to com-
prehend that this ship from Macao had arrived in the roadstead of
Whampoa empty. He suggested that the ship be loaded at Macao.
The Dutch supercargoes were surprised by this answer and wondered
whether they would ever be able to procure a chop at all, since, as they
pointed out, the Hoppo of Macao also complained about the drop in the
number of ships entering his port and was not overjoyed at the prospect
of the Herstelder leaving Macao and sailing into the hands of strangers. He
had protested about her departure as strongly as it was possible for him to
do so because he felt he would certainly be punished were he to allow the
ship to leave. It was certain that should the Tsongtu and Hoppo persist in
refusing a chop to allow the ship go to Whampoa, she would have to
remain at Macao. The purchase would either have to be cancelled or its
cargo would have to be loaded there. There was absolutely no doubt that
the Tsongtu feared an imperial reprimand if he let the ship approach
Whampoa without taking the appropriate measures. Faced with this
impasse, Poan Keequa hurriedly said that he would see the Tsongtu again
the next day and would try to persuade him to think it all over again.
Surely the Emperor would not be happy were his export duties to be
lost.40
On the morning of 4 September, the Herstelder left the Inner Harbour
of Macao and anchored in the Bay of Praia Grande. In the afternoon, Van
Braam went on board accompanied by First Mate Pheil. He hoisted the
Prince’s flag with a seven-gun salute, and the Guia Castle hoisted the flag
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as well and returned the salute. Van Braam then mustered the crew and
found fourteen absentees. Going back ashore, he sent their names to the
Governor with a request that they be arrested and sent on board. On the
morning of 5 September, the Governor informed him that the most of
the absentees had been arrested and Van Braam could take them on
board. Van Braam therefore sent orders for a boat which could transport
the crew.41
The same day, Poan Keequa came in declaring that he had spoken to
the Hoppo of Canton but, as matters were still inconclusive, he would
have to continue his discussion the next day. In order to facilitate the
business, the frustrated Dutch now proposed that the Herstelder should
take over part of the cargo of the Veldhoen, which had just arrived, before
sailing into the Bocca Tigris.42 On 6 September, Poan Keequa was invit-
ed by the English for a meal, but he excused himself saying that he had
to see the Hoppo. L’Heureux was then asked to see him to be given some
good news, because he could not afford to come to the Dutch factory as
the English might see him. When L’Heureux went to see him in his office,
Poan Keequa explained that, having deliberated the business in question
with the Tsongtu and Hoppo, he had proposed once again that some of the
goods from the Veldhoen be transferred to the Herstelder. Upon hearing
this, the Tsongtu promised to give a chop to allow the ship to be loaded
in this way. The Tsongtu recommended to Poan Keequa that the Dutch
should submit a request to him and to the Hoppo. The next day, the draft
submission to the Tsongtu and Hoppo was delivered to Poan Keequa who
promised to hand it over that same day.43
On 6 September, L’Heureux wanted to talk with Poan Keequa about
the chop for the Herstelder, but the latter had gone to the city. Upon his
return from the city, Poan Keequa declared that the chop could not be
delivered right away because of the festivities for the Tsongtu’s birthday,
but it would be handed over as quickly as possible. On the evening of
10 September, Poan Keequa again said that he would do all the work
required on the 11th.44
On the morning of 11 September, L’Heureux received a letter from
Van Braam dated 9 September, in which he stated that he had decided to
wait no longer for the chop from the Hoppo because he had already
received the message containing the assent of the Senate. He had sailed
out of Taipa that same evening, and at present he was sailing through the
Bocca Tigris without a pilot and hoped to arrive at Whampoa the follow-
ing day. This unexpected news caused the chief great consternation and
anxiety, and he worried about how to present this fait accompli to the
Hoppo, since no chop had been received to allow the ship to enter
Whampoa.
At noon, Poan Keequa arrived at the Dutch factory, anxiously impart-
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ing the news that he had been summoned by the Hoppo. The latter
declared that he was curious to know why the Herstelder had arrived
before she had been granted a chop. He urgently recommended that Poan
Keequa speak to the Tsongtu and also ask the Dutch what was going on.
In order to delay his exposure to the Tsongtu’s fury, Poan Keequa chose to
visit the Dutch factory first and then report to the Tsongtu.
L’Heureux decided to give the Hoppo as innocent an explanation as
possible, telling him that the ship was compelled to go to the Bocca Tigris
by the bad weather and had even been forced to sail to Whampoa with-
out a pilot since there was no secure anchorage at the Bocca Tigris.
Standing his ground, he ordered Van Braam in an express not to approach
Whampoa itself but to anchor outside until further orders. Meanwhile,
Poan Keequa went to see the Hoppo. That afternoon, Poan Keequa’s chief
clerk informed the Dutch that his master had talked with the Hoppo, who
suggested that the Herstelder should leave the Bocca Tigris again and then
after one or two days enter when the chop was ready. The Dutch were
requested that this be put into effect without further ado. This offered the
only escape-route from what would otherwise be a sea of trouble and a
plethora of administrative turmoil.
The Dutch supercargoes adduced diverse excuses, but in vain. They
were assured that without the chop the Tsongtu would never allow the
ship to appear in the roadstead of Whampoa to be loaded. Seeing there
seemed to be no solution in sight, the members of the Trade Council con-
sidered their predicament and reached the unanimous decision to follow
Poan Keequa’s advice, as was recommended by the Hoppo. Consequently
it dispatched a letter to Van Braam, informing him of everything and rec-
ommending that he sail back out of the Bocca Tigris and anchor at an
appropriate spot.45
On 12 September, the comprador, Ajet,46 who had left with L’Heu-
reux’s letter to Van Braam on the 11th, reported that he had handed the
letter over and had been told that the ship would remain where she lay
close to the Bocca Tigris. In the afternoon, L’Heureux received news from
Van Braam stating that he had sailed the Herstelder close to the Zoet-
Zoet-Ham47 where he would anchor according to instructions. L’Heureux
communicated this to Poan Keequa, who was satisfied and recommend-
ed sailing the ship out of the Bocca Tigris.48 Early on the morning of
13 September, L’Heureux received a letter from Van Braam, announcing
that he had anchored outside the castle at the Bocca Tigris at the place he
deemed safest and that he was waiting for the chop. L’Heureux immedi-
ately informed Poan Keequa who was very pleased and promised to work
with might and main to expedite the reception of the chop. That evening,
Poan Keequa came out of the city and informed the Dutch that he had
had a very embarrassing meeting with the Hoppo and consequently no
THE DUTCH-CHINESE-EUROPEAN TRIANGLE 109
chop for the Herstelder was forthcoming. He thought that he needed one
more day when the Hoppo would hopefully be in a better mood to grant
the chop. Therefore the Dutch should be patient and wait. That same day,
a commission had gone to the Bocca Tigris in the name of the Tsongtu
and Hoppo to investigate whether the Herstelder really lay outside or not.
When the commission came on board, Van Braam requested its permis-
sion to sail inside the Zoet-Zoet-Ham. The mandarins refused but prom-
ised that the chop would be issued in three days.49 September 16 came
and went and the interpreter arrived at the Dutch factory to report that
the mandarins would grant no chop because they believed that the whole
matter was suspect and quite irregular. The next day Poan Keequa even
said that the high-ranking mandarins who had boarded the Herstelder had
not reported to the Tsongtu and the Hoppo. He stated that the ship lay
fairly close to the Bocca Tigris. He reckoned that it would take three more
days before the Dutch were granted the chop.50
On the afternoon of 24 September, Poan Keequa privately announced
via one of the clerks that he had returned from the city and was happy to
discuss affairs. In response to this invitation, L’Heureux went to see him
and asked why there was such a delay with the chop for the Herstelder.
What was this all about? L’Heureux said that if matters could be facilitat-
ed with some presents, he might be prepared to undertake this on the
account of the Company, but if Poan Keequa thought that obtaining a
chop was completely out of the question, he should say so. In that case,
the Dutch Trade Council would send the ship back to Macao. Poan
Keequa answered that no presents were needed because he dealt directly
with the Tsongtu and Hoppo about the matter, but that “presents” might
be needed if things were to be speeded up by the mandarins. He was
absolutely confident that the chop would be granted, but he could not
ascertain when exactly this would happen. He said that he had requested
the Hoppo for the chop again that very day but it still had not been forth-
coming. The Hoppo absolved himself of blame saying that he himself was
awaiting an answer with definite information about permission for the
ship from the Casa Branca.
After L’Heureux had patiently listened to all the excuses, he pointed
out to Poan Keequa the dangers besetting the ship lying exposed off the
Bocca Tigris should there be any high winds or electrical storms. She ran
the risk of shipwreck owing to the long delay with the chop. Also, costly
time was running out to make the ship ready for departure that year. In
view of the perils which might await her, he proposed that should the
Hoppo not approve the chop, at least the mandarins should permit the
ship to sail inside the Bocca Tigris so as to protect her against potential
damage. Poan Keequa thought he should apprise the Hoppo of this idea,
and he believed the coming day would be the right moment to do so,
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principally because the Tsongtu would then be receiving good wishes for
his birthday, at which time he was usually in a good mood.51
Quite unexpectedly, the Dutch received the chop from Poan Keequa in
the afternoon of 25 September. The mandarins permitted the Herstelder
to sail to Whampoa from the Bocca Tigris. L’Heureux immediately sent
this message to Van Braam.52 Consequently the matter of the Herstelder
was settled.53
This incident shows that in order to settle the Herstelder business the
Dutch not only had to negotiate with the ship-owner, the Governor of
Macao, they also had to treat cautiously with the Macao Government, of
which the Senate was the principal authority in all dealings with the
Hoppo of Macao and with the Chinese authorities in Canton.54 The
Macao Government consisted of the Governor (or the Captain-General)
and the Senate. The Governor was just in charge of the forts and of the
exiguous garrison, and the real governing body was the Senate which fre-
quently was at loggerheads with the Governor. No matter what the state
of the relationship between the Governor and the Senate was, living
under the roof of the Chinese authority, the Macao Government had no
escape from the Chinese rules and laws when any business pertaining to
the Canton trade had to be dealt with. This was, of course, also applied
to all the European companies trading in Canton and sojourning in
Macao.
Recapture of the Goede Hoop
On 17 August 1781, the English trade representatives in Macao were
reported that captain John McClary of the English country ship the
Dadoloy had that day captured the private merchantman the Goede Hoop
which was anchored at Whampoa under Dutch colours. Captain
McClary justified his action by pointing out that Great Britain had
declared war on the Dutch Republic in December 1780.
The Dutch trade representatives in Macao reacted promptly to this act
of violence. They first desired a co-signed statement from other European
delegates pressing the English supercargoes to condemn captain McClary
for his action, but they refused to comply. Then, on the security mer-
chants’ advice, on 21 August the Dutch requested the mandarins in
Canton to intervene because Canton was a neutral port where the ships
of foreign nations – even if they were at war with each other – should
never break the local peace; more acts of violence might follow if they did
not take immediate action.55 The Dutch chief, Cornelis Heyligendorp,
who also happened to be in Macao, lodged a strong protest with the
English supercargoes:56
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In view of the justification of this act on account of the rupture between the 
two nations, we think it proper to address ourselves to you the representa-
tives of your sovereign and the Company in this empire in order to point out
the injustice of such a procedure. You should be aware that ships of belliger-
ent powers anchored in a neutral port are always considered safe from the
attacks of each other. This may have very prejudicial consequences to both
Companies, [... and] will be exposed to similar enterprises as well as those of
private persons. We require your assistance, so that the Dutch ship with her
crew and cargo will be given back immediately. In case this will not be put
in effect we shall feel ourselves forced to lodge a protest in the strongest man-
ner against this action and make the author of it answerable for all the con-
sequences it might have.
This letter was originally written in Dutch but was then translated into
French, because the English said no one in their factory understood
Dutch. The English replied in English, saying not without a touch of
arrogance that some of the Dutch understood English well enough. In
their reply, the English stated that they agreed with the practice of respect-
ing the neutrality of ports in the countries with which they were living in
peace, but that they had no control over the captains of the country ships.
Their only option, they said, was to apply the strictest observation of neu-
trality on the ships of the English Company, but they would not tackle
the private traders.57 The Dutch, of course, were not satisfied with being
brushed off with such an answer. Suffering from an obviously disadvan-
tageous position as the weaker party in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War,
their only recourse was to appeal to the Chinese authorities.
After receiving complaints from the Dutch condemning this act of vio-
lence, the mandarins in Canton instantly demanded restitution of the
Dutch ship. Captain McClary did not want to return his prize, and pro-
posed that the cargo would be sold to the Chinese merchants as if she
belonged to the Dutch, ensuring the Hoppo would not lose his duties, on
the condition that the mandarins did not interfere. He threatened that he
would take his prize out of the river and sail her away if he were molest-
ed in any way by the Chinese authorities. The mandarins were infuriated
by his words. When they continued to press McClary to return the ship,
he began preparations to make sail, weigh anchor, and go downriver
towards the Bocca Tigris with the tide. Every man in the Chinese
Customs House was now alarmed. All the troops who could be hurriedly
assembled, about 2,000 soldiers in all, were ordered to a rendezvous on
the Tiger Island, and preparations were made to obstruct captain
McClary’s passage.
The mandarins still preferred a peaceful solution to a violent one, and
dispatched messengers to the English in Macao who now found them-
selves in a very disagreeable predicament. On 24 August, a mandarin
travelled to Macao and addressed the English supercargoes, not through
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a merchant or an interpreter as was usual, but through the Portuguese
procurator of the Senate. He complained loud and long about the outrage
and insult to the Imperial Government brought about by their English
fellow countryman, and announced that the Chinese would hold the
English supercargoes accountable for his behaviour, if they did not oblige
captain McClary to restore everything he had taken forthwith. The super-
cargoes replied that they had heard of what had happened at Whampoa
only by word of mouth because they did not regard this as part of their
responsibilities. They said they had no control over McClary, the captain
of a country ship, and therefore could not compel him to do anything.
None the less, they assured the mandarin that they also considered the act
both illegal and violent, and were also desirous of preventing captain
McClary from carrying out his threats; they would exhort him to restitute
his prize in order to appease the mandarins. Their offer was accepted, and
the mandarin himself delivered the English supercargoes’ letter to captain
McClary, in which the latter was merely informed that his non-compli-
ance might endanger the Company trade in this port.
When another mandarin was treated just as cavalierly one day later, the
mandarins sent an order requiring the attendance of the English chief and
other supercargoes at the Bocca Tigris, in order to compel captain
McClary to comply with the Tsongtu’s demands. The English chief,
James Bradshaw, complained that no Hong merchant had been sent to
acquaint him with the particulars of this affair about which he knew only
from hearsay. He protested that the supercargoes had already done every-
thing in their power and he, as the chief, would neither put himself in
such a humiliating and disagreeable situation nor would he subject him-
self to being sent to the Bocca Tigris. This blunt reply obviously dis-
pleased the mandarin, yet from that moment on other mandarins contin-
ued to come to Macao almost every day, threatening that the trade of the
English Company as well as that of private persons would be made to pay
for captain McClary’s conduct. They refused to accept the argument that
the English supercargoes had no control over any ships other than those
of the Company. The more the mandarins of Canton perceived their lack
of control over the real offender, the more it seemed their resolve to impli-
cate the English supercargoes hardened. Fortunately, for the English
supercargoes a way out of this tricky situation presented itself.
While they were pressing the English in Macao, the Chinese authori-
ties also were continuing direct negotiations with captain McClary on the
Pearl River. As the Dadoloy was moving downriver with the tide, the prin-
cipal magistrates of Canton and the merchants surrounded her with their
boats. They kept up a constant barrage of intercourse with captain
McClary; sometimes attempting to intimidate him, at other times trying
to soothe him, but he was not at all impressed by these ravenous oppo-
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nents. Despite his display of sang-froid, it was clear to him that he would
never be able to leave the river unscathed. At long last, Poan Keequa, the
principal security merchant of the EIC, contrived the following strategy
with the English captain. They agreed that when McClary approached
the Bocca Tigris with his prize, he would order his men off the Goede
Hoop. He was as good as his word and immediately the ship was tri-
umphantly boarded by the shouting Chinese.
The mandarin went to see the English in Macao again on 29 August,
for the Fooyuern had had representations made by the aggrieved [Dutch]
party, claiming that part of the cargo of the Goede Hoop was still missing.
He maintained that the English supercargoes should oblige captain
McClary to return everything. The English cavilled that this time the
mandarin in Canton had contacted them in an extraordinary and highly
unusual manner. On every former occasion the mandarins had assiduous-
ly made use of the Hong merchants and interpreters to convey their mes-
sages.
Captain McClary’s conduct created a sea of troubles for the English
supercargoes in Macao, because the officials of Canton had ordered the
local magistrates to send boats to prevent McClary escaping with his
prize. It was rumoured in Canton that the Fooyuern was preparing to do
whatever was in his power to compel captain McClary to make a full resti-
tution of the captured goods. On 3 September, the English were even
informed that a mandarin from Canton had asked the Governor of
Macao to seize some persons belonging to the English factory and have
them delivered to him, but this had been refused by the latter. On 8 Sep-
tember, the Dutch supercargoes once again wrote a letter to the man-
darins, informing them that captain McClary still refused to return all the
remaining items in compliance with the mandarins’ order. The Dadoloy
therefore was once more surrounded by Chinese war junks stationed to
prevent any communication with the English supercargoes.
On 23 September, the EIC trade representatives returned to Canton
and at once discussed the captain McClary affair with Poan Keequa. Poan
Keequa informed them that the Fooyuern was extremely displeased with
captain McClary’s behaviour and wanted to punish him as if he were a
pirate; he was also highly incensed with the English supercargoes, because
they had procrastinated in complying with his orders. It seemed that
nothing could have prevented him from perpetrating some violence
against the English, but Poan Keequa had dexterously made up a story
explaining that the English Company resided in the “north” [England],
whereas the individual traders came from the “south” [India], and that the
English were at war with these people, even in their own country.
Consequently it was no wonder that these people would not allow the
English supercargoes to exert any power over them in Canton. Somewhat
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soothed by such strategies, the Fooyuern seemed to have calmed down a
little. Then, on 28 September, the English supercargoes, together with the
other European supercargoes, received a general chop in the name of the
Tsongtu, Fooyuern, and Hoppo, dated 9 September, saying that:58
As it is the first time a thing of this nature has happened, and as the offend-
er pleaded ignorance of the laws and customs of this country, we have for-
given him and have moreover excused him the payment of port charges, and
ordered all the assistance that may be necessary for the repairing of his ship
and preparing her for the voyage.
This is to give notice to the supercargoes of the different nations in order
that they may inform their countrymen that the Emperor will not suffer
them to bring war into his dominions, and that whoever does so in the
future shall be treated as an enemy.”
After reading the chop, it was painfully clear to the English supercargoes
how much the mandarins were inclined to consider them responsible for
all the irregularities or outrages that were committed by the commanders
of the country ships. To set the matter straight, they therefore thought it
proper to address a letter to the mandarins, expressing their opinion of
captain McClary’s unjustifiable conduct, disclaiming once again any kind
of power over ships not belonging to the English Company. They
explained that their failure to go to the Bocca Tigris was the result of sick-
ness, and then complained of the ill-treatment they had experienced at
the hands of the lower-ranking mandarins. Finally, they hotly denied
there was a difference between Englishmen from the “north” and the
“south”, insisting that all this was the fault of a mistranslation by the secu-
rity merchant. In no uncertain terms they said that they found the answer
of the Fooyuern of 2 October bristled with “boasting, insults, and threats,
as was never before uttered to Europeans, even in this scene of their
humiliation.”59 Not mincing his words the Fooyuern had written as fol-
lows:60
You English are a lying and injurious people, for other nations that come to
Canton are peaceful and do not hurt anyone, but you English are always
making trouble. Some time ago one McClary took a ship and her cargo.
Supercargoes are sent here by your king to superintend the Company busi-
ness, and private persons are permitted to trade here by the same power.
Why did you therefore say that you had no power to prevent the misdeeds
of those individuals, and why did you refuse to obey me when I ordered you
to come to Bocca Tigris to oblige this McClary to restore what he had taken?
[...] If your sickness was not feigned, why do you excuse yourselves for not
coming to the Bocca Tigris by telling me you have no control over private
persons? From such equivocations I see that all this is bogus, and it is not
clear to me but this attempt to take away the ship was made by your order 
[...]. Let me inform you that if hereafter you do not follow my orders the 
English ships shall not be permitted to trade here any more, and I will send 
my soldiers to expel you from the country. What will you then do? [...] To 
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my tribunal your representations seem insolent and impertinent. [...] If any 
of you English in future shall do wrong, whether supercargoes or individu-
als, he shall be punished to the full measure of his crime.
The mandarins’ reply exacerbated the English supercargoes’ thoughts of
how unpleasant their present situation was: it seemed to them that every
mandarin in Canton exerted his authority over them according to his own
particular humour and was invariably hostile to them. They realized that
they could not have recourse to the justice from the mandarins for their
affairs. The only solution was to bear this treatment patiently as if they
were timid of character, although they were by no means willing to be at
all submissive.
In fact, the English very much envied the relations the Dutch enter-
tained with the mandarins in Canton. One striking example was the case
of a Dutch seaman who had been murdered by one of his own country-
men some months earlier. The Dutch supercargoes were not forced to
hand the murderer over to the mandarins but executed him themselves on
board one of their ships, in sight of the Chinese. Such privileges of this
kind were not extended to other Europeans. For example, in October
1780 a French sailor killed a Portuguese sailor in Canton and consequent-
ly the Portuguese petitioned that the culprit should be handed over to
them so he could be tried for murder in Portugal. The Fooyuern refused
to consider this petition and put the murderer on trial and had him exe-
cuted. These two instances show the variable nature in the proceedings of
the Chinese tribunal in the trials of different Europeans. The English
supercargoes drew the conclusion that if a murder concerning the English
were committed, there was little probability that they would be allowed
to try the culprit themselves. The mandarins would try, condemn, and
execute the murderer.61
The atrocious situation of the English supercargoes in Canton and
Macao was the result of their own non-intervention in captain McClary’s
business. They had made their own bed and they had to lie in it.
Apparently, the English had learned the wrong lesson from the “Chinese
debts” trouble in 1779, in which Sir Edward Vernon (Admiral and
Commander in chief of the squadron and fleet of the EIC in India) dis-
patched captain John A. Panton to the mandarins of Canton, requesting
the liquidation of the Chinese merchants’ debts borrowed from the
British creditors in Madras and in Britain. On this occasion, the English
supercargoes were forced to negotiate with the mandarins in Canton on
behalf of the British creditors. After the negotiations broke down, the
mandarins reported this business to Peking and consequently the default-
ing Chinese debtors were severely punished. Nevertheless, the British
creditors received a very unreasonable recompense for their loans and the
Company business also ran into difficulties because of this trouble.62
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When called upon to intervene in clearing up the matter of captain
McClary’s privateering acts, the English supercargoes preferred not to
stick their noses into the trouble caused by their fellow countryman,
shrugging aside the admonishments from both the Dutch and the
Chinese who felt that the English supercargoes should intervene. Hence,
it is easy to understand why the Dutch headed directly for the English
supercargoes when some cargo and a chest belonging to the Goede Hoop
had still not been returned. On 28 October, the Dutch chief who arrived
in Canton from Macao handed a paper over to the English chief, contain-
ing a detailed account of sundry stores as well as a chest of gold and pearls
seized by captain McClary.63 Confronted with this evidence, the English
supercargoes at once strongly remonstrated with McClary and demanded
he return all the remaining goods forthwith.
On 4 November, the Goede Hoop was advertised for sale by auction at
Whampoa, but was only sold a year later in October 1782, when she
became British property. On 16 December 1781, the troublemaker cap-
tain McClary fitted out his ship in warlike array and left the Pearl River
for Bengal loudly declaring that he intended to take many Dutch prizes
on his trip back to India. This was not an idle boast, because a few
months later, without hesitation he plundered a Chinese junk bound for
Batavia in the Bangka Straits under the pretext that the property on board
the junk belonged to the Dutch.64
In seeking redress, the Dutch had finally made use of their satisfactory
contacts with the Chinese merchants and their good terms with the
Chinese authorities. The Dutch understood they would never win in any
direct confrontation with the English, which had been their unhappy
experience in previous years.65 They behaved very shrewdly throughout
the whole process. They did not take up arms directly against the trouble-
some captain but lodged protests with the English supercargoes, at the
same time as they begged the mandarins to intervene, and picked the
Chinese merchants’ brains for suggestions as to how to outmanoeuvre the
English. Simultaneously this case exposes the English supercargoes’ diffi-
culty in controlling the country traders, whereas the Dutch did not have
the same kind of “private trader” problem in China.
Conclusion
Since the official establishment of the Canton System in 1760, every year
the delegates of the VOC, as well as those of the other European compa-
nies, had remained in Canton during the trading season and in Macao
during the off-season. Under such conditions, they would perforce inter-
act in various ways not only with the Chinese merchants and local author-
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ities but also with the servants of other companies and the Macao
Government. The three cases set out above collectively give a fine illustra-
tion of the Dutch-Chinese-European (principally English and Portu-
guese) triangle.
As far as relations with the Chinese were concerned, the VOC trade
representatives in Canton were well aware of the need to preserve agree-
able contacts with the Chinese merchants and to remain on good terms
with the mandarins. In other words, the Dutch supercargoes always did
their best to negotiate with the Chinese merchants for fair dealings,66 and
to make a favourable impression on the mandarins by presenting them-
selves as “honest men”. The inescapable conclusion is that the Dutch del-
egates carried out their business in Canton by conscientiously paying full
respect to the Chinese authorities, as they were painfully aware of the
dominant role of the Chinese authorities in the European trade in
Canton. They behaved in a similar manner towards the Japanese bureau-
cracy when they traded at their trading-station Deshima in Nagasaki.67
As for the relations with the English in Canton, as shown by the first
and third cases, the Dutch competed on the market and conflicted in
daily life with their rivals far more than they co-operated with them. In
comparison to the good relations between the VOC trade representatives
and the Chinese authorities, interestingly enough, the English had suf-
fered very shaky relations with the Chinese authorities since they started
their China trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century, although the
volume of their business with the Chinese merchants was much larger
than that of the Dutch. In the third case, by their independent and some-
times rash behaviour the English country traders must have acted as the
spoilsports in any efforts to maintain good relations.
As regards the relations with the Macao Government, the second case,
the purchase of the Herstelder, shows that the VOC trade representatives
kept in close contact with this administration no matter whether they
were sojourning in Macao during the off-season or whether they negoti-
ated some business with this administration while in Canton. Frankly
speaking, the Dutch delegates probably received such fair treatment from
the Macao Government because they had strong backing: the High
Government. A number of Macao (Portuguese) vessels sailed to Batavia
to trade every year, and the Portuguese traders frequently put in at Batavia
for a short call when they sailed to Timor and other Asiatic ports, so to a
large extent the treatment the High Government meted out to these




THE SALE OF THE “VOC TEAS” IN EUROPE
Introduction
When the China Committee took control of the VOC China trade at the
end of the 1750s, the procedures regarding the entire voyage of the China
ships changed virtually completely from those which had been followed
in the previous phases.1 From then onwards, the China ships set out any
time between September and December every year (or rarely at the begin-
ning of the next year) from the Dutch Republic, and arrived in Canton
in the summer, or October at the latest, of the next year; the ships left
Canton late that same year (in October, November or December) or early
the following January or February, and arrived home at any time between
June and October.2
The homecoming of a China ship after a voyage which may have taken
as long as three years did not yet herald the conclusion of the whole trad-
ing venture. The greatest concern of the Company about the voyage still
had to take place: the sale of the return cargoes, in other words, the real-
ization of the Company’s trading profit. In the case of the Company’s tea
trade, this was done at one or two Company auctions held between the
second half of the year and the first half of the next year separately by the
various chambers.
Such Company auctions were not the final destination of the “VOC
teas”. Once they had taken place, the “VOC teas” were resold by the
domestic tea-dealers, both wholesalers and retailers, to shopkeepers from
whom they were purchased by the consumers. Not all tea remained in the
Dutch Republic. Dutch traders re-exported some part of the “VOC teas”
to other European countries which did not import tea directly from
China and on whose domestic market there was a demand for more teas.
Company auctions of the “VOC teas”
The Gentlemen Seventeen of the VOC represented the six Chambers of
Amsterdam, Zeeland, Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen, whose
delegates also participated in the China Committee.3 These chambers fit-
ted out ships under their own control for the Dutch-Asian trade, and they
each received their share of the return cargoes of tea when the China ships
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returned home. Therefore, a number of barges were dispatched by the
Chambers of Zeeland, Delft, and Rotterdam to unload the goods ordered
once the China ships made port in the southern estuaries of Zeeland and
Holland. The Chambers of Hoorn, Enkhuizen, and Amsterdam did the
same when the China ships anchored in the roadstead of Texel in the
north.4
Subsequently, according to the rule of the Gentlemen Seventeen, the
return cargoes were sold in each of the various chamber cities. In the early
phase of the Company’s existence, these chambers disposed of their share
of the goods in three ways. Most frequently, they sold the goods by organ-
izing an auction. Failing this, they drew up a contract with one or more
domestic trading groups. Finally, they occasionally offered tea to individ-
ual traders at a fixed price.5 Later, especially in the eighteenth century, all
the goods were sold at the Company auctions in the chamber cities.
Although these chambers held their own auctions of tea and other
Asian goods each year, the dates and other additional stipulations pertain-
ing to the running of the auctions were decreed by the Gentlemen
Seventeen at the end of each trading season. The Gentlemen Seventeen
issued an annual pamphlet, which mentioned when and where such auc-
tions were to take place, including a comprehensive description of the
quantities and value of the goods for sale.
All chambers participated in the trade with Asia, but as far as the
Chinese tea trade was concerned, the number of chambers taking part in
this trade fluctuated every year. Consequently, the number of chamber
cities in which the tea auctions took place yearly varied from all six to only
one in the sixty years between 1731 and 1790. Only Amsterdam held tea
auctions every year, with the exception of 1782 and 1783, when no China
ship was sent back to the Dutch Republic because of the Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War.6
Scanning the data in Appendix 6, we can establish that all the six
chamber cities had public tea auctions each year in 1731-1744, 1748, and
1752, but in other years an auction did not take place in one or more of
the cities. When considering the number of chamber cities where the teas
were auctioned, it should be pointed out that, even though all six cham-
ber cities organized tea auctions in some years, this does not mean that all
of them sent ships to China, especially in the first two phases of the direct
China trade. Before the China Committee was established, some of the
chambers frequently made their purchases of tea in Batavia. There were
also instances when some chambers sent ships to Canton but did not pur-
chase tea but acquired other products instead. Sometimes ships were lost
on the homeward voyage. Such a fate befell the ship the Abbekerk sent by
the Hoorn Chamber in 1778. Its cargo was scheduled to be sold in 1780.7
However, in the years 1760-1781, most of the chambers which held 
CHAPTER FIVE120
tea auctions in their own cities also joined in sending ships to Canton.
Although the tea auctions were arranged by these chamber cities sepa-
rately, an overview of all auctions held by the six chambers was eventual-
ly compiled by the Gentlemen Seventeen in one VOC document under
the title of “Annual Statements of the Goods Sold by all the VOC
Chambers, 1731-1790” (see Appendix 6). In these statements, which
were recorded on 15 or 31 May each year, the results of the auctions of
tea and other products can be easily consulted.8 Perusing this informa-
tion, we discover that every auction dealt with the cargo of one complete
voyage of the China ships over the past three years.
Those chambers which had the commodity to trade sold the teas on
the market every year at one or two public auctions held in succession.9
Detailed information on this can be abstracted from the “Annual
Statements” and the “Lists of the Deliveries, with the Names of the
Buyers and the Prices Paid at the Sales of the Zeeland Chamber, 1757-
1776” (see Appendix 8). In the first record, the auction dates for the
Chambers of Delft and Rotterdam are clearly noted throughout the year
in the months of April, May, August, September, October, December,
and (most frequently) November, and the auction dates for all other
chambers are omitted.10 Examining the second record, we find that the
auctions of the Zeeland Chamber took place in both April and October,
November, or December for the years 1758, 1761-1764, and in either of
May, October, November, or December for other years 1765-1767 and
1772-1776.11
Customarily, the tea-buyers assembled at a VOC auction in the cham-
ber cities to bid for the goods they wanted to purchase on the auction
date. It is a pity that no detailed account has survived of the spectacle of
customers outbidding one another, but one fact is crystal clear: the num-
ber of buyers involved in the tea business in the eighteenth century was
great.12 Appendix 8 gives an impression of the tea-dealers’ purchases in
Middelburg. The quantity, price, and value of the teas sold are meticu-
lously recorded. The number of the tea-buyers vying with each other to
acquire the sought-after commodity in the periods 1758-1766 and 1772-
1776 was quite considerable (see Table 4). Unfortunately, there is hardly
any information about the tea-buyers in other chamber cities to be
retrieved from the VOC archives. J.A. ter Molen claims there were forty
tea-dealers in Amsterdam in 1766, most of whom also sold coffee;13 a
practice also followed by tea-dealers in Zeeland.14
Among the tea-buyers, the quality and the price of tea were the two
most important thoughts uppermost in their minds when they made their
bids at the Company auctions. In discerning quality, tea-buyers paid par-
ticular attention to the dustiness of the tea auctioned. After the middle of
the eighteenth century, they frequently complained to the VOC about the 
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Table 4  Number of the tea-buyers at the auctions in Middelburg by the Zeeland Chamber,
1758-1766 and 1772-1776
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Number Year Number______________________________________________________________________________________
1758 38 1765 51
1759 29 1766 49
1760 47 1772 42
1761 41 1773 51
1762 58 1774 50
1763 58 1775 53
1764 44 1776 48______________________________________________________________________________________
NB: it should be pointed out that this amount, as shown in Appendix 8, includes not only 
the persons who bought tea directly from the Company but also those who purchased tea
from the private sellers via the Company.
Source: Appendix 8.
dusty nature of the tea, Bohea in particular, in spite of the fact that ever
since 1760 this matter had already engaged the undivided attention of the
Gentlemen Seventeen. In their seasonal instructions, the latter never
failed to remind the VOC trade representatives in Canton to check the
quality of the teas. The tea-buyers were also displeased with the short-
weighting. They argued that before the direct trade had been inaugurat-
ed in 1757, the “VOC tea” chests were packed very carelessly and they
were light weight. After that date the chest had admittedly grown heavier
but the contents were heavily contaminated by dust. The excuse for this
adulteration was according to the supercargoes’ later caustic assumption
that the tea-buyers benefited from adulterating the Company’s coarsely
packed teas with dust; and should the “VOC teas” already be heavily
mixed with dust before they were transported to the Dutch Republic, the
tea-buyers would be deprived of the opportunity to fiddle the goods
themselves.15
Defending the way they went about their business, the trade represen-
tatives declared that they could not possibly satisfy the tea-buyers at home
without harming the interests of the Company. If they wanted the teas
less dusty, they should purchase little or no Ankay,16 which was very fri-
able and could not be packed without badly pulverizing it. They should
opt for Bohea instead. This would push the price of Bohea up higher than
it already was and that would certainly militate against the interests of the
Company. To their credit, the trade representatives continued to do their
best to minimize the damage to the tea-buyers, but they saw no possibil-
ity to meet all the tea-buyers’ wishes, because their first duty was to care
for the interests of the Company and not allow the purchase price of tea
to rise too high.17 The road open to them to help the tea-buyers at home,
while still considering the interests of the Company, was to assign their
own people to supervise the packing and weighing of tea by the Chinese
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tea-supplying agents, especially when they happened to be mixing Bohea,
Congou, or Souchong with Ankay. This procedure was observed through-
out the second half of the eighteenth century.18
There is irrefutable evidence that the “VOC teas” were sold at different
prices in different chamber cities in each auction season. The minimum
prices were calculated to cover prime costs, freight, and such charges on
the merchandise as the supercargoes’ commission and the expenses
incurred by the Company’s establishment in Canton, insurance, interest,
and the customs duties – an ad valorem tax assessed on the sale of tea and
paid by the Company. Even armed with these data, it is quite difficult to
gather information about the selling price in the archives. There are, how-
ever, three sources which can be used for this purpose: the purchase and
selling prices of Twankay in Canton and the Dutch Republic, 1756-1764
(NA NFC 28); the selling prices of teas by different chambers, 1777-
1780 (NA Aanwinsten 541); and the auctions held by the Zeeland
Chamber in the years 1757-1776 (NA VOC 13377).
Table 5  The VOC purchase (in Canton) and sales (in the Dutch Republic) prices of
Twankay, 1756-1781
______________________________________________________________________________________
Season Purchase price Sales price
(taels/picul) (stivers/pound) (stivers/pound)______________________________________________________________________________________
1756-59 29 204/5 48½ - 49¼ 
1757-60 unknown unknown unknown
1758-61 26 19 45 - 50¾
1759-62 29 - 31 204/5 - 221/3 44 - 46½
1760-63 29 204/5 42 - 45
1761-64 26 19 52 - 55½ 
1775-78 19¼ 134/5 32 - 35½
1776-79 221/3 16 38½ - 46½
1777-80 24 17 unknown
1778-81 225/8 16¼ 34½ - 54½______________________________________________________________________________________
NB: The China Committee fixed 88 stivers equal to one tael, which means that 4.4 
guilders were equal to one tael, for the China trade since 1765 (NA VOC 4543,
Instruction of the China Committee to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton, 28 May
1765). Before that year, it was customary to reckon about 71 to 72 stivers to one tael (see
the section on “Preparations for the improved management of the China trade” in
Chapter One).
Sources: NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council in Canton, 25 August 1765;
Appendices 4 and 7.
When we compare the buying and selling prices of Twankay between
1756-1759 and 1761-64 (see Table 5), we are left in no doubt about how
much profit the VOC earned on this one single article during this peri-
od. In the season 1760-1763, for instance, the trade representatives in
Canton paid 29 taels per picul for this article, which was equivalent to
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about 20.8 stivers per pound, and subsequently the Company sold it in
the Dutch Republic at 42 to 45 stivers per pound. A simple sum shows
that the Company made a gross trading profit of 21 to 24 stivers per
pound or 50 to 53 per cent.19 The VOC record-keeping makes it very
hard to calculate the net profit, but the gain on this article after all expens-
es had been deducted still seemed to be profitable, not least thanks to the
fact that the tea market in the Republic was by and large in the hands of
the Company, although strictly speaking tea was not a monopoly product
on the domestic market. There is cogent evidence that the VOC was not
the only tea merchant in the Republic. Non-“VOC teas”, which always
represented a comparatively small market share, could be sold as well.20
In Appendix 7, the selling prices of Bohea and Congou are listed, fol-
lowing the method by which the tea chests were packed. This was because
of the fact that, as soon as the VOC trade representatives in Canton
bought in these teas, they had already packed them not only in whole
chests, which had a capacity of 340 pounds, but also in half, quarter, and
one-eighth chests, even on occasion in two-thirds as well as one-third
chests. Generally speaking, the smaller the chest, the better the quality of
the tea packed in it. Such difference was shown particularly obvious on
the price of Congou. In Appendix 8, the prices of teas which were calcu-
lated in Zeeland’s own currency are listed not according to the kind of tea
but according to the names of the tea-buyers who purchased them.21 Such
confusion obviates the making of any deeper analysis of the sales prices of
tea.
Despite such hurdles, thanks to the above-mentioned “Annual State-
ments”, it is still possible to get some idea of the quantity and the value
of the teas auctioned by the different chambers. Three remarks may be
made on this topic.
First of all, throughout the long period between 1730 and 1790, the
two Chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland almost invariably always sold
the biggest amounts.22 These two chambers were the best funded cham-
bers of all, and their undisputed prominence unequivocally is demon-
strated by the fact that they served alternately as the presiding chamber of
the VOC.
Another factor which has to be taken into consideration is that in some
years the tea sold by some chambers had been procured from two differ-
ent sources: it was the property of either the Company or private individ-
uals. The part owned by private parties was categorized as consisting of
teas op recognitie or op vracht, and these were comparatively smaller
amounts (see Appendix 6). In the “Annual Statements”, the Zeeland
Chamber customarily used the term of op vracht to designate these teas
while the others used op recognitie. These kinds of tea appeared at the auc-
tions because a number of private individuals – businessmen or trading
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group(s) in the Dutch Republic as well as Batavia – could entrust the
Company with a commission to buy tea for them. It is believed on the
basis of the source materials that most of the teas on recognition (and at
freight) were sent from Batavia. The reason for this is obscure, but it is
possible that it was purchased locally there. Considering the teas owned
by the private parties in Zeeland, one more factor should be mentioned.
The information about the auctions of tea held by the Zeeland Chamber
reveals that, besides the teas op recognitie, this chamber also oftentimes
auctioned teas van particulieren (see Appendix 8). How these teas ended
up at the Company auction is shrouded in mystery, but undoubtedly
they, like those op recognitie, were the property of private parties.
When the teas op recognitie came up for auction, the chambers deduct-
ed a percentage from the money received on selling this kind of tea as the
Company’s commission, generally claiming 40 or 50 per cent and on a
few rare occasions 30 per cent. For teas sold in the op vracht category, the
Company’s commission varied from 30 to 50 per cent, with only two
exceptions.23 The teas op vracht, or op recognitie, were shipped to the
Dutch Republic from Batavia only during the “Batavia period” of the
China trade,24 and in 1769 the Gentlemen Seventeen resolved to limit the
transport of teas for the private parties and a few years later, in 1772,
brought it to an end.25 Only in the years 1787-1788 did these teas appear
on the home market again.26 Since the Company did not pay for purchas-
ing these teas and simply asked a commission on selling them, I have not
included them in the computations of the quantities and the value of the
“VOC teas” bought and sold.
Finally, if we compare the data on the amounts of teas sold in the
Dutch Republic (see Appendix 6) with those sent from Canton and also
from Batavia (see Appendices 4 and 5),27 there can be no single shred of
doubt, as shown in Figure 2, that in the first and second phases of the
China trade, the teas sold in the Republic originated both from China
and from Batavia. How much tea was purchased in the seasons from
1734-1737 to 1739-1742 is not clearly listed in Figure 2, but when we
look at the money paid for the purchases of tea in those seasons, as shown
in Figure 3, the aggregate volume probably amounted to about half all
teas sold in the Republic. From the season 1751-1753, and especially after
the establishment of the China Committee at the end of 1756, this situa-
tion was utterly transformed when the transportation of teas from Batavia
to the Republic on the account of private persons in the Republic was def-
initely limited. Eventually no more tea was sent from Batavia on the
account of the Company. Consequently after 1756 all the “VOC teas”
sold in the Republic had to have been basically purchased and sent from
Canton, with only a few exceptions (see Table 6).
As shown in the table, there is a difference – in most years more was 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6  Comparison of volumes between tea sent from Canton and sold at auction
in the Dutch Republic, 1756-1790
______________________________________________________________________________________
Season Volumes (in pounds) Deficit Surplus
Sent from Canton Sold at auction______________________________________________________________________________________
1756-59 1,686,884 1,700,897 14,013
1757-60 1,772,005 1,527,766 244,239
1758-61 2,836,555 1,516,768 1,319,787
1759-62 2,528,203 2,846,403 318,200
1760-63 2,950,024 1,641,672 1,308,352
1761-64 2,846,176 2,652,812 193,364
1762-65 3,802,122 1,706,949 2,095,173
1763-66 3,663,571 4,140,874 477,303
1764-67 3,622,816 3,317,266 305,550
1765-68 3,724,440 3,193,006 531,434
1766-69 3,638,791 3,341,164 297,627
1767-70 3,763,629 3,452,945 310,684
1768-71 3,894,460 3,365,108 529,352
1769-72 3,432,942 3,474,144 41,202
1770-73 3,017,285 3,203,696 186,411
1771-74 3,666,399 3,052,479 613,920
1772-75 3,704,908 3,282,673 422,235
1773-76 3,748,410 3,287,164 461,246
1774-77 3,715,294 3,315,334 399,960
1775-78 3,680,465 3,249,842 430,623
1776-79 3,391,016 3,189,892 201,124
1777-80 3,562,416 1,627,821 1,934,595
1778-81 3,637,784 2,030,506 1,607,278
1779-82 no tea sent from Canton
1780-83 no tea sent from Canton
1781-84 1,911,778 213,687 1,698,091
1782-85 3,927,361 1,335,022 2,592,339
1783-86 3,011,706 2,630,485 381,221
1784-87 4,077,086 2,015,307 2,061,779
1785-88 4,358,499 3,960,840 397,659
1786-89 3,322,437 1,623,417 1,699,020
1787-90 3,696,763 1,429,355 2,267,408______________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: Appendices 4, 5, and 6.
sent than sold – between the quantities of teas sent from Canton and of
those sold at the Company auctions nearly every year during the second
half of the eighteenth century. Why and how did this happen? Various
reasons can be adduced to explain this.
The Company servants in Canton frequently purchased more teas than
the China Committee demanded. In the annual instructions to the
Dutch supercargoes in Canton, the China Committee always fixed cer-
tain amount for most kinds of teas (see Appendix 4), but in most
instances the trade representatives oversupplied the return ships because
they had taken advantage of the favourable purchase price (especially dur-
ing the off-season) in Canton. Cogently, in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century, the China Committee never settled an exact amount for
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the Bohea demanded but simply instructed the supercargoes to buy as
much as they could depending, of course, on the quality of Bohea avail-
able. This, in practice, resulted in an oversupply of tea but one which did
not really hurt the interests of the Company.28 In a few years, more teas
were sold than received in that same year from Canton, therefore the dif-
ference must have been made up by shipments of tea from the previous
and/or the following seasons. There were several possibilities which would
explain why the quantity of tea sold in Europe would have been less than
that purchased in Canton. During the long journey to Europe, almost
inevitably the teas on board tended to go stale. As this meant a drying out,
it involved some unavoidable weight loss. In patria the unloaded teas were
repacked before the auction and during this process some of the dust,
which had been mixed in with it by the Chinese tea-supplying agents and
their coolies,29 would have been removed somewhat. This caused yet
another weight loss. Such matters were understood and in these cases, a
10 to 15 per cent weight loss was acceptable.
In any attempt to make an analysis of the value of the teas sold at auc-
tion by the VOC, the “Annual Statements” made by the Gentlemen
Seventeen is still the best source to consult. The statistics of the annual
proceeds in Appendix 6 illustrate that during the twenty-seven seasons
between 1729-1732 and 1755-1758, when the annual proceeds hovered
around 1,995,215 guilders, the sales actually exceeded 2,500,000 guilders
in the seven seasons 1743-1746, 1744-1747, 1749-1752, 1751-1754,
1752-1755, 1753-1756, and 1755-1758. In the twenty-three seasons
between 1756-1759 and 1778-1781, the annual proceeds were much
larger, about 3,268,412 guilders on average, and now the sum of sales fell
below 2,500,000 guilders only in the three seasons 1756-1759, 1762-
1765, and 1777-1780. In short, sales surpassed 2,500,000 guilders in as
many as twenty seasons and even over 3,000,000 guilders in eleven sea-
sons. In the seven seasons between 1781-1784 and 1787-1790, during
and after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, as could have been expected from
the upsets to shipping, the annual proceeds were only 2,095,192 guilders
on average. The sales even surpassed 3,000,000 guilders in the three sea-
sons 1781-1784, 1783-1786, and 1785-1788, but hovered around
1,600,000 guilders in the other four seasons 1782-1785, 1784-1787,
1786-1789, and 1787-1790.
On the basis of the information derived from the “Annual Statements”
and the teas sent from Canton and Batavia, compared with the specifica-
tion of the shipments from Canton to the Netherlands provided by Jörg,
it is possible to compare, as shown in Figure 3, the trading profit made
on the sale of the “VOC teas” through the seasons from 1729 to 1790.
On the basis of this computation, it can be argued that the seasons
between 1756-1759 and 1778-1781 were the “Golden years” of the VOC 
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Table 7  Gross profits margins on selling the “VOC teas” by the Company, 1756-1790
______________________________________________________________________________________
Season Value (in guilders) Profits margin
paid in Canton received in Europe______________________________________________________________________________________
1756-59 777,409 2,483,414 219%
1757-60 1,486,611 2,287,140 54%
1758-61 1,614,841 2,294,510 42%
1759-62 1,037,991 4,158,927 300%
1760-63 1,651,976 2,810,944 70%
1761-64 1,427,968 3,688,542 158%
1762-65 2,093,534 2,291,483 9.5%
1763-66 2,199,097 5,039,351 129%
1764-67 2,087,036 4,047,350 94%
1765-68 2,009,217 3,791,377 89%
1766-69 1,829,786 3,519,360 92%
1767-70 1,864,660 3,046,539 63%
1768-71 1,777,256 2,893,271 62%
1769-72 1,740,889 3,644,758 109%
1770-73 1,632,644 4,007,786 145%
1771-74 1,657,285 2,991,147 80%
1772-75 1,608,419 3,243,977 102%
1773-76 1,625,045 2,891,489 78%
1774-77 1,723,870 2,803,403 62%
1775-78 2,028,413 2,534,388 25%
1776-79 1,970,198 3,785,493 92%
1777-80 1,744,791 2,280,929 31%
1778-81 1,738,936 2,679,128 54%
1779-82 no tea sent from Canton
1780-83 no tea sent from Canton
1781-84 1,076,991 358,451 – 67%
1782-85 2,255,619 1,402,558 – 38%
1783-86 1,768,428 3,009,116 70%
1784-87 3,342,391 2,698,184 – 19%
1785-88 3,435,415 4,089,218 19%
1786-89 3,171,942 1,646,633 – 48%
1787-90 3,316,479 1,385,457 – 58%
______________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: Appendices 4, 5, and 6; Jörg, Porcelain, Appendix 8, 217-220.
tea trade with China. Most of the 1780s and half of the 1750s yielded
only a low profitability as trade in Asia suffered the aftershocks of wars in
Europe. The last seven years of the 1780s were especially gloomy and only
two years (1786 and 1788) were reasonably successful; in the other five
years the Company by then ailing from bad management allied with cor-
ruption lost money drastically. In the short seasons fairly early on from
1729-1732 to 1733-1736 and from 1736-1739 to 1737-1740, the gross
profit margins were 22, 171, 148, 154, 172, 102, and 41 per cent respec-
tively. In the seasons from 1742-1745 to 1744-1747, since the amounts
of money paid in Batavia were not clear, it is no easy task to calculate the
profit margins, but there is little reason to think that they would not have
been as lucrative as in the afore-mentioned periods. Even so, the profits
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in these short periods still trail far behind those made in the period of the
direct Canton trade, when the trading profits on sales of tea were high in
all years (see Table 7). The one exception was the season 1762-1765,
when the profit was low at 9.5 per cent but made up for by the 158 per
cent profit in the previous and the 129 per cent profit in the following
season.
Domestic distribution of the “VOC teas”
After the Company auctions, the “VOC teas” entered two distribution
channels. One was the domestic distribution, and the other was the re-
export to other European countries. In comparison with the detailed
study on the domestic distribution of the “EIC teas” by the British
domestic tea-dealers,30 there are still large gaps in our understanding of
the extent or magnitude of the two distribution channels under the con-
trol of the Dutch. This can largely be attributed to the scarcity of source
materials available to compile a statistical analysis of the two channels.
None the less, there is at least enough to be able to draw a simple sketch.
First of all, both sets of tea-dealers – the wholesalers as well as retailers,
who, presumably also, put in their bids at the Company auctions – and
shopkeepers were involved in this distribution channel. The imported
teas probably reached the households of the common people as follows:
tea-dealers, either from the chamber cities or from surrounding towns,
purchased the “VOC teas” at the Company auctions in the chamber
cities; then, these tea-dealers sold tea to shopkeepers who in their turn
sold it to the ordinary customers. It should be pointed out that the shop-
keepers could purchase teas directly from the wholesalers, but the latter
often sold first to those retailers who were not involved in the Company
auctions and who then in turn sold the teas on to the shopkeepers.
The profits tea-dealers earned by reselling the “VOC teas” to the next
group of buyers are hard to compute, but we can get some idea if we look
at the profits earned by one famous group of tea-dealers, Jan Jacob Voute
& Sons, in Amsterdam from 1778 to 1781 and compare the prices of teas
sold by this group with those at the VOC auctions in that city. As shown
in Table 8, the profits the tea-dealers earned were much lower in total
than those which had already accrued to the Company, and the tea-
dealers even lost money on some sorts of teas by selling them at lower
prices than they paid at the Company auction. Likewise, the comparison
of the prices at which the teas were sold by this group in 1777, 1788, and
1795 (see Table 9) provides some idea of the fluctuations in the prices of
teas sold by the same group in the last three decades of the eighteenth cen-
tury. More information about the selling prices of these teas by various 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9  Prices of teas sold by Jan Jacob Voute & Sons in 1777, 1788, and 1795
(stivers/pound)
______________________________________________________________________________________
6 September 1777 18 August 1788 10 August 1795______________________________________________________________________________________
Bohea 13 – 16 11 – 13 10 – 12.5 
Congo 28 – 36 24 – 42 27 – 45
Souchong 34 – 56 34 – 52 37 – 50 
Pekoe 40 – 56 78 – 85 40 – 60 
Songlo 33 – 34 26 – 31 20 – 26 
Tawnkay 35 – 36 27 – 31 22 – 28 
Hyson skin 36 – 40 28 – 40 26 – 34 
Hyson 80 – 85 50 – 65 38 – 56 ______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: GAA, Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, “Coffee and Tea”.
tea-dealers in Amsterdam during the period 1776-1795 can be found in
Appendix 10.
As a rule, selling tea in the street to the common people was forbidden
in the Dutch Republic.31 Since the beginning of the seventeenth century,
tea had been sold to ordinary citizens originally only at the apothecaries’
shops because initially Dutch people drank tea as a medicinal beverage. It
was believed that tea was beneficial to human health. According to med-
ical practitioners, such various deficiencies which then were rampant in
this country in that era as heavy-headedness, weepy eyes, and weak sight
could be cured by imbibing this exotic product, and it was even said to
guarantee longevity without the illnesses which usually accompany great
age.32 During the first half of the eighteenth century, there was a change
in conceptions about tea and its sale was moved to special tea businesses,
when the beverage became popular in society as an enjoyable drink. Shops
specialized in selling tea mushroomed in nearly every town of the
Republic.
No statistical data about tea shops in the Dutch cities during the eigh-
teenth century are still extant; only some scattered references can be
gleaned from various sources. In 1749 in the city of Leiden, fifty shops
sold coffee as well as tea. In addition, five special tea shops and no less
than a hundred coffee shops were registered and there were twenty-three
male and female dealers in tea and/or coffee.33
Since 1752 in Utrecht all sellers of coffee and tea had to be duly regis-
tered with their names and addresses. The wholesalers on the official list
were in the majority and licensed victualers formed a minority.34 Names
of coffee shops appeared more frequently than those of tea shops, but this
does not necessarily mean that the shops, devoted to the coffee business,
did not also deal in tea business. Many coffee shops usually sold coffee
and tea at the same time, even though coffee was the principal product of
the shop.
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Traditionally, the tea shops were easily recognizable by a suitably deco-
rated window in the transom above the door or a sign with a logo on it,
such as a “Big Tea Caddy” or “Small Tea Tree” (see Illustration 4).
Window-dressings in the form of a bag bearing the label “Coffee and Tea”
were employed to attract the passing potential clients.
Illustration 4  Wooden-framed transom of a tea shop, with the inscription
“The Green Tea Tree”
This shop was situated on the Boterstraat, on the west corner of the Kreupelstraat, in
Schiedam at the end of the eighteenth century, 98x75x1.5 cm; this object was received as
a donation by the Museum in 1899. 
Source: Courtesy of Stedelijk Museum Schiedam, inventory number: H/00000088/1-
2/01.
Sometimes a striking text was written on the awning over the shop front.
In late-seventeenth-century Amsterdam, Hieronymus Sweerts copied one
so interesting text from the signboard of the shop “The Two Tea-Bottles”
(De Twee Thee-Flessen) on the Oude Leliestraat which reads as follows: 35
Don’t pass by (Ga niet voorby
If you Indien dat gy
Seek good tea. Soekt goeje thee.
Look, smell, and taste, Sie, ruyk, en smaak,
To your heart’s content Tot u vermaak,
And take something with you. En neemt wat mee.)
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In Utrecht in the first half of the eighteenth century, after the imposi-
tion of a tax on tea, shopkeepers were even obliged to put or hang out a
board in front of their shops or display a message on the awning of their
houses, which stated: “Here we sell coffee and tea”.36
This was the period in which the selling of tea was permitted only in
shops. The certified shopkeepers were obliged to keep a list recording the
weight of their canisters, kegs, and caddies. This should be clearly dis-
cernible on the basis of a number, in order to facilitate the quick check-
ing of the stock available in the shop. The prohibition on street sales
proved impossible to enforce all of the time, and there were a few excep-
tions in some years. So far, it has proved an insuperable problem to deter-
mine how often such exceptions occurred in the eighteenth century, but
we know of at least one example in Amsterdam in 1721. In that year,
because the price of tea had been drastically cut by the manipulations of
the VOC, the market was literally swamped by the beverage and as a con-
sequence this commodity was hawked around the streets of Amsterdam
in wheelbarrows.37
How the owners of tea shops went about running their enterprises in
the eighteenth century is also of interest to us. Normally, when a client,
usually a housewife, walked in to buy tea, the shopkeeper would first pres-
ent and recommend some samples of various teas; and then, as was cus-
tom, the client would put some dry tea leaves into his or her mouth and
chew them. After this first test, the shopkeeper (or the shop assistant) pre-
pared a “sample” of tea of the chosen kind – mostly in an adjacent room
– so as to enable the potential customer to take a sip of the tea prepared
with boiled water. Small test-cups which belonged to the shop were used
or were brought along by the prospective customers themselves.
Advertisements for selling tea were already being printed on the pack-
ing-paper and/or small bags used in the shops in the eighteenth century.
Around 1730, for instance, Joannes Kramer, the owner of the shop “The
Old Town Hall” (Het Oude Stadhuys), which was situated on the
Oudezijds Kapelsteeg in Amsterdam, advertised that he sold various sorts
of tobacco as well as all kinds of tea and coffee beans at a fair price (see
Illustration 5); his fellow shopkeeper, J.P. van Bergen, kept “strong liquor”
and a medicine-chest as well as tea and coffee on his premises on the
Warmoesstraat.38
One excellent example can be adduced to illustrate the history of tea
shops in the Netherlands. As early as 1769, the wig-maker Jacobus van
der Kreek (see Illustration 6) opened a shop “The Cloverleaf” (Het
Klaverblad) selling tea, coffee and other sorts of groceries on the southern
side of the Hoogewoerd close to the Barbarasteeg in the university town
of Leiden. A signboard in the shape of a small wooden tea chest bearing 
the logo of the “VOC” was fixed to the shop front to indicate that the 
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Illustration 5  Advertisement for the shop “The Old Town Hall”
The text of this advertisement reads: “This and more other sorts of tobacco are for sale in
larger and smaller (quantities). In the Oude Zijds Kapelsteeg, in the Old Town Hall of
Amsterdam, the fifth house on the Warmoesstraat, by Joannes Kramer in Amsterdam;
NB: As well as all sorts of tea and coffee beans all at a fair price.”
Source: GAA, Bibliotheek N 40.03.012.24, “Advertising Material”.
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Illustration 6  The first shopkeepers of “The Cloverleaf ”
The subtitle reads “1769 – a wig-maker in Leiden and his daughter launch a coffee and
tea shop in the Hogewoerd”.
Portraits of the wig-maker Jacobus van der Kreek (?-1800) and his daughter, Elisabeth
Maria van der Kreek (1761-1831).
Source: Courtesy of the shop “The Cloverleaf”, Leiden.
shop sold the Company products. Van der Kreek obtained the patent for
this logo from the Company.39 After Van der Kreek passed away in 1800,
his eldest daughter, Elisabeth Maria van der Kreek, took over the business.
Via a niece, who succeeded Elisabeth Maria, the shop passed into the
hands of the Molkenboer family, who continued to specialize in the sale
of tea and coffee. Nowadays, passers-by can still see the very conspicuous
yellow signboard suspended between the big windows on the shop front
(see Illustration 7), which still bears the same name “The Cloverleaf”.
With its 237-year history, “The Cloverleaf” is the oldest-existing tea and
coffee shop in the Netherlands.40
A highly refined consumer product like tea could hardly escape being
subjected to taxes in the Dutch Republic. From the last decade of the sev-
enteenth century, tax was levied not only on the consumption of tea but
also on the selling of tea in the Republic. In September 1691, a “sum-
mons” was issued by the States of Holland and West Friesland (Staten van
Holland en West-Friesland), in which a notice was given that an addition-
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Illustration 7  The shop “The Cloverleaf ”
This shop has been in operation since 1769 at Hoogewoerd 15; the signboard on the shop
front is a small square wooden chest, 36x33x43 cm. 
Source: Courtesy of the shop “The Cloverleaf”, Leiden.
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al tax would be added because of the crushing war costs being incurred at
that moment.41 Apparently, the warfare being waged against the power-
hungry King Louis XIV of France, which obliged the Dutch to finance a
big army and enlarge their fleet considerably, made enormous inroads on
the Dutch national treasury. The new tax measure, which was put into
effect on 15 March 1692, decreed that “All the people, in whose houses,
gardens, rooms or other places coffee, tea, chocolate, sorbet, mineral
water, lemonade, or some other suchlike beverage which has been pre-
pared with water, whey, or milk, by infusion of sage or other spices, will
be drunk”, would be liable to pay extra excise duty (Illustration 8).42
Depending on the tax category in which the Dutch were classified on
the grounds of their wealth, this excise duty varied from six to fifteen
guilders per year, which was changed to four to fifteen guilders in 1724,
depending on total sales.43 In the unlikely case a person might swear that
in the past season none of the afore-mentioned drinks had been con-
sumed in his home, either alone or in the company of others, an exemp-
tion from this impost could be obtained. It is said that many people sub-
mitted petitions because, if their explanations are to be believed, they had
been classed in too high a category or because they seldom or never could
afford coffee or tea, because of their straitened circumstances.
Exceptionally, the professors of Leiden University were exempted by a
senatorial decision of 31 March 1693 from their duty to pay tax on such
exotic drinks as coffee, tea, and chocolate.44
In Utrecht, a direct excise duty was levied on all coffee, chickpea, and
tea which were brought into this province. This impost was fixed at one
guilder for each pound of tea in 1702, an amount which was subsequent-
ly decreased to eight stivers in 1744; without doubt, this tax relief was
directly related to the drastically reduced price of tea.
Those who were involved in the sale of tea, coffee, and chocolate, as
well as those who wished to serve these exotic beverages in their houses
for gain, were subjected to the same obligation.45 Coffee-dealers had to
pay a lower tax than shopkeepers in tea. Shopkeepers were permitted to
sell both products without having to pay any additional impost. An ordi-
nance of the States of Holland and West Friesland in 1776 shows that the
shopkeepers had to pay taxes for selling tea, related to the volume of their
business:46
Annually if:
2,000 pounds of tea or more were sold, 25 guilders of taxes should be
paid;
1,200 to less than 2,000 pounds were sold, 15 guilders should be paid;
480 to less than 1,200 pounds were sold, six guilders should be paid;
200 to less than 480 pounds were sold, four guilders should be paid;
less than 200 pounds were sold, two guilders should be paid.
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Illustration 8  Announcement of the tax on coffee, tea, chocolate et al., 1734
Source: CAS, HMR, Rotterdam.
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Fifteen years later in 1791, the taxation on the shopkeepers was specified
in even more detail:47
Annually if:
less than 200 pounds of tea were sold, two guilders should be paid;
200 to less than 500 pounds were sold, four guilders should be paid;
500 to less than 1,200 pounds were sold, six guilders should be paid;
1,200 to less than 2,000 pounds were sold, 15 guilders should be paid;
2,000 to less than 3,000 pounds were sold, 25 guilders should be paid;
3,000 to less than 4,000 pounds were sold, 31.1 guilders should be paid;
4,000 to less than 5,000 pounds were sold, 40 guilders should be paid;
5,000 to less than 6,000 pounds were sold, 50 guilders should be paid;
6,000 to less than 10,000 pounds were sold, 60 guilders should be paid;
10,000 to less than 20,000 pounds were sold, 80 guilders should be paid;
20,000 pounds or more were sold, 100 guilders should be paid.
Re-export of the “VOC teas”
So far no detailed attention has been given to the re-export of the teas that
the VOC imported,48 but it is for sure that part of the auctioned “VOC
teas” was re-exported to other European countries by the tea-dealers in
the Dutch Republic.49 On the Continent, the Dutch teas were re-export-
ed to Brabant, Flanders and Hainaut in the Southern Netherlands, the
riverine areas along the Maas and Rhine, East Friesland, Prussia and other
countries where tea was consumed but which did not import tea directly
from China,50 and Russia which also imported tea from North China via
the land route.51 Although it is difficult to ascertain how much tea was re-
exported to these nations in the second half of the eighteenth century,
some succinct but very helpful information can be gleaned from the
instructions of the China Committee to the Dutch supercargoes in
Canton. In 1768, the instruction referring to Pekoe explained that for the
coming season two-thirds of the 60,000 to 70,000 pounds ordered should
be of top quality, while the rest could be of lesser quality, or second rank.
They added the information that the increasing demand for Pekoe origi-
nated not only in Germany but that Moscow (Russia) had made a partic-
ular request.52
When it was all said and done, the Continental re-export of the Dutch
teas was small in volume. Paradoxically, the biggest European client for
Dutch teas was Britain to where considerable quantities were smuggled.
The most important reason for resorting to smuggling was the tax which
was levied on the legal import of tea into Britain – at least 80 per cent of
the value, but frequently more than 100 per cent. For a long time the EIC
did not import enough tea before it was able to satisfy the thirst of the
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British domestic tea market in the second half of the 1780s. The
“Continental teas”, including the Dutch teas of course, were therefore
able to make big profits there. A group of Dutch tea traders, under the
leadership of the firm of J.J. Voute & Sons, knew how to capitalize on the
inability of the EIC to supply the British domestic market. They were
able to lay their hands on half the continental supply in 1784, which the
EIC was obliged to purchase from them at high prices, and in the follow-
ing year their supply was even considerably more. This consortium
acquired a strangle-hold on almost all European teas. In February 1786,
Amsterdam traders exported 8,000,000 pounds of teas to the English
Company, nearly 40 per cent of all the British import.53
The smuggled teas shipped to Britain from other European countries
were carried by their own special routes to particular areas of Britain.
These routes had been set up in the 1740s, although none claimed an
exclusive right. Whenever the shipping season allowed, some of the teas
from Sweden and Denmark were customarily smuggled directly to the
west and east coasts of Scotland and to Ireland. In France the chief cen-
tres of sale were Lorient and Nantes, and by 1760s Roscoff had become
one of the major ports from where tea was sent to the east, south, and
west coasts of Britain.54 There is some uncertainty about which secret
routes the Dutch favoured, but it is known that the Dutch did make use
of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, neither of which fell under
British customs regulations, as strategic entrepôts for smuggling their
contraband tea into Britain. Although Dutch traders exported a large
quantity of tea to Britain, they had actually acquired a bad reputation for
bringing “teas of the worst qualities” to Europe, the refuse of all other
nations. A lasting memorial to Dutch tea is the adage: “Dutch tea has
become a name for all teas that are bad in quality and unfit for [British?]
use.”55
Conclusion
A comparison of the sales of tea by the VOC in the Dutch Republic
throughout the entire span of the Company’s China trade shows that this
trade with China was not always profitable. The period between 1757
and 1781 was, however, an outstanding one: it was the only period in
which the VOC profited from the Chinese tea trade for as long as twen-
ty-three years without a break, with a seasonal 3,316,808 pounds import-
ed from Canton, making a gross trading profit of 94 per cent on average.
The first ten years of the Company’s China trade were also quite success-
ful, but the quantities of teas then brought from Asia were much smaller
in comparison.
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Generally speaking, the movement of the “VOC teas” from the
Company, through the tea-dealers and then the shopkeepers to the com-
mon consumers reveals a centralized and comparatively simple network of
inland distribution. This was very advantageous to the VOC, the domi-
nant supplier of the domestic tea market in the Dutch Republic. At the
apex of the network, the Company completely controlled the source of
teas imported into the Republic, and according to the principle of “more
pay for more work”, it shared the biggest portion of profits on the tea sales
in the Republic.
The domestic tea market in the Dutch Republic was, because of its
limited size, too small a stage and therefore the re-export of the “VOC
teas” by Dutch traders to other European countries helped to swallow up
the surplus of the “VOC teas”. In this sense, the re-export of the “VOC
teas” not only benefited those Dutch traders involved in the commerce, it
indirectly also guaranteed the profits of the Company at the same time.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE “GOLDEN AGE” OF THE TEA TRADE
AND ITS CONCLUSION
The “Golden Age” of the tea trade
The Dutch East India Company could claim to have played a pioneering
role as an importer of Chinese tea into Europe. But it was not until its
trade with China was thoroughly reorganized by the establishment of the
China Committee that the VOC tea trade entered into an extraordinary
boom period which lasted for about two decades, that is, until the begin-
ning of the 1780s. This prosperity led the Amsterdam director, Cornelis
van der Oudermeulen, to laud the direct China trade when he analysed
the profit and loss account of the Company in 1785. He asserted that the
improved results in the period 1760-1780 should be directly attributed to
it, and that it had acquired the VOC a better position in the internation-
al tea trade.1
Plagued by hindrances and delays, in order to arrive at a more flexible
and satisfactory management of the China trade, in 1756 the VOC set up
the China Committee in Amsterdam, which was given absolute authori-
ty to make decisions on the China trade. Henceforth, every year a fixed
number of China ships were fitted out by the Chambers of Amsterdam
and Zeeland, and from the season 1763-1765 the smaller chambers were
also allotted their share in this profitable trade route (see Appendix 2).
This new policy ensured that the VOC remained second only to the EIC,
the biggest East India Company, in the tea trade at Canton.
After this reorganization, the resultant direct China trade benefited
from the effective hands-on management of the China Committee. It was
also boosted by the more effective organization of business affairs by the
VOC trade representatives in China and also by that of the crews on the
China ships. All these Company servants co-operated closely with each
other in assiduously observing the instructions of the China Committee
for the benefit of this particular trade. Even though the running of the
China trade had been taken out of the hands of the High Government in
Batavia, the headquarters of the VOC in Asia continued to contribute to
the success of the operations in Canton as it was always ready to step in
whenever quick and decisive assistance was needed. Finally, the sufficient
sale of fresh teas at the Company auctions in the Netherlands realized the
interests of the Company in a highly satisfactory manner. Tea was easily
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the most profitable product in which the VOC dealt in the second half of
the eighteenth century, and it is interesting to see that the Company
which had experienced almost overwhelming difficulty in adjusting to the
shifts in global trade was able to take innovative steps towards effectuat-
ing reorganizations.
All the above steps were intrinsic factors on the side of the VOC man-
agement. But, when we look at the VOC tea trade with China from an
even wider angle, the realization also dawns that this “Golden Age” in the
tea trade was also inextricably linked to other external factors which were
embedded in particular political, social, and economic developments in
both Europe and China during the second half of the eighteenth centu-
ry. 
In Europe, up to the 1780s the Dutch Republic had managed to stay
neutral in the global struggle for supremacy between France and Britain.
This neutral stance seemed the safest policy for the Republic allowing it
to remain aloof from the Anglo-French rivalry and to preserve its interna-
tional position in finance and overseas trade. Nevertheless, this neutrality
was somewhat biased. The Dutch and English had maintained an endur-
ing alliance since the seventeenth century and, until the middle of the
eighteenth century, the English considered the Dutch Republic an impor-
tant ally in international, especially European, politics. The English
believed that maintaining good relations with the Dutch Republic would
be helpful in the event of any war on the Continent. In French eyes, the
Dutch Republic was the régulateur de la politique anglaise should there be
a Continental war.2 Yet, in French conflicts with Britain, the neutral
Dutch Republic could continue to provide its southern neighbour with
the foreign goods it needed. Therefore, during the Seven Years’ War
(1756-1763),3 which was fought in Europe, North America, and India
between France, Austria, Russia, the German Kingdom of Saxony,
Sweden and (after 1762) Spain on the one side, and Britain, Prussia, and
Hanover on the other, both Britain and France, the principal participants
respected Dutch neutrality.4
Safely entrenched in their neutrality, the Dutch were able to take
advantage of the war conditions which offered them a favourable oppor-
tunity to expand their commerce and trade. At home, Amsterdam grew
rapidly as a financial market, a process which was not only attributable to
a major extension of acceptance credit, but also had a great deal to do
with the enormous growth in the trade in specie – gold and silver coins
and bullion – and the continual transfer of British subsidies to the
Continent and the marketing of British domestic loans by the Amsterdam
houses.5 This step in the development of the Amsterdam financial market
was closely related to the steady demand for specie emanating in part
from the reorganized direct trade with China. All preparations for the
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new management of the China trade were effectuated during the early
part of the Seven Years’ War. Britain, France, and Sweden, which partici-
pated in this war and had commercial companies trading with China,
were unable to devote much attention to their China trade: Britain,
Sweden, and Denmark as well, had few ships to spare; and France had no
ships at all sailing to Canton during the war years. After a few rather
unsteady years of experimentation, the VOC tea trade settled into a sta-
bly developing curve and continued to prosper for over twenty years.6
In the Dutch Republic during the second half of the eighteenth centu-
ry, there were also several positive socio-economic developments which
affected the VOC tea business. Although the Republic failed to partici-
pate in the general European revival marked by a strong population
growth in the second half of the eighteenth century, the population still
kept growing yearly.7 Throughout the whole eighteenth century, the pop-
ulation of the Republic grew from 1,850,000-1,950,000 in 1700 to
1,900,000-1,950,000 in 1750 and to 2,100,000 in 1800. In the last fifty
years of the eighteenth century the population increased by 0.2 per cent
a year. A steadily mounting number of consumers was absolutely essential
to a steady rise in the consumption of tea in the Republic. But the num-
ber of tea-drinkers did not stop at the border; not all the “VOC teas” were
consumed in the Republic itself but a considerable proportion of the tea
was either re-exported or smuggled into other European countries. The
strong demographic growth in neighbouring countries, such as France,
the Austrian Netherlands, the German States, and Britain,8 stimulated
and guaranteed the re-export of the “VOC teas”.
The purchasing power for tea among Dutch people can be analysed by
comparing the average income with the selling price of tea in the eigh-
teenth-century Dutch Republic (see Appendices 9 and 10), by looking at
average summer daily wages for various grades of craftsmen and workers:
masters (carpenters and masons), journeymen, masons’ assistants, and
unskilled labourers in both the Western and Eastern Netherlands and
comparing these with the selling price of Bohea (since it then was the
most popular tea). The daily summer wages of these occupations
increased at a steady rate, though slowly, in the Netherlands from 1725
to 1790, nearly the whole period of the VOC tea trade with China.
Throughout these sixty-five years we see a slight decline in the selling
price of Bohea on the Amsterdam Commodity Exchange, which was the
price offered by the tea-dealers (wholesalers) to the retailers and/or the
shopkeepers and which could by correspondence be said to reflect the
price of Bohea which the mass consumers eventually paid. The price of
tea was not the only cost to fall. Other common food expenditures, such
as that for bread, meat, fish, and beer, also decreased in Amsterdam dur-
ing the second half of the eighteenth century.9
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On the other side of the globe, several significant factors in China stim-
ulated the VOC China trade as well. The second half of the eighteenth
century was an era of outstanding florescence in China, the time at which
the Qing Empire reached the height of its power and splendour. The
sixty-year rule of the Qianlong Emperor (1736-1795) virtually coincided
with the history of the VOC China trade.
Chinese trade with the West benefited from the strength of the Chinese
economy, even though it was restricted to the sole port of Canton. The
Hong merchants in Canton monopolized the tea trade, because tea was
exported only from China to Europe during that time. Throughout the
eighteenth century, until the eve of the First Opium War (1839-1842),
the port of Canton continued to satisfy, with an ever-growing supply,
Western demands for tea which mounted decade by decade. Such a benef-
icent development of both demand and supply guaranteed the steady
increase in the tea trade throughout the eighteenth century and prevent-
ed any excessive increase in the price of tea.
In order to obtain teas of good quality, in sufficient quantities and at
reasonable prices, the European companies had to send ships loaded with
as many trade goods and funds as possible to Canton, where their trade
representatives were forced to compete fiercely with each other. The VOC
delegates were well aware that the better the relations, or guanxi, they
nourished with the Hong merchants and the lower mandarins with
whom they met, the more able they would be to surpass their competi-
tors. They made an effort to maintain excellent contacts with their
Chinese trading partners and remained on particularly good terms with
the local mandarins. In this behaviour, the VOC was well served by its
servants in Canton.
In 1760, the Co-hong, the so-called monopoly bureau of the Hong
merchants, was officially established in Canton not without manifesta-
tions of protest from the European side. This union was detrimental to
the interests of the European companies, because its members could
decide the price of import and export goods unilaterally. However, since
it was only an experiment, and there was always discord among its mem-
bers, in particular the great Hong merchants, and confusion in its regula-
tions, the proper functioning of the Co-hong was very problematic.10 The
Dutch trade representatives’ negotiations with the Hong merchants did
not comply strictly with the regulations of this combine, and the business
with the tea-supplying agents was not really greatly harmed by its estab-
lishment. Early in 1771 the Co-hong was dissolved,11 and afterwards the
delegates of the European companies dealt freely with their Chinese trad-
ing partners once again until its re-establishment in 1782 around the time
when the “Golden Age” of the VOC tea trade drew to an end.
By all accounts, the Canton trade was conducted professionally by the
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trade representatives of the European companies and their Chinese part-
ners during the period under study. On the Chinese side in particular,
local official procedures for supervising the European trade were pre-
dictable and not too burdensome, pilots showed an amazing ability to
guide the ships up the river. Once the European ships had dropped
anchor they could unload goods, acquire supplies, and find reliable part-
ners in the tea trade itself.12
Conclusion of the “Golden Age”
Good fortune did not continue to smile on the Dutch. On 20 December
1780, England declared war on the Dutch Republic, because the Dutch,
as the English complained, had interfered in the American War of
Independence (1775-1783), by lending assistance to the American insur-
gents.13 British warships searched and attacked Dutch ships suspected of
carrying contraband to the American rebels. The English Navy had 122
ships of the line at its disposal while the Dutch possessed only seventeen.
The Dutch Republic was therefore incapable of providing its merchant-
men effective protection against English attacks.
The war dealt a heavy blow to Dutch maritime trade. In January 1781
alone, British naval ships and privateers captured no fewer than 200
Dutch vessels, completely paralysing Dutch shipping.14 Ship-owners were
only just able to prevent a total collapse of their trade by transferring the
registration of their ships to neutral nationalities.15 In the Caribbean, on
3 February 1781 the British admiral George Bridges Rodney conquered
the island of St Eustatius, the so-called Golden Rock where the American
revolutionaries had been able to buy goods which they could not obtain
directly from Europe. Hammering their superiority home, the British
captured all the West African forts belonging to the Dutch West India
Company, with the exception of Elmina; the Dutch also lost their
colonies in Guiana on the South American Coast.16 The upshot was that
the trade in the Dutch West Indies would never regain its former glory.17
The war also proved to be a disaster for the operations of the VOC in
Asia. Various Dutch possessions in South India and Ceylon were lost: a
short time after the conquest of Sadras on the Coromandel Coast, just
100 Englishmen were sufficient to occupy the Dutch possessions on the
West Coast of Sumatra. In Ceylon, the British took the strategically
important harbour of Trincomale, which served as a strategic base for the
Dutch possessions in the Indian Sub-Continent.18 At the Peace of Paris
which concluded the war, the VOC ceded Negapatnam in India to the
EIC, and granted the EIC free access to the Moluccas.19
During the disastrous Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784), the
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thriving Dutch tea trade in Canton was also brought to a full stop. The
Company’s China ships suffered from the attacks of the British warships
and of country traders; therefore the export of tea from Canton to the
Dutch market sharply declined. No ships arrived in Canton from the
Dutch Republic in 1781-1782. Soon after hostilities began in Europe in
December 1780, three of the four VOC ships, which had left Canton in
January 1781 and were not aware of the war, were captured in Saldanha
Bay near the Cape of Good Hope, and the fourth was set on fire and sank
on the spot. In order to continue the profitable China trade, the VOC
was forced to send ships under a neutral flag. In 1783, three ships were
chartered (two for the Amsterdam Chamber and one for the Zeeland
Chamber) under the Prussian flag and sailed to Canton, but two of them
were lost on the outward- and homeward-bound voyage.20 Obviously, the
war with the British plunged the VOC trade representatives in Canton
into a financial dilemma. They had no option but to go heavily into debt
to the Chinese Hong merchants, as they were completely cut off from
capital from overseas to purchase tea and other products, just at a time
when the demand for tea in Europe was soaring and EIC was rapidly
increasing its own purchases of tea. The successful running of its tea trade
by the EIC in some senses was certainly to the detriment of the VOC
business in Canton.
In all, the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War hurt the Dutch Republic more
economically than territorially. This war relentlessly revealed the internal
weakness of the VOC which made the Company vulnerable, although it
was still a giant enterprise.21 De Vries and Van der Woude have calculat-
ed how, as a direct result of the loss of ships and their costly cargoes alone,
the VOC suffered enormous financial problems. Altogether the direct
losses of the VOC can be calculated at 43 million guilders.22 Loans to
keep the Company afloat reduced its net assets to zero in 1784. Its cred-
itworthiness destroyed, it was forced to become a ward of the state.23 The
VOC Chambers even had to ask for suspension of payment, thereby con-
verting the Company’s short-term credit into a long-term one. The
Company was unable to continue under its own power, and left the state
with a gigantic debt which weighed on the Republic as an enormous bur-
den.24 Only by grace of the magnanimity of the States-General, which
gave guarantees of the payment of interest on financial commitments,
could the VOC carry on its business.25 After the French invasion of 1795,
the management of the VOC teetered on the verge of bankruptcy, and the
only solution was for it to be taken over by the newly created Batavian
Republic. In the same year, the tea trade under the Dutch flag was halted
again.26 It was not the real end as it continued on for several years still,
again with chartered vessels under foreign flags.
Misfortunes never come singly. In the 1780s, more and more competi-
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tors flooded into Canton. Among them the Americans, who soon
emerged as competitors of the VOC in the China trade, were very con-
spicuous.27 Although they posed a serious threat, the position of the VOC
was irretrievably undermined by shifts in the tea trade in Europe itself
which were set in motion by the passing of the British Commutation Act
in 1784, just after the conclusion of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War on 1
June. The aim of the Commutation Act was to remove all incentives for
smuggling tea into Britain from the Continent. On the eve of the passing
of the Commutation Act, a large part of the tea consumed on the British
domestic market was supplied not just by the EIC but was smuggled in
from other Continental nations, including of course the Dutch Republic.
Since the mid-eighteenth century, 4,000,000 to 7,500,000 (English)
pounds of tea per year had been smuggled into Britain from France, the
Dutch Republic, and Scandinavia;28 and just before the outbreak of the
war in 1780 the annual consumption of tea in Britain already amounted
to 18,000,000 (English) pounds. The Companies of France, the Dutch
Republic, Sweden, Denmark, and the Austrian Netherlands imported
two-thirds of the tea, leaving the EIC to attend to about one-third.29 The
Continental companies profited abundantly from the tea smuggling to
Britain, but their contraband seriously hurt the interests of the EIC as
well as those of the domestic tea-dealers in Britain.
The Commutation Act, which was put into effect in September 1784,
therefore reinforced the monopoly of the EIC on the import of tea into
Britain. Under the provisions of the Act, the EIC was required to import
sufficient tea to supply the domestic market; to maintain in its warehous-
es a quantity equal to one year’s consumption; to hold public sales by auc-
tion four times a year “at equal distance of time”; to put tea up for sale at
prices which should not exceed the capital from the time of the arrival of
such tea in Britain, and the common premium of insurance; and to sell
such tea “without reserve to the highest bidder, provided an advance of
one penny per pound should be bid upon the [put-up] prices”.30 In the
wake of the Commutation Act of 1784, the import duties on tea were
drastically dropped from over 100 per cent to 12.5 per cent of the value
of the teas.31 This dealt an enormous blow to the foreign tea-smugglers
who could earn no more profits. This all happened at a time at which the
consumption of tea in Britain was rising to even newer heights. In this
sense, the passing of the Commutation Act of 1784 can be considered a
turning point in the history of the British tea trade.32
It goes without saying that the British Commutation Act of 1784 also
had an impact on the tea trade of the VOC. Even if the Dutch were not
the biggest smugglers for the British domestic tea market, legitimately
Britain had always been the most important foreign client for the “VOC
teas”. The Dutch Republic was a small state with a comparatively small
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outlet for selling tea, so the VOC was heavily dependent on the export of
its tea cargoes. The Commutation Act of 1784 therefore inevitably shat-
tered the Dutch dream of sharing in the profits made on the British
domestic tea market, although for several years after 1784 the Dutch were
allowed to continue to supply tea to the EIC. This was because at that
moment the EIC was not able to provide sufficient shipping to meet the
domestic demand. Two years later, the picture had changed completely.
From 1786 the EIC in Canton was practically able to exclude the VOC,
its most dangerous competitor, from the tea trade. It managed to pay
higher prices than the Dutch supercargoes could afford and forced the
prices of tin and pepper down by flooding Canton with these products
which had previously been abundantly supplied by the VOC. It also sent
more and more Company ships to China to purchase larger quantities of
tea and encouraged the country trade between India and Canton.33 By
doing so, after the season 1786-1787 the EIC was able to provide for
most of the tea imports required by Britain, and the year 1788 was the
last year in which it purchased a small quantity of tea from the Continent.
At the end of the 1780s, the EIC totally dominated the European pur-
chase of tea in Canton and succeeded in completely fulfilling the demand
for tea in England.
Now the tables were turned and the English could even export all the
tea which could not be sold in England to the Netherlands, the only
country in Europe where no import restrictions were imposed. In 1789,
the United States of America also introduced a tax on tea imported from
Europe, to protect its own direct trade with China.34 In the meantime,
ever-growing pressure was being exerted on the VOC to be able to find
and to carry sufficient goods and money to Canton for the purchase of
tea.35 With limited funds, therefore most of the tea the VOC was still able
to obtain was of inferior quality.36 The inevitable upshot was that the
VOC market in the Dutch Republic was entirely ruined by foreign teas
of superior quality. In 1791 the States-General finally could not but grant
the VOC the monopoly to sell tea in the Dutch Republic, in a last-ditch
attempt to guarantee the interests of the VOC.37 The domestic market
was now assured, and the China Committee was able to increase the
number of the China ships from two to four again. It was to be an
ephemeral renaissance as this situation lasted just a few years till 1795
when the last Company ships sailing under the Dutch flag left China.38
From then on until 1802, no Dutch ships sailed to China, although in
the intervening period tea, porcelain and other Chinese goods could still
be found on the Amsterdam market.39 How that was brought about by
ingenious planning and the leaving of ships to sail under “neutral flags”
can be read in the study on this Dutch trade in the period 1795-1810 by
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Notes to Chapter Two
1 The provisions and necessities were especially those for daily use in the factory. They
were of two kinds – those from Europe such as wine, beer, salted meat and bacon, butter,
cheese, wax candles, lamp oil, and the like, and those from Batavia such as rice, arrack,
olive oil, spices, and other Asian commodities.
2 NA VOC 4542, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government,
28 October 1757.
3 In the eighteenth century, tin deposits were found in three areas: the Siamese islands
of Ujung Salang, the mountainous regions of the Malay Peninsula (Kedah, Perak,
Selangor and Rembau), and the island of Bangka, which was an outlying dependency of
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4 Reinout Vos, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 8.
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190.
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junks in 1765; 2,838 piculs by one junk in 1779; 241 piculs by one junk in 1780; and
only two piculs of pepper by one junk in 1779 and two piculs by one junk in 1780 (NA
NFC 278-279 and 289-290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 24
June 1763, 5 July 1765, 16 July 1779 and 27 July 1780); most likely no tin and pepper
were sent from Batavia by Chinese junks. However, a large quantity of “illegal” tin and
pepper was smuggled from Palembang (and Banten) by Chinese junks and other foreign
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Gentle Janus, 26-29; Ota Atsushi, Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java:
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High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765 and 30 July 1780).
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9 Vos, Gentle Janus, 213.
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22-44) and Daily records of the supercargoes (NA NFC 278-291) in Canton as well as
the instructions of the High Government to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton between
1760 and 1781 (NA NFC 278-291). For a comparison of prices the Bugis, English, and
Portuguese paid, see Arasaratnam, “Dutch Commercial Policy”, 173.
11 For this kind of use, there is a very interesting description by the Dutch supercargoes
in the general report on 4 January 1765. See NA VOC 4396.
12 Ernest S. Hedges, Tin in Social and Economic History (London: Edward Arnold,
1964), 95.
13 The simpler sorts for the Asian market were packed in bamboo baskets. See Jacobs,
Koopman in Azië, 147.
14 The Dutch fixed both the “Company” picul in the East Indies and Chinese piculs at
Canton at 122½ pounds.
15 Jacobs, Koopman in Azië, 54.
16 Ota, Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics, 117 and 124.
17 No information about the “Assessments of the merchandise” for Canton is available
for the years 1760-1762.
18 Ota, Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics, 25.
19 NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 January
1765.
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Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765; NA NFC 28,
Resolution of the Trade Council, 3 August 1765), 12.3 taels in 1776 (NA NFC 287,
Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777) and 13.5 taels in
1778 (NA NFC 289, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July
1779).
21 Jörg, Porcelain, 76.
22 About the VOC intra-Asian trade in copper, see Ryuto Shimada, The Intra-Asian
Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century
(Leiden: Brill, 2006).
23 Annual emission of bronze coins began at 1.5 million strings (1 string = 1,000 coins)
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more than 3 million strings by 1754. Mint output had peaked at 3.9 million strings annu-
ally in 1759-1767, and an average annual output had fallen to 3 million strings in the
1770s and 2.5 million strings throughout the 1780s. During the period 1793-1796 there
was a large-scale rebellion in western China that hindered commerce with Yunnan. After
that, annual mint output remained at 2.0-2.5 million strings to 1840. See Richard von
Glahn, “Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Met-
als, 1500-1800”, in Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn (eds),
Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 196-
197.
24 NA NFC 288-290, Instructions of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July
1777, 16 July 1779, and 27 July 1780.
25 NA NFC 289 and 290, Instructions of the High Government to the supercargoes,
16 July 1779 and 27 July 1780.
26 For a description of the Dutch ducat in the eighteenth century, see Glamann, Dutch-
Asiatic Trade, 69-72.
27 NA NFC 290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 27 July
1780.
28 Bruijn et al. (eds), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping, Vol. I, 74.
29 An infrastructure consisting of such facilities as shipyards, warehouses, and workmen’s
quarters was indispensable to the High Government. It set up the facilities for this on the
island of Onrust (“No rest” or “Busy” in English), which lay just off the coast of Batavia.
On this island, the VOC repaired all its shipping and kept a large quantity of stores of
trade goods. The maintenance and repair work was carried out under the charge of the
master of the equipage.
30 For example, in 1766 the Jonge Thomas replaced the Lindenhof, in 1771 the Lam
replaced the Vreedejaar, in 1772 the Veldhoen replaced the Honcoop and the Prinses van
Oranje replaced the Groenendaal, the Bodt replaced the Willem de Vijfde, in 1773 the Jonge
Hellingman replaced the Juno, in 1774 the Oostcapelle replaced the Mars and the Beemster
Welvaaren replaced the Vreedenhoff, in 1775 the Morgenster replaced the Huijs te Spijk, in
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in 1787 the Middelwijk replaced the St Laurens, in 1791 the Alblasserdam replaced the
Erfprins and the Blitterswijk replaced the Meerwijk, in 1792 the Roozenburgh replaced the
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information has been taken from Jörg, Porcelain, 198-201. Many of these replacements
were forced by the delay of the ships.
31 Bruijn et al. (eds), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping, Vol. I, 70.
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of 140 feet. See NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes,
5 July 1765.
33 NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765.
34 NA VOC 4543, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government,
10 October 1759.
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ness report annually to the China Committee. See NA NFC 223-246.
37 These instructions were sent to the Trade Council with all the names of the Council
members. See NA NFC 278-301.
Of course, besides these official instructions, there were also personal letters carried
between Batavia and China, for example, in the names of the High Government in
Batavia and president of the Trade Council in Canton.
38 NA NFC 287, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777.
39 NA NFC 289, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July
1779. On 23 January 1779, the High Government received the letter from the Governor
and Council of Macao, in which the Macao Government expressed its gratitude for the
assistance given to the shipwrecked victims of the Estrela de Aurora near the Island Nor de
Vaca; in his reply of 16 July that year, the Governor-General in Batavia, Reijnier de Klerk,
very politely wrote that it was his pleasure that the captain of a Dutch ship had so gener-
ously assisted the Estrela de Aurora. He was sure that the Macao Government would have
given the same orders should a misfortune be visited on a Dutch ship. See NA NFC 289,
Letter from the Governor-General and Council in Batavia to the Macao Government,
16 July 1779.
40 BL IOR-G/12/58, Diary and consultation, 4 December 1778.
41 A bankzaal (or “banksaul” in English records) was a storage space for shipping equip-
ment and ballast material. All European ships had their own bankzaals. The bankzaals
were also the place where sick sailors were sent to recover from their illnesses. The French
paid an extra amount to the Hoppo to build their bankzaals on the “French Island” near
Whampoa, which was also used as a place of recreation. The other Europeans were gen-
erally restricted to setting up their bankzaals on the “Danes Island”, which is called
“Whampoa Island” by Paul A. Van Dyke. See Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 8. For the
Danes and French Island, see BL IOR-G/12/66, Letter from the Council at Canton to
Captain William Thomson commander of Calcutta, No. 3, 8 July 1779.
The interpreters and/or compradors were responsible for seeking permission from the
Hoppo for the construction of bankzaals, and the compradors arranged for the actual
building of the structures. The bankzaals were usually dismantled at the end of each trad-
ing season, and rebuilt again when the ships arrived next season. See Van Dyke, The
Canton Trade, Chapter Four.
42 BL IOR-G/12/58, Diary and consultation, 4 December 1778.
43 NA NFC 289, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July
1779.
44 NA NFC 290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 27 July
1780.
45 NA NFC 291, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 6 July 1781.
46 Raids by the English on Chinese junks actually occurred after the Goede Hoop affair,
which took place between the English captain McClary and the Dutch in China in 1781.
See the part of “Recapture of the Goede Hoop” in Chapter Four.
As for these occurrences, an example also can be found in the paragraph “Commodities
for Batavia’s use” in this chapter.
47 Captain McClary attacked two Macao ships with goods for the VOC in the Bangka
Strait in 1782, until he was driven away by the warships sent by the High Government.
See NA NFC 292, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 14 June
1782.
Early the next year, another Macao ship, the St Antonio, carrying goods for the VOC
was captured by the same captain. See NA NFC 44, Resolution of the Trade Council, 7
October 1782; NA NFC 293, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes,
3 June 1784.
48 The Batavia demand for porcelain consisted of all the various assortments.
49 There was no tea mentioned among the wares ordered, but this does not mean that
tea was not in demand in Batavia. In fact, the required tea was transported to Batavia on
Chinese junks or other private vessels. See NA NFC 292, Instruction of the High
Government to the supercargoes, 14 July 1782.
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50 Information about these sales can be found in all the business reports of the supercar-
goes to the High Government (NA NFC 220-222) and the homeland (NA NFC 223-
254).
51 Jörg, Porcelain, 85.
52 Hugh Chisholm (ed.), The Encyclopædia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences,
Literature and General Information (Eleventh edition, New York: Horace Everett Hooper,
1911), “Musk”.
53 Jörg, Porcelain, 86.
54 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 82.
55 Bruijn et al. (eds), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping, Vol. I, 170; Blussé, Strange Company, 16.
56 By looking at the figures of “the total population inside and outside Batavia” and “the
major population groups at Batavia” in Strange Company (Blussé: 18-19), it is possible to
build up a picture of the connection between the import of Chinese textiles and the pop-
ulation of Batavia in the latter half of the eighteenth century.
57 Jörg, Porcelain, 89.
58 See the section on “Instructions of the China Committee” in Chapter One.
59 The junk the Sam-con-hing (or the San Guang Xing ), Nachoda Zhang
Zhenguan , belonged to the San Guang Xing Company in Canton;
the junk the Sweehing (or the Rui Xing ), Nachoda Wen Xiongguan belonged
to the Rui Xing Company in Canton. See NA NFC 73, Daily record of the
supercargoes, 15 January 1764.
60 The junk the Eckthaaij (or the Yi Tai ), Nachoda Yan Lishe , belonged to
the Mao Sheng Company . See NA NFC 277, Instruction of the High
Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769.
61 NA NFC 74, Daily records of the supercargoes, 18 January and 27 February 1765.
62 NA NFC 76, Daily record of the supercargoes, 16 December 1767.
63 NA NFC 280, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 22 February
1769.
64 The junk the Honka (or the Huang Zai ), Nachoda Tsoa Tsoagua (Cai Quguan,
), belonging to the Da Xing Company                in Canton. See NA NFC 277,
Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769.
65 According to the daily records of the supercargoes, during the season 1768-1769, this
junk sailed the route between Canton, Batavia, and Cochin China. See NA NFC 77 and
78-79, Daily records of the supercargoes, 26 December 1768, 3 January and 14 July 1769.
66 NA NFC 78-79, Daily record of the supercargoes, 21 December 1769.
67 The St Luz in 1772 (NA NFC 282A, Missive from the Trade Council to the High
Government, 6 January 1773), the Nossa Senhora da Luz in 1777 (NA NFC 287, Report
of the Trade Council to the High Government, 31 January 1778), the St Vincenti in 1778
(NA NFC 288, Report of the Trade Council to the High Government, 24 January 1779),
the N. Sr.a de Boa Viageme in 1779 (NA NFC 289, Report of the Trade Council to the
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69 In 1769, for example, the junks the Eckthaaij and the Honka received their freight
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stivers, for spelter per picul at freight (NA NFC 277, Instruction of the High
Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769). This manner of consigning ship-
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Notes to Chapter Three
1 The ins-and-outs of the Canton trade as well as the Canton System are explained in
more detail in the introduction to Chapter Four.
2 According to the regulations of the Chinese authorities, the off-season lasted from the
departure of the European ships (customarily in January, but sometimes in February or
even early March) until the arrival of the next season’s European ships (in August or
September); correspondingly, the trading season lasted from the arrival of the current-sea-
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3 From the 1830s, the Dutch and English earlier or later succeeded in cultivating the tea
plant for their home markets in Java, India, and Ceylon, and the export of Chinese tea
from then on suffered a big decline. See A. Bierens de Haan, C.F. Bierens de Haan, and
L.L. Bierens de Haan, Memorie Boek van Pakhuismeesteren van de thee te Amsterdam 1818-
1918 en de Nederlandsche Theehandel in den loop der tijden (Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy,
1918), 130-155; Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Reports on the Tea and Tobacco Industries
in India (London: Printed by George Edward Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1874), 13-
14; R. Jayaraman, Caste Continuities in Ceylon: A Study of the Social Structure of Three Tea
Plantations (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1975), 12-13.
4 Although these teas are still produced today, I shall refer to them here in the past tense
as I am describing these varieties as they were purchased for the VOC.
5 Zhuang, “Fujian Tea Industry”, 11.
6 “Chinese tea”, at: http://www.fmltea.com by the FML Tea Trading Co., LTD.,
Xiamen, 19/04/2005.
7 Ch’en, “Transaction Practices”, 746. However, it is also likely that a small portion of
tea from Jiangxi Province was added to the teas from the Provinces of Fujian and Anhui
when they were transported to Canton.
8 “The naming of teas”, at http: //www.teanet.com.cn/chaye3.htm by the China Teanet
Group, Beijing, 20/04/2005.
9 Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, The Management of Monopoly, 5.
10 According to VOC-Glossarium: verklaringen van termen, verzameld uit de Rijks
Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
(M. Kooijmans et al. (eds), Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2000,
89) Pekoe was the best quality black tea bought by the VOC, but as stated in the reports
of the supercargoes, the price they paid for it was not higher than that disbursed for
Souchong.
11 “What is Orange Pekoe?”, at: http://www.virtualtea.com/vt/tips.html by Virtual Tea,
Depoe Bay Oregon, 19/04/2005.
12 It should be noted that in their daily records or the resolutions of the Trade Council
the Dutch trade representatives mention Ankay mixing with the two teas, but they fail to
mention Ankay in connection with Bohea, Congou, or Souchong when they composed
the general reports on the expeditions for the Company.
13 Nowadays Wuyuan is a county in Jiangxi Province, but during the Qing period it
belonged to Anhui Province.
14 Diana Rosen, “Teas of yore: Bohea, Hyson and Congou”, at: http://www.teamuse.
com/article_031001.html by the Tea Muse, 18/04/2005.
15 All types of names of the black and green teas in European languages originate from
Chinese. Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Pekoe, Ankay, and Twankay obviously derive from
the Quanzhou dialect spoken in South Fujian; Songlo and Hyson probably stem
from Mandarin.
16 [ ] Luo Bing , Cha jie [Explanation about Tea], “Songluo cha” 
[Songlo Tea], in: Guo Mengliang  , Zhongguo chadian     [Chinese Tea
Thesaurus] (Taiyuan: Shanxi guji chubanshe, 2004), 39. Guo’s book also extracts several
other works from the Tang to the Ming Dynasty, which all involve topics about the pluck-
ing of tea leaves, the production, drinking and storage of tea, and the use of different tea
services. For example, [ ] Lu Yu , Cha jing [Tea Scripture]; [ ] Cai Xiang
, Cha lu [Records about Tea]; [ ] Huang Ru , Pincha yaolu
[Useful Notes about Tea-tasting]; [ ] Zhu Quan , Cha pu [The Chronicle of
,
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Tea]; [ ] Huang Longde , Cha shuo [Talk about Tea]; [ ] Tian Yiheng
, Zhu quan xiaopin         [Small Talks about Tea-brewing].
17 Hyson was the most expensive tea the Dutch supercargoes purchased in Canton until
they began to purchase Gunpowder tea in 1778. See Appendix 4.
18 Michael Plant, “Imperial green”, at: http://www.normbrero.com/cgi-bin/viewTea.
cgi?search1=SHOW_TEA&param1=5&param2=Imperial+Green&param3=Michael&pa
ram4=2003-11-13, 21/04/2005.
19 Gardella, Fukien’s Tea Industry and Trade, 101-103; Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H.
Mui, The Management of Monopoly, 10-11; Ch’en, “Transaction Practices”, 746.
20 BL IOR-G/12/214, Diary and consultation, 25 February 1819.
21 [ ] Zhou Kai , Xiamen zhi [Xiamen Gazetteer], in: Taiwan wenxian
congkan [A Collection of Documentary Materials on Taiwan] (Taipei:
Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1961), N. 95, 177.
22 Ch’en, “Transaction Practices”, 747; BL IOR-G/12/214, Diary and consultation,
22 January 1797.
23 With the only exception being 112½ pounds of Linchinsing, which is supposed to be
“Linki-sam” tea, one kind of black tea, which was bought by the Dutch in 1761. See
Appendix 4.
24 In Ch’en’s opinion, the tea merchants did not trade personally with the Hong mer-
chants but employed the proprietors of warehouses as go-betweens to negotiate with
them. See Ch’en, “Transaction Practices”, 746.
25 A security merchant was appointed under the provisions of the security merchant sys-
tem, which had been institutionalized in Canton around 1745. This system required all
foreign traders to engage several Hong merchants to stand as sureties for their ships, crews,
and for the due payment of their duties during their stay in China. In return, the securi-
ty merchants were granted the largest portion of the trade of the ships they secured.
Generally foreigners took good care not to allow the security merchants to supply more
than about 50 per cent of the total cargo, and the amount often fluctuated between 20
and 25 per cent. In their turn the security merchants usually insisted on being given a por-
tion larger than that accorded to any other supplier to the ships they had secured. See
Morse, The Chronicles, Vol. I, 247; Vol. V, 28-29; Ch’en, The Insolvency, 8-10; Van Dyke,
The Canton Trade, 11.
There were many differences between the security merchants acting for the EIC and
those allied to the VOC: in the case of the EIC, it was palpably clear which security mer-
chant(s) guaranteed which ship(s), and how much merchandise he or they could obtain
from the ship(s); in the case of the VOC, three or four security merchants were always
mentioned together, alongside the merchandise given to the security merchants from
which ship. The Dutch used the word “fiador”, or “(onze) marchandeurs/kooplieden” to
designate the security merchants who were their regular trading partners. During the
period under study, the security merchants for the VOC were Tsja Hunqua & Co., Swetja,
and Tan Chetqua in 1757; Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, and Inksja in 1763-1769;
Semqua & Co., Inksja, and Tan Chetqua in 1769-1772; Semqua & Co. (replaced by
Tayqua & Co. from 1774), Inksja, and Tinqua in 1772-1776; Inksja, Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua,
Monqua, and Tsjonqua in 1776-1778; and Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, and Tsjonqua
in 1778-1780. See NA NFC 22-43, passim.
26 Chapter Four deals in detail with the establishment of the Co-hong and the protest
lodged by the European supercargoes against this combination.
27 They did in 1766 (Houqua, Chetqua’s clerk; Tsja Kinqua, Inksja’s clerk); 1768
(Emanuel, Tsjobqua’s clerk; Quyqua, Chetqua’s clerk; Tsja Kinqua, Inksja’s clerk); 1769
(Quyqua, Chetqua’s clerk; Tsja Kinqua, Inksja’s clerk); 1772 (Kiouqua, Inksja’s clerk);
1775 (Keequa, Inksja’s clerk); 1776 (Heyqua, Monqua’s clerk; Kiouqua, Inksja’s clerk; and
Tetqua, Tan Tsjonqua’s clerk); and 1777 (Jemqua, Koqua’s clerk). See Appendix 3.
28 NA NFC 26, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 10 and 15 March 1763.
29 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 27 October 1764.
30 NA NFC 85, Daily record of the supercargoes, 27 January 1776.
31 NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 29 November 1762.
32 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 23 October 1764.
TO CHAPTER THREE 165
33 NA NFC 79 and 80, Daily record of the supercargoes, 28 January 1770.
34 When the Co-hong was established in 1760, ten Hong merchants joined this asso-
ciation. During the short existence of the Co-hong, 1760 to 1771, there were four chief
and six smaller Co-hong members, who have been clearly described by Ch’en (The
Insolvency, 13).
35 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, Chapter Five; and his “The Yan Family: Merchants of
Canton, 1734-1780s”, Review of Culture (International Edition 9) (Macao, January
2004): 30-85.
36 NA NFC 33, Resolution of the Trade Council, 2 August 1770.
37 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 10 August 1764.
38 Ibid., 24 June 1764.
39 See NA NFC 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7.
40 NA NFC 222, Report of the supercargoes to the High Government, 8 May 1759.
41 NA VOC 4382, Trade journal of the direct council in Canton, 7 and 18 November
1758.
42 See NA NFC 29, 31, 77, and 79.
43 Cheong, The Hong Merchants, 71 (note 74), 140; Morse, The Chronicles, Vols 1 and
5, passim; Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, Chapters Five and Six; Ch’en, The Insolvency,
268-269; and see NA NFC 34, 80.
44 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 24 June 1764.
45 NA NFC 38, Resolution of the Trade Council, 6 January 1774.
46 A place far away in the north-west of China which in the Qing period was especially
notorious as a penal colony for those exiled by the government.
47 See NA NFC 15.
48 Ch’en Kuo-tung, “Pan Youdu, a Successful Businessman for a Foreign Firm”, in Liu
Ping et al. (eds), Guangzhou shisanhang cangsang [The Transfor-
mation of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton] (Guangzhou: Guangdongsheng ditu chuban-
she, 2001), 150-193; Dilip Kumar Basu, Asian Merchants and Western Trade: A
Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800-1840 (PhD dissertation, Berkeley:
University of California, 1975), 355; Cheong, Hong Merchants, 40-41 and 71 (note 79);
Huang Qichen and Pang Xinping , Mingqing guangdong shangren
[Guangdong Merchants in Ming and Qing Period] (Guangzhou:
Guangdong jingji chubanshe, 2001), 259-269; Liang Jiabin, Guangdong shisanhang kao,
259; NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 18 April 1764.
49 When Tsja Hunqua suggested so to the Dutch chief, the latter felt very surprised why
he would do so, as Poan Keequa was his biggest opponent for the European trade in
Canton. The Dutch refused because, as they explained, Poan Keequa was a “sly fox”,
always full of intrigues, and they thus did not want Poan Keequa “to put his nose direct-
ly into our affairs”. See NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 31 May and
23 June 1764.
50 NA NFC 31, Resolution of the Trade Council, 2 May 1768.
51 See NA NFC 51, 95.
52 Jörg, Porcelain, 71, 338 (note 84); Cheong, Hong Merchants, 40 and 72 (note 80);
Ch’en, The Insolvency, 19 and 294-296.
53 Cheong, The Hong Merchants, 259.
54 Jörg, Porcelain, 58-59; Paul A. Van Dyke, Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta,
1690-1845 (PhD dissertation, California: Department of History, University of Southern
California, 2002), Chapter Five and Appendices O, P, Q, S; Ch’en, The Insolvency, 259-
260; NA NFC 25, 26, 32, 72, and 78; NA VOC 4394.
55 Van Dyke and Viallé (eds), CMD 1762, note 104.
56 Van Dyke, Port Canton, 316-317 and Appendices N-S; Ch’en, The Insolvency, 307-
311; Cheong, The Hong Merchants, 98, 131, 212, and 264-265.
57 Van Dyke and Viallé (eds), CMD 1762, note 12; CMD 1763, note 7.
58 That was the reason why the Dutch called him a “Macao merchant” in 1763 (NA
NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 November 1763).
59 Van Dyke and Viallé (eds), CMD 1762, note 12 and 67; Van Dyke, “The Ye Mer-





Culture Institute, 2005): 7-37; Ch’en, The Insolvency, 261-268; NA NFC 7, 17-39 and
76-84, NA VOC 4381-4413.
60 Van Dyke, “The Ye Merchants”, 7-37.
61 NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 29 November 1762; NA NFC 26,
Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 November 1763.
62 Van Dyke, Port Canton, Appendixes O, P, Q; Cheong, The Hong Merchants, 40;
Ch’en, The Insolvency, 260-261; NA NFC 28, 31, 74, and 77; NA VOC 4397 and 4402.
63 NA VOC 4396, Capital to the Chinese merchants, 5 July 1764; Appendix 3.
64 Ch’en, The Insolvency, 200-208 and 275-277; Cheong, The Hong Merchants, 152-153
and 253; Van Dyke, “The Yan Family”, 30-85; Van Dyke and Viallé (trans), CMD 1762,
note 47.
65 Jörg, Porcelain, 61; Ch’en, The Insolvency, 296-297; Cheong, The Hong Merchants,
263; NA NFC 24, 37, 43-60, 88-96, and 326; NA VOC 4381-4446.
66 The name “Suchin” (Suizhen ) is the romanization of the Cantonese pronunci-
ation of a porcelain shop, and “Kinqua” is a reference to the merchant. The European
supercargoes often combined these two names into one. See Appendix 3.
67 Jörg, Porcelain, 116 and 351 (note 80); Van Dyke, “The Ye Merchants”, 7-37; NA
VOC 4382-4397.
68 The teas bought by contract or additional trading-season purchases on the free mar-
ket were called “new tea” by the Dutch (or Xincha in Chinese). The price differences
between “old tea” and “new tea” were very large, as can be seen in Appendix 4.
69 These three avenues were also those open to the EIC. See Ch’en, “Transaction
Practices”, 749.
70 For the duration of one expedition of the China ships each season, see Chapter Five.
In the eighteenth century, a homeward-bound journey took six to eight months, so that
the ships returned to the Dutch Republic in the Summer or the beginning of the Autumn.
71 NA NFC 74, Daily record of the supercargoes, 4 July 1765.
72 NA NFC 29, Resolution of the Trade Council, 14 August 1766.
73 NA NFC 30, Resolution of the Trade Council, 20 August 1767.
74 During the Co-hong period, the Co-hong decided the price of Bohea each year, but
the European supercargoes still could obtain various other prices from the individual tea-
supplying agents.
75 NA NFC 77, Daily record of the supercargoes, 23 July 1768.
76 NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 11 February 1763.
77 NA NFC 35, Resolution of the Trade Council, 18 February 1772.
78 NA NFC 38, Resolution of the Trade Council, 19 January 1775.
79 NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 26-29 February 1764.
80 The assortments of the East Indies goods from Batavia are specifically explained in
Chapter Two.
81 NA NFC 32, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 April 1769.
82 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 30 January 1764.
83 NA NFC 79, Daily record of the supercargoes, 9 January 1770.
84 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 8 March 1764.
85 NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 29 January 1763.
86 Ibid., 25 May 1763.
87 From 1760 to 1764, one whole chest of Bohea weighed on average 34813/16, 3461/8,
35913/16, 3395/16 and 342¾ pounds respectively each year (NA NFC 73, Daily record of
the supercargoes, 24 November 1764), but from 1765 onwards one whole chest of Bohea
was fixed at a weight of 340 pounds on average (NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade
Council, 7 November 1765). In the meantime, the weight of other tea chests was always
changing.
88 Three VOC ships were supposed to arrive in Canton this year. For the number of the
ships each season, see Appendix 2.
89 On 19 May 1763, some remarks were made with respect to the first, second, and
third conditions of the contract to the effect that the so-called off-season or the drawn
consideration should end on 1 June and anything which happened afterwards would have
no relation to this contract; on the 24th, one more stipulation was added with regard to
 
TO CHAPTER ONE 167
the sixth condition, namely that half of the remaining part of the contracted 9,000 piculs
of teas which the tea-supplying agents promised to keep on their account would not be
more than 1,250 piculs. See NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 19 May 1763.
90 NA NFC 32, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 April 1769.
91 NA NFC 30 and 31, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 14 April 1767 and 2 May
1768.
92 NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 10 February - 29 April 1764. In fact,
examples of this kind are scattered mainly in the daily records and sometimes in the reso-
lutions of the Trade Council each year.
93 The final quantities on board differed slightly from those following the actual pur-
chase (Twankay from 90,000 to 50,302 pounds; Songlo from 184,000 to 106,764
pounds; and Hyson skin from 30,000 to 19,103 pounds). It also should be mentioned
that they all diverged greatly from the demands by the China Committee. For all differ-
ent figures, see Appendix 4.
94 Some comparisons between the purchase and sales prices of Twankay are demonstrat-
ed in Chapter Five.
95 NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council, 31 August 1765.
96 NA NFC 43, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 November 1780.
97 For instance, the storage of Bohea with porcelain at the Dutch factory from Kousia
and Conjac in 1773, and from Suchin Kinqua in 1779 (NA NFC 82 and 88, Daily
records of the supercargoes, 7-12 October 1773 and 10 February 1779). More informa-
tion about the teas from the porcelain shops also can be found in Appendix 3.
98 NA NFC 124, Instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes, 13 No-
vember 1761.
99 NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council, 7 November 1765.
100 NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 22 October - 2 November 1764.
101 NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 3 November 1764. The work of pack-
ing tea, of course, was delegated to the Chinese coolies who were employed by the tea-
supplying agents. As they packed, the coolies rammed the tea into the chests by trampling
on it with their feet. There is the following interesting description of the coolies’ work by
the Dutch in 1764:
[Today] there are seven places where the tea is being packed and more than 1,200
coolies are occupied, of whom our three merchants have employed only around 700
to serve us.
Each nation which is packing screams a thousand times a day: “Do not grind the tea
to dust, but stamp it straight up and down!” and perhaps one has 100 chests which
are already half-full thrown back upon the heap of tea which is not yet packed,
because the tea has been ground to dust. It never ever always goes the way one wants
it, for how can two or three people keep 200 or more workers, who are of the worst
scum of common people, in order? And, if the clerks of the merchants reprimand
them too severely, all of them jump out of the chests. In order to get them back to
work again and make things right, one has to cajole them and give them more comt-
sia [Gongqian , i.e. wage].
102 On 29 September 1779, for example, the Dutch picked up Bohea packed in the off-
season in small barrels to examine before sending it aboard the Blok the next day. See NA
NFC 88, Daily record of the supercargoes, 29 September 1779.
103 NA NFC 33, Resolution of the Trade Council, 2 April 1770.
104 For the tea-buyers’ complaint about the dustiness of tea, see the section on “Com-
pany auctions of the ‘VOC teas’” in Chapter Five.
105 In 1765, E. Steeger (supercargo) with P. Rocquette (assistant) and Van den Bergh
(assistant); E. Schartouw (supercargo) with Karsseboom (supercargo), Guitard (assistant),
and H. Klinkert (bookkeeper); and E. Kintsius (supercargo) with Helene (assistant) and
Rijnagh (bookkeeper) (NA NFC 28, 7 November 1765); in 1766, Schartouw (supercar-
go) with Wijnberg (assistant), Arends (bookkeeper), and Kuijper (koopkeeper); Karsse-
boom (supercargo) with H. Klinkert (assistant), Alphusius (bookkeeper), and
Teschemacher (bookkeeper); and Van Braam (supercargo) with Rocquette (assistant),
Hemmingson (bookkeeper), and Van Veen (bookkeeper) (NA NFC 29, 23 October
NOTES168
1766); in 1779, H. Klinkert (supercargo) with A. Benthem (assistant) and B. Nebbens
(bookkeeper); S. van Karnebeek (supercargo) with A. Boers (assistant) and B. Idemans
(bookkeeper); S. Certon (supercargo) with Hemmingson (supercargo), A. Rhenius (assis-
tant), and W. in ’t Anker (bookkeeper); and S. Klinkert (supercargo) with A. Serrurier
(assistant) and B. Lunt (bookkeeper) (NA NFC 42, 30 October 1779); and in 1780,
Karnebeek (supercargo) with Benthem (assitant) and Idemans (bookkeeper);
Hemmingson (supercargo) with Rhenius (assistant) and Nebbens (bookkeeper); and S.
Klinkert (supercargo) with Serrurier (assistant) and Lunt (bookkeeper). See NA NFC 43,
Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 October 1780.
Notes to Chapter Four
1 The Canton System was specially designed for the European trade with China from
the eighteenth century until the First Opium War. As for this system, see Li Shiyao
, “Qianlong ershisinian yingjili tongshang an” [Case
of the English Petition for Trade in the 24th Year of the Qianlong Emperor] of “Li Shiyao
zhe san” [The Third Memorial to the Throne by Li Shiyao], in Shiliao
xunkan, Vol. 9, 307-310; Morse, The International Relations, Vols I-III, passim.
2 It is difficult to fix the exact period of the off-season for European traders at Macao,
as it varied for the different companies each year. But, generally speaking, the off-season
of roughly four months would start from the end of February, March, or April, and last
to the end of June, July, or August.
3 The highest civil official with authority over the Provinces of Guangdong and
Guangxi .
4 The subordinate colleague of the Viceroy in matters relating to Guangdong Province.
5 The Imperial Commissioner of the Guangdong Customs House, with headquarters in
Canton.
6 The principal Hong merchant Poan Keequa, in alliance with other great Hong mer-
chants, applied to establish the Co-hong to monopolize the European trade. See Liang
Tingnan (ed.), Yue haiguan zhi [The Chronicle of Guangdong Customs
House] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), Vol. 25, 1797; Ch’en, The Insolvency, 8. An
earlier association of such kind appeared as early as the end of 1720 but only lasted for
one year. See Morse, The Chronicles, Vol. I, 161-165.
7 BL IOR-R/10/4, Diary and consultation, 23 July 1760.
8 Ibid., 4 August 1760.
9 Ibid., 8 August 1760.




14 The eleven Hong merchants were Poan Keequa, Tswaa (Tsja) Suyqua, Tsja Hunqua,
Tan Chetqua, Swetja, Tan Tinqua, Consciens Giqua, Theonqua (or The Onqua), Tan
Tsjoqua, Foutia, and Tan Hunqua (NA VOC 4387, Letter of M.W. Hulle to other super-
cargoes, 6 February 1761). After Tan Tinqua’s arrest on 15 August, the other ten Hong
merchants formed the Co-hong.
15 See note 10.
16 Ibid.
17 NA VOC 4384, Order of the Hoppo to the English and Dutch, 16 August 1760.
18 These troubles derived from the Flint incident between the English merchants and
the Chinese authorities in 1759. See Morse, The Chronicles, Vol. V, 68-107.
19 NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 August 1760.
20 Ibid; BL IOR-R/10/4, Diary and consultation, 17 August 1760.
21 NA VOC 4384, Request of the Dutch to the Tsongtu, 17 August 1760.
22 The reply of the Tsongtu to the Dutch in August 1760, which is inserted in the
Resolution of the Trade Council. See NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council,
25 August 1760.
 
TO CHAPTER FOUR 169
23 NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 August 1760.
24 Ibid.
25 BL IOR-R/10/4, Diaries and consultations, September-December 1760.
26 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 21 July 1772.
27 Ibid., 22 July 1772.
28 Ibid., 1 August 1772.
29 NA NFC 81, Daily records of the supercargoes, 15 and 19 August 1772.
30 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 25 August 1772.
31 NA NFC 35, Daily record of E. van Braam, 28 August 1772. The text of his records
is inserted in the Resolution of the Trade Council in the same year.
32 Being assisted by the Chinese interpreter, he was the accredited representative of the
Senate in all dealings with the Chinese officials, and was accorded the grade of a junior
mandarin by the Chinese authorities. See C.R. Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics: The
Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800 (Madison and Mil-
waukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 45-46.
33 NA NFC 35, Resolution of the Trade Council, 31 August 1772.
34 Ibid.
35 The territory of Macao consisted of the Macao Peninsula and two islands, Taipa
(Dangzai ) and Coloane (Luhuan ).
36 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 2 September 1772.
37 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 3 September 1772.
38 NA NFC 35, Resolution of the Trade Council, 3 September 1772.
39 Ibid.
40 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 4 September 1772.
41 NA NFC 35, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 4 and 5 September 1772.
42 Qing soldiers guarded the Bocca Tigris to the Pearl River with numerous forts and
batteries, through where the Western ships had to pass and be checked before reaching
Whampoa.
43 NA NFC 81, Daily records of the supercargoes, 5 and 6 September 1772.
44 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 10 September 1772.
45 Ibid., 11 September 1772.
46 Yayi (or Yadi ), who together with three other colleagues, Allay , Attay
, and Adjo (or ) served the European companies, under the name of the
“Whampoa Comprador Company” . See NA VOC 4387, Receipts and state-
ments of the compradors, 6 October and 4 December 1760.
47 Its location was known by several different names, for example, the “Bocca Tigris
Roads”, the “2nd Bar anchorage” or “the Bogue”. See Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 268
and 280.
48 NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 12 September 1772.
49 Ibid., 13 September 1772.
50 Ibid., 16 September 1772.
51 Ibid., 24 September 1772.
52 Ibid., 25 September 1772.
53 On 29 November, the Dutch received a grand chop for the Herstelder. On the morn-
ing of 2 December, the Herstelder passed by Macao. See NA NFC 81, Daily record of the
supercargoes, 29 November 1772.
54 Boxer, Portuguese Society, 48, 50, and 70.
55 NA NFC 44, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 21 August and 15 October 1781.
56 NA NFC 292, Letter from the Dutch supercargoes to the English supercargoes,
21 August 1781; BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 22 August 1781.
57 BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Letter from the English supercargoes to the Dutch supercar-
goes, 23 August 1781.
58 BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Chop of the Tsongtu, Fooyuern, and Hoppo, 9 September
1781.
59 BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 2 October 1781.






61 This judgment was strongly expressed by the English supercargoes in their diary. See
BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 14 February 1781.
62 BL IOR-G/12/66, Diaries and consultations, 16 October - 3 November 1779;
1 March - 17 April 1780.
63 The detailed account of sundry stores and a chest of gold and pearls are annexed to
the paper. See BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 28 October 1781.
64 For the capture of the Chinese junk, see BL IOR-G/12/76, Diary and consultation,
25 April 1782. After Captain McClary returned to Bengal in July 1782, the Governor-
General and Supreme Court of Bengal charged him with murdering several Malays in the
Straits of Malacca. Finally, Captain McClary was released because of lack of evidence.
65 The incident of cutting down the flagstaff in Chapter Two may be a good example.
66 The examples can be found in Chapter Three.
67 J.L. Blussé, “Divesting a Myth: Seventeenth Century Dutch-Portuguese Rivalry in
the Far East”, in Anthony Disney and Emily Booth, Vasco Da Gama and the Linking of
Europe and Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 387.
68 Examples of this are given in Chapter Two.
Notes to Chapter Five
1 The data on the homeward- as well as outward-bound voyages of the VOC ships can
be found in Bruijn et al. (eds), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping, Vols II and III.
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11 In Jörg’s opinion, the cargoes of the return ships from China were sold at the autumn
sales in November or December (Porcelain, 130), but this does not appear to be correct if
we look at the above-mentioned archival records.
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13 Ibid.
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17 See note 15.
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short-lived monopoly of the VOC on selling tea on the domestic market requires some
further explanation. In the early 1780s, the VOC China trade found itself facing strong
competition from the Americans who, after the conclusion of the American Revolutionary
War in 1781 and the subsequent confirmation of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, immediate-
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28 The amount of teas demanded by the China Committee can be found in the annual
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29 See note 101 in Chapter Three.
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hen, geldt ende andere koopmanschappen met veele discoursen verrijckt: nevens eenighe koope-
re platen verciert: nut ende dienstigh alle curieuse, ende de andere zee-varende liefhebbers
(Amsterdam: Jan Jansz., 1646), dl. 2, 102.
It is interesting that in the late seventeenth century Dutch public opinion about the
power of tea, whether this be true or not, was comprehensively summed up by Dr Cor-
nelis Bontekoe who listed twenty-six “merits”, for example: 1) to purify the coarse
blood; 2) to expel nightmares; 3) to relieve pressure of the brain; 4) to alleviate and cure
all forms of dizziness and head-aches; 5) to promote the curing of dropsy; […]; 7) to
absorb all excess fluids; 8) to relieve all constipation; 9) to clarify vision; 10) to eradica-
te choler and calm the liver; […]; 12) to ease a disturbed spleen; 13) to expel drowsi-
ness; 14) to eradicate foolishness; 15) to keep awake and alert; 16) to strengthen the
heart; 17) to ease anxiety; 18) to act as a carminative; […]; 21) to sharpen the intelli-
gence; […]; 24) to purge gall gently; 25) as an aphrodisiac useful in early marriage; and
26) to quench thirst. See Eelco Hesse, Thee: de oogleden van Bodhidharma: de wereld van
de thee: het theedrinken in China, Tibet en Japan, thee in Europa, bereiding van thee, krui-
denthee, theegerei, theezetten en thee-recepten (Den Haag: Bert Bakker, 1975), 119; Ter
Molen, Thema thee, 23.
33 Ter Molen, Thema thee, 44.
34 GAU, Inventory II, N 354, “Registers of acts of permission for doing pub-business or
for selling strong drinks, light beer, coffee, and tea, designed according to the resolution
of city council on 28 August 1752” (5 vols); N 355, “General registers of the wholesalers
and licensed victualers of coffee, chickpea, and tea in the city and its surrounding, who
have sworn their oath on the ordinance of the Sates over the impost over coffee, 23 April
1755” (2 vols).
35 Hieronymus Sweerts, Het derde, en laatste deel der koddige en ernstige opschriften op
luyffens, wagens, glazen, borden, graven, en elders (Amsterdam: Jeroen Jeronsz., 1700), 103.
36 This citation is extracted from the ordinance on the impost of coffee, chickpea and
tea, Utrecht 1744. See Ter Molen, Thema thee, 47.
37 Broeze, “Het einde”, 128.
38 GAA, Bibliotheek N 40.03.012.24 and N 61.01.016.33, “Advertising Materials”.
39 Although the emblem of the “VOC” on the chest tell us about the relationship of the
shop with the renowned Company, it is difficult to know precisely when the patent was
obtained from the VOC.
40 All the written information about the shop “The Cloverleaf” was obtained from
Marion de Vries-Jacobs, the present owner of this shop.
41 Jacobus Scheltus (ed.), Groot placaet-boek, vervattende de placaten, ordonnantien ende
edicten van de [...] Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden, ende van de [...] Staten van
Hollandt en West-Vrieslandt, mitsgaders van de […] Staten van Zeeland (’s-Gravenhage:
P. Scheltus, 1705), dl. 4, 713.
42 CAS 3873, Announcement of the tax on coffee, tea, chocolate et al., 1734; four dif-
ferent bills were presented in the years 1734, 1735, 1736, and 1740 on coffee, tea, cho-
colate, sorbet, spa-water, lemonade and other mixed beverages. See G. van Rijn, Atlas van
Stolk te Rotterdam: Katalogus der historie, spot- en zinneprenten betrekkelijk de geschiedenis
van Nederland, verzameld door A. van Stolk (Amsterdam, 1901), 135.
43 BHIC, Plakkaten 2237, 1 October 1724. The taxes were levied on a sliding scale rela-
ting to the household income: a household with an income of less than 4,000 guilders
paid four guilders; that with 4,000 to 10,000 guilders paid six guilders; with 10,000 to
20,000 guilders paid twelve guilders in duties; a household with an income of more than
20,000 guilders paid fifteen guilders in duties.
44 P.C. Molhuysen (ed.), Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Leidsche Universiteit (’s-Gra-
venhage: Nijhoff, 1920), “Act of Senate in the year of 1639 under the decision of Rector
D. Philippus Reinhardus Vitriarius” (Acta Senatus anno 1693 Rectore Magnificus D.
Philippo Reinhardo Vitriario), dl. 4, 109.
45 See note 42.
46 BHIC, Plakkaten 1607, 17 May 1776.
47 BHIC, Plakkaten 2157, 2 September 1791.
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48 F.S. Gaastra, “The Dutch East India Company in National and International Per-
spective”, in Philippe Haudère, René Estienne, and Gérard Le Bouëdec, Les flottes des
Compagnies des Indes, 1600-1857 (Vincennes: Service Historique de la Marine, 1996),
310.
49 Broeze, “Het einde”, 131.
50 Van der Kemp, Oost-Indië’s geldmiddelen, 299-302.
51 Both the Russian Government caravan trade and private trade were engaged in the tea
business with China, but in 1762 the Government caravan trade came to an end, and then
the private traders began to dominate the tea trade. See Zhuang, Tea, Silver, Opium and
War, 142-146.
52 NA VOC 4544, Demand of return by the China Committee for 1770, 20 September
1768.
53 Broeze, “Het einde”, 134.
54 Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, “Smuggling”, 50.
55 NA (UK) PRO 30/8/354:247, Memorial on Smuggling, 12 March 1784.
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APPENDIX 1




Year Value Value Remarks 
(sent from (remained at (on the precious metals from
Europe) Canton) home)______________________________________________________________________________________
1759 1,000,000 none calculated in guilders only
1760 1,000,000 none calculated in guilders only
1761 500,000 none Spanish rials     200,000
1762 875,000 none Spanish rials     350,000
1763 750,000 none Spanish rials     300,000
1764 750,000 854,140 Spanish rials     300,000
1765 950,000 1,120,000 Spanish rials      380,000
1766 1,446,700 320,000 Mexicanen (marks) 62,900
1767 1,446,700 320,000 Mexicanen 62,900
1768 1,446,700 1,179,284 Mexicanen 62,900
1769 1,446,700 706,536 Mexicanen 62,900
1770 1,446,700 800,000 Mexicanen 62,900
1771 1,446,700 800,000 Mexicanen 62,900
1772 1,446,700 800,000 Mexicanen 62,900
1773 828,000 600,000 Mexicanen 36,000
1774 510,830 406,392 Mexicanen 22,210
1775 839,500 951,536 Mexicanen 36,500
1776 759,000 700,424 Mexicanen 33,000
1777 846,400 716,228 Mexicanen 36,800
1778 759,000 459,816 Mexicanen 33,000
1779 1,237,009 359,116 Mexicanen 53,783
1780 1,771,000 259,104 Mexicanen 77,000
1781 1,209,990 743,020 Mexicanen 53,000
1782 none                      * 328,000 * left over for the next season
1783 960,428 none piasters > half, ducats < half
1784 1,200,000 none gold ducats half, piasters half
1785 897,000 none piaster        39,000
1786 1,237,400 none Mexicanen 53,800
1787 1,380,000 none piaster        60,000
1788 2,070,000 none piaster          90,000
1789 2,760,000 none Mexicanen 120,000
1790 1,200,100 none Mexicanen    (calculated in guilders)
1791 718,000 none Mexicanen    (calculated in guilders)
1792 1,440,000 none piaster         (calculated in guilders)
1793 1,400,000 none Mexicanen    (calculated in guilders)
1794 1,080,000 none Mexicanen    (calculated in guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: NA VOC 4543-4547; NA NFC 25, 36-43; J.R. Bruijn et al. (eds), Dutch-Asiatic 
Shipping, Vol. I, 240-245.
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APPENDIX 2
ASSESSMENTS OF THE MERCHANDISE IMPORTED BY THE 
VOC INTO CANTON, 1758-1793
______________________________________________________________________________________
Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
1758-1759
With the Zuidbeveland (150 feet, Captain Hendrik Booms, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Banten pepper 119,602 to Tsja Hunqua, Semqua, & Tayqua
Bangka tin 800,068 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Soequa, Swetja, 
& Jong Hoeyqua
Surat cotton 114,796 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
Malabar sandalwood 46,433 to Tsja Hunqua
rattan 41,548 to the shopkeeper Babtist (alias)
myrrh 2,311 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
catechu 3,388 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
liquid storax 225 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
Baros camphor 70 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
Ceylon pearl dust 21
Banda pearl dust 17/64
lead 2,650 to Macq (comprador)
(ells)
laken 5,346 to Tsja Hunqua
printed laken 1,226
polemieten 10,451




delivery date: 23 September 1758 deliverer: H. Booms
delivery place: Dutch factory in Canton receiver: B. Karsseboom
With the Velsen (150 feet, Captain Marcus Tetting, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
nutmeg 6,200 to Tan Chetqua & Swetja
cloves 6,452 to Tan Chetqua & Swetja
delivery date: 16 November 1758 deliverer: M. Tetting
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: M. Graal, Eg. Geniets, M.W. Hulle, 
etc.
With the Renswoude (150 feet, Captain Jan Zacharias Nauwman, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 868,003 to Swetja, Tan Chetqua, Tsja Hunqua & Co.
nutmeg 6,116 to Tan Chetqua & Swetja
cloves 6,285 to Tan Chetqua & Swetja
Surat cotton 221,387 to Tsja Hunqua
Baros camphor 933 to diverse merchants
cochineal 505 to diverse merchants
delivery date: 16 November 1758 deliverer: J.Z. Nauwman
& 12 January 1759
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Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: M.W. Hulle, J.B. Schartouw, & 
B. Karsseboom
1763
With the Slooten (150 feet, Captain Christian Hagerop, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 948,213 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
nutmeg 8,369 to the above-mentioned merchants
cloves 8,288 to the above-mentioned merchants
Banten pepper 297,590 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 8,459 to the above-mentioned merchants
blue dye 984 to Consciens Giqua
mother-of-cloves 126 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
(taels)
Banda pearl dust 4.1 to the above-mentioned merchants
Ceylon pearl dust 33 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 31 October 1763 deliverer: C. Hagerop
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: M.W. Hulle
With the Huijs te Bijweg (150 feet, Captain Dirk van Mastricht, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Malacca & Bangka tin 948,389 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
nutmeg 4,159 to the above-mentioned merchants
cloves 4,250 to the above-mentioned merchants
Banten pepper 293,873 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 8,605 to the above-mentioned merchants
blue dye 1,036 to Consciens Giqua
clove oil 2½ to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
mother-of-cloves 125 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
delivery date: 31 October 1763 deliverer: D. van Mastricht
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: M.W. Hulle
With the Westerveld (150 feet, Captain Hans Bruns, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin 769,358 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
rattan 8,660 to the above-mentioned merchants
bird’s nests 670 to Tan Tsjoqua
mother-of-cloves 125 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
(pieces)
polemieten 15 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
printed carpets 127 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
printed laken 42 to Tsja Hunqua & Co.
delivery date: 31 October 1763 deliverer: H. Bruns
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: M.W. Hulle
1764
With the Aschat (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Kuijper, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Malacca (inkpot) &  Bangka tin 835,003 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
Banten & Palembang pepper 495,158 to the above-mentioned merchants
Baros camphor 258 to the above-mentioned merchants
olibanum 1,488 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,381 to the above-mentioned merchants
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Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
(pieces)
polemieten 27 to the above-mentioned merchants
printed laken 39 to the above-mentioned merchants
(chest)
fire engine & accessories 1 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 8 October 1764 deliverer: C. Kuijper
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Spliethof & Guitard
With the Ruijterveld (150 feet, Captain Isaac van den Bergh, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin 961,786 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
Cheribon arrack 194,307 to the above-mentioned merchants
printed laken 33 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 4 October 1764 deliverer: I. van den Bergh
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Spliethof & Guitard
With the Huijs Om (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Pietersz., by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin 1,065,388 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
Banten pepper 197,378 to the above-mentioned merchants
Surat cotton 4,083 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 10 October 1764 deliverer: C. Pietersz.
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: P. Kintsius & R. Schellewaart
With the ’s Lands Welvaaren (140 feet, Captain Pieter Fruijt, by the Delft Chamber)
(pounds)
tin 80,000 for return ballast
tin 619,490 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
Banten pepper 302,358 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,377 for use on board
mother-of-cloves 128 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 7 October 1764 deliverer: P. Fruijt
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: P. Kintsius & R. Schellewaart
1765
With the Vreedenhoff (150 feet, Captain Willem van Braam, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 73,550 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 775,080 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
Palembang pepper 398,540 to the above-mentioned merchants
Japanese copper 125,175 to the above-mentioned merchants
Cheribon arrack 125 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 834 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
mother-of-cloves 250 stored in the warehouse
(ells)
polemieten 1,294 to the above-mentioned merchants
printed laken 1,192 to the above-mentioned merchants
laken carpets 38 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 12 September 1765 deliverer: W. van Braam
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: P. Kintsius & F. Helen
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Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
With the Noordbeveland (150 feet, Captain Simon Both, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 73,550 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 824,030 to the above-mentioned merchants
Banten pepper 297,698 to the above-mentioned merchants
Japanese bar-copper 124,704 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 739 to the above-mentioned merchants
Surat putchuck 7,996 stored in the warehouse
bird’s nests 110 stored in the warehouse
mother-of-cloves 252 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 1,710 to the above-mentioned merchants
printed laken 1,310 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 8 September 1765 deliverer: S. Both
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.C. Steeger & J. van der Bergh
With the Pallas (150 feet, Captain Jacobus Boekhoudt, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 73,550 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 1,023,825 to the above-mentioned merchants
Palembang pepper 298,017 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 27 September 1765 deliverer: J. Boekhoudt
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Schartouw & Karneboom
With the Walenburg (140 feet, Captain Crasmus de Vries, by the Rotterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 60,000 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 695,219 to the above-mentioned merchants
Cheribon arrack 167,169 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
bird’s nests 68 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 22 September 1765 deliverer: C. de Vries
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Guitard & Rocquette
1766
With the Jonge Thomas (150 feet, Captain Jacob Wiebe, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 110,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 890,267 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
Palembang pepper 297,000 to the above-mentioned merchants
Japanese copper 74,871 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,277 to the above-mentioned merchants
cloves 6,281 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 8 September 1766 deliverer: J. Wiebe
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Schartouw & Hemmingson
With the Jonge Lieve (150 feet, Captain Hendrik de Haart, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Malacca inkpot tin 114,500 for return ballast
Malacca inkpot tin 886,842 to the above-mentioned merchants
Japanese copper 74,975 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: xx October 1766 deliverer: H. de Haart
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karneboom & C.H. Alphusius
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Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
With the Nieuw Rhoon (150 feet, Captain A. in ’t Anker, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 110,021 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 890,813 to the above-mentioned merchants
Palembang pepper 198,400 to the above-mentioned merchants
Japanese copper 100,154 to the above-mentioned merchants
Cheribon arrack 10,565 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,257 to the above-mentioned merchants
cloves 6,279 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 22 September 1766 deliverer: A. in ’t Anker
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: van Braam Houckgeest & Rocquette
With the Bartha Petronella (140 feet, Captain Leendert van Coopstad, by the Chambers of Hoorn
& Enkhuizen)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 516,299 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 85,036 for return ballast
Banten pepper 195,555 to the above-mentioned merchants
Japanese copper 125,156 to the above-mentioned merchants
Cheribon arrack 35,144 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 8,348 for use on board
delivery date: 22 September 1766 deliverer: L. van Coopstad
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & Hemmingson
1767
With the Geijnwensch (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Kuijper, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 449,851 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
lead 51,027 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 252 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 2,056 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 15 September 1767 deliverer: C. Kuijper
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Spliethoff & Arents
With the Ganzenhoeff (150 feet, Captain Tijs Fiereman, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 800,921 to the above-mentioned merchants
Cheribon arrack 125,829 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 679 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 254½ stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 6,272 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 14 September 1767 deliverer: T. Fiereman
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: Kintsius & J. H. Rijnagh
With the Pallas (150 feet, Captain Jacobus Boekhoudt, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 449,695 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,406 stored in the warehouse
cloves 6,392 stored in the warehouse
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mother-of-cloves 253 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 14 & 30 September 1767 deliverer: J. Boekhoudt
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Schartouw, F. Helene, B. Houckgeest, 
& J. van den Bergh
With the Vrouwe Margaretha Marria (150 feet, Captain Arij Arkenbout, by the Chambers of
Hoorn & Enkhuizen)
(ells)
polemieten 11,619 to the above-mentioned merchants
(pounds)
Bangka tin 300,357 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 50,234 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,353 stored in the warehouse
cloves 6,344 stored in the warehouse
mother-of-cloves 256 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 14 September 1767 deliverer: A. Arkenbout
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karneboom & J. van den Bergh
1768
With the Woestduijn (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 132,250 for return ballast
Bangka tin 673,595 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
lead 55,042 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 125 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 11,853 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 15 September 1768 deliverer: J. Och
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J. van den Bergh & L. Serrurier
With the Jonge Thomas (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 132,260 for return ballast
Bangka tin 670,028 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 54,393 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 125 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 10,776 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 15 September 1767 deliverer: W. Popta
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: B. Houckgeest & Teschemacher
With the Willem de Vijfde (150 feet, Captain Jan Cauvas, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 132,260 for return ballast
Bangka tin 670,418 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
mother-of-cloves 206 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 15 September 1768 deliverer: J. Cauvas
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.C. Steeger & Hemmingson
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With the Paauw (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Harmeijer, by the Chambers of Rotterdam & Delft)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 103,230 for return ballast
Bangka tin 495,321 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 8,562 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 28 September 1768 deliverer: G. Harmeijer
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: I. Guitard & B. Stuijper
1769
With the Oostcapelle (150 feet, Captain Fredrick Papegaaij, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 171,523 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja 
Bangka & Malacca  tin 200,000 for return ballast
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 29 September 1769 deliverer: F. Papegaaij
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.C. Steeger & L. Serrurier
With the ’t Loo (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Pietersz., by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 805,076 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 105,933 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 247 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,282 to the above-mentioned merchants
cloves 6,408 to the above-mentioned merchants
(ells)
polemieten 16,398 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 24 September 1769 deliverer: C. Pietersz.
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: P. Kintsius & J.P. Certon
With the Oud Haarlem (150 feet, Captain Pieter Sijbrands Flouth, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
lead 107,175 to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja
rattan 9,375 for use on board
mother-of-cloves 249 to the above-mentioned merchants
(ells)
polemieten 16,362 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 27 September 1769 deliverer: P.S. Flouth
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Houckgeest & J. van den Bergh
With the Tempel (140 feet, Captain Wouter Macquelijn, by the Chambers of Rotterdam & Delft)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 70,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 589,766 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,266 to the above-mentioned merchants
cloves 5,938 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: xx 1769 deliverer: W. Macquelijn
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karneboom & Arents
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1770
With the Prinses van Oranje (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Kuijper, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 698,503 to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, 
& Inksja
lead 66,674 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 250 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
pearl dust 93 stored in the warehouse
(ells)
polemieten 6,526 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 27 September 1770 deliverer: C. Kuijper
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.C. Steeger & J.H. Rijnnagh
With the Willem de Vijfde (150 feet, Captain Fredrik Visser, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 702,040 to the above-mentioned merchants
pepper 193,862 to the above-mentioned merchants & 
the Co-hong
lead 117,306 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 250 to the above-mentioned merchants
polemieten 6,598 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 27 September 1770 deliverer: F. Visser
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & Karneboom
With the Bodt (150 feet, Captain Jan Rondekrans, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 697,590 to the above-mentioned merchants
pepper 19,718 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 27 September 1770 deliverer: J. Rondekrans
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Houckgeest & Teschemacher
With the Jonge Hellingman (140 feet, Captain Jan Baltus Meijer, by the Chambers of Hoorn &
Enkhuizen)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 499,333 to the above-mentioned merchants
pepper 98,784 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 17 September 1770 deliverer:  J. B. Meijer
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J. van de Bergh & J.H. Alphusius
1771
With the Lam (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Harmeijer, by the Enkhuizen Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 699,725 to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, 
& Inksja
pepper 99,789 to the above-mentioned merchants
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rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 15 October 1771 deliverer: G. Harmeijer
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karneboom & M. Gardijn
With the Oud Haarlem (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 550,188 to the above-mentioned merchants
pepper 296,376 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 349 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg & cloves 12,624 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 100,490 stored in the warehouse
pearl dust 85 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 16 October 1771 deliverer: J. Och
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den Bergh
With the ’t Loo (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 552,808 to the above-mentioned merchants
Malacca tin 199,996 to the above-mentioned merchants
Banten pepper 295,811 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg & cloves 12,458 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 240 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 100,334 stored in the warehouse
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 8 October 1771 deliverer: W. Popta
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Kintsius & M. Gardij
With the Oostcapelle (150 feet, Captain Frederik Papegaaij, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 602,516 to the above-mentioned merchants
Malacca tin 200,367 to the above-mentioned merchants
pepper 297,539 to the above-mentioned merchants
mother-of-cloves 250 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 15 October 1771 deliverer: F. Papegaaij
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: B. Houckgeest
1772
With the Bodt (150 feet, Captain Damian Húgo Staring, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka & Malacca tin 133,334 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 715,944 to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co.
Banten pepper 337,418 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg & cloves 12,504 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 16 October 1772 deliverer: D.H. Staring
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: P. Kintsius
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With the Prinses van Oranje (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Pietersz., by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 133,333 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 714,751 to Tingqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua
Banten pepper 345,061 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 99,806 to Tinqua
mother-of-cloves 982 to Tinqua
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 18 September 1772 deliverer: C. Pietersz.
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den Bergh
With the Veldhoen (150 feet, Captain Pieter Sijbrands Flouth, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 133,333 for return ballast
Bangka & Malacca tin 710,394 to Tinqua, Poan Keequa, & Monqua
Banten pepper 393,232 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 99,103 to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co.
mother-of-cloves 927 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 7 October 1772 deliverer: P.S. Flouth
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Kuijper & Certon
1773
With the Holland (150 feet, Captain Hans Hansse, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 10,775 to Tayqua & brothers, & Inksja
(pounds)
lead  51,354 to Tayqua & brothers
Bangka tin 401,592 to the above-mentioned merchants
nutmeg 6,252 to Tinqua & Inksja
cloves 6,219 to Tinqua & Inksja
mother-of-cloves 860 to Tayqua & brothers
Timor sandalwood 7,630 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 26 September 1773 deliverer: H. Hansse
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & Kuijper
With the Voorberg (150 feet, Captain Fredrik Visser, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 10,888 to Tayqua & brothers, & Inksja
(pounds)
lead 51,278 to Tayqua & brothers
Malacca tin 152,008 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 129,329 to diverse merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 26 September 1773 deliverer: F. Visser
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.P. Certon & J.G. Steijn
With the Europa (155 feet, Captain Jacobus de Freijn, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
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lead 100,147 to Tayqua
mother-of-cloves 800 to Tinqua
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 30 September 1773 deliverer: J. de Freijn
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den S. Hancke
With the Jonge Hellingman (140 feet, Captain Jan Baltus Meijer, by the Rotterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 502,088 to Tayqua & brothers
nutmeg & cloves 12,543 to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja, & Tinqua
mother-of-cloves 840 to the above-mentioned merchants
pearl dust 27 to Tayqua & brothers
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 24 September 1773 deliverer: J. B. Meijer
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Kintsius & Benthem
1774
With the Vrijheid (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 10,897 to Inksja
(pounds)
lead 1,008 to Inksja
lead 104,053 to Inksja & Tinqua
mother-of-cloves 1,240 to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja
Banten pepper 247,455 to Inksja
Bangka tin 602,620 to Inksja
pearl dust 40 to Tayqua & brothers
delivery date: 4 October 1774 deliverer: J. Och
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Kintsius & Hemmingson
With the Ceres (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 10,937 to Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers
(pounds)
lead 952 to Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers
lead 103,162 to Inksja, Tayqua & brothers
Banten pepper 243,143 to Tayqua & brothers
Bangka tin 401,211 to Tayqua & brothers
delivery date: 3 October 1774 deliverer: W. Popta
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J. van den Bergh & J. van den S. Hancke
With the Oostcapelle (150 feet, Captain Jan Abel, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
pepper 247,581 to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja, & Tinqua 
lead 100,327 to the above-mentioned merchants
Malacca tin 89,019 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 312,110 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 16 October 1774 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: P. Kintsius & J.H. Alphusius
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With the Beemster Welvaaren (140 feet, Captain Marten Schoning, by the Hoorn Chamber)
(pounds)
pepper 237,972 to Tinqua
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 601,336 to Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers
lead 100,357 to Inksja, Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers
mother-of-cloves 1,326 to Inksja
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: xx October 1774 deliverer: M. Schoning
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: P. Kintsius & J.H. Alphusius
1775
With the Indiaan (150 feet, Captain Jan Fredrik Raatjes, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 598,964 to Inksja
pepper 295,673 to Inksja
pearl dust 28 to Inkjsa
blue dye 600 to Inksja
lead 149,640 to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Inksja
nutmeg 6,275 to Inksja, Tinqua, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua
cloves 31,274 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 1,538 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
(ells)
polemieten 16,241 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 19 September 1775 deliverer: J.F. Raatjes
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den Bergh
With the Morgenster (150 feet, Captain Gerrit Springer, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 301,129 to Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua
pepper 201,786 to the above-mentioned merchants
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 19 September 1775 deliverer: G. Springer
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J.H. Alphusius
With the Europa (155 feet, Captain Francois van Ewijk, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 100,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 236,492 to Tinqua
pepper 488,318 to Tinqua, Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua
lead 52,272 to Tinqua
mother-of-cloves 2,800 to Inksja, Tinqua, Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua
blue dye 100
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 19 September 1775 deliverer: F. van Ewijk
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den Bergh
With the Jonge Hugo (140 feet, Captain Hendrik Hilverduijn, by the Enkhuizen Chamber)
(pounds)
tin 100,000 for return ballast
APPENDIX 2 189
______________________________________________________________________________________
Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
tin 403,956 to Tinqua, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua
pepper 296,757 to Tinqua
mother-of-cloves 250 to Tinqua
rattan 9,375 for use on board
delivery date: 19 September 1775 deliverer: H. Hilverduijn
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J.H. Alphusius
1776
With the Triton (150 feet, Captain Pieter van Prooijen, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 16,449 to Inksja & Tan Tsjoqua
Grijnen 815 to Inksja
(pounds)
lead 151,613 to Inksja & Tan Tsjoqua
Bangka tin 500,869 to Inksja & Monqua
sandalwood 24,708 to Tsjonqua
cloves 8,524 to Inksja, Tinqua, Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & 
Tsjonqua
delivery date: 18 September 1776 deliverer: P. van Prooijen
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den Bergh
With the Blok (150 feet, Captain Jacob de Lange, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 11,117 to Inksja & Tan Tsjoqua
laken 3,656 to Inksja & Tinqua
(pounds)
lead 2,177 to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Inksja, & Tinqua
Bangka tin 415,969 to Tinqua, Tsjonqua, Inksja, Monqua, & Tan 
Tsjoqua
lead 200,437 to Inksja
delivery date: 18 September 1776 deliverer: J. de Lange
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & B. Kuijper
With the Ceres (150 feet, Captain Johannes van Voorst, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 21,994 to Tinqua, Tsjonqua, & Tan Tsjoqua
(pounds)
lead 1,816 to Tinqua & Tan Tsjoqua
nutmeg & cloves 16,520 to Inksja, Tinqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 301,198 to Tinqua & Tan Tsjoqua
arrack 29,895 to Tinqua
sapanwood 33,925 to Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua
lead 8,190 to Tsjonqua
delivery date: 18 September 1776 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karnebeek & Benthem
With the Buijtenleeven (140 feet, Captain Jan Caatman, by the Delft Chamber)
(pounds)
Siam sapanwood 189,929 to Tan Tsjoqua & Monqua
Bangka tin 150,027 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Inksja
delivery date: 18 September 1776 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: [no signature]
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1777
With the Zeepaard (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 15,480 to Koqua, Tsjonqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua
(pounds)
lead 1,482 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 100,764 to Inksja & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 300,146 to the above-mentioned merchants
Cheribon arrack 95,512 to Tan Tsjoqua & Monqua
sandalwood 46,825 to the above-mentioned merchants
pearl dust 34
delivery date: 14 September 1777 deliverer: J. Och
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & A.A. Boers
With the Ganges (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Cahmber)
(ells)
polemieten 17,616 to Inksja & Koqua
(pounds)
lead 1,832 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 50,089 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 499,150 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua
Palembang pepper 149,636 to Inksja
nutmeg 12,481 to Inksja, Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & 
Tsjonqua
cloves 12,547 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 13 September 1777 deliverer: W. Popta
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & B. Kuijper
With the Overduijn (150 feet, Captain J.C. Roose, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Palembang pepper 147,886 to Inksja
Bangka tin 499,819 to Inksja, Tsjonqua, Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & 
Monqua
delivery date: 19 September 1777 deliverer: J.C. Roose
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karnebeek & Benthem
With the Canaän (140 feet, Captain Willem Koelbier, by the Rotterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 400,904 to Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua
lead 102,657 to Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
delivery date: 14 September 1777 deliverer: W. Koelbier
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.P. Certon & J. van den S. Hancke
1778
With the Abbekerk (140 feet, Captain Kasper Burger, by the Hoorn Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 705,602 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
Palembang pepper 97,074 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 14 November 1778 deliverer: K. Burger
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Kuijper & Rhenius
With the Dolphijn (150 feet, Captain J.F. Raatjes, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 23,152 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
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(pounds)
lead 2,307 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 399,328 to Inksja
Palembang pepper 99,531 to Inksja
kapok 27,135 to Tsjonqua
Timor sandalwood 50,768 to Tsjonqua
lead 152,910 to Inksja & Tsjonqua
pearl dust 38
delivery date: 8 October 1778 deliverer: J.F. Raatjes
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: E. van Karnebeek & J. Nebbens
With the Vreedenhoff (150 feet, Captain R. den Uijt, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 9,928 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
(pounds)
lead 967 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 150,401 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 601,078 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
Palembang pepper 97,831 to the above-mentioned merchants
delivery date: 11 November 1778 deliverer: R. den Uijt
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J. van den Bergh
With the Zeeuw (150 feet, Captain J. Sierevelt, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
Bangka tin 399,512 to Tsjonqua
pepper 97,661 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
nutmeg 12,544 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
cloves 12,547 to the above-mentioned merchants
arrack 57,385 to Tsjonqua
kapok 26,797 to Tsjonqua
delivery date: 2 October 1778 deliverer: J. Sierevelt
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & Serrurier
1779
With the Blok (150 feet, Captain Jacob de Lange, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 16,553 to Inksja, Tsjonqua, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua
laken 2,295 to the above-mentioned merchants
(pounds)
lead 3,164 to the above-mentioned merchants
Timor sandalwood 46,514 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 707,672 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 113,727 to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua
delivery date: 7 October 1779 deliverer: J. de Lange
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & J.J. Idemans
With the Zeeploeg (150 feet, Captain Jan Still, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 16,531 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, & 
Poan Keequa
laken 4,946 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
(pounds)
lead 3,290 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 122,516 to Monqua & Tsjonqua
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pepper 396,943 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 403,166 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua 
Bangka tin 50,169 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 25 October 1779 deliverer: J. Still
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karnebeek & Idemans
With the Voorberg (150 feet, Captain Johannes van Voorst, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
nutmeg 3,156 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
cloves 9,376 to the above-mentioned merchants
arrack 125,435 to Inksja
pepper 392,127 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua
tin 175,048 to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua
tin 327,311 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 4 November 1779 deliverer: J. van Voorst
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & Nebbens
With the Java (140 feet, Captain Jan Mijndertse Swaal, by the Enkhuizen Chamber)
(pounds)
nutmeg 3,175 to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
cloves 8,368
pepper 392,942 to the above-mentioned merchants
tin 454,950 stored in the warehouse
lead 99,985 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 17 November 1779 deliverer: J.M. Swaal
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & Benthem
1780
With the Honcoop (150 feet, Captain Axel Land, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
pearl dust 53 to Pinqua
lead 161,580 to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua
cloves 12,347 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
pepper 197,842 to Monqua & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 605,148 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
(ells)
polemieten 12,045 to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Poan Keequ
laken 6,020 to Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua
delivery date: 31 October 1780 deliverer: A. Land
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Karnebeek & Idemans
With the Paerl (150 feet, Captain D.C. Plokker, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 21,368 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, Poan 
Keequa, & Limpo Tsjouqua
laken 3,527 to the above-mentioned merchants
(pounds)
lead 3,065 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 158,294 to Tan Tsjoqua & Monqua
pepper 98,376 to Tan Tsjoqua
Bangka tin 524,727 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua, 
and stored in the warehouse
Malacca tin 118,761 to Tsjonqua
delivery date: 1 October 1780 deliverer: D.C. Plokker
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delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & L. Lund
With the Middelburg (150 feet, Captain J. van Gennep, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
pepper 193,840 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 668,838 to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua, 
and stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 15,000 for return ballast
Malacca tin 14,652 to Tsjonqua
Malacca tin 20,017 for return ballast
delivery date: 1 November 1780 deliverer: J. van Gennep
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & Nebbens
With the Hoogkarspel (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Harmeijer, by the Delft Chamber)
(pounds)
cloves 12,533 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua
pepper 294,722 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tiqua (silk 
fabricant)
Bangka tin 549,283 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, & Tiqua
delivery date: 31 October 1780 deliverer: G. Harmeijer
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Serrurier & Idemans
1781
No ships at Canton
1782
No ships at Canton
1783
With the Potsdam (150 feet, Captain Bernard Christian Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 22,065 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, Pinqua, & 
Kiouqua
laken 4,986 to the above-mentioned merchants
(pounds)
lead 3,717 to Tsjonqua
clove oil 3½ to Monqua
Japanese bar-copper 62,511 to Tan Tsjoqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
lead 56,373 to Tsjonqua
pepper 600,736 to Tan Tsjoqua, Tsjonqua, & Pinqua
Bangka tin 81,800 to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 245,575 stored in the warehouse
Malacca tin 15,028 stored in the warehouse
nutmeg 6,214 stored in the warehouse
cloves 6,260 stored in the warehouse
delivery date: 16 November 1783 deliverer: B.C. Muller
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & Idemans
With the Breslau (150 feet, Captain Johannes Cornelis Roose, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
lead 44,404 to Tsjonqua
Japanese bar-copper 62,574 to Tsjonqua, Pinqua, & Monqua
pepper 601,358 to Monqua & Tsjonqua
Bangka tin 255,188 to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
Bangka tin 72,668 stored in the warehouse
APPENDIX 2194
______________________________________________________________________________________
Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
Malacca tin 15,033 stored in the warehouse
nutmeg 6,332 stored in the warehouse
cloves 6,270 stored in the warehouse
clove oil 3½ to Monqua
delivery date: 19 November 1783 deliverer: J.C. Roose
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Rhenius & Klinkert
1784
With the Gouverneur Generaal de Klerk (150 feet, Captain Jochem Bank, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
black pepper 295,261 to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Kiouqua, & Pinqua
Japanese bar-copper 60,453 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 642,164 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 160,000 for return ballast
delivery date: 29 September 1784 deliverer: J. Bank
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Serrurier & J.H. Rabinel
With the Draak (150 feet, Captain Arie Kikkert, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 28,275 stored in the warehouse
(pounds)
Japanese bar-copper 62,555 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 621,636 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 180,000 for return ballast
clove oil 3½ stored in the warehouse
pepper 234,057 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua
delivery date: 20 October 1784 deliverer: A. Kikkert
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: E. van Karnebeek & M. Nolthenius
With the Brederode (150 feet, Captain Gottlieb Mulder, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
laken 4,584 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
(pounds)
lead 1,327 to Attacq* (comprador)
pepper 236,465 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua
Japanese bar-copper 62,507 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 624,865 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua
Bangka tin 180,000 for return ballast
delivery date: 4 December 1784 deliverer: G. Mulder
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Idemans & Klinkert
With the Berkhout (150 feet, Captain Herman Jacob Hulleman, by the Hoorn Chamber) 
(ells)
polemieten 28,043 the goods were partly kept for return ballast; 
partly stored in the warehouse, and party 







delivery date: 27 November 1784 deliverer: H.J. Hulleman
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & R.J. Dozij
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1785
With the Voorschooten (150 feet, Captain C. Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)
polemieten 28,153 all dgoods elivered to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, 








delivery date: 17 November 1785 deliverer: C. Muller
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Klinkert & Nolthenius
With the Barbesteijn (150 feet, Captain D.C. Plokker, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(ells)








delivery date: 20 October 1785 deliverer: D.C. Plokker
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: A.A. Boers & R.J. Dozij
With the Pollux (140 feet, Captain L. Kappelhoff, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
pepper 96,809 the goods were partly received & partly remained 
tin 60,346 on board
delivery date: 2 November 1785 deliverer: L. Kappelhoff
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: L. Serrurier & G. Schouten
With the Afrikaan (140 feet, Captain P. Moddenman, by the Enkhuizen Chamber)
(pounds)
cloves 10,221 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
pepper 115,947 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 713,419 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 87,616 for return ballast
delivery date: 25 November 1785 deliverer: P. Moddenman
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: Hemmingson & J.A. de Melander
1786
With the Zoutman (150 feet, Captain B.C. Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pieces)
laken 130 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
polemieten 390 to the above-mentioned merchants & Poan 
Keequa
(pounds)
lead 3,730 to Attacq
clove oil 3½ to Sequa (shopkeeper)
nutmeg 1,565 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
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cloves 6,292 to the above-mentioned merchcants
Timor sandalwood 12,335 stored in the warehouse
pepper 124,031 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
Bangka tin 590,302 to the above-mentioned merchants
Bangka tin 60,000 for return ballast
delivery date: 2 November 1786 deliverer: B.C. Muller
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J. Nebbens & J.A. de Melander
With the Horssen (140 feet, Captain J. van de Berg, by the Delft Chamber)
(pounds)
nutmeg 1,560 stored in the warehouse
cloves 6,216 stored in the warehouse
sandalwood 12,335 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 384,965 stored in the warehouse
Bangka tin 130,000 for return ballast
Bangka tin 133,607 to Tan Tsjoqua & Kiouqua
pepper 122,423 to Tan Tsjoqua
delivery date: 19 October 1786 deliverer: J. van de Berg
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.J. Idemans & G. Schouten
With the Gouverneur Generaal de Klerk (150 feet, Captain J. Arend, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
nutmeg 1,552 the goods were partly stored in the warehouse; 






delivery date: 23 October 1786 deliverer: J. Arend
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: A.A. Boers & M. Nolthenius
With the Beeverwijk (150 feet, Captain A.E.L.P. van Baggen, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pounds)
cloves 6,262 stored in the warehouse
pepper 99,184 to Pinqua
tin 160,000 for return ballast
tin 490,181 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua
delivery date: 23 October 1786 deliverer: A.E.L.P. van Baggen
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.J. Idemans & M. Nolthenius
With the Vreedenburg (150 feet, Captain H. Kikkert, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pieces)
laken 170 the goods were partly stored in the warehouse; 












Assortment of merchandise Volumes Destination of merchandise______________________________________________________________________________________
Bangka tin 551,905
delivery date: 16 October 1786 deliverer: H. Kikkert
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: F. Benthem & J.H. Rabinel
1787
With the Nederlands Welvaaren (150 feet, Captain Arie Kikkert, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(chests)
laken 16 the goods were partly stored in the warehouse; 
partly delivered to diverse merchants, and a part 








delivery date: 31 October 1787 deliverer: A. Kikkert
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: A.A. Boers & E.L. Steijn
With the Canton (150 feet, Captain Cornelis de Wit, by the Rotterdam Chamber)
(pounds)




delivery date: 5 December 1787 deliverer: C. de Wit
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: L. Serrurier & J.H. Rabinel
With the Admiraal de Suffren (150 feet, Captain G. Mulder, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(pieces)
laken 140 to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua
polemieten 320 to the above-mentioned merchants
(pounds)
Japanese bar-copper 201,079 to the above-mentioned merchants
pepper 97,917 to the above-mentioned merchants
rice 154,829 to the above-mentioned merchants
lead 3,881 to Attacq
delivery date: 1 November 1787 deliverer: G. Mulder
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.J. Idemans & J.A. de Melander









delivery date: 5 December 1787 deliverer: K. van Vlaanderen
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: A.A. Boers
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With the Voorschooten (150 feet, Captain W. van Groningen, by the Amsterdam Chamber)
(chests)
polemieten 25






delivery date: 5 December 1787 deliverer: W. van Groningen
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: F. Benthem & E.L. Steijn
1788








delivery date: 27 October 1788 deliverer: J.H. Gevels
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: F. Benthem












delivery date: 6 December 1788 deliverer: Gerrit Esman
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: R.J. Dozij & W. Tros
With the Goede Trouw (150 feet, Captain Jan Arendsz., by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)
nutmeg 3,040




delivery date: 24 November 1788 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: M. Nolthenius & J.A. de Melander
With the Blitterswijk (150 feet, Captain Lodewijk Elgenhuizen, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(pounds)











delivery date: 20 December 1788 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.H. Rabinel & G. Schouten
1789







delivery date: 14 November 1789 deliverer: J. Swetman
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: R.J. Dozij & M.A. van Schoor










delivery date: 17 November 1789 deliverer: B.C. Muller
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: F. Benthem & E.L. Steijn






delivery date: 22 November 1789 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: F. Benthem & E.L. Steijn












delivery date: 1 December 1789 deliverer: [no signature]
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delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.H. Rabinel & J.A. de Melander








delivery date: 9 December 1789 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: B. Teerlink & M.A. van Schoor
1790
With the Alblasserdam* (150 feet, Captain Pieter Mallet Junior, by the Zeeland Chamber)
(chests)






delivery date: 11 October 1790 deliverer: P. Mallet Junior
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: F. Benthem & E. L. Steijn









delivery date: 14 October 1790 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: B. Houckgeest, B. Teerlink & van Braam
1791










delivery date: 3 October 1791 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: E.L. Steijn & J.H. Bletterman














delivery date: 1 December 1791 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: E.L. Steijn & J.P. Kranth
1792






delivery date: 4 October 1792 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: E.L. Steijn & M.A. van Schoor





delivery date: 13 October 1792 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: J.A. de Melander & J.M. Bosma





delivery date: 15 October 1792 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receivers: B. Teerlink & J.W.D. van der Sleijden
1793






delivery date: 20 September 1793 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: B. Teerlink
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Bangka tin 284,270
cloves 9,369
delivery date: 24 September 1793 deliverer: [no signature]
delivery place: the Dutch factory receiver: J.W.D. van der Sleijden  ______________________________________________________________________________________
* Attacq , Ami , and Apo organized the “Yuehe Comprador Company” 
to serve the European companies. See NA VOC 4387, Receipt and statement of the compradors, 10
August 1760.
Sources: NA NFC 24-55; J.R. Bruijn et al. (eds), Dutch-Asiatic Shipping, Vol. II, 564-757.
( )  
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TEA-SUPPLYING AGENTS OF THE VOC IN CANTON,
1762-1780
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
1762 Tsja Hunqua Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson, 
Hyson skin, Twankay
Tan Chetqua Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson, 
Imperial tea
Swetja Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Songlo, 
Hyson skin, Imperial tea, Twankay
Lisjoncon Bohea (with porcelain)
Tsjobqua Souchong, Songlo
Consciens Giqua Congou, Souchong
Monqua Congou, Hyson
Tan Tsjoqua Souchong, Pekoe
1763 Swetja Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Ankay Congou
Tan Chetqua Bohea, Congou, Ankay Congou, Souchong, Songlo, 
Twankay, Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea
Tsja Hunqua Bohea, Congou, Ankay Congou, Hyson, Hyson skin, 
Twankay
Uhn-Sam-Ja (under Bohea, Congou
the name of Chetqua)
A country merchant Bohea
(under Chetqua’s name)
Tsjobqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Songlo
Consciens Giqua Souchong
Inksja Ankay Congou, Bohea, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, 
Twankay
Quyqua (Tan Chetqua’s Congou
brother & clerk)
Consciens Giqua Souchong
Tan Tsjoqua Souchong, Pekoe
Tayqua (Tsja Hunqua’s Pekoe 
son, under the name 
of Giqua)
1764 Consciens Giqua Congou, Ankay Congou, Ankay, Ankay Souchong, 
Twankay, Songlo





Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
Tsja Kinqua (Inksja’s Souchong
cousin & clerk)
Inksja Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Songlo, Hyson, 
Twankay, Ankay
Tsja Hunqua Congou, Ankay, Bohea, Songlo, Souchong, Pekoe
Tan Chetqua Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Ankay, Souchong, Pekoe
Tan Tsjoqua Pekoe
1765 Tsja Hunqua Congou, Bohea, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Souchong, 
Ankay, Twankay
Inksja Congou, Bohea, Hyson skin, Souchong, Pekoe, Ankay, 
Imperial tea, Songlo
Tan Chetqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, 
Songlo, Pekoe, Ankay, Twankay
Tan Tsjoqua Congou, Souchong
Tsjobqua Souchong, Pekoe
Tan Anqua (under Souchong
the name of Tsjobqua)
Tsja Kinqua Souchong, Hyson
Tayqua (under Pekoe
the name of Inksja)
Monqua Hyson
Quyqua Congou
1766 Tan Chetqua Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Bohea, 
Imperial tea, Twankay, Songlo
Inksja Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Bohea, 
Twankay, Songlo





Tsja Kinqua Pekoe, Hyson
Tsjobqua Pekoe, Souchong
1767 Tsja Hunqua Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Ankay, Songlo, 
Hyson, Hyson skin, Pekoe
Tan Chetqua Bohea, Pekoe, Congou, Songlo, Songlo-Imperial tea, 
Twankay, Hyson skin, Souchong
Inksja Bohea, Songlo, Souchong, Twankay, Hyson skin, 
Hyson, Congou, Ankay, Pekoe
Namqua (with Poan Bohea, Pekoe
Keequa’s permission)




Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
Tan Tsjoqua Bohea
1768 Huyqua (Consciens Songlo, Hyson, Bohea, Ankay
Giqua’s son & successor)
Tan Tsjoqua Pekoe, Bohea, Ankay
Poan Keequa Congou, Hyson, Souchong, Bohea, Ankay
Tan Chetqua Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Ankay, Hyson skin, 
Souchong
Inksja Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, 
Ankay, Hyson skin, Hyson
Tsjobqua Hyson, Twankay, Songlo, Souchong, Congou, Pekoe
Tsja Hunqua Bohea, Pekoe, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo, Hyson, 
Hyson skin, Imperial tea
Monqua Bohea, Ankay
Tayqua Pekoe




Quyqua Pekoe, Souchong, Congou
Tsja Kinqua Souchong
1769 Tsja Hunqua Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Pekoe, 
Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea, Ankay
Tan Chetqua Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Hyson, Hyson skin, 
Twankay
Tan Anqua Congou




Tsja Kinqua Pekoe, Souchong, Bohea (with porcelain)
Tayqua Pekoe
Ajou (boutiquier) Pekoe 
Pinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
1770 Quyqua Congou, Pekoe, Souchong
Tan Chetqua Congou, Souchong, Ankay, Bohea, Songlo, Hyson, 
Hyson skin
Tsja Hunqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo, Imperial 
tea, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin
Tan Tinqua (Tan Souchong, Congou, Pekoe
Chetqua’s brother)
Inksja Souchong, Bohea, Ankay, Songlo, Twankay, Hyson 
skin, Hyson
Tan Tsjoqua Congou, Bohea, Ankay, Souchong, Pekoe
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(Tsja) Anqua (or Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson skin 
Hanqua, Tsja 
Hunqua’s son)
Tayqua Congou, Souchong, Ankay, Pekoe, Twankay 
Monqua Songlo
Echong Bohea (with porcelain)
Suchin Kinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
Conjac Bohea (with porcelain)
Pinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
1771 Tsja Hunqua Congou, Souchong, Bohea, Pekoe, Hyson skin
Tan Chetqua Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Bohea, Ankay, Hyson skin, 
Songlo
Inksja Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Ankay, Bohea, Songlo, 
Twankay, Hyson skin, Hyson
Wijsee (Inksja’s Congou, Bohea, Pekoe
brother) & Quyqua
Loncsia Bohea 
Lamsia (Inksja’s Bohea, Congou
brother)
Semqua, (Tsja) Congou, Songlo, Souchong
Anqua & Co.
Tayqua Souchong, Congou
Poan Keequa Bohea 
Tan Tsjoqua Bohea, Pekoe, Souchong
Monqua Congou, Bohea, Souchong
Aiou Bohea, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay, Congou
Jemqua (Tan Tinqua’s Congou
son)
Luchoncon Souchong
Conjac Bohea (with porcelain)
Pinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
1772 Tan Chetqua Congou, Bohea
Tayqua (sometimes Congou, Bohea, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Imperial tea
Semqua, Tayqua 
and Co.)
Ajou & Loncsia Bohea, Congou, Souchong
Wijsee & Quyqua Congou, Bohea








Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
Gregorij Chan Congou
Tan Tinqua Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Hyson, Imperial tea
Phoqua (shopkeeper) Souchong, Congou, Pekoe, Songlo
Honksia Twankay, Songlo
Suchin Kinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
Lisjoncon Congou
Kiouqua (Inksja’s clerk) Congou
Poan Keequa Souchong, Hyson, Twankay
Tan Tsjoqua Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Bohea
Monqua Souchong, Hyson, Bohea, Imperial tea
Conjac Bohea (with porcelain)
1773 Tan Tinqua Bohea, Congou, Songlo, Souchong, Twankay, Pekoe
Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong
& Co.
Tan Tsjoqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo
Monqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Twankay
Poan Keequa Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson skin, 
Hyson, Twankay
Tsjonqua (Tsja Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay
Hunqua’s youngest son)
Tayqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay, Pekoe, 
Hyson
Kousia Bohea (with porcelain), Congou
Inksja Congou, Souchong, Hyson skin
Conjac Bohea (with porcelain)
1774 Tayqua Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson skin
Inksja Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson 
skin, Pekoe
Poan Keequa Songlo, Congou, Bohea, Hyson skin
Tan Tsjoqua Songlo, Bohea, Souchong
Monqua Songlo, Bohea






Conjac Bohea (with porcelain)
1775 Tan Tinqua Bohea, Congou, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Souchong, 
Twankay, Songlo




Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
Monqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson
Tan Tsjoqua Congou, Souchong, Pekoe
Kiouqua Souchong, Hyson skin
Keequa (Inksja’s clerk) Souchong
Conjac Hyson
Tayqua & brothers Songlo, Twankay, Pekoe
Quyqua Congou, Souchong
Lisia (Inksja’s brother) Congou
Suchin Kinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
Pinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
1776 Inksja Congou, Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Souchong, Hyson, 
Hyson skin
Kousia Bohea, Congou, Souchong
Tan Tsjoqua Bohea, Congou, Pekoe  
Monqua Pekoe, Souchong, Bohea, Congou, Hyson  
Heyqua Souchong, Congou  
Koqua (Tayqua’s Bohea, Congou, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong
brother)
Tsjonqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe
Longsia Souchong
Kiouqua Hyson skin






A few countrymen Congou, Bohea
Lhie sien-sang Congou, Souchong
(Mr Li , 
hawker)
1777 Inksja Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, 
Hyson skin
Tan Tsjoqua Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson
Monqua Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Hyson
Lisjoncon (shopkeeper) Songlo, Souchong
Tayqua & brothers Songlo
Koqua Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay
Tsjonqua Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe




Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
Tan Tinqua Congou
Kiouqua Congou, Songlo, Twankay
Tan Anqua Souchong
Tetqua (Tsjonqua’s Congou, Souchong
clerk and interpreter)
Conjac Bohea (with porcelain), Hyson
Keequa Hyson
Suchin Kinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
1778 Inksja Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Congou, Souchong, Hyson, 
Hyson skin
Tan Tsjoqua Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, 
Hyson, Hyson skin
Tsjonqua Souchong, Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, 
Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin
Tetqua Souchong, Congou





Kousia Bohea (with porcelain)
Foyec Bohea (with porcelain)
Pinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
Suchin Kinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
Exhin Bohea (with porcelain)
1779 Inksja Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Hyson, 
Hyson skin, Gunpowder tea
Tan Tsjoqua Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, 
Hyson
Monqua Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Hyson, 
Hyson skin, Gunpowder tea








Suchin Kinqua Bohea (with porcelain)
APPENDIX 3210
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Tea-supplying agents Teas from the supplying agent______________________________________________________________________________________
1780 Tan Tsjoqua Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Hyson, Souchong, 
Pekoe, Hyson skin, Gunpowder tea
Tsjonqua Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Souchong, Pekoe, 
Hyson, Gunpowder tea
Monqua Congou, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo, Hyson, Hyson 
skin
Conqua Souchong
Inksja Twankay, Songlo, Bohea
Limpo Congou, Souchong, Twankay, Hyson skin, Hyson, 
Gunpowder tea______________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: NA NFC 25-43, 72-89; P. Van Dyke and C. Viallé (eds), The Canton-Macao 
Dagregister 1763, Macao Cultural Institute, note 24.
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APPENDIX 4
TEAS EXPORTED FROM CANTON TO
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1742-1794
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Assortments Volumes Percentage Prices
(pounds) (teas purchased) (guilders/pounds)
home order Canton purchase______________________________________________________________________________________
1742 Bohea 635,393 67.33 0.45, 0.49, 0.51, 0.57
Congou 119,290 12.64 0.81, 0.84, 1.13, 1.15
Souchong 34,121 3.62 0.84, 1.40, 1.44
Songlo 75,710 8.02 0.60, 0.84, 0.86
Pekoe 28,637 3.03 0.56, 0.90, 0.92 
Hyson 12,249 1.30 1.72
Imperial tea 38,233½ 4.05 0.98, 1.13, 1.15
1743 Bohea 581,573 55.09 0.43
Congou 105,291 9.97 0.65, 0.72
Souchong 57,372 5.43 1.01, 1.04
Songlo 193,041 18.28 0.51, 0.53
Pekoe 40,338 3.82 0.65, 0.72
Hyson 31,352 2.97 1.08
Imperial tea 46,790 4.43 0.65, 0.72, 0.79
1744 Bohea 561,731 60.46 0.34, 0.36, 0.47, 0.48, 0.50
Congou 96,170 10.35 0.83, 0.84
Souchong 91,839 9.88 1.24, 1.26
Songlo 91,179 9.81 0.72
Pekoe 24,154 2.60 0.79
Hyson 64,067 6.90 1.44
1745 Bohea 561,731 56.55 0.40, 0.41, 0.49
Congou 96,170 9.69 0.54, 0.65, 0.72, 0.84
Souchong 91,839 9.24 1.08, 1.15, 1.23
Songlo 131,179 13.21 0.57, 0.72
Pekoe 24,154 2.43 0.65, 0.72, 0.79
Hyson 64,067 6.45 1.22, 1.44
Imperial tea 24,255 2.44 0.65, 0.79
1746 Bohea 650,030 54.88 0.38, 0.40, 0.43, 0.45
Congou 140,348 11.85 0.68, 0.84
Souchong 92,875 7.84 1.11, 1.15, 1.19
Pekoe 96,280 8.13 0.61, 0.68, 0.75, 0.77, 0.79
Songlo 105,879 8.94 0.61, 0.65, 0.72
Hyson 73,792 6.23 1.29, 1.33, 2.08
Imperial tea 25,200 2.13 0.68, 0.72, 0.75, 0.90 
1747 Bohea 675,110 52.09 0.38, 0.40, 0.43
Congou 212,960 16.43 0.68, 0.74, 0.79, 0.84
Souchong 113,508½ 8.76 1.15, 1.19
Songlo 97,391 7.51 0.61, 0.72
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(pounds) (teas purchased) (guilders/pounds)
home order Canton purchase______________________________________________________________________________________
Pekoe 97,545½ 7.53 0.68, 0.75, 0.77, 0.79, 0.83
Hyson 73,112 5.64 1.29, 2.08
Imperial tea 26,341 2.03 0.68, 0.75, 0.83, 0.90
1748 Bohea 308,189 44.34 0.57
Congou 88,201 12.69 0.75, 0.84
Songlo 128,178 18.44 0.83, 0.86
Souchong 63,908 9.20 1.08
Pekoe 70,039 10.08 0.75, 0.84
Hyson 22,360 3.22 2.01
Imperial tea  14,210 2.04 0.75
1749 Bohea 578,774 50.39 0.49, 0.52, 0.56, 0.57
Congou 88,902 7.74 0.61, 0.65, 0.67, 0.68
Souchong 110,904 9.66 0.82
Songlo 160,442 13.97 1.08
Pekoe 97,793½ 8.51 0.57, 0.79
Hyson 111,831 9.74 2.01
1750 Bohea 463,765 44.95 0.34, 0.40
Congou 122,584 11.88 0.61
Souchong 85,278 8.27 0.84
Pekoe 97,051½ 9.41 0.61
Songlo 146,099 14.16 0.65
Hyson 97,187½ 9.42 1.54
Imperial tea  19,668 1.91
1751 Bohea 509,723 36.19 0.34, 0.40, 0.57
Congou 212,783 15.11 0.61, 0.83
Souchong 118,457 8.41 0.84, 1.02, 1.08
Songlo 201,880 14.33 0.65, 0.86
Pekoe 64,803 4.60 0.61, 0.83
Hyson 140,753 9.99 1.54, 2.08
Imperial tea 12,250 0.87 0.86
Ankay Congou 147,980 10.51 0.32, 0.38, 0.40
1752 Bohea 765,625 57 0.29, 0.34, 0.40, 0.38, 0.52, 
0.57
Congou 165,375 12.44 0.61, 0.65
Souchong 122,500 9.22 0.84, 1.08
Songlo 85,750 6.45 0.65
Pekoe 49,000 3.69 0.61
Hyson 116,375 8.76 1.38
Imperial tea 24,500 1.84 0.86
1753 Bohea 1,976,783 81.26 0.56, 0.57, 0.59
Congou 221,603 9.08 0.83
Souchong 159,985 6.55 1.08
Songlo 59,903 2.45 0.86
Pekoe 6,186 0.25 0.83
Hyson 10,045 0.41 1.98
APPENDIX 4 213
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Assortments Volumes Percentage Prices
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1754 Bohea 2,694,388 85.56 0.54, 0.57
Congou 203,963 6.48 0.83
Souchong 158,638 5.04 1.11
Songlo 61,495 1.95 0.90
Pekoe 10,474 0.33 0.83
Hyson 20,151 0.64 1.98
1755 Bohea 2,666,213 74.76 0.38, 0.60
Congou 417,082 11.65 0.88
Souchong 366,618 10.24 1.15, 2.93
Songlo 49,980 1.40 0.92
Pekoe 36,597 1.02 0.88
Hyson 44,345 1.24 1.99
1756 Bohea 141,120 35.74 0.38
Congou 76,073 19.26 0.63
Souchong 177,748 45 0.77
1757 Bohea as much as possible 478,217 67.03 0.41, 0.43
Congou 100,000 129,082 18.09 0.54, 0.59, 0.63, 0.64, 0.65
Souchong 50,000 36,361 5.10 0.65, 0.86, 0.90, 1.58, 1.98, 
2.66
Songlo 60,000 59,563 8.35 0.43, 0.47, 0.54
Hyson 5,000 6,634 0.93 1.22
Imperial tea 3,000 3,602 0.50 0.72
1758 Bohea as much as possible 1,224,612 72.60 0.41, 0.45
Congou 170,000 205,743 12.20 0.86, 0.88, 0.93, 0.95, 0.99, 
1, 1.08
Souchong 100,000 125,043 7.41 1.13, 1.15, 1.17, 1.29, 1.33, 
1.36, 1.65
Songlo 100,000 or 120,000 112,499 6.67 0.77, 0.90, 1.04
Hyson 10,000 9,422 0.56 1.40, 1.58
Hyson skin 6,000 3,042 0.18 1.10
Imperial tea 6,000 6,523 0.39 1.08, 1.15
1759 Bohea as much as possible unknown 0.38, 0.43, 0.65
Congou 250,000 unknown 0.93, 1.01
Souchong 150,000 unknown 1.08, 1.44, 2.59
Pekoe 25,000 unknown 1.01, 1.10
Songlo 150,000 unknown 0.89
Hyson 25,000 unknown 1.72
Hyson skin no order unknown 0.94
Imperial tea 10,000 unknown 1.11
1760 Bohea as much as possible 2,302,177 81.16 0.56, 0.57, 0.61, 0.65
Congou 150,000 179,673½ 6.33 0.93, 0.97, 0.99, 1
Souchong 100,000 121,094¾ 4.27 1.08, 1.19, 1.26, 1.29, 1.44, 
2.59
Pekoe 25,000 25,078½ 0.88 1, 1.10
Songlo 150,000 107,623 3.79 0.89
Twankay no order 51,746½ 1.82 0.93
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Hyson 25,000 26,166 0.92 1.72
Hyson skin 15,000 15,786 0.56 0.93
Imperial tea 6,000 7,210 0.25 1.11
1761 Bohea unknown 1,472,960 80.57 unknown
Congou unknown 130,604 7.14 unknown
Souchong unknown 86,552½ 4.73 unknown
Pekoe unknown 6,217 0.34 unknown
Songlo unknown 75,175 4.10 unknown
Twankay unknown 28,746½ 1.57 unknown
Hyson unknown 8,313 0.45 unknown
Hyson skin unknown 13,674 0.75 unknown
Imperial tea unknown 5,803 0.32 unknown
Linchinsing* unknown 112½ 0.07 unknown
* probably the Linki-sam tea, a type of black tea
1762 Bohea as much as possible 2,460,683 83.41 0.52, 0.64, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75, 
0.76 
Congou 150,000 170,635¼ 5.78 0.83, 0.88, 0.93
Souchong 100,000 116,231½ 3.94 0.93, 1, 1.02, 1.04, 1.08, 
2.87
Pekoe 25,000 8,351 0.28 1.15
Songlo 150,000 103,791 3.51 0.97
Twankay no order 46,176 1.57 1.04
Hyson 25,000 26,874 0.91 1.98, 2.08
Hyson skin 15,000 13,018 0.44 1.04
Imperial tea 6,000 4,265 0.14 1.19
1763 Bohea as much as possible 2,398,212 84.26 0.48, 0.52, 0.55, 0.63, 0.70, 
0.71, 0.73, 0.79 
Congou 150,000 165,596½ 5.82 0.72, 0.88, 0.93, 1, 1.08
Souchong 100,000 101,842 3.58 0.72, 1, 1.08, 1.15, 1.80, 
1.98, 2.33, 2.66
Pekoe 25,000 32,000 1.12 1.08, 1.15
Songlo 150,000 79,044 2.78 0.53
Twankay no order 24,200¾ 0.85 0.90
Hyson 25,000 21,862¾ 0.77 2.16
Hyson skin 15,000 16,715 0.59 1.08, 1.11
Imperial tea 6,000 6,703 0.24 1.19
1764 Bohea as much as possible 3,285,576 86.41 0.34, 0.47, 0.48, 0.49, 0.64, 
0.67, 0.70, 0.71, 0.73, 0.75
Congou 150,000 175,548¾ 4.62 0.53, 0.65, 0.68, 0.72, 0.79, 
0.83, 0.86, 0.97
Souchong 100,000 106,177 2.79 0.77, 0.97, 1.44, 2.16, 2.37 
Pekoe 25,000 23,626¼ 0.62 0.93, 1.15, 1.22
Songlo 150,000 106,764 2.81 0.86
Twankay no order 50,302 1.32 0.93
Hyson 25,000 28,577 0.75 2.05
Hyson skin 15,000 19,103 0.50 1
Imperial tea no order 6,448 0.17 1, 1.11
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1765 Bohea as much as possible 2,879,601 78.61 0.61, 0.65, 0.68, 0.75 
Congou 240,000 254,3987/8 6.94 1, 1.04, 1.06, 1.08
Souchong 170,000 177,7715/8 4.85 1.11, 1.19, 1.20, 1.26, .35, 
44, 1.54, 1.58, 1.65, 1.98, 
2.33, 2.66
Pekoe 24,000 26,440¾ 0.72 1.26, 1.44, 2.16
Songlo 240,000 182,170 4.97 0.88
Twankay 4,000 91,096½ 2.49 0.93
Hyson 60,000 50,655½ 1.38 1.98, 2.05, 2.16, 2.33
Imperial tea no order 1,437½ 0.04 1.11
1766 Bohea as much as possible 2,823,388 77.93 0.57, 0.59, 0.60, 0.64, 0.68, 
0.71, 0.72
Congou 240,000 264,6357/8 7.30 0.83, 0.86, 0.93, 1
Souchong 170,000 146,598 4.05 1, 1.29, 1.44, 1.80
Pekoe 24,000 25,690¼ 0.71 1.44, 1.80
Songlo 163,000 164,214 4.53 0.86
Twankay 81,000 67,752¼ 1.87 0.88, 0.93
Hyson 48,000 57,473 1.59 2.16, 2.30, 2.33
Hyson skin 48,000 68,360¼ 1.89 0.93, 1.08
Imperial tea no order 4,705 1.30 1.08
1767 Bohea as much as possible 2,791,033 74.94 0.40, 0.44, 0.46, 0.47, 0.48, 
0.49, 0.57, 0.65, 0.69, 0.70, 
0.71
Congou 240,000 377,897 11.37 0.65, 0.67, 0.72, 0.89, 0.90, 
0.96, 1.08
Souchong 170,000 169,181½ 4.54 1.08, 1.15, 1.80
Pekoe 36,000 37,845 1.02 0.65, 0.72, 1.44
Songlo 160,000 126,518 3.40 0.57, 0.61
Twankay 20,000 105,296 2.83 0.57, 0.67, 0.68
Hyson 48,000 49,717 1.33 2.30
Hyson skin 48,000 48,285½ 1.30 0.67, 0.72, 1.08, 1.11
Songlo-Imperial tea no order 13,290 0.36 0.57
Imperial tea no order 5,377 0.14 1.29
1768 Bohea as much as possible 2,955,758 81.23 0.37, 0.38, 0.40, 0.41, 0.42, 
0.50, 0.54, 0.57, 0.70
Congou 220,000 135,406 3.72 0.90, 0.97, 1.08
Souchong 160,000 164,526¾ 4.52 0.97, 1, 1.08, 1.22, 1.65, 
1.72
Pekoe 50,000 50,233 1.38 0.86, 1, 1.22
Songlo 160,000 172,678 4.75 0.49, 0.50, 0.52, 0.53
Twankay 65,000 62,962 1.73 0.54, 0.59
Hyson 40,000 39,204¾ 1.08 2.16
Hyson skin 50,000 51,917 1.42 1.08
Imperial tea 7,000 6,106 1.67 1.11
1769 Bohea as much as possible 3,010,719 79.99 0.42, 0.43, 0.47, 0.54, 0.62, 
0.63, 0.64
Congou 160,000 176,720¾ 4.70 0.88, 0.95, 1.02
Souchong 140,000 161,317½ 4.29 1.08, 1.15
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Pekoe 60,000 or 70,000 87,584 2.33 1.26, 1.28, 1.31, 1.40, 1.51
Songlo 240,000 157,315 4.18 0.73, 0.78, 0.80
Twankay 65,000 66,653 1.77 0.86
Hyson 30,000 32,274½ 0.86 2.19
Hyson skin 60,000 63,767¾ 1.69 1.11
Imperial tea 7,000 7,278 0.19 1.26
1770 Bohea as much as possible 3,075,685 78.98 0.42, 0.54, 0.72, 0.74, 0.75, 
0.77
Congou 100,000 320,519½ 8.23 0.68, 0.95, 1.33 
Souchong 140,000 139,226¾ 3.57 0.82, 1.10, 1.47, 1.51, 1.65, 
1.69, 1.72
Pekoe 25,000 58,510 1.50 1.11, 1.15, 1.86, 1.90, 1.94
Songlo 160,000 128,767 3.31 0.55, 1.40, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 
1.54, 1.65
Twankay 50,000 or 60,000 85,003¼ 2.18 0.64, 1.51, 1.58, 1.69
Hyson 30,000 30,075½ 0.77 2.19, 2.59, 2.62, 2.66, 2.73, 
2.80
Hyson skin 50,000 48,652½ 1.25 1.11, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 1.94 
Imperial tea no order 8,020½ 0.21 0.65, 1.54
1771 Bohea as much as possible 2,396,843 69.82 0.43, 0.47, 0.49
Congou 390,000 522,640 15.22 0.64, 0.65, 0.67, 0.72, 0.75
Souchong 150,000 179,896½ 5.24 0.75, 0.78, 0.95, 1.02, 1.65, 
1.80, 2.26
Pekoe 40,000 39,396½ 1.15 1.22
Songlo 150,000 or 160,000 163,399 4.76 0.57, 0.79
Twankay 40,000 or 50,000 51,123 1.49 0.65, 0.86
Hyson 30,000 32,431 0.94 2.44
Hyson skin 50,000 47,213½ 1.38 1.11
1772 Bohea as much as possible 1,699,163 56.31 0.38, 0.40, 0.43, 0.50, 0.54, 
0.57
Congou 360,000 726,359½ 24.07 0.54, 0.57, 0.57, 0.59. 0.59
Souchong 150,000 150,041 4.97 0.54, 0.57, 1.11, 1.15, 1.29, 
1.33, 1.44, 1.58, 1.72
Pekoe 60,000 or 70,000 63,200½ 2.09 0.57, 0.72, 1.15, 1.22
Songlo 200,000 203,662 6.75 0.57, 0.75, 0.79
Twankay 60,000 60,634 2.01 0.65, 0.83
Hyson 40,000 58,515¾ 1.94 1.98, 2.01, 2.05, 2.08
Hyson skin 55,000 55,710 1.85 1.11
1773 Bohea as much as possible 2,745,486 74.88 0.40, 0.43, 0.45, 0.47, 13.5 
Congou 360,000 362,962½ 9.90 0.50, 0.54, 0.79, 0.83, 0.86, 
0.93
Souchong 160,000 177,612½ 4.84 0.78, 0.95, 1.02, 1.65, 1.80, 
2.26
Pekoe 50,000 or 60,000 48,528½ 1.32 1.22, 1.36, 1.44
Songlo 200,000 203,245¾ 5.54 0.57, 0.79
Twankay 65,000 72,048 1.97 0.65, 0.86
Hyson 34,000 35,039 0.96 2.01, 2.44
Hyson skin 70,000 70,005¼ 1.91 1.11
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1774 Bohea as much as possible 2,799,797 75.57 0.39, 0.43, 0.46
Congou 300,000 305,3341/8 8.24 0.50, 0.79, 0.93
Souchong 155,000 169,445¼ 4.57 0.57, 0.93, 1.22, 1.36, 1.51, 
1.58, 1.90
Pekoe 30,000 44,364 1.20 1.36
Songlo 180,000 213,076 5.75 0.54, 0.56
Twankay 50,000 68,390½ 1.85 0.61
Hyson 32,000 36,363 0.98 1.98
Hyson skin 54,000 68,139 1.84 1.11
1775 Bohea as much as possible 2,654,838 70.83 0.39, 0.42, 0.43, 0.48
Congou 600,000 600,096¾ 16 0.50, 0.54, 0.77, 0.79
Souchong 150,000 152,559 4.07 0.61, 0.65, 0.72, 1, 1.08, 
1.11, 1.15, 1.47, 1.51, 1.54
Pekoe 40,000 35,769 0.95 1.26, 1.33
Songlo 180,000 182,821½ 4.88 0.54, 0.56, 0.73, 0.75
Twankay 50,000 50,503 1.35 0.61, 0.79
Hyson 30,000 31,443 0.84 1.90
Hyson skin 40,000 40,380 1.08 1.11
1776 Bohea as much as possible 2,483,609 66.85 0.37, 0.41, 0.43, 0.60
Congou 108,000 835,556¾ 22.49 0.47, 0.50, 0.52, 0.79, 0.81, 
0.83, 0.86, 0.88, 0.90, 1.19, 
1.33, 1.44, 1.80
Souchong 100,000 108,047¼ 2.91 0.54, 0.61, 0.73, 1.15, 1.19, 
1.33, 1.36, 1.44, 1.80
Pekoe 48,000 50,306¾ 1.35 0.54, 1.44
Songlo 120,000 119,602 3.22 0.50, 0.75
Twankay 50,000 49,916 1.34 0.56, 0.83
Hyson 36,000 38,233½ 1.03 1.98
Hyson skin 30,000 30,023¼ 0.81 1.11
1777 Bohea as much as possible 2,059,018 55.94 0.38, 0.41, 0.43, 0.47, 0.60
Congou 1,000,000 1,000,002 27.17 0.50, 0.57, 0.61, 0.75, 0.83, 
0.90, 1
Souchong 150,000 147,993 4.02 1.29, 1.40, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 
1.72, 1.80
Pekoe no order 79,193½ 2.15 1.40, 1.51, 1.54
Songlo 200,000 164,009½ 4.46 0.52, 0.73, 0.75, 0.79
Twankay 80,000 56,615¼ 1.54 0.73, 0.81, 0.86
Hyson 50,000 52,886¼ 1.44 1.98
Hyson skin 60,000 60,374¼ 1.64 1.11
1778 Bohea as much as possible 1,919,936 56.62 0.37, 0.45, 0.49, 0.60
Congou 800,000 765,512 22.57 0.54, 0.77, 0.83, 0.84, 0.86, 
0.88, 0.90
Souchong 200,000 238,127¾ 7.02 0.72, 1.08, 1.15, 1.19, 1.22, 
1.29, 1.33, 1.36, 1.44, 1.65, 
1.69, 1.72
Pekoe 80,000 85,468½ 2.52 1.40, 1.51, 1.69, 1.72
Songlo 200,000 169,715 5 0.75, 0.77, 0.83
Twankay 100,000 83,480½ 2.46 0.83, 0.90
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Hyson 50,000 49,499½ 1.46 1.98
Hyson skin 80,000 78,742½ 2.32 1.11
Gunpowder tea 500 535 0.02 2.33
1779 Bohea as much as possible 2,152,349 60.42 0.34, 0.45, 0.47
Congou 600,000 599,879¼ 16.84 0.52, 0.73, 0.79, 0.97
Souchong 200,000 204,833 5.75 0.59, 0.63, 0.97, 1.04, 1.08, 
1.15, 1.29, 1.36, 1.40
Pekoe 80,000 82,608 2.32 0.67, 1.31, 1.36
Songlo 250,000 252,903¾ 7.10 0.56, 0.57, 0.77, 0.79, 0.86
Twankay 125,000 169,981 4.77 0.61, 0.84, 0.86, 0.93
Hyson 50,000 51,948¾ 1.46 1.90
Hyson skin 80,000 44,114 1.24 1, 1.08
Gunpowder tea 4,000 3,799¾ 0.11 2.30
1780 Bohea as much as possible 2,338,060 64.27 0.36, 0.40, 0.43, 0.50 
Congou 500,000 500,788¾ 13.77 0.52, 0.54, 0.56, 0.72, 0.75, 
0.77
Souchong 200,000 204,447¼ 5.62 0.57, 0.61, 0.65, 0.68, 0.72, 
1.08, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15, 1.19, 
1.22, 1.26, 1.29, 1.44
Pekoe 80,000 84,689 2.33 1.31, 1.65
Songlo 250,000 257,070½ 7.07 0.50, 0.52, 0.79, 0.83
Twankay 125,000 107,460½ 2.95 0.54, 0.56, 0.57, 0.61, 0.88, 
0.95
Hyson 50,000 63,175¼ 1.74 1.72, 1.87, 1.94
Hyson skin 80,000 77,670¾ 2.14 1.06, 1.08, 1.11, 1.15
Gunpowder tea 4,000 4,422½ 0.12 2.16, 2.23
1783 Bohea as much as possible 1,243,225 65.03 0.38, 0.41, 0.45, 0.47, 0.52
Congou 800,000 345,117 18.05 0.56, 1, 1.02, 1.04, 1.08, 
1.10, 1.11
Souchong 180,000 171,214 8.96 0.65, 0.75, 1.15, 1.19, 1.51, 
1.54, 1.65, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87
Pekoe 60,000 14,788½ 0.77 1.54, 1.80
Songlo 120,000 73,142 3.83 0.54, 0.90, 0.93
Twankay 60,000 30,817 1.61 1
Hyson 20,000 or 22,000 19,899 1.04 2.12
Hyson skin 40,000 12,867½ 0.67 1.08, 1.15
Soulang* 600 708½ 0.04 3.59
* a high-quality type of green tea
1784 Bohea 2,000,000 or 2,546,982 64.85 0.49, 0.50, 0.51, 0.52, 0.55, 
3,000,000 0.56
Congou 800,000 or 120,000 803,972¾ 20.47 0.93
Souchong 180,000 or 270,000 180,001¾ 4.58 1.08, 1.15, 1.22, 1.26, 
1.29,1.33, 1.44, 1.54, 1.58, 
1.87
Pekoe 60,000 or 90,000 59,937½ 1.53 1.36, 1.44, 1.51, 1.54
Songlo 160,000 or 240,000 158,168½ 4.03 0.86, 0.88
Hysont 40,000 or 60,000 55,728¾ 1.42 1.36, 1.72
Hysont skin 56,000 or 84,000 40,259½ 1.03 1.08
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Year Assortments Volumes Percentage Prices
(pounds) (teas purchased) (guilders/pounds)
home order Canton purchase______________________________________________________________________________________
Twankay 80,000 79,720 2.03 0.93
Gunpowder tea 2,000 or 3,000 2,012½ 0.05 2.33
Soulang 600 or 900 578 0.01 3.41
1785 Bohea 1,840,000 1,453,242 48.25 0.43, 0.47, 0.51
Congou 1,320,000 944,076½ 31.35 0.57, 0.58, 0.61, 0.63, 0.65, 
0.97
Souchong 136,000 139,634¼ 4.64 0.65, 0.68, 0.86, 0.90, 0.93, 
1, 1.04, 1.08, 1.65, 1.72
Pekoe 48,000 59,511½ 1.98 1.54, 1.65, 1.72
Songlo 344,000 200,210½ 6.65 0.59, 0.61, 0.63, 0.70, 0.86, 
0.88
Hyson 64,000 58,365 1.94 1.94, 1.98, 2.01, 2.05
Hyson skin 96,000 69,816¼ 2.32 0.72, 1.08
Twankay 134,000 84,379 2.80 0.65, 0.93
Gunpowder tea 1,000 1,217¼ 0.040 2.33
Soulang 1,500 1,254 0.042 3.41
1786 Bohea 1,000,000 or 1,458,737 35.78 0.40, 0.43, 0.47, 0.50
1,500,000
Bohea no order 154,407 3.79 0.77, 0.80, 0.81, 0.82
(mixed with Congou)
Congou 1,600,000 or 1,344,490¾ 32.98 0.57, 1.11, 1.15, 1.17, 
2,400,000 1.19, 1.22, 1.24 
Souchong 380,000 or 570,000 398,169 9.77 1.44, 1.58, 1.65, 1.80, 1.87, 
1.94, 2.01, 2.05, 2.08, 2.16
Pekoe 60,000 or 90,000 67,387 1.65 1.36, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 2.08
Songlo 320,000 or 480,000 300,799¼ 7.38 0.57, 0.92, 0.93, 0.95
Hyson 320,000 or 480,000 126,597 3.11 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.30, 2.33
Hyson skin 160,000 or 240,000 97,157 2.38 0.72, 1.11, 1.15, 1.19, 1.22
Twankay 160,000 or 240,000 126,145¼ 3.09 0.65, 1
Gunpowder tea 1,000 976 0.024 2.51
Soulang 1,500 1,502 0.037 3.59
Uutsjien* no order 719 0.018 1.44
* Yuqian (means “before the Grain Rain” (19, 20, or 21 April)) tea, a high quality type of green tea
1787 Bohea  1,370,000 2,394,709 54.94 0.50, 0.57
Congou  2,600,000 1,096,164¾ 25.15 1.19, 1.26, 1.29, 1.33
Souchong 240,000 210,975½ 4.84 1.44, 1.65, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 
2.33
Souchong no order 338,836 7.77 1.36, 1.44, 1.51, 1.54, 
(labelled as Congou) 1.58, 1.65, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87
Pekoe 200,000 56,468½ 1.30 2.16, 2.33, 2.37, 3.23
Songlo 200,000 102,474 2.35 0.93, 1
Hyson 500,000 67,819 0.15 2.51
Hyson skin 100,000 92,793¾ 2.13 1.08, 1.15, 1.26
Twankay 100,000 57,984 1.33 1, 1.04
Gunpowder tea no order 690 0.0158 2.87
Soulang no order 685 0.0157 3.92
1788 Bohea 1,000,000 1,015,889 30.58 0.50
Congou 2,000,000 1,188,214¼ 35.76 1.15, 1.19, 1.20, 1.26, 1.28
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Year Assortments Volumes Percentage Prices
(pounds) (teas purchased) (guilders/pounds)
home order Canton purchase______________________________________________________________________________________
Souchong 24,000 351,660 10.58 1.36, 1.44, 1.58, 1.65, 1.65, 
1.83, 1.94, 1.98, 2.33, 3.23
Souchong no order 369,059 11.11 1.33, 1.36, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 
(labelled as Congou) 1.54, 1.58
Pekoe 300,000 70,319¾ 2.12 1.94, 2.44, 2.69
Songlo 700,000 42,434 1.28 0.93
Hyson 500,000 208,263¾ 6.27 2.16, 2.19, 2.23, 2.30
Hyson skin 100,000 30,613½ 0.92 1.22
Twankay 200,000 45,773 1.38 1
Soulang 2,000 210 0.006 3.92
Gunpowder tea 2,000 no purchase — unknown
1789 Bohea unknown 819,024 22.16 0.43
Congou unknown 2,099,896 56.80 1, 1.06, 1.08, 1.10, 1.15, 
1.17
Souchong 72,000 or 96,000 227,723¾ 6.16 1.65, 1.69, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 
1.94, 2.16, 2.33, 3.23
Souchong no order 98,530 2.67 1.33, 1.36
(labelled as Congou)
Pekoe 240,000 or 320,000 140,710½ 3.81 1.94, 2.37, 2.44, 2.51, 2.66
Songlo 300,000 or 400,000 88,613½ 2.40 0.72, 0.86
Hyson 240,000 or 320,000 145,295 3.93 2.23, 2.30
Hyson skin 120,000 or 160,000 26,942 0.73 1.15
Twankay 120,000 or 160,000 44,217½ 1.20 0.79, 0.93, 1
Soulang 3,000 or 4,000 1,313¾ 0.036 3.92, 4.67
Gunpowder tea 3,000 or 4,000 4,497 0.121 2.87, 3.05
1790 Bohea 240,000 648,575 75.77 0.40
Congou 750,000 133,126 15.55 0.61
Souchong 20,000 30,128 3.52 0.65
Campoe 450,000 no purchase – unknown
Pekoe 80,000 no purchase – unknown
Songlo 80,000 20,325 2.37 0.54
Twankay 20,000 18,400 2.15 0.57
Hyson skin 20,000 5,412 0.63 0.65
Hyson 40,000 no purchase — unknown
Soulang 1,000 no purchase — unknown




Congou 982,600 0.59, 0.63
Campoe* 573,600 0.63, 0.68
Souchong 36,800 59,648 3.73 0.83, 0.86, 0.90, 0.97, 2.33 
Pekoe 25,200 66,514 4.16 0.83, 1.80, 1.87
Songlo 11,250 36,323 2.27 0.50
Twankay 11,250 37,550 2.35 0.54
Hyson 15,000 18,473 1.15 2.16, 2.41
Hyson skin 8,250 5,630 0.35 1.26
Gunpowder tea 2,550 2,555 0.16 unknown
Soulang 1,500 1,723 0.10 3.59
* a type of black tea
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Year Assortments Volumes Percentage Prices
(pounds) (teas purchased) (guilders/pounds)
home order Canton purchase______________________________________________________________________________________
1792 Bohea unknown 165,641 8.09 0.50
Congou unknown 961,794 47 1.08, 1.10, 1.13, 1.15, 1.17, 
1.33, 1.51, 1.54
Congou unknown 77,862 3.80 0.61
(mixed with Bohea)
Campoe unknown 406,427 19.86 0.68, 1.22
Souchong unknown 246,447¼ 12.04 0.83, 0.90, 1.62, 1.72, 1.80, 
1.87, 1.94
Pekoe unknown 21,924 1.07 1.94, 2.01, 2.16, 2.37, 2.51
Songlo unknown 40,233 1.97 0.72, 0.93
Hyson unknown 43,001 2.10 2.19, 2.30, 2.37
Hyson skin unknown 32,863 1.61 1.15
Twankay unknown 43,739 2.14 0.79, 1.04
Gunpowder tea unknown 4,932 0.24 2.69
Soulang unknown 1,623¾ 0.08 4.31
1793 No purchase
1794 Bohea 159,600 158,598 5.28 0.43
Congou 1,643,000 1,558,698 51.87 0.57, 0.65, 0.70, 0.74, 0.79, 
1.01, 1.11, 1.22
Campoe 908,200 863,849½ 28.75 0.77, 0.81, 0.86, 1.08, 1.11, 
1.19, 1.29
Souchong 323,000 325,330 10.83 0.75, 0.79, 0.84, 0.86, 0.88, 
0.92, 1.01, 1.15, 1.62, 1.69, 
1.72, 1.80, 1.90
Pekoe 60,000 14,502 0.48 0.97, 1.76, 2.51, 2.87
Songlo 24,000 no purchase — unknown
Twankay 24,000 7,110 0.24 unknown
Hyson 40,000 38,736 1.29 2.16
Hyson skin 33,000 32,829½ 1.09 1.08
Gunpowder tea 3,000 2,712 0.09 2.51
Soulang 2,000 2,651 0.08 3.59______________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: NA NFC 1-56, 69-95, 191-257; NA VOC 4381-4447, 4543-4547.
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APPENDIX 5
TEAS SENT FROM BATAVIA TO THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 
1730-1787
______________________________________________________________________________________
Season Chambers Volumes Value Remarks
(pounds) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
*1730-1731 Amsterdam 195,080 230,624.5 * sent in late 
47,843 60,033.1 1730 & early 
Zeeland 184,518 219,029.2 1731 (it is alike




























































































Season Chambers Volumes Value Remarks
(pounds) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________














1751-1752 Amsterdam 249,445 121,229.5 on freight
Zeeland 304,155 175,106.13 on freight
Delft 44,378 34,082.6
Rotterdam 147,531 101,180.19 on freight
Hoorn 113,383 68,882.6 on freight
108,666 75,562.2 on freight
Enkhuizen 258,284 196,733.1 on freight
1752-1753 Amsterdam 264,432 143,526.13 on freight
10,444 9,003.3
Zeeland 217,911 106,769.18 on freight
Delft 199,740 139,900.4
Rotterdam 52,220 29,131.11
Hoorn 227,667 119,449.1 on freight
1753-1754 none
1754-1755 Rotterdam 86,037 37,223.6
1756-1757 none
1758-1759 Amsterdam 18,148 16,486.14 on freight
30,262 26,146.8 on freight
1759-1760 Amsterdam 309,225 190,384.5 on freight
Rotterdam 303,121 189,472.4 on freight
1760-1761 none
1761-1762 Amsterdam 441,399 311,644.13 on freight
Zeeland 353,248 239,039.14 on freight
Rotterdam 321,235 226,319.3 on freight




















1786-1787 Amsterdam 8,559 2,568.11 on freight
107,468 32,240 on freight______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: NA BGB 10767-10801.
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APPENDIX 6
TEAS AUCTIONED BY THE VOC IN THE DUTCH REPUBLIC,
1729-1790
______________________________________________________________________________________
Record date Chambers Volumes Value Remarks
(pounds) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
15 May 1732 Amsterdam 297,146+399,902 442,301.3+459,200.12 brought by the 





15 May 1733 Amsterdam 531,623+442,391 801,900.18+539,387.2 brought by the 





15 May 1734 Amsterdam 504,227+241,314 872,788.6+346,834 brought by the 





31 May 1735 Amsterdam 542,172+158,972 988,510.3+240,068.11 brought by the 





31 May 1736 Amsterdam 304,301+324,092 531,667+524,455.5 brought by the





31 May 1737 Amsterdam 422,089 654,350.12





15 May 1738 Amsterdam 370,572 581,450.11 *disclaimed
(for 1735-38) Zeeland 193,142 243,412.7______________________________________________________________________________________
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15 May 1739 Amsterdam 613,255 942,936.12





May 1740 Amsterdam 896,364 1,010,131.6





15 May 1741 Amsterdam 578,122 786,798.8





15 May 1742 Amsterdam 288,337 430,244.15 *volumes unknown





15 May 1743 Amsterdam 533,829 638,418.4 *disclaimed





15 May 1744 Amsterdam 850,927 1,223,609.6





15 May 1745 Amsterdam 374,655+275,054 196,736.4+561,356.14 on recognition 
(for 1742-45) Zeeland *204,679+464,691 99,567.6+906,693.8 *at freight for 30%
15 May 1746 Amsterdam 1,217,712+988,552 681,866.9+1,791,928.12 on recognition




Record date Chambers Volumes Value Remarks
(pounds) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Rotterdam 127,105+167,813 159,820.1+331,013.5
May 1747 Amsterdam 925,510+579,492 506,439.6+987,463.15 on recognition
(for 1744-47) Zeeland *214,867+489,316 108,648.6+890,014.9 *at freight for 30%
Delft 201,242 285,753.10
31 May 1748 Amsterdam 817,579+513,431 406,817.8+968,766.5 on recognition
(for 1745-48) Zeeland *391,051 174,770.9 *at freight for 30%




31 May 1749 Amsterdam 1,228,336+563,169 502,375.13+892,458.6 on recognition 
(for 1746-49) Zeeland *370,295+225,414 173,211.10+398,971.2 for 40%
Rotterdam 253,876+158,008 268,601.10+254,169.17 *at freight for 30%
15 May 1750 Amsterdam 649,091+471,448 302,632.17+810,582.12 on recognition 
(for 1747-50) Zeeland *282,491+457,459 113,318.6+743,584.9 for 40%
Rotterdam 137 63.14 *at freight for 30%
15 May 1751 Amsterdam 471,025+518,674 176,726+831,646 on recognition 
(for 1748-51) Zeeland *299,605 117,506.7 for 40%
Rotterdam 406°+384,664 707.14+265,395.8 *at freight for 30%
Hoorn 134,926 56,625.17 °disclaimed
31 May 1752 Amsterdam 529,073+546,680 219,555.1+794,519.6 on recognition
(for 1749-52) Zeeland *260,699+584,078 98,548.5+876,499.2 for 40%
Delft 272,406 195,259.13 *at freight for 30%
Rotterdam 330,445 259,567.4 °volumes unknown
Hoorn 313,102 426,508.2
Enkhuizen °?+53,570 174,152.17+61,488.17
31 May 1753 Amsterdam 233,911+485,355 105,344.3+776,248.9 on recognition %
(for 1750-53) Zeeland *346,658+34,244 147,071.6+55,711.4 for 40%
Delft 42,367 28,713.4 *at freight for 30%
Hoorn 207,927 89,931.2 °volumes unknown
Enkhuizen °?+1494 106,389+1,195.10
31 May 1754 Zeeland *248,982+606,873 96,294.8+736,490.14 on recognition 
(for 1751-54) Amsterdam 248,390+1,026,755 102,298.13+1,094,324.10 for 40%
Rotterdam 49,911 34,001.1 *at freight for 30%
Hoorn 220,291 89,296.9
Enkhuizen 429,645 355,780.1
31 May 1755 Amsterdam ? 1,588,000.2 volumes unknown
(for 1752-55) Zeeland 614,620 598,581 *on recognition 
Rotterdam *166,917+466,062 115,518.18+368,120.4 for 40%
Enkhuizen 227 73.3
31 May 1756 Amsterdam ? 1,588,000.2 volumes unknown
(for 1753-56) Zeeland 1,058,809 908,681.9 *on recognition
Delft 430,660 289,476.11 for 40%
______________________________________________________________________________________
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Record date Chambers Volumes Value Remarks
(pounds) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Rotterdam *81,580 32,327.9
31 May 1757 Amsterdam 1,182,082 1,299,464.8 on recognition 
(for 1754-57) Zeeland 91,393 177,245.6 for 40%
Rotterdam 156,742 59,930
31 May 1758 Amsterdam 655,642 914,997.7
(for 1755-58) Zeeland 1,208,516 1,393,972
Hoorn 475,631 524,125.2
31 May 1759 Amsterdam 1,159,552 1,750,646.8 on recognition 
(for 1756-59) Zeeland 3,750 5,831.9 for 40%
Rotterdam 7,108 4,829.16
Enkhuizen 537,595 722,152.17
31 May 1760 Amsterdam 419,671+1,527,560 235,317.17+2,287,075.7 on recognition 
(for 1757-60) Enkhuizen 207 65.7 for 40%
31 May 1761 Amsterdam 332,525+1,511,778 168,859.12+2,156,959.9 on recognition 
(for 1758-61) Zeeland *389,140+4,990 153,589.8+19,701.5 for 40%
Rotterdam 289,770 118,009.4 *at freight for 30%
31 May 1762 Amsterdam 40+1,699,175 46+2,451,506.18 on recognition 
(for 1759-62) Zeeland 1,147,228 1,721,642.10 for 40%
31 May 1763 Amsterdam 441,522+827,852 259,199.18+1,328,246.6 on recognition 
(for 1760-63) Zeeland *344,717+813,820 186,254.7+1,321,133.7 for 40%
Rotterdam 309,805 172,483.11 *at freight for 30%
31 May 1764 Amsterdam 1,777,249 2,483,526.3 volumes unknown
(for 1761-64) Zeeland 875,563 1,215,054.8 *on recognition 
Hoorn  *? 119,662.10 for 50%
31 May 1765 Amsterdam 846,881½ 1,136,177.2
(for 1762-65) Zeeland 860,068 1,164,936
31 May 1766 Amsterdam 2,514,303 3,079,853.8 on recognition 
(for 1763-66) Zeeland 904,417 1,101,599.1 for 50%
Delft 283,959+722,154 344,821.7+867,005.14
31 May 1767 Amsterdam 1,735,801 2,115,765.15
(for 1764-67) Zeeland 896,272 1,113,634.2
Rotterdam 685,193 827,152.11
31 May 1768 Amsterdam 1,690,041 2,015,793.7 volumes unknown
(for 1765-68) Zeeland 831,466 1,019,791 *on recognition
Hoorn 671,499 764,217.7
Enkhuizen *? 25,950.4
31 May 1769 Amsterdam 1,737,863 2,036,878.8 62 pots of confiture
(for 1766-69) Zeeland 902,422 1,084,086.2 and (pickles), one
Hoorn 155 468.9 case of tea and one
Enkhuizen 700,724 406,885.4 case of wine, worth
______________________________________________________________________________________
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31 May 1770 Amsterdam 6,810+1,855,475 4,840.6+1,742,029.8 on recognition 
(for 1767-70) Zeeland 927,537 978,015.8 for 50%
Delft 669,933 334,574.4
31 May 1771 Amsterdam 1,768,287 1,566,957.19




31 May 1772 Amsterdam 90,962+1,828,654 52,988.19+1,913,845.3 on recognition 
(for 1769-72) Zeeland 958,464 1,020,301 for 50%
Hoorn 687,026 719,043.2
31 May 1773 Amsterdam *?? +1,729,804 121,091.6+2,420,698.10 volumes unknown 
(for 1770-73) Zeeland 839,545 1,178,442 *on recognition 
Enkhuizen 634,347 418,383.7 for 50%
31 May 1774 Amsterdam 1,718,797 1,820,274.12
(for 1771-74) Zeeland 895,426 943,618.16
Delft & 438,256 235,053.8
& Rotterdam
31 May 1775 Amsterdam 123,297+1,675,373 64,729.5+1,687,466.15 on recognition
(for 1772-75) Zeeland 929,533 925,126.1
Rotterdam 677,767 639,032.9
31 May 1776 Amsterdam 26+1,718,773 28.8+1,512,078.16 on recognition
(for 1773-76) Zeeland 841,216 761,864.1
Hoorn 727,175 623,814.7
31 May 1777 Amsterdam 33,326+1,696,974 21,349.17+1,604,841.17 on recognition
(for 1774-77) Zeeland 934,043 890,847.7
Enkhuizen 684,317 293,723.10
31 May 1778 Amsterdam 206,125+1,714,206 121,925.11+1,503,009.9 on recognition
(for 1775-78) Zeeland 872,285 764,423.18
Delft 663,351 273,273.9
31 May 1779 Amsterdam 1,699,344 1,996,550.19
(for 1776-79) Zeeland 829,825 1,015,325.15
Rotterdam 660,723 782,009.12
31 May 1780 Amsterdam 821,762 1,120,240.11
(for 1777-80) Zeeland 806,059 1,170,358.3
31 May 1781 Amsterdam 885,004 1,115,781.16




Record date Chambers Volumes Value Remarks
(pounds) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
1782 (for 1779-82) no sale
1783 (for 1780-83) no sale
31 May 1784 Amsterdam 150,311 295,024.9 on recognition 
(for 1781-84) Zeeland 19,524 19,897.8 for 50%
Delft 19,965+43,665 1,214.6+43,516.17
Enkhuizen 187 176.1
31 May 1785 Amsterdam 1,258,145 1,278,396.18 on recognition 
(for 1782-85) Zeeland 76,877 119,212.7 for 50%
Delft 8,187 5,930.18
31 May 1786 Amsterdam 893,509 971,636.3
(for 1783-86) Zeeland 847,271 948,626.4
Hoorn 889,705 1,096,692.2
31 May 1787 Amsterdam 60,638+1,213,109 33,176+1,571,552 on recognition 
(for 1784-87) Zeeland 802,198 1,136,020.18 for 30%
31 May 1788 Amsterdam 114,076+2,453,918 36,840+2,551,317.14 on recognition 
(for 1785-88) Zeeland 813,954 830,275.4 for 50%
Delft 647,709 360,410.6
Enkhuizen 692,968 354,073.13
31 May 1789 Amsterdam 785,171 836,543.7 volumes unknown
(for 1786-89) Rotterdam 834,594 808,223.10
Enkhuizen ? 1,866.15
31 May 1790 Amsterdam 5,075+1,429,355 5,502.10+1,385,456.19 on recognition 
(for 1787-90) for 40%
______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: NA VOC 4592-4597.
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APPENDIX 7
PRICES OF TEAS AT THE COMPANY AUCTIONS 




10 November Hyson 78 - 81 
By the Zeeland Chamber Hyson skin 36½ - 37
Twankay 34 - 35¼
Songlo (½ chest) 32½ - 34
Songlo (¼ chest) 32¾
Pekoe 39 - 43
Souchong 32 - 38¾
Congou (whole chest) 22¾ - 23½
Congou (½ chest) 23 - 25½
Congou (¼ chest) 24¼ - 36
Bohea (whole chest) 12 - 12¾
Bohea (2/3 chest) 11 - 12¼
Bohea (½ chest) 11 - 13
Bohea (¼ chest) 12¼
Bohea (beam chest) 12¼ - 13¼
18 November Hyson 78 - 81 
By the Delft Chamber Hyson skin 36½ - 41½
Twankay 34¾
Songlo (½ chest) 32½ - 33¼
Pekoe (¼ chest) 33½ - 38
Souchong 32½ - 37¾
Congou (whole chest) 23¼ - 23½
Congou (½ chest) 21½ - 34¾
Congou (¼ chest) 23¾ - 29¼
Bohea (whole chest) 11 ½ - 16
Bohea (½ chest) 11¾
Bohea (beam chest) 11¼ - 11½
2 December Hyson 80 - 81 
By the Amsterdam Chamber Hyson skin 38 - 46
Twankay 32 - 35½
Songlo 33 - 33¼
Pekoe 34 - 58
Souchong 32 ½ - 50
Congou (whole chest) 23¼ - 23¾
Congou (½ chest) 21 ¼ - 25
Congou (¼ chest) 24 - 37¼
Bohea (whole chest) 11½ - 16½
Bohea (2/3 chest) 11 - 11¾
Bohea (½ chest) 10¼ - 12¼
Bohea (1/3 chest) 10¼
Bohea (¼ chest) 11 - 12¾
233
1778
9 & 10 November Hyson 86½ - 89½ 
By the Amsterdam Chamber Hyson skin 43½ - 51½
Twankay 38½ - 46
Songlo 37½ - 39½
Pekoe 38 - 51
Souchong 39 - 62
Congou (whole chest) 22½ - 26
Congou (¼ chest) 22½ - 43
Bohea (whole chest, best) 16½ - 18
Bohea (whole chest, ordinary) 16 - 16¾
Bohea (2/3 chest) 15½ - 15¾
Bohea (½ chest) 15¼ - 15¾
Bohea (1/3 chest) 15¼ - 15½
Bohea (¼ chest) 15½ - 16
2 December Hyson 90 - 90½
By the Zeeland Chamber Hyson skin 50 - 54½
Twankay 46 - 46½
Songlo 40 - 43
Pekoe 44 - 49½
Souchong 38½ - 52
Congou (whole chest) 23 - 24
Congou (¼ chest) 25½ - 39
Bohea (whole chest) 16½ - 18
Bohea (2/3 chest) 18½
Bohea (½ chest) 18¼ - 18½
Bohea (1/3 chest) 18½ - 18¾
Bohea (¼ chest) 18¼ - 18½
Bohea (small chest) 18½ - 18¾ 
Bohea (prop chest) 18 - 18½
Bohea (beam chest) 18½ - 19
9 December Hyson 84 - 88 
By the Rotterdam Chamber Hyson skin 47½ - 52
Twankay 44 - 45
Songlo 40 - 41
Pekoe 44 - 46½ 
Souchong 37 - 45½
Congou 23¼ - 38½
Bohea (whole chest) 17¼ - 18
Bohea (whole chest, ordinary) 16½ - 17
Bohea (2/3 chest) 16¾ - 17
Bohea (½ chest) 16½ - 17
Bohea (1/3 chest) 16¾
Bohea (¼ chest) 16
1779
1 & 2 November Hyson 89½ - 93½ 
By the Amsterdam Chamber Hyson skin 51½ - 56½
Songlo 49 - 49½
Pekoe 44 - 57
Souchong 32½ - 52
Congou (whole chest) 25¾ - 26½
Congou (1/8 & ¼ chest) 27½ - 38
Bohea (whole chest) 21½ - 22
Bohea (½ chest) 21¾
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Bohea (1/3 chest) 21¼ - 21½
Bohea (¼ chest) 21 - 21½
Bohea (beam chest) 22 - 22¾
15 November Hyson 95 - 97½
By the Zeeland Chamber Hyson skin 54 - 70
Songlo 52½ - 53
Pekoe 40 - 60½
Souchong (¼ chest) 38 - 55½
Souchong (1/8 chest) 46
Congou (whole chest) 27 - 27½
Congou (¼ chest) 30½ - 38
Bohea (whole chest) 22¼ - 23
Bohea (2/3 chest) 22¼ - 22½
Bohea (½ chest) 22 - 22½
Bohea (1/3 chest) 21¾ - 22
Bohea (¼ chest) 21¼ - 21½
Bohea (small chest) 22 - 22½
Bohea (prop chest) 22 - 22¼
Bohea (beam chest) 22½ - 23
1780
13 & 14 November Hyson 86 - 92 
By the Amsterdam Chamber Hyson skin 40 - 60
Twankay 35 - 37
Songlo 32½ - 35½
Gunpowder tea 108 - 145
Pekoe 45 - 48½
Souchong 34½ - 41
Congou (whole chest) 27 - 28½
Congou 30½ - 41
Bohea (whole chest) 19¾ - 20¼
Bohea (2/3 chest) 19¾ - 20
Bohea (½ chest) 20 - 20½
Bohea (1/3 chest) 19½ - 20
Bohea (¼ chest) 20½ - 21¾
27 November Hyson 95 - 107
By the Zeeland Chamber Hyson skin 57½ - 71
Twankay 35½ - 54½
Songlo 32½ - 35½
Gunpowder tea 108 - 125
Pekoe 47½ - 57
Souchong 33 - 68½
Congou (big chest) 28½ - 29
Congou 31 - 42
Bohea (whole chest, best)* 21 - 22
Bohea (whole chest, ordinary)* 18¾ - 20
Bohea (2/3 chest) 18½ - 19
Bohea (½ chest) 18¾ - 19
Bohea (1/3 chest) 18 - 18¾
Bohea (¼ chest) 19½
20 December Hyson 87 - 95
By the Enkhuizen Chamber Hyson skin 47 - 48½
Twankay 34½ - 42
Songlo 32½ - 34
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Gunpowder tea 114 - 133
Pekoe 45 - 48½
Souchong 35 - 57½
Congou 31 - 39
Bohea 19 - 20½
______________________________________________________________________________________
* In the typescript (date unknown) made of the originals the price of Bohea (whole 
chest, best) is given as 18¾ - 20 stivers per pound and that of Bohea (whole chest, ordi-
nary) as 21 - 22 per pound. This goes against all reason, and accordingly, I assume that
the typist made an error and that the prices should be reversed. 
Source: NA Aanwinsten 541.
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APPENDIX 8
AUCTIONS OF TEAS HELD BY THE ZEELAND CHAMBER,
1758-1776
A. The auction of teas belonging to the VOC
______________________________________________________________________________________
Tea buyers Volumes Prices Value
(pounds) (stivers/pound) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
12 April 1758
Pieter Bos 2,196 20 - 36 2,662
Cornelis Willemsen 308 33 510
Gijsbert van Ippel 59 38.5 119
Jan Charles Boucheer 1,429 20 - 37.5 1,695
Jan de Vos 1,594 21.5 1,705
Jan Swart 561 20.5 576
Elias de Timmerman 579 20 580
Joost Alffes 1,111 21 1,162
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 302 16 246
27 November 1758
Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,173 31 - 33 1,868
Paulus Hendrik Securius 563 33 927
Bomme & Voutje 591 34.5 1,017
Benjamin Gavin 715 28 998
Cornelis Dijserinck 708 28.5 1,006
17 November 1760
Hendrikus Kakelaar 2,440 20.5 - 47.8 4,151
Daniel Smit 847 21.3 898
Faken ten Hoorn 4,930 18.5 - 22 4,948
Cornelis Dijserinck 3,782 18 - 20 3,605
Cornelis de Gruijter 2,085 18.8 - 20.3 347
Jan Macquet 2,089 18 - 21.8 2,097
Jan der Moijse 5,996 18.3 - 21.3 5,923
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 4,194 16 - 20 3,773
Bomme & Engelsez. 6,427 19.5 - 22.5 6,610
Gerrit de Jong 1,165 20.5 1,190
Lambert Schoft 889 18.5 821
Elias de Timmerman 2,546 18.3 - 20.8 4,829
Aarnoud Brouwers 2,510 1.5 - 20.3 2,480
Pieter van der Elst 4,835 18 - 20.3 4,480
Bomme & Voutje 1,154 20.3 1,154
Petrus Hamer 8,173 18.3 - 47.5 11,777
Andries van der Poest 5,494 15 - 18.8 4,616
Gijsbert van Ippel 5,734 19 - 21 5,665
Anthonij Leliaart 6,306 19.5 - 20.5 6,314
Hendrik van de Walle 877 19.8 865
Ewout van Groenenberg 5,019 19.3 - 20.8 5,001
Jan Willeboorts 862 20.5 882
Johannes Rodolpheus Teuts 1,366 19.3 1,310
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Tea buyers Volumes Prices Value
(pounds) (stivers/pound) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Jan Bekker Junior 594 20.5 610
Joan van Groenenberg 227 15.8 184
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 18,434 20.5 16,920
the widow Maartens & Son 24,829 20.8 23,432
Benjamin Gavin 26,896 47.5 28,663
Boursse de Superville & Smith 66,711 49.3 71,007
Casparus Ribaut & Son 61,369 51 64,060
Paulus Hendrik Securius 33,836 50.5 33,880
Cornelis Willemsen 70,153 50.8 75,844
13 April 1761
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 1,345 17.3 - 21.8 1,315
the widow Maartens & Son 699 21.8 763
Petrus Hamer 2,336 16.5 - 22 2,149
Heijman Hendriks 352 22.3 397
Cornelis de Gruijter 322 18.8 307
Willemsen & Steurbroek 1,311 17.3 1,069
9 November 1761
Petrus Hamer 12,253 23.8 - 47.8 20,557
Boursse de Superville & Smith 72,686 20 - 77.8 117,379
Willemsen & Steurbroek 181,479 20.5 - 76.5 267,085
Casparus Ribaut & Son 264,562 23.5 - 73.3 397,633
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 88,258 24.5 - 76.5 135,447
the widow Maartens & Son 103,235 21.8 - 76.3 147,841
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 27,047 20.3 - 60 40,639
Gijsbert van Ippel 10,695 24 - 44.5 17,071
James Turing 50,160 25.3 - 51 66,493
Paulus Hendr. Securius 77,523 24.5 - 78.3 116,713
Pieter Bos 20,524 24.5 - 43 26,833
Jan der Moijse 3,970 25.5 - 38.8 5,779
Benjamin van Heulen 7,267 25.5 - 43.3 10,111
Cornelis Dijserinck 16,041 23.8 - 48.5 24,145
Johannes Rodolphus Teuts 941 24.8 - 34 1,261
Johan Bendleij 18,645 25.3 - 47.3 30,631
Lambert Schoft 4,008 25.8 - 40.5 5,917
Christiaan Wollaart 1,535 28 2,137
Lendert Doudeijns 1,274 38.3 2,419
Cornelis Molder 1,245 38.5 2,383
Charel Acherveld 3,212 24.8 - 30 4,381
Bomme & Engelsz. 14,585 23.5 - 44.5 21,937
Jeremias Petit 5,856 25.5 - 38.8 8,533
Jan de Zitter & Sons 3,178 24.8 - 24.5 3,847
Pieter van der Elst 41,179 24.5 - 44.8 57,133
Aarnoud Brouwers 15,696 24.8 - 39 22,105
Heijman Hendriks 2,460 20.3 - 40.5 3,199
Andries van Valkenburg 2,927 26 - 40 4,705
Jan Willeboorts 11,849 25.5 - 43.5 16,771
Jeremias van Nederveen 3,207 24.3 - 26.5 4,045
Jan de Vos 1,593 29.8 2,353
Jan Bekker Junior 3,001 25 - 51.5 4,369
Bartholomeus Wijbo 1,596 30 2,377
Cornelis de Gruijter 4,750 23.8 - 31 6,307
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Willem Nevejans 406 42.8 865
William Daij Junior 523 22 - 42.8 985
Daniel van den Berge Wmzoon 1,602 26 2,071
Elias de Timmerman 18,476 25.5 - 43.5 25,783
Anthonij Leliaart 4,570 25.5 - 38.8 6,619
Andries van der Poest 3,565 23 - 43.8 5,641
Abraham de Smit de Jonge 1,285 38.8 2,473
Jan Macquet 4,495 25.5 - 38.8 6,559
Gerrit de Jong 4,307 25.8 - 26 5,533
Jacobus Fak 3,300 25.5 - 26.5 4,261
Bomme & Voutje 1,995 25.8 - 41.8 2,881
Hendrik van de Walle 3,175 25.5 - 26.8 4,117
Leendert Doudeijns 3,245 25.3 - 25.8 4,105
Jan van de Kruijsse Junior 3,106 25.5 - 26 3,967
Martinus Jasper van Beijdselaar 1,610 25.5 2,041
Jan Beukelaar 1,504 26.3 1,963
Jan Swart & Son 947 25 1,183
19 April 1762
Gijsbert van Ippel 97 66 325
Lambert Schoft 260 36 - 47 571
Pieter Bos 4,809 24 - 44 6,775
Cornelis Willemsen 674 38 1,279
the widow Maartens & Son 177 37 331
Petrus Hamer 1,360 38 2,023
Hendrik van de Walle 1,247 35.5 2,203
Cornelis de Gruijter 521 36 937
Roeland Leenders 753 24 901
Heijman Hendriks 772 24 925
& Hartog Hendriks
22 November 1762
Boursse de Superville & Smith 41,440 28.8 - 92 67,639
Heijman Hendriks 1,580 29.8 2,335
& Hartog Hendriks
James Turing 20,283 29 - 92 32,425
Daniel Smith 2,679 30 - 91 7,555
Pieter Bos 18,397 29 - 84 29,443
John Bendleij 15,349 28.8 - 44.5 25,759
Gijsbert van Ippel 9,707 29 - 45.5 16,927
Bomme & Engelsz. 7,027 28.8 - 49.3 10,807
Petrus Hamer 4,989 29 - 45.5 9,751
Silo de Cheff 879 31.8 1,387
Charel Acherveld 1,604 31.5 2,509
Jan Sierevelt 1,561 29 2,251
Leendert Doudeijns 4,644 29 6,679
John Porter 4,691 30 6,883
Jacobus Borkelmans Junior 4,380 30.8 6,505
Cornelis van der Veere 4,694 30 6,889
Der Moijse & Van der Woord 17,503 31.8 25,137
Hendrik van de Walle 1,495 30 2,227
Andries van der Poest 1,340 30.3 2,017
Jan Macquet 7,775 28.8 - 29 11,161
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Hendrik van der Linde 550 32.3 883
Jacobus Aartsen 3,168 28.8 - 29 4,513
Jacobus Fak 1,547 29.8 2,287
Elias de Timmerman 12,411 29 - 30 18,085
Benjamin van Heulen 7,149 32 10,649
Gerrit de Jong 1,504 29.8 2,227
Lambert Schoft 4,406 29 - 32.3 6,637
Daniel van den Berge Wmzoon 1,580 30 2,353
Cornelis Dijserinck 8,943 29 - 45.5 13,921
Aarnoud Brouwer 10,276 48.5 16,489
Jeremias van Nederveen 1,922 30 - 48.3 3,205
Jacobus Mareeuw 392 49.5 967
Anthonij Leliaart 4,419 29 - 45.3 7,321
Jeremias Petit 5,896 29.5 - 45 9,559
Jan van de Kruijsse 4,111 29 - 46.3 8,005
Cornelis de Gruijter 5,760 49 9,925
Bomme & Voutje 9,611 49.5 21,133
Jan Willeboorts 14,731 45.3 22,669
Pieter Clement 34,402 28.8 - 45.5 55,345
Pieter van der Elst 35,171 29 - 49.3 58,357
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 14,717 29 - 46.3 24,715
Jan Bekker Junior 826 69.5 2,851
Francois Gaaswijk 2,784 29 - 42.8 4,843
Johan Philip Hardij 1,953 30.3 - 48.5 3,271
Willemsen & Steurbroek 70,957 28.8 - 45.5 116,371
the widow Maartens & Son 19,647 46.5 30,253
Paulus Hendrik Securius 71,903 81 118,267
Casparus Ribaut & Son 163,025 55.5 256,927
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 121,623 49.5 191,083
Paulus Hendrik Securius 1,258 45.5 2,845
Jacob de Vries 1,492 29 2,149
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 1,625 29 2,341
18 April 1763
Jeremias Petit 104 36 193
Heijman Hendriks 719 28 1,003
& Hartog Hendriks
Willemsen & Steurbroek 592 28 829
Petrus Hamer 629 24 - 27 811
8 December 1763
Jeremias van Nederveen 4,514 24 - 26.8 5,715
Heijman Hendriks 4,761 23.8 - 25 5,695
& Hartog Hendriks
Johan Philip Hardij 897 26 1,165
Gerrit de Jong 3,291 23.8 - 26.8 4,117
Francois Gaaswijk 4,867 24.5 - 25 5,995
Cornelis den Herder 835 26 1,081
Cornelis de Gruijter 3,252 25.8 - 27.5 4,311
Lion van Hildeshijm 656 25.8 841
Jan Bekker Junior 422 25.8 547
Jacobus Bal Davidzoon 527 24 631
Cornelis Perduijn 2,784 26.3 3,631
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Hendrik van de Walle 3,386 23.8 3,991
Leendert Doudeijns 6,667 23.5 - 24.5 7,975
Anthonij Leliaart 5,554 23 - 26.8 6,673
Jan Macquet 11,153 23.3 - 42 14,137
Jan Sierevelt 1,569 23.5 1,831
Jacobus Aartsen 3,660 23.8 - 28.5 4,501
Martinus Jasp. van Beijtselaar 3,866 23.5 - 25.3 4,579
Lambert Schoft 1,602 23.3 1,855
Elias de Timmerman 8,169 23.5 - 42 10,981
Abraham & Cornelis Tak 10,180 23 - 24.3 11,947
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 3,127 23.5 3,649
Bomme & Engelsz. 19,086 23.5 - 42 25,051
Jan Willeboorts 10,327 23.5 - 30 12,643
the widow Maartens & Son 13,014 23 - 42 16,855
Hendrik van der Linde 1,621 23.5 1,897
Jan Swart & Son 8,377 23.3 - 24 9,799
Benjamin van Heulen 15,895 23 - 26.3 19,093
John Porter 4,917 23.5 - 45.5 7,687
Coppello & Carlebur 2,675 25 - 50 4,645
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 9,003 23.8 - 49 12,019
Daniel Smith 4,289 23.8 - 69 7,027
Cornelis Dijserinck 6,187 24 - 42 8,659
Pieter van der Elst 13,480 24 - 49 20,113
Jeremias Petit 5,558 23.5 - 42 7,867
Bomme & Voutje 4,321 26.3 - 45.5 8,089
Cornelis van der Veere 7,010 23.8 - 96 9,919
Pieter Clement 13,556 23.8 - 49.5 18,745
Gijsbert van Ippel 14,463 23.3 - 45.5 20,539
Aarnoud Brouwer 17,109 23.5 - 42 23,215
Pieter Bos 15,439 23.5 - 45 21,679
Boursse de Superville & Smith 78,545 23 - 67.5 349,687
James Turing 25,756 23.3 - 69.5 33,211
Maria Greeax 9,360 23.5 - 49.5 13,867
Thomas Holman 34,350 23.3 - 49.5 49,867
Petrus Hamer 45,361 22 - 70 71,023
Paulus Hendrik Securius 72,652 23 - 69.5 98,539
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 39,624 23.3 - 69.5 59,527
Willemsen & Steurbroek 165,747 22.8 - 69.5 225,283
Casparus Ribaut & Son 132,102 23.3 - 46 182,929
25 April 1764
Petrus Hamer 1,485 23.5 1,735
2 October 1764
Cornelis Perduijn 1,618 27.3 2,191
Petrus Hamer 36,035 19.8 - 61.5 50,395
Daniel Smith 29,183 15.5 - 65.5 43,441
Willemsen & Steurbroek 64,758 18.8 - 63.5 87,919
Jeremias van Nederveen 4,590 21.5 - 54 8,995
Gijstbert van Ippel 22,820 21.5 - 54.5 30,379
Casparus Ribaut & Son 107,422 18.3 - 81 160,261
Jan van de Kruijsse 5,466 21.8 - 25.8 6,295
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 111,563 9.5 - 80 149,131
APPENDIX 8 241
______________________________________________________________________________________
Tea buyers Volumes Prices Value
(pounds) (stivers/pound) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Thomas Holman 33,082 21.5 - 54.5 39,931
the widow Maartens & Son 53,279 20.5 - 54 70,951
Jan Macquet 13,604 21.5 - 51.5 18,391
Jan Willeboorts 8,087 21.5 - 47 9,265
Aarnoud Brouwer 11,995 21.8 - 52 15,853
Anthonij Leliaart 4,358 21.5 - 24.3 4,819
Pieter Bos 22,236 21.8 - 76 30,163
Bomme & Van der Veere 10,963 21.8 - 54 24,301
Heijman Hendriks 4,187 21.8 - 24.3 4,675
& Hartog Hendriks
Paulus Hendrik Securius 86,688 20.3 - 80 115,657
Leendert Doudeijns 1,503 20.3 - 21.8 1,627
Boursse de Superville & Smith 107,650 20 - 53.5 144,421
Bomme & Engelsz. 13,654 21.8 - 50.5 18,583
Jeremias Petit 3,822 22.8 - 23 4,345
Elias de Timmerman 9,983 21.5 - 47 11,875
Lambert Schoft 4,064 21.8 - 27.8 4,951
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 11,202 21.5 - 40 12,379
Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon 3,173 22.5 - 23 3,583
Francois Gaaswijk 1,601 21.5 1,711
Pieter van der Elst 13,247 22 - 26.3 15,067
Hendrik van Erp 1,560 22.8 1,765
Gerrit de Jong 1,587 22.3 1,759
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 6,236 21.5 - 22.3 6,769
De Jonge & Clement 15,066 21.5 - 22.8 16,453
James Turing 6,221 22 - 22.8 6,925
John Porter 4,590 21.8 - 22 4,975
Daniel van den Berge Wmzoon 9,514 21.8 - 22.5 10,465
Cornelis Dijserinck 6,824 22 - 22.5 7,525
Anthonij van Citters 3,401 22.5 - 24.5 4,027
Hendrik van de Walle 3,236 22 - 27 3,931
11 November 1765
Petrus Hamer 29,567 18.3 - 73.5 38,155
Daniel Smith 5,843 18.8 - 55.8 7,351
Willemsen & Steurbroek 49,157 18.5 - 73.5 70,759
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 121,208 14 - 72.5 147,361
Boursse de Superville & Smith 75,901 16 - 72 89,671
Pieter Kakenberg 3,151 18.8 2,935
Casparus Ribaut & Son 135,297 18 - 60 173,833
Gerrit de Jong 4,421 19.3 - 54.8 6,481
John Podd 16,999 10 - 60.3 27,709
Thomas Holman & John Holman 41,143 18 - 55.3 44,905
Gijsbert van Ippel 9,426 18.3 - 55.8 14,389
Paulus Hendrik Securius 69,246 17 - 56.8 90,463
Jacobus Aartsen 3,503 19 - 52.8 4,999
Pieter Bos 35,568 18.3 - 55.8 42,949
Jeremias van Nederveen 8,948 18 - 54.8 13,339
Pieter van der Elst 37,407 19.3 - 55.8 37,765
Jan van de Kruijsse 653 60.5 - 62 1,987
Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. 20,420 19 - 54.8 26,443
Francois Gaaswijk 17,411 18.5 - 57.5 20,653
Aarnout Brouwers 19,821 18.5 - 55.3 24,325
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Elias de Timmerman 21,798 18.8 - 52.3 22,651
Jan Willeboorts 19,547 18.8 - 52.3 20,143
John Porter 16,040 18.8 - 19.3 14,989
Johannus Jacobus Landrij 6,400 18 - 24.8 6,283
Benjamin van Heulen 10,998 18.8 - 21.3 10,759
Jeremias Petit 7,398 18.8 - 55.3 9,619
Jan Macquet 19,095 18.3 - 19.8 17,989
the widow Maartens & Son 25,613 18.5 - 26.5 27,853
de Jonge & Clement 24,201 18.5 - 26.5 23,251
Heijman Hendriks 7,437 18.8 - 19.5 7,045
& Hartog Hendriks
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 4,077 18.8 - 19.5 3,865
Anthonij Leliaart 5,397 18.5 - 19.8 5,059
James Turing 6,509 18.8 - 19.3 6,091
Cornelis Perduijn 3,925 18.8 - 54.8 4,813
Lambert Schoft 3,879 19.5 - 26.5 4,297
Cornelis Dijserinck 2,608 18.8 - 54.8 4,207
Leendert Doudeijns 3,323 18.8 3,097
Cornelis Schieteratte 2,666 19 - 24.8 2,989
Abraham de Smit 1,009 56 2,809
Huijbregt Blommaart 1,624 19.8 1,597
Nicolaas de Koebert 710 19.5 691
Andries van der Poest 1,668 18.8 1,555
Johan Philip Hardij 1,614 19 1,525
Willem Nevejans 990 19.3 949
Pieter Bos 802 55.8 2,221
3 November 1766
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 40,952 15.8 - 63 48,607
Abraham de Smit 1,383 58 3,979
Boursse de Superville & Smith 42,464 17 - 79 68,905
John Podd 35,782 16.5 - 62.5 49,735
Petrus Hamer 30,757 16.3 42,229
Willemsen & Steurbroek 90,357 15.8 - 60.5 100,963
Jan Macquet 7,459 16.8 - 62 8,215
Gilles & Martinus Engelsz. 21,899 16.8 - 61 30,745
Gijsbert van Ippel 8,626 17.3 - 57 13,015
Thomas Holman & John Holman 67,201 16.8 - 60.5 75,565
Jan Francois Herman 2,491 17.5 - 18.3 2,203
Casparus Ribaut & Son 98,069 16 - 60.5 142,495
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 82,690 16.8 - 59 98,107
Paulus Hendrik Securius 66,009 15.5 - 62 16,438
Francois Gaaswijk 6,417 38.5 - 56.5 16,255
Cornelis Perduijn 4,946 17.5 - 24 4,897
the widow Maartens & Son 28,688 15.8 - 55.5 28,297
Pieter Kakenberg 4,007 18 - 20 3,763
Pieter van der Elst 16,680 17.5 - 58.5 25,057
Johan David Herklots 5,152 52 - 53 13,411
Jeremias van Nederveen 11,481 15.5 - 57.5 12,679
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 10,709 16.8 - 17.3 9,031
Pieter Bos 30,188 16.8 - 56.5 31,657
Daniel Smith 6,469 17 - 17.8 5,599
Cornelis Dijserinck 15,809 17.3 - 53.5 15,919
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Willemina Tijdgat widow A. Brouwers 22,531 17 - 53.5 23,083
Jan Willeboorts 14,463 17.3 - 52.5 15,343
Elias de Timmerman 19,837 17.3 - 57.5 18,013
de Jonge & Clement 27,680 17 - 18.3 24,223
Jeremias Petit 4,721 17.3 - 18.5 4,219
Jacobus Aartsen 8,328 17 - 54.5 11,875
Heijman Hendriks 10,462 16.8 - 17.8 8,875
& Hartog Hendriks
Nicolaas de Koebert 959 18 865
John Porter 13,036 16.8 - 18.3 11,173
Jacobus Fak 1,869 17.8 1,651
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 10,128 16.5 - 18 8,737
Lambert Schoft 8,143 17.5 - 24.3 8,071
Willem Nevejans 946 17.8 841
Anthonij Leliaart 7,564 17.3 - 19.8 6,883
Gerrit de Jong 3,484 18 - 18.3 3,133
Jan Swart & Son 968 18 871
Jacob Pos J.Z. 703 18.8 661
Boursse de Superville & Smith 1,763 18.8 - 52 3,781
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 396 57 1,123
Francois Gaaswijk 1,604 17.8 1,417
9 November 1772
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 92,235 5 - 90 135,133
Boursse de Superville & Smith 57,259 22.3 - 90 87,439
Thomas Holman & John Holman 85,553 20.5 - 90 107,053
Casparus Ribaut & Son 149,466 20.8 - 90 207,445
Richard Roberts 3,427 22.3 - 90 5,065
Petrus Hamer 50,756 22 - 89 74,159
Abraham de Smit & Johanes de Smit 2,952 22.3 - 22.5 3,277
Cornelis Willemsen 41,591 22 - 92 63,583
Gerrit de Jong 4,364 22.8 - 33.5 5,713
de Haze Bomme van Citters 48,762 20 - 58 81,103
& Catteau
Securius & Bourje 18,041 21.5 - 52.5 28,759
Anthonij Friskus 2,377 22.3 - 22.8 2,653
Jan van Maaren 25,291 18 - 47 34,123
Willem Nevejans 919 30.3 1,387
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 37,429 20.5 - 52.5 47,371
Pieter Bos 36,976 21.8 - 53 50,347
Jacobus Mareeuw & Son 2,324 22.5 - 23.8 2,695
Gijsbert van Ippel 6,940 22.3 - 48.5 13,051
Nicolaas de Koebert 483 22.5 547
William Nickalls 12,179 20.5 - 43.5 14,485
Jan Willeboorts 13,964 22.3 - 39.5 17,845
Cornelis Willemsen 1,468 22.3 1,627
Johan David Herklots 16,606 21.5 - 45.5 21,157
Jan Muntener 5,261 22.3 - 31 6,739
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 9,116 22.3 - 53 10,747
Johannes van Deijnsen 2,239 21 - 23 2,503
Jacob Bouvin 8,075 22.5 - 34 9,853
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 1,517 22.8 1,717
de Timmerman & de Jonge 14,518 22.3 - 37 18,133
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Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. 12,453 22.5 - 38 14,287
Cornelis Dijserinck 1,542 23.3 1,783
Isaak de Wijze 7,203 22 - 46.5 11,383
Hendrik van der Linde 9,433 22.5 - 33.3 12,193
Jan van de Kruijsse 829 22.8 943
Jan Bekker Junior 13,339 22.3 - 22.8 14,881
Pieter de Bruijn 11,790 22.3 - 23.3 13,285
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 4,296 22.3 - 22.8 4,831
Heijman Hendriks 12,757 22.3 - 23 14,281
& Hartog Hendriks
Jacobus Aartsen 2,900 22.3 - 22.8 3,241
David van Wijk 10,915 22.8 - 59 20,173
22 November 1773
Petrus Hamer 85,373 14.8 - 68 105,841
Jacobus Fak 5,820 15 - 20.5 4,735
Thomas Holman & John Holman 74,600 12.8 - 67.5 83,677
James Turing 3,046 16 2,419
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 135,018 9 - 68 163,753
Boursse de Superville & Smith 28,242 10 - 68.5 28,915
Johan David Herklots 4,906 15 - 68.5 8,168
Jan Bekker Junior 17,046 14.8 - 50 25,099
Elias Levij Content 2,800 19.3 - 21 2,815
Casparus Ribaut & Son 103,923 15 - 56.5 102,775
Petrus Jacobus Mathijse 1,515 15.5 1,171
Securius & Bourje 49,234 15 - 36 46,861
Anthonij Friscus 1,707 15.3 - 20 1,471
Johanes Jacobus Landrij 10,526 15.5 - 43.5 11,383
Cornelis Willemsen 94,606 12 - 37.8 82,945
Joost Sanders 1,915 15.3 - 30 1,729
Jan van Maaren 23,252 15 - 37.5 24,019
Nicolaas de Koebert 1,939 16 - 30.5 1,819
Heijman Hendriks 12,270 15.3 - 42.5 14,407
& Hartog Hendriks
Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. 9,179 15.3 - 36.3 8,665
de Timmerman & de Jonge 25,059 15 - 43 24,049
Willem Nevejans 2,858 16.3 - 19.3 2,503
Jacobus Aartsen 6,611 15 - 35 7,483
Daniel van den Berge Blok 378 30.5 577
Jeremias Petit 3,666 15.5 - 32.8 4,189
Jan Swart & Son 3,035 15 - 16 2,335
Johannes Casparus Helleman 5,342 10 - 38.3 5,335
Gijsbert van Ippel 714 16 - 16.3 577
Jacob Bouvin 4,449 16 - 37.5 4,993
Jan van der Woord 4,330 16 - 19.8 3,703
Gerrit de Jong 4,609 16.3 - 29 5,191
Stephannus Francois de Moulin 855 15.5 - 29 919
Jan Muntener 1,624 16 - 43.5 2,071
Johannes van Deijnsen 2,289 16 - 30.5 2,365
Jan Willeboorts 13,119 15 - 35.3 14,365
Pieter Bos 32,368 14.8 - 34 33,619
Cornelis Dijserinck 5,235 15 - 19.3 4,255
Hendrik van der Linde 5,458 15 - 29.3 5,257
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Johannes Henricus Schuttel 2,729 15.3 - 29.5 2,365
Isaak de Wijze 8,760 15.3 - 23.3 7,885
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 12,450 15.3 - 32.3 11,575
de Haze Bomme van Citters 45,423 10.8 - 29.5 39,139
& Catteau
Jacobus Mareeuw & Son 3,156 16 - 16.5 2,551
Van de Perre & Meijners 22,789 15 - 16.3 17,593
Boursse de Superville & Smith 8,155 12.3 - 22 6,283
Richard Roberts 1,509 15 1,129
John Podd 1,539 15.3 1,171
28 November 1774
John Pilkington 18,565 13.3 - 68 23,827
Gerrit de Jong 4,605 15.3 - 28 4,627
Thomas Holman & John Holman 149,335 14.5 - 68 139,393
Pieter Kakenberg 729 14.5 529
Jan Swart & Son 49,858 14.5 - 65.5 49,153
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 125,178 10 - 65.5 141,949
Cornelis Willemsen 103,512 11.5 - 36 88,111
Richard Roberts 1,550 15 1,159
de Haze Bomme van Citters 21,692 12 - 50.5 26,185
& Catteau
Jacobus Fak 3,144 15 2,341
Jan van der Woord 15,190 14.5 - 68 15,919
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 14,498 12.8 - 68 13,747
Johannes Casparus Helleman 10,465 12 - 37.8 10,753
Boursse de Superville & Smith 16,352 14 - 51 14,473
Isaak de Wijze 7,652 15.3 - 28 8,737
Casparus Ribaut & Son 94,163 14.8 - 52.8 101,653
Johan David Herklots 21,779 12 - 36 21,613
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 4,509 15 - 27.3 4,321
Jan van Maaren 28,753 11.8 - 50.5 32,311
Securius & Bourje 26,121 14.8 - 52 24,325
Pieter de Bruijn 6,722 15 - 15.3 5,017
de Timmerman & de Jonge 28,178 14.8 - 41.5 25,411
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 4,492 15.3 3,403
Jan Willeboorts 12,735 15 - 45.8 13,801
Pieter Bos 24,710 14.8 - 69 26,497
Joost Sanders 3,038 15 2,263
Heijman Hendriks 20,072 15 - 35.3 18,301
& Hartog Hendriks
Jeremias Petit 3,580 15.3 - 35.3 3,799
Jan Bekker Junior 17,392 15 - 15.5 13,075
Nicolaas de Koebert 1,543 15 1,153
Jacob Bouvin 8,898 14.8 - 35.3 7,759
James Turing 1,514 15.3 1,153
Hendrik van der Linde 7,308 14.5 - 35.3 7,831
Ferdinand Kladt 489 15.8 391
Johannes van Deijnsen 5,624 14 - 28 5,167
Elias Levij Content 1,350 15 1,009
Jacobus Aartsen 6,957 14.8 - 15.3 5,185
Willem Nevejans 2,383 14.8 - 28 2,731
Anthonij Friscus 2,518 15.3 - 35.3 2,869
APPENDIX 8246
______________________________________________________________________________________
Tea buyers Volumes Prices Value
(pounds) (stivers/pound) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Jan Muntener 2,338 14.5 - 15.5 1,759
Jacobus Broekhoven 4,202 15 - 35.3 4,249
Gijsbert van Ippel 2,740 15.3 - 30 2,983
Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,488 15.3 1,129
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 1,465 15.3 1,111
Daniel Lijmons & Comp. 1,482 15.3 1,129
Hartog Jacob de Vries & Co. 6,571 13.8 - 27.5 5,815
Mozes Isaac Gans 32,092 12.5 - 51.5 27,685
23 October 1775
Leendert Doudeijns 19,820 12.5 - 70 16,951
Pieter de Bruijn 5,986 12.5 - 13 3,787
Jacobus Aantsen 3,388 12.3 - 43 5,413
Cornelis Dijserinck 2,959 12.8 1,879
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 151,796 7 - 69 132,037
Jan Swart & Son 64,473 12.5 - 69 62,065
Securius & Bourje 22,709 7 - 35.3 16,903
Martinus Engelsz. 5,826 12.8 - 13 3,721
Thomas Holman & John Holman 155,405 8.3 - 69 152,599
Boursse de Superville & Smith 16,307 8.3 - 34.5 11,575
Gerrit de Jong 3,085 13 - 14.5 2,107
Johan David Herklots 29,940 10.3 - 34.5 20,815
James Turing 4,322 12.8 2,737
Gijsbert van Ippel 3,911 17 - 34 4,603
Gillis Engelsz. 2,923 13 1,891
John Pilkington 7,963 12.8 - 34.5 6,499
Pieter Kakenberg 500 31.5 787
Cornelis Willemsen 99,784 8.3 - 38.5 87,103
Jacobus Broekhoven 1,468 12.8 937
Jan Willeboorts 12,285 12.8 - 37 14,989
Pieter Bos 21,374 12.8 - 43.3 23,995
Hendrik van der Linde 5,639 17.8 - 32.8 6,013
Jan van Maaren 23,791 12.8 - 42.8 30,271
Adriaan van den Berge 1,511 13 979
Jan van der Woord 2,860 12.5 - 23.5 2,101
Jan Muntener 2,069 18.3 - 34 2,311
Johannes Casparus Helleman 8,008 12.5 - 41.8 6,091
Christiaan & Willem Hendrik 1,472 12.8 937
Herklots
Jeremias Petit 4,346 13 - 39 4,951
Abraham de Smit & Johannes 9,170 12.8 - 13 5,857
de Smit
Jacob Bouvin 5,964 13 - 38.8 5,749
Isaak de Wijze 7,956 12.3 - 34 9,241
Van den Perre & Meijners 22,577 7 - 44 20,575
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 4,313 13 - 38.3 5,875
de Timmerman & de Jonge 18,531 12.8 - 38.8 15,109
Jan Bekker Junior 12,743 12.8 8,059
Heijman Hendriks 18,194 8.5 - 36 16,969
& Hartog Hendriks
Jacobus Fak 6,744 8.5 - 14.3 4,321
Johannes van Deijnsen 5,575 12.8 - 13.5 3,625
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 17,995 12.8 - 13.3 11,599
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John Gregorie 8,928 13 5,755
Evert Jansz. van Bel 498 35.3 877
Johan Pagter Roelandszoon 1,132 10.3 583
Boursse de Superville & Smith 3,168 12.8 2,011
Van de Perre & Meijners 1,375 12.8 877
Isaak Baalden 5,795 13 - 37.3 5,683
Hartog Jacob de Vries & Co. 3,889 32.8 4,861
Abraham Cohen 749 8.3 313
25 November 1776
Jan Swart & Son 73,011 8.5 - 74.5 71,383
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 190,022 6.8 - 74.5 173,707
Adriaan van den Berge 1,520 13 985
Thomas Holman & John Holman 66,942 6.3 - 74.5 71,395
Gijsbert van Ippel 8,612 12.8 - 46.5 11,185
Cornelis Willemsen 80,868 9.8 - 35.8 85,819
Jan van Maaren 35,218 12.8 - 46.5 39,235
Pieter Kakenberg 1,019 36.5 - 45.3 1,981
Securius & Bourje 60,865 6.8 - 37.8 44,881
Anthonij Friskus 2,584 13.3 - 47.3 3,787
Boursse de Superville & Smith 49,384 12.8 - 44.8 46,699
Gerrit de Jong 2,859 28.3 4,009
Jan van der Woord 15,921 7 - 35.8 16,003
John Pilkington 10,112 12.8 - 13 6,415
Pieter Bos 65,017 12 - 37.3 70,213
Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon 6,035 12.8 - 13 3,859
Leendert Doudeijns 12,089 10.5 - 35.8 12,397
Van de Perre & Meijners 17,908 13 - 44.3 19,951
Johan David Herklots 24,651 8.8 - 35.8 22,513
Willem Nevejans 1,273 30.5 1,933
Jacob Bouvin 13,768 12.8 - 36.8 11,503
Johannes van Deijnsen 6,495 12.8 - 35.8 6,595
Evert Jansz. van Bel 793 37.3 1,471
Jeremias Petit 3,955 17.8 - 35.8 5,353
Christiaan & Willem Hendrik 2,870 12.8 - 28.8 2,923
Herklots
Hendrik van der Linde 8,023 10.8 - 31 7,627
Jan Brouwer Hendrikzoon 1,442 30.5 2,185
Jacobus Aartsen 3,429 30.3 - 35.8 5,683
Johannes Casparus Helleman 5,799 12.8 - 13 3,703
de Timmerman & de Jonge 25,534 12.8 - 35 22,825
Isaak de Wijze 6,846 8 - 27.8 6,673
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 1,282 13.3 847
Boudewijn Dijserinck 7,106 13 - 37.5 10,891
Jan Pozolij 371 8.5 163
Jan Willeboorts 14,488 12.8 - 30.8 17,503
Jacobus Fak 9,432 8.3 - 30.5 8,773
Pieter Achermans 14,814 12.8 - 13 9,475
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 2,776 13.3 - 30.5 2,917
James Turing 9,940 12.8 - 32.5 7,663
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 10,823 8.5 - 12.8 5,923




Tea buyers Volumes Prices Value
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Jan Bekker Junior 31,705 6 - 12.8 14,569
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 25,626 8.3 - 34.5 19,777
B. The auction of teas op vracht
22 November 1762
Pieter  Bosch 2,878 26.3 - 27.3 3,823
Jacobus Fak 2,810 26.3 - 26.8 3,697
Leendert Doudeijns 5,593 26 - 37 8,773
the widow Maartens & Son 8,546 26.3 - 38.3 12,925
Cornelis Perduijn 846 38 1,597
Francois Gaaswijk 1,386 26.8 1,843
Gijsbert van Ippel 3,238 26.8 - 33.5 4,591
Jan Macquet 2,947 25.8 - 36.8 4,681
Bomme & Engelsz. 6,728 26 - 38.8 10,681
Jeremias Petit 895 27.3 1,213
Cornelis de Gruijter 1,913 27 - 28 2,635
Anthonij Leliaart 3,601 25.8 - 35.5 5,215
Jan Willeboorts 5,810 25.8 - 27.8 7,693
Pieter Clement 2,935 27.5 4,009
Johan Bendleij 8,129 26.3 - 31.5 11,005
Der Moijse & Van der Woord 3,453 25.5 - 27 4,489
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 3,120 26.8 - 27 4,165
Cornelis Dijserinck 2,302 32.8 - 36.5 3,895
Aarnoud Brouwer 9,568 26.5 - 38.3 13,243
Cornelis van der Veere 3,525 26.8 - 29.5 4,813
Elias de Timmerman 5,533 26.8 - 35.3 7,795
Johan Rodolphus Teuts 465 27.3 637
Gerrit de Jong 1,454 26.8 1,933
Petrus Hamer 11,181 26.5 - 46.5 17,539
Silo de Cheff 368 26.5 493
Daniel de Smith 1,004 25.8 1,291
Willemsen & Steurbroek 56,197 25.8 - 45.3 83,641
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 45,697 25.5 - 45.8 71,977
Paulus Hendrik Securius 37,962 25.5 - 45 56,095
Boursse de Superville & Smith 39,524 26.5 - 38.8 57,865
Casparus Ribaut & Son 60,772 25.8 - 46.8 91,441
18 April 1763
Jeremias Petit 103 40 211
Jan Porter 449 32 721
Pieter Bos 78 32 133
Gijsbert van Ippel 823 27 - 31 1,147
Casparus Ribaut & Son 644 30 967
Bomme & Engelsz. 547 31 847
Willemsen & Steurbroek 1,693 27 - 31 2,395
8 December 1763
Cornelis de Gruijter 3,292 20.8 - 31.3 4,315
Maria Greeax 6,925 20 - 21.3 7,087
Casparus Ribaut & Son 62,898 19.5 - 37 82,477
John Porter 1,487 21.3 1,573
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Boudaan & Van den Bosch 37,439 20 - 36.3 51,529
Leendert Doudeijns 6,689 20.3 - 32.8 8,305
Hendrik Jan van Wijck 5,733 17.3 - 33.8 8,083
Gijsbert van Ippel 11,093 16.8 - 32 13,075
Johan Constantin Mathias 261 38 499
Jeremias van Nederveen 41,777 19.8 - 35 52,849
Lambert Schoft 2,254 24 - 34.8 3,493
Anthonij Leliaart 2,730 20.5 - 21.3 2,833
Paulus Hendrik Securius 23,985 20 - 36.8 29,887
Petrus Hamer 11,546 19.8 - 21.3 11,737
Pieter Bos 4,543 20 - 34.8 5,671
Boursse de Superville & Smith 28,751 20 - 36.3 32,761
Thomas Holman 11,345 20 - 21.8 11,593
Cornelis Perduijn 1,336 20.3 1,345
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 5,140 20 - 33.3 5,863
Cornelis van der Veere 2,608 20 - 20.3 2,605
Willemsen & Steurbroek 33,846 19.5 - 34.5 40,531
Bomme & Engelsz. 5,455 21.5 - 31.5 7,069
Elias de Timmerman 4,258 30.3 - 33.3 6,589
Aanroud Brouwer 2,854 20.8 - 21.3 2,977
Cornelis Dijserinck 2,778 30 - 37 4,591
Jan Willeboorts 3,456 30 - 31.8 5,263
Jan Swart & Son 1,458 21.5 1,561
the widow Maartens & Son 1,349 20.5 1,375
Benjamin van Heulen 1,424 21.5 1,525
Jan Macquet 1,289 20.3 1,291
James Turing 1,317 20.8 1,363
Daniel Smith 521 41 1,063
Andries van der Poest 1,378 32.3 2,209
25 April 1764
Lambert Schoft 400 30 591
Pieter Bos 1,370 21 - 21.5 1,453
Willemsen & Steurbroek 1,985 19.5 - 21.5 2,005
Petrus Hamer 639 19.5 625
Gijsbert van Ippel 411 21 433
Heijman Hendriks 89 15.5 73
& Hartog Hendriks
3 November 1766
John Podd 5,532 11.5 - 30.5 4,585
Cornelis van der Veere 377 12 229
Boursse de Superville & Smith 22,156 12.3 - 33.5 27,805
Paulus Hendrik Securius 5,578 12.3 - 33.5 4,876
Anthonij Leliaart 1,390 12.5 865
Petrus Hamer 2,777 12.5 - 33.5 3,175
Jeremias van Nederveen 5,601 12.8 3,493
Casparus Ribaut & Son 6,922 33.5 8,551
the widow Maartens & Son 2,794 33 3,139
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 8,776 33.5 8,467
Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon 8,358 13 5,287
Francois Gaaswijk 4,146 12.8 - 33.5 5,431
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4 May 1767
Petrus Hamer 330 32.5 541
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 537 13 355
C. The auction of teas van particulieren
27 November 1758
Benjamin van Heulen 1,657 32.5 - 37.5 2,785
Anthonij van Citters 655 28 - 29 937
Willem Wondergem 155 20 - 30.5 211
Aarnoud Brouwers 917 30.5 - 36 1,591
Jan de Haase 487 18.5 - 26 535
Hendrik van de Walle 1,737 28.5 - 50 3,385
Cornelis de Gruijter 282 27 - 45 979
Hendrik van der Linde 239 20.5 - 28 277
Adriaan Lourens 148 27 - 27.5 211
Jeremias Petit 232 21.5 - 24.5 271
Elias de Timmerman 278 43.5 1,759
Anthonij Leliaart 347 15.5 - 27 331
Jacob Coole 76 29.5 121
Martinus Gardijn 90 27.5 133
Gijsbert van Ippel 601 34 1,003
Jan Willeboorts 67 24 85
Gerrit Sleutelenberg 105 17.5 97
Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,018 48 2,263
John Porter 1,007 32.5 1,525
Bomme & Engelsz. no data no data 811
Lambert Schoft 254 38 493
James Turing 359 23 385
Jan Boudaan 130 19.5 133
Paulus Hendrik Securius 411 20 1,075
Bomme & Voutje 914 40.5 - 41 1,873
Jacobus Mareeuw no data no data 463
Pieter van der Elst 1,163 42.5 - 45 2,551
Benjamin Gavin 481 42.5 1,033
Roeland Leenders 533 26.5 715
Daniel Smit 466 43 1,009
Paulus Hendrik Securius 1,094 40 2,197
19 November 1759
Jeremias Petit 1,545 28.5 - 37 2,581
Lambert Schoft 524 29 769
Gerrit de Jong 993 31.5 - 33.5 1,621
Petrus Hamer 632 16.5 - 36 925
Cornelis de Gruijter 1,015 33 - 34.5 1,717
Daniel Smith 299 24 - 35.5 1,105
John Porter 130 17.5 121
Elias de Timmerman 450 32.5 739
Cornelis Willemsen 1,415 16 - 30 2,215
Jan de Feijter 505 17.5 - 24 583
Anthonij van Citters 547 24 667
Jonas Nathan Cohen 465 26.5 625
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Christiaan Wollaart 204 29.5 307
Hendrik van de Walle 854 36 1,255
Bomme & Voutje 806 25.5 1,015
Boursse de Superville & Smith 542 26 685
James Turing 231 25 295
Bomme & Engelsz. 482 30.5 745
Pieter van der Elst 477 30 721
Gijsbert van Ippel 120 24 151
Jeremias van Nederveen 404 25.5 1,123
Cornelis Zachariassen 96 24.5 289
Godart Redeker 1,110 24.5 - 25 1,381
Roeland Pagter no data no data 385
Roeland Leenders 484 24.5 601
Paulus Hendrik Securius 370 24.5 451
Jacobus Helleweel 88 25.5 121
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 211 25 271
17 November 1760
Cornelis Dijserinck 910 22 - 23.3 1,045
Jacocb van Os 138 18.5 133
Anthonij van Citters 959 28 - 29 1,375
Abraham Verheeke 541 25 685
Pieter Bos 983 15.5 36.5 1,459
Petrus Hamer 1,004 17 - 20.8 967
Benjamin Gavin 3,756 13.3 - 23.5 3,577
Alexander Israel 202 11.8 127
Maria Uijtterschout 73 16 67
Hendrik van de Walle 491 38.5 955
Hendrik Lambertus de Vos 216 18 199
the widow Maartens & Son 1,185 17.8 - 24.8 1,243
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 1,435 22.5 - 36 2,089
Bomme & Voutje 259 15.8 205
Gijsbert van Ippel 238 16.5 205
Willem Grauwert 460 22.3 517
Bomme & Engelsz. 433 20.3 451
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 1,010 28.5 1,249
Lambert Schoft 512 23.5 607
Jan Swart & Son 192 20.3 199
Cornelis Willemsen 2,244 27 2,701
Aarnoud Brouwers 913 24.8 961
Jeremias Petit 442 18 403
Pieter van der Elst 73 16.8 67
Abraham de Smit de Jonge 238 21.3 259
Cornelis de Gruijter 993 36.5 1,675
Roeland Leenders 459 23.3 541
Benjamin van Heulen 406 14.3 295
Jan Noordhoek 475 22.3 535
Hendrikus Kakelaar 547 36.8 1,015
9 November 1761
Jeremias van Nederveen 596 33.3 997
Johan Bendleij 537 36 973
Lambert Schoft 1,572 25.8 - 34 2,353
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Jan der Moijse 275 33 463
Jacobus Mareeuw 678 22.5 - 24.3 793
Willem Nevejans 493 24.5 613
Petrus Hamer 857 23 - 23.5 1,003
Paulus Hendrik Securius 401 23.8 481
Abraham Verheeke 659 22.3 - 25.3 817
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 536 36 973
Gijsbert van Ippel 55 22 67
Samuel Le Cocq 548 35.5 979
the widow Maartens & Son 1,490 28.5 - 40 2,941
Andries Nebbens 422 25.3 541
Bomme & Voutje 831 40.3 - 40.5 1,687
Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,130 39.5 - 41 2,281
Jan de Haase 497 40 - 42 1,027
Leenderd Doudeijns 497 32 805
22 November 1762
Cornelis Dijserinck 1,971 26.8 - 40 3,253
John Porter 1,095 27 - 33.8 1,669
Bomme & Engelsz. 743 34.5 1,291
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 4,302 33.3 - 38.5 7,627
Gerrit de Jong 531 36 961
Francois Gaaswijk 483 39.3 955
Pieter de Swarte 421 42.3 895
Jacobus Aartsen 270 36.3 499
der Moijse & Van der Woord 325 25.3 - 25.8 421
Jan Willeboorts 577 27.8 811
Jan Macquet 227 no data 505
Casparus Ribaut & Son 2,025 38 - 40.5 4,015
Jeremias van Nederveen 444 36.8 823
Boursse de Superville & Smith 4,474 26.3 - 40 8,185
Jacobus Bal 701 26.8 - 30 1,027
Pieter van der Elst 513 38.3 991
Anthonij van Citters 1,556 39 - 39.8 3,085
Jeremias Petit 553 26.8 - 38 1,003
Petrus Hamer 610 26.3 - 35.3 1,027
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 490 36.8 907
Cornelis van der Veere 478 34.8 841
Jan Sierevelt 395 27 - 33.3 631
Bomme & Voutje 646 26.5 - 44 1,273
Silo de Cheff 107 26.5 151
Daniel van den Berge Wmzoon 502 38 961
Heijman & Hertog Hendriks 185 26.8 253
8 December 1763
Lion van Hildeshijm 803 20.8 - 35.3 1,099
Pieter van der Elst 939 21.3 - 33.5 1,333
Willemsen & Steurbroek 2,830 20.3 - 37.5 4,579
Pieter Adriaansen 517 21 - 23.3 565
Heijman & Hertog Hendriks 909 21.8 - 33.3 1,303
Silo de Cheff 1,010 20.3 - 35.8 1,423
Paulus Hendrik Securius 1,967 34.5 - 36 3,439
Jeremias Petit 2,119 34.5 - 38 3,847
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Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,542 34.3 - 38 2,785
John Porter 668 34.3 1,705
Petrus Hamer 885 23.8 - 34.8 1,297
Thomas Holman 937 34 - 35.5 1,639
Boursse de Superville & Smith 2,589 33 - 37 4,549
Jeremias van Nederveen 1,828 35.3 - 36.5 3,265
Dirk de Visser 141 29 211
Johan Philip Hardij 285 33 - 34.8 493
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 967 32.8 - 34.3 1,627
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 73 33 127
Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon 522 35.3 925
Abraham de Smit 1,406 35 - 38.5 2,551
Cornelis Perduijn 1,037 36 - 38.3 1,933
Cornelis de Gruijter 167 25.3 217
Benjamin van Heulen 223 34.8 397
Francois Gaaswijk 532 35.8 961
Cornelis Dijserinck 475 36.8 883
Pieter Bos 252 35.8 637
Jacobus Aartsen 540 36.8 1,003
Hendrik Jan van Wijck 1,859 35.3 - 36 3,325
Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,040 34.8 - 35 1,825
2 October 1764
Jeremias Petit 618 45.3 1,405
Daniel Smith 649 43 1,405
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 1,160 43.8 - 44 2,557
Casparus Ribaut & Son 585 43.3 1,273
Cornelis Dijserinck 649 43 1,396
Bomme & Van der Veere 530 44.3 1,183
Pieter Bos 524 44.8 1,183
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 584 45 1,321
19 November 1764
Willemsen & Steurbroek 1,165 16.5 - 36.5 1,483
Jacobus Aartsen 550 37.8 1,045
Casparus Ribaut & Son 2,903 20.3 - 43 5,353
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 1,458 38.5 - 40 2,893
Jeremias Petit 505 39.5 1,003
Petrus Hamer 2,379 14.3 - 37.5 2,461
Roeland Leenderts 167 22.3 193
Boursse de Superville & Smith 1,279 38 - 43.8 3,001
Paulus Hendrik Securius 2,637 17.3 - 44.8 5,233
Hendrik van de Walle 1,404 41.3 - 45.5 3,019
Roeland Pagter 453 28.5 655
Thomas Holman 501 43 1,085
Pieter Bos 1,085 32.5 - 41.3 2,125
Cornelis van der Veere 993 37.3 - 39.5 1,915
Jan Willeboorts 588 35.8 1,057
Gijsbert van Ippel 230 41 481
Jacobus Pols 917 39.5 - 41.5 1,867
Pieter van der Elst 396 17.3 - 17.8 355
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11 November 1765
Cornelis Perduijn 1,032 37 2,071
Bomme & Van der Veere 3,420 36 - 47.3 7,213
Jacobus Bal David & Son 92 18 91
Elias Levij Content 72 12.3 - 17 61
Paulus Hendrik Securius 1,325 10.5 - 45 1,615
Willemsen & Steurbroek 168 13 115
Boursse de Superville & Smith 1,263 8 - 45.5 1,771
Casparus Ribaut & Son 822 17.3 - 48.3 1,819
Jan Willeboorts 1,089 45.3 - 45.5 2,479
Der Moijse & Van der Woord 1,060 8 - 11.8 499
John Porter 952 41.8 - 44.5 2,059
Pieter Bos 250 13 - 15.5 181
Jeremias Petit 656 45.3 - 58 1,651
Lambert Schoft 152 12.3 103
Daniel Smith 206 23.8 - 24 253
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 449 45.5 1,027
3 November 1766
Lion van Hildescheijm 167 8 - 31 217
Paulus Hendrik Securius 2,157 7.8 - 46.5 3,649
John Porter 1,546 31 - 45 3,277
Gijsbert van Ippel 1,686 8.5 - 46.5 3,445
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 1,885 8.8 - 45 3,451
Boursse de Superville & Smith 1,350 8.3 - 44.5 2,377
Daniel Smith 221 8 - 10 103
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 466 46 1,081
Casparus Ribaut & Son 488 43.5 1,069
Francois Gaaswijk 193 44.5 439
Willemina Tijdgat widow A. Brouwers 706 42.5 1,501
Heijman Hendriks 226 8.5 97
& Hartog Hendriks
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 230 43.5 505
Jeremias Petit 431 46 997
Cornelis Dijserinck 1,167 46 2,695
9 November 1772
Cornelis Willemsen 1,187 30.5 - 66 2,215
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 512 29.5 763
Jan Willeboorts 967 28.8 - 30.8 1,447
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 2,611 27 - 30.5 3,721
Securius & Bourje 1,265 19.8 - 35.3 1,717
de Haze Bomme van Citters 1,360 27.3 - 34.3 2,293
& Catteau
Casparus Ribaut & Son 2,097 31 - 35.3 3,529
Jan Muntener 658 26.8 - 27.3 901
Petrus Hamer 692 28.3 - 34.5 1,069
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 1,018 27.3 - 33.3 1,561
Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. 449 19.5 445
Jacobus Fak 2,017 20 - 27.8 2,629
Hendrik van der Linde 503 36.5 925
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 563 34.8 985
the widow Daniel Smith 510 36 925
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Boursse de Superville & Smith 775 25 - 84 1,801
Gerrit de Jong 989 35.3 - 35.8 1,765
Jacob Bouvin 479 35 847
Gijsbert van Ippel 1,531 32.5 - 37 2,665
Thomas Holman & John Holman 420 19 409
22 November 1773
Pieter Bos 977 19.3 - 20 967
Johannes Jacobus Landrij 1,048 18.5 - 30.5 1,321
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 202 19.3 199
Petrus Hamer 5,052 10.5 - 30.3 6,673
Cornelis Willemsen 2,211 24 - 28 2,851
Hendrik van der Linde 500 19 481
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 4,011 13.8 - 32 4,381
de Haze Bomme van Citters 837 24 - 34.5 1,219
& Catteau
Jan Bekker Junior 182 30.5 383
Ferdinand Kladt 213 22 241
Thomas Holman & John Holman 3,078 27.8 - 34.3 4,693
Casparus Ribaut & Son 932 24.5 - 25.5 1,177
Jacob Bouvin 932 29 - 29.3 1,363
Jan Muntener 483 20.8 511
Securius & Bourje 920 29 - 32.8 1,335
Johannes van Deijnsen 890 22.3 - 31.8 1,207
Joachim Rutger Liens 431 18.3 403
Willem Nevejans 501 25.5 649
Jacobus Mareeuw & Son 498 30.5 769
Isaak de Wijze 445 29 655
Johan David Herklots 456 24.3 559
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 255 30.5 397
Pieter Kakenberg 252 28.5 367
Jan van Maaren 481 22.5 547
Dirk de Visser 467 26 613
Heijman Hendriks 480 30.5 739
& Hartog Hendriks
28 November 1774
Securius & Bourje 738 35.5 - 38.5 1,387
Isaak de Wijze 1,239 24 - 36.8 1,927
Cornelis Willemsen 955 17.5 - 34.5 1,279
Jan Willeboorts 629 18 - 23.5 691
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 4,280 7.5 - 35.3 4,399
Jacobus Broekhoven 1,478 20.5 - 34.3 1,993
Jan Muntener 878 18.3 - 21.8 865
Casparus Ribaut & Son 1,951 18.5 - 33 2,593
John Pilkington 1,905 34.3 - 35.8 3,349
Jacob Bouvin 474 36.3 865
de Timmerman & de Jonge 1,548 33.5 - 35.3 2,689
Elias Levij Content 272 22 307
Pieter Bos 428 22.5 487
Johannes van Deijnsen 450 18 415




Tea buyers Volumes Prices Value
(pounds) (stivers/pound) (guilders)______________________________________________________________________________________
Hendrik van der Linde 245 36.5 457
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 524 34.8 919
Jan van Maaren 514 33.8 877
Pieter Jacob van Engelsdorp 592 34.3 1,021
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 237 36.5 439
Nathan Jonas Cohen no data 40.5 415
22 October 1775
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 3,997 13.8 - 38.3 5,269
Stephanus Francois de Moulin 197 23 235
Johannes Henricus Schuttel 194 22 223
Securius & Bourje 990 36 - 37.8 1,831
Gerrit de Jong 1,037 34.5 - 35.5 1,819
Heijman Hendriks 539 34.3 931
& Hartog Hendriks
Hendrik van der Linde 952 34.5 1,651
Pieter Bos 999 33.8 - 36 1,723
Thomas Holman & John Holman 1,614 32.8 - 34 2,707
Jacobus Broekhoven 544 33.3 913
Van de Perre & Meijners 582 35.3 1,033
Cornelis Willemsen 438 32.5 721
Jan van Maaren 473 34.3 817
Jacob Bouvin 467 33.8 793
Joost Sanders 269 35.3 481
Fredrik Papegaaij 470 33 781
Mathijs Gotreke 241 36.5 445
Jan Bekker Junior 488 33.3 817
Jan Pozolij 200 17 175
25 November 1776
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 9,438 22.8 - 30 12,721
Cornelis Willemsen 2,386 23.3 - 30 3,325
Thomas Holman & John Holman 3,634 8.8 - 71.5 5,305
Jan Swart & Son 1,125 26.5 - 72.3 2,665
Jacobus Aartsen 962 26.8 - 29.3 1,351
Jan Muntener 446 25.3 - 38.3 721
Pieter Kakenberg 1,395 25.3 - 29.5 1,945
Isaak de Wijze 1,115 31.5 - 32.8 1,795
Gijsbert van Ippel 1,153 28 - 30.3 1,693
Van de Perre & Meijners 1,606 24.3 - 31.3 2,299
Securius & Bourje 589 10.3 - 26 487
Heijman Hendriks 889 25 - 27.5 1,171
& Hartog Hendriks
de Timmerman & de Jonge 899 26.5 - 30 1,273
Pieter Jacob van Engelsdorp 477 27.5 661
Pieter Bos 517 28.3 739
Anthonij Friskus 201 24.3 253
Hendrik van der Linde 402 27.5 559
Johannes van Deijnsen 521 26 685
Leendert Doudeijns 498 31.8 799
Willem Nevejans 466 31.3 733
Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek 544 27.5 757
Jan Bommene 487 29.5 727
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Johannes Hendricus Schuttel 457 23.8 553
Petrus Johannes Nortier 234 24.8 295
Jan van Maaren 110 30.3 175
Daniel van den Berge Blok 221 32 361
Jacob Bouvin 487 30 739
Boudaan & Van den Bosch 460 28 649______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: NA VOC 13377.
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APPENDIX 9
SELLING PRICES OF BOHEA AND SOUCHONG ON THE
AMSTERDAM COMMODITY EXCHANGE, 1732-1795
(guilders/pound)
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Bohea Souchong Year Bohea Souchong______________________________________________________________________________________
1732 1.33 unknown 1764 1.21 3.41
1733 1.44 unknown 1765 1.21 3.95
1734 1.55 unknown 1766 1.06 3.94
1735 1.59 unknown 1767 1.01 3.96
1736 1.60 unknown 1768 1.04 3.57
1737 1.30 unknown 1769 1.04 3.50
1738 1.12 unknown 1770 0.92 3.38
1739 1.03 unknown 1771 1.07 3.15
1740 1.00 unknown 1772 1.11 3.35
1741 1.09 unknown 1773 1.00 3.30
1742 0.94 unknown 1774 0.90 3.14
1743 0.90 unknown 1775 0.83 2.99
1744 1.13 unknown 1776 0.89 2.83
1745 1.05 unknown 1777 0.75 2.31
1746 1.52 unknown 1778 0.82 2.12
1747 1.40 unknown 1779 0.99 2.20
1748 1.23 unknown 1780 1.09 2.15
1749 unknown unknown 1781 1.31 2.63
1750 0.97 unknown 1782 1.58 2.98
1751 0.9 unknown 1783 1.18 2.60
1752 0.81 unknown 1784 0.77 2.31
1753 0.89 unknown 1785 0.76 2.46
1754 0.67 unknown 1786 0.68 2.75
1755 0.92 unknown 1787 0.70 2.95
1756 0.77 unknown 1788 0.62 2.39
1757 0.98 unknown 1789 0.54 2.15
1758 1.00 3.1 1790 0.54 2.12
1759 unknown unknown 1791 0.51 2.12
1760 1.05 3.25 1792 0.53 1.88
1761 1.18 3.05 1793 0.51 1.88
1762 1.30 3.05 1794 0.49 1.97
1763 1.32 3.15 1795 0.56 2.13______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: N.W. Posthumus, Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, dl. I, 189-194.
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APPENDIX 10
SELLING PRICES OF TEAS BY SEVERAL TEA-DEALERS
IN AMSTERDAM, 1776-1795
(guilders/pound)
A. Selling prices by J. Voute & Sons
______________________________________________________________________________________
Sales date Bohea Congou Souchong Pekoe Songlo Twankay Hyson skin Hyson______________________________________________________________________________________
6 Sept. 1777 13 - 16 28 - 36 34 - 56 40 - 56 33 - 34 35 - 36 36 - 40 80 - 85
9 Feb. 1778 13.5 - 16 28 - 36 35 - 50 46 - 60 34 - 36 36 - 38 42 - 46 82 - 90
9 Mar. 1778 14 - 16 28 - 36 35 - 50 46 - 60 34 - 36 36 - 38 42 - 46 82 - 90
29 Jun. 1778 16 - 17 28 - 36 35 - 50 46 - 60 36 - 37 38 - 42 40 - 50 82 - 86
13 Jul. 1778 16 - 17 28 - 36 35 - 50 46 - 60 36 - 37 38 - 42 40 - 50 82 - 86
7 Sept. 1778 16 - 17 28 - 45 34 - 60 45 - 60 37 - 39 38 - 42 40 - 50 82 - 90
29 Mar. 1779 19 - 20 28 - 46 36 - 60 48 - 60 45 - 48 49 - 50 50 - 54 85 - 95
9 Aug. 1779 19.5 - 20 28 - 46 32 - 60 34 - 56 46 - 50 50 - 56 58 - 60 92 - 96
13 Dec. 1779 22 - 23 28 - 45 34 - 60 48 - 60 50 - 52 54 - 56 52 - 60 78 - 102
3 Jan. 1780 22 - 23 28 - 45 34 - 60 48 - 60 50 - 52 54 - 56 52 - 60 78 - 100
17 Jan. 1780 22 - 23 28 - 45 34 - 60 48 - 60 50 - 52 54 - 56 52 - 60 78 - 100
23 Jan. 1780 22 - 23 28 - 45 34 - 60 48 - 60 50 - 52 54 - 56 52 - 60 78 - 100
31 Jan. 1780 22 - 23 28 - 45 34 - 60 48 - 60 50 - 52 54 - 56 52 - 60 78 - 100
24 Mar. 1780 22 - 22.5 28 - 45 34 - 60 48 - 60 50 - 52 54 - 56 54 - 60 80 - 100
11 Sept. 1780 21 - 21.5 30 - 40 34 - 60 42 - 60 42 - 45 44 - 46 48 - 56 70 - 95
5 Mar. 1781 22 - 24 36 - 50 38 - 60 48 - 56 36 - 38 38 - 44 50 - 60 80 - 105
25 Feb. 1788 13 - 16 32 - 46 42 - 65 unknown 28 - 32 34 - 40 42 - 56 75 - 100
26 May 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
2 Jun. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
9 Jun. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
30 Jun. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
11 Aug. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
1 Sept. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
8 Sept. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 78 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 28 - 40 50 - 65
3 Nov. 1788 11 - 13 26 - 42 34 - 52 80 - 85 26 - 30 27 - 31 38 - 40 50 - 65
2 Mar. 1795 9 - 11 20 - 24 32 - 48 36 - 60 14 - 24 16 - 25 24 - 32 36 - 52
9 Mar. 1795 9 - 11 20 - 24 32 - 48 36 - 60 14 - 24 16 - 25 24 - 32 36 - 52
4 May 1795 9 - 11 22 - 44 34 - 52 38 - 60 17 - 24 18 - 26 24 - 33 38 - 52______________________________________________________________________________________
B. Selling prices by D.J. van Wijk
______________________________________________________________________________________
Sales date Bohea Congou Souchong Pekoe Songlo Twankay Hyson skin Hyson______________________________________________________________________________________
14 Apr. 1788 10 - 14 26 - 48 45 - 65 66 - 100 28 - 32 34 - 36 38 - 44 70 - 110
5 May 1788 10 - 14 27 - 48 38 - 60 65 - 90 28 - 30 30 - 34 38 - 45 75 - 95
19 May 1788 9.5 - 14 27.5 - 46 37 - 60 66 - 95 30 - 36 31 - 37 35 - 45 68 - 95
26 May 1788 8.5 - 14 27 - 46 40 - 60 60 - 90 24 - 34 31 - 37 38 - 45 58 - 90
1 Jun. 1788 8.5 - 14 26 - 46 40 - 60 68 - 90 26 - 34 31 - 37 36 - 45 58 - 96
9 Jun. 1788 9 - 13 26 - 47 40 - 60 70 - 95 24 - 35 32 - 37 35 - 46 55 - 90
16 Jun. 1788 11.75 - 14 27 - 47 45 - 70 73 - 95 28 - 36 34 - 38 37 - 46 60 - 95______________________________________________________________________________________
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C. Selling prices by G. Hentzen
______________________________________________________________________________________
Sales date Bohea Congou Souchong Pekoe Songlo Hyson skin Hyson______________________________________________________________________________________
13 May 1776 15 - 24 36 - 56 38 - 70 36 - 60 28 - 34 38 - 46 74 - 110
28 Mar. 1795 10 - 13 24 - 50 24 - 60 40 - 70 16 - 22 24 - 32 40 - 140
27 Apr. 1795 10 - 13 24 - 50 24 - 50 36 - 60 18 - 34 24 - 34 40 - 140
11 May 1795 10 - 13 24 - 50 24 - 50 36 - 60 18 - 24 24 - 34 40 - 140
28 May 1795 10 - 13 25 - 50 26 - 50 36 - 60 18 - 24 24 - 34 40 - 140
15 Jun. 1795 10 - 13 28 - 56 28 - 56 36 - 60 20 - 26 26 - 36 40 - 140
29 Jun. 1795 10 - 13 28 - 56 28 - 56 36 - 60 20 - 26 26 - 36 40 - 140
28 Sept. 1795 12 - 16 33 - 56 38 - 56 44 - 60 24 - 30 30 - 40 40 - 150
19 Oct. 1795 12 - 16 33 - 56 38 - 56 44 - 60 24 - 30 30 - 40 40 - 150
16 Nov. 1795 12 - 17 33 - 56 38 - 56 44 - 60 24 - 30 30 - 40 40 - 150
30 Nov. 1795 13 - 15 30 - 50 38 - 48 40 - 60 23 - 28 28 - 36 60
14 Dec. 1795 13 - 15 30 - 50 38 - 48 40 - 60 23 - 28 28 - 36 60______________________________________________________________________________________
Source: GAA, Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, “Coffee and Tea”.
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APPENDIX 11
AVERAGE WAGES: WESTERN AND EASTERN NETHERLANDS,
1725-1790
(stivers per day, summer wages)
______________________________________________________________________________________
Year Master Journeyman Unskilled Hod-carrier
W.N. E.N. W.N. E.N. W.N. E.N. W.N. E.N.______________________________________________________________________________________
1725 27.16 19.5 24.12 18.4 18 12.25 18.8 unknown
1730 27.48 19.5 24.29 18.4 19.25 12.25 18.8 unknown
1735 28.34 20 25.41 18.4 19.13 12.25 18.8 unknown
1740 28.13 20 24.87 18.4 17.33 12.25 18.6 unknown
1745 27.75 20 24.33 18.8 17.33 12.25 18.6 unknown
1750 28.35 20 24.7 18.8 18 12.88 18.6 unknown
1755 28 20 24.93 18.8 17.33 12.88 19.2 unknown
1760 28 20 25.08 18.8 17.33 12.88 19.2 unknown
1765 28.25 20 24.3 18.4 18 12.88 19.2 unknown
1770 28.38 20 24.3 18.8 17.33 11.88 19.2 unknown
1775 28.5 20 24.9 18.8 17.33 11.88 19.2 unknown
1780 unknown 20 unknown 18.8 unknown 11.88 unknown unknown
1785 28.7 20 24.55 18.8 17.2 11.88 19.2 unknown
1790 28.6 20 25.23 18.4 17.2 12.75 19.2 unknown______________________________________________________________________________________
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- Japanese, 59-60
- Sumatra, 59 
gold merchants, 62
- trade, 49, 60, 62-63
Golden Rock, 149
Governors/Captain-Generals of Macao,
101, 103-108, 111, 114







Gunpowder tea (Joosjes), 71-72
Haak, Daniel Diederick van (Chief
Clerk of the General Secretary of the
Indies), 59
Habjak (Heyi) (shop), 78 





Hapwoa (shop[keeper]), 78 
Herstelder (VOC ship), 101, 103-104,
107-111
Heyligendorp, Cornelis (Dutch chief ),
111, 117
High Government (Hoge Regering), 3, 5,
10-13, 17-28, 30, 34-37, 39-40, 43-
45, 47-51, 53-63, 65, 101, 118, 145
Holland, 2, 120
Home goods, 20-21, 35-37, 49 
Hong merchants (hangisten), 9, 49, 74,
77-80, 84, 88-89, 91-100, 113-114,
148, 150 
Hongs (Hangs), 75-78
Honka (Huang Zai) (junk), 57, 59
Hoop, Cornelis van der (VOC advoca-
te), 23
Hoorn Chamber, 119-120
Hope, Thomas (VOC director), 23
Houckgeest, Andreas Everardus van
Braam (supercargo), 103
Houde (Hong), 77
Houqua (Quyqua’s clerk), 76
Houqua (shopkeeper of Guangyin), 78
Hulle, Martin Wilhelm (Dutch chief ),
25, 94-98, 100
Hullu, Johannes de, 6
Huyqua (Hong merchant), 78
Hyson tea, 69, 71-73, 84, 132-133
Hyson skin tea, 69, 71-73, 85, 132-133
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Imperial 
- Court, 91, 106-107
- Merchants, 99
Imperial tea (Bing), 71-73
India, 19, 55, 59, 101, 114, 116-117,
146, 149, 152




- textile trade, 55, 59-60
Indian Ocean, 55
Inksja (Yngshaw or Ingsia, Yan Yingshe,
Yan Shiying) (Hong merchant), 74-
76, 78, 81, 83-84, 87-88 
interpreters, 9, 77, 88, 91, 94, 96-98,
104, 110, 113-114
intra-Asian trade, 7, 39, 55, 59
Ireland, 142
Isle of Man, 142





Jörg, Christiaan J.A., 6-7
Jufeng (Hong), 75-76
junks, 3, 5, 22, 35-36, 43, 45, 53, 55,
57-59, 63, 82, 114, 117 
junk people, 82
- trade, 5, 36 
Knibbe, Jan Hendrik (supercargo), 25
koban, 59-60
Konqua (shopkeeper), 78
Kousia (Zhang Tianqiu) (Hong mer-
chant), 76, 78
Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), 59
Kramer, Joannes (shopkeeper), 135-136
Kreek, Elisabeth Maria van der (shop-
keeper), 135, 137




lead, 5, 20, 26, 36-37, 43, 47, 49 
Leiden, 37, 133, 135, 137-139 
L’Heureux, Anthony Francois (Dutch
chief ), 103, 108-111 
Limpo, 3
Limsia (Yan Linshe) (Hong merchant),
78
Lisjoncon (Li Xianggong, Li Zhengmao)
(shopkeeper), 78-79
Locqua (Hong merchant), 76
London (EIC ship), 101
Longhe (Hong), 78
Lorient, 142
Low Countries, 22, 40
Maas, 141
Macao, 35, 53-55, 57, 65, 77, 82, 84,
91, 93, 101, 103-107, 110-114, 116-
118
- Government, 11, 53-54, 111, 118
- Hoppo (customs officer), 103-107, 111
- Inner Harbour, 107
- procurator (procurador), 104-106, 113
- Senate, 53, 104-108, 111, 113 






- Straits of, 44-45
- Sultan of, 44




- tin-producing areas, 45
- world, 45 
Mandarin Quyqua (Chen Kuiguan)
(Hong merchant), 76
Manila, 76
Manuel Corree (shop[keeper]), 78-79
Matthias, Johan Constantin (VOC
director), 23
McClary, John (English captain), 59,
111-117 
Meiling Mountains, 72
Mexicanen, 33, 38, 49
Middelburg, 121-122
Min River, 72
Molen, J.R. ter, 9-10, 121
Moluccas, 18, 149
monopoly, 8, 44, 47, 92, 124, 148,
151-152
Monqua (Cai Wenguan, Cai Shiwen)
(Hong merchant), 77, 85, 88
Morse, Hosea Balou, 7-8
Moscow, 141
Mossel, Jacob (Governor-General of the






Nancy (EIC ship), 58
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Nanhai Court (Court of Justice of
Nanhai County), 93
Nanking linen, 26, 37-38, 55-57 




Neyschong (Yichang) (shop), 78
Ningguo, 69
Northern Islands, 58, 61
nutmeg, 21, 26, 48
Onrust Island, 51-52
Oostcapelle (VOC ship), 57
opium, 1
Ordinary Council of Naval Officers
(Ordinaire scheepsraad), 30-31 
Ostend, 3
Oude Stadhuys (shop), 135
Oudermeulen, Cornelis van der (VOC
director), 145
Paauw (VOC ship), 57 
Padang, 19
Palembang, 44-45, 47 
- pepper, see pepper
- Sultan of, 44, 47
- tin, see tin
Panton, John A. (English captain), 116
Parra, Petrus Albertus van der
(Governor-General of the Indies),
101 
Peace of Paris, 149
pearl dust (stampparels), 48, 55, 61
Pearl River, 9, 11, 13, 102, 113, 117
Peking, 1, 92, 97, 116
Pekoe tea, 69, 71-72, 132-133, 141
pepper, 18, 21, 35-36, 44-50, 53, 82,
152 
Perak, 44
Pheil, Justus Hendrik (First Mate of the
Herstelder), 103, 107
piasters, 38
pieces of eight, 33 
Pinqua (Yang Bingguan, Yang Cengong)
(shopkeeper), 78-79
Poan Keequa (Pan Qiguan, Pan
Wenyan) (Hong merchant), 74, 76-
77, 93, 103, 105-111, 114 
polemieten, 36-37 
Pontonchon (Tongchang) (shop), 78
porcelain, 1-2, 5-7, 21, 24, 26, 38, 48-
49, 55, 57, 59, 74, 78, 85, 130, 152
- shops, 74, 78-79, 85 
Portuguese, 77, 116, 118
- sailor, 116
- ships, 36, 53-55, 57, 118
- trade, 77
- traders, 45, 54, 118
Pouwchong (shop), 78
Poyang Lake, 72
Prinses van Oranje (VOC ship), 101
Prussia, 141, 146, 150
putchuck, 48




Qing, 1, 8, 11, 15, 148
Quanzhou, 76, 94
Quonsching (Guangshen) (shop), 78
Quonschong (Guangchang) (shop), 78
Quyqua, see Tan Quyqua
Radermacher, Samuel (VOC director),
23
Rijnsburg (VOC ship), 101, 105
ras de Marocco, 20
rattan, 21, 44, 47
red ochre, 22
Republic, see Dutch Republic
Rhine, 141
rhubarb, 2, 26, 38, 56-57 
rice, 48








Saldanha, Diogo Fernandes Salema e,











security merchants (fiadors), 49, 61-62,
74-76, 79-80, 97-98, 100, 103, 111,
114-115
Semqua (Qiu Kun) (Hong merchant),
61, 75, 77, 100
Sequa (Hong merchant), 75
Seven United Provinces of the
Netherlands, 2
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Seven Years’ War, 146-147
shark-fin, 55
ship’s officers, 23, 28-30, 32, 34-35, 40,
44, 51, 53, 55, 105 
Shunli (Hong), 75
Siam, 45
silk, 1-2, 5, 21, 26, 38 
silver, 5, 21, 26, 35, 38, 45, 49, 55, 59-
62 
Slooten (VOC ship), 25-26 
Smith, Jan Fredrik (Dutch Chief
Carpenter), 103
smuggling, 5, 7, 14, 29, 45, 141-142,
149, 151
Songlo tea, 69, 71-73, 83-85, 132-133 
Songlo-Imperial tea, 73
Souchong tea, 69, 71-73, 81-84, 123,
132-133
South China Sea, 55, 61
South-east Asia, 45, 56-57, 82
Soyschong (Juchang) (shop), 78
Spaarzaamheid (VOC ship), 25-26
Spain, 146
Spanish rials, 38, 45, 47, 49-50, 80-81,
83-84, 103 
spelter, 2, 26, 37-38, 55-57, 59
spices, 1, 18, 21, 26, 36, 48, 82
star anis, 2, 26, 38
St Antonio (Macao ship), 59
St Catharina (Portuguese ship), 57
St Eustatius Island, 149
St Jan (Shangchuan Island), 101
St Louis (Portuguese ship), 57
St Luz (Macao ship), 101
St Simão (Macao ship), 101, 103 
States of Holland and West Friesland
(Staten van Holland en West-
Friesland), 137, 139 
States-General, 2, 27, 150, 152
Sumatra, 19, 44, 59 
- West Coast of, 149
Sunda Strait, 57-58, 61
Surat, 39
Sweden, 142, 146-147, 151





Sweehing (Rui Xing) (junk), 57
Sweerts, Hieronymus, 134
Swetja (Yan Ruishe, Yan Shirui) (Hong




Tan Chetqua (Chen Jieguan) (Hong
merchant), 61, 74-76, 81, 83, 87-88,
100 
Tan Quyqua (Hong merchant), 76, 88
Tan Soequa (Chen Shouguan) (Hong
merchant), 75
Tan Tinqua (Chen Dengguan) (Hong
merchant), 76, 81, 
Tan Tinqua (Chen Zhenguan) (Hong
merchant), 93
Tan Tsjoqua (Chen Zuguan, Chen
Wenkuo) (Hong merchant), 76, 82,
85, 88
taxes, 8, 10, 14, 123, 135, 137, 139-
141, 152
Taxion (shop[keeper]), 78
Tayqua (Hong merchant), 75, 77
tea (see also Ankay, Ankay-Souchon,
Bohea, Congou, Gunpowder, Hyson,
Hyson skin, Imperial, Pekoe, Songlo,
Songlo-Imperial, Souchong,
Twankay)
- auctions, 6, 8, 10-13, 117, 119-125,
128-129, 131, 145, 151 
- buyers, 13, 39, 88, 121-122, 124
- chests, 37, 47, 88, 124, 135
- clippers, 1
- cultivating areas, 8, 69-71, 74-75, 79-
80, 82
- dealers, 11, 14, 119, 121, 131, 133,
141, 143
- distributing centres, 71
- drinking, 2, 9
- industry, 8
- market, 7, 65, 74, 124, 142-143
- merchants, 71-72, 74, 78, 82, 84
- op recognitie, 124-125
- op vracht, 124-125
- peddlers, 71, 74
- samples, 79, 85
- services, 10
- shops, 10, 133-135, 137
- supplying agents, 9, 11, 49, 68, 74-75,
78-85, 87-89, 92, 123, 129 
- van particulieren, 125
- “VOC teas”, 9-11, 13, 38, 40, 65, 67-
72, 74-75, 77, 85-86, 89, 119, 122-
123, 125, 129-131, 141, 143, 147,
151
Teunqua (Hong merchant), 77
test-needles, 62
Texia (Yan Deshe, Yan Liangzhou)
(Hong merchant), 75-76
textiles
- Chinese, 2, 26, 56
- Coromandel, 55, 60





Timor, 54, 57, 118
tin, 18, 21-22, 26, 35-37, 44-50, 53,
82, 152 
Tinqua, see Tan Tinqua (Chen
Dengguan) 
Tokugawa government, 59
Tonchon (Yaochang) (shop), 78





Trade Council (Commercie Raad), 31-
33, 50-51, 53-54, 58, 62, 80, 88,
100, 104-105, 109-110, 123 
trepang, 55, 58
Tsja Hunqua (Hunqua, Cai Ruiguan)
(Hong merchant), 61-62, 74-77, 80,
83-84, 87-88, 93, 100
Tsjobqua (Cai Yuguan) (Hong mer-
chant), 76
Tsjonqua (Cai Xiangguan, Cai Zhaofu)





91, 93-94, 96-99, 101, 104-111, 113,
115
Tswaa Suyqua or Tsja Suyqua (Ruiguan)
(Hong merchant), 76
Twankay tea, 69, 71-73, 80-81, 83-85,
123 
Uhn-Sam-Ja (tea merchant), 74
United States of America, 152
Van Dyke, Paul A., 9
Veldhoen (VOC ship), 101, 108
Vernon, Edward (EIC Admiral and
Commander), 116
VOC
- administration, 2, 13-14, 20, 25
- business/trade, 2, 5-8, 10-13, 17, 27,
41, 45-46, 59, 79, 89, 119, 130, 145,
147-148, 150-151
- Chambers, 10, 12, 14, 119-125, 131,
150
- directors, 2-3, 6, 19-20, 23, 26, 37,
39, 145
- shareholders, 20-24
- trade directors, 19, 24-25, 28-29
- trade representatives, 9, 11, 13, 68-69,
74, 79, 117-118, 122, 124, 145-147-
148, 150
Voute, Jan Jacob (tea-dealer), 131-133,
142
Vries, Jan de, 150





Whampoa, 54, 88, 103-105, 107-109,
111, 113, 117
Wijnberg, Nanning (supercargo), 25
Wilhem, David de (VOC director), 23
Winschong (Yongchang) (shop), 78
Wonchan (Wongsong) (junk), 59
Woude, A.M. van der, 150
Wuyi, 71




Yellow Mountains (Huangshan), 69
Yifeng (Hong), 75, 77
Yihe (Hong), 75, 77
Yili, 76
Yu River, 72
Yuanquan (Juun Suun) (Hong), 76
Yuyuan (Hong), 78
Zeeland, 2, 120-121, 124-125






Deze studie richt zich op de meest winstgevende fase van de theehandel
van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) met China. Daarbij
komen vragen aan bod zoals waarom en hoe in 1757 de theehandel uit
handen van de Hoge Regering in Batavia werd genomen en onder de
supervisie werd gesteld van de nieuw opgerichte Chinasche Commissie in
Amsterdam. Daarnaast wordt in detail verklaard welke factoren hebben
bijgedragen aan de fenomenale groei en het plotselinge verval van deze
handel in het voorlaatste decennium van de achttiende eeuw.
Hoofdstuk Een behandelt de voorbereidingen voor de directe vaart op
China en de oprichting van de Chinasche Commissie. De leiding over de
directe vaart was bij de Chinasche Commissie in goede handen. De com-
missie vaardigde enkele strikte en zeer gedetailleerde instructies uit voor
de deelnemers aan de handel, waarin hun functies en bevoegdheden dui-
delijk werden omschreven om op deze manier te bewerkstelligen dat zij
met elkaar konden samenwerken. Bovendien specificeerde de commissie
haar bestellingen van thee en gaf de kamers de opdracht om de schepen
naar China van handelsgoederen en fondsen te voorzien.
Hoofdstuk Twee beschouwt de rol van de Hoge Regering in Batavia in de
directe vaart op China. De bijdrage van de Hoge Regering was aanzien-
lijk en daardoor kreeg zij de rol toebedeeld om de directe vaart op China
te ondersteunen door allerlei soorten diensten aan te bieden en te leveren
om ervoor te zorgen dat het beleid van de Chinasche Commissie succes-
vol was. Als we in aanmerking nemen hoeveel de Hoge Regering bijdroeg
aan de handel op China, vielen de voordelen die zij ontving uit de direc-
te vaart op China magertjes uit.
Hoofdstuk Drie richt zich op de manier waarop de VOC de handel in
thee in Canton bedreef. Er wordt aandacht besteed aan de theesoorten
waarin de VOC handelde, de handelaren die deze theesoorten leverden en
de manier waarop de vertegenwoordigers van de VOC de thee inkochten.
De theesoorten waarin de VOC handelde bestonden uit zwarte en groe-
ne thee; van deze was zwarte thee de grote favoriet. De Hong handelaren,
de winkeliers, en de klerken van de Hong handelaren traden op als agen-
ten die de VOC-theesoorten leverden. De voornaamste wijze van inkoop
van de VOC-thee verliep volgens een contract met de reguliere handels-
partners van de Compagnie. Er waren nog twee andere manieren van
inkoop: in het naseizoen, wanneer de schepen van de Compagnie vertrok-
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ken waren, werd thee ingekocht maar ook vond inkoop van extra thee op
de vrije markt plaats tijdens het handelsseizoen. Beide manieren waren
een onontbeerlijke aanvulling op de inkoop volgens een contract.
In Hoofdstuk Vier worden drie representatieve gebeurtenissen behandeld
die illustreren hoe verwarrend de verstandhouding tussen de Europese
handelaren, de Chinese autoriteiten en de regering van Macao vaak was.
De Nederlanders in Canton waren zich er goed van bewust dat het nood-
zakelijk was een goede relatie met de Chinese handelaren te onderhouden
en op goede voet te blijven staan met de mandarijnen. Met de andere
Europese handelaren concurreerden ze en in het dagelijkse leven raakten
ze eerder met hen in conflict dan dat ze met hen samenwerkten. Ze ble-
ven nauw in contact staan met de regering van Macao, of ze nu in Macao
verbleven tijdens het stille seizoen of dat ze zaken met haar deden wan-
neer ze in Canton waren.
Hoofdstuk Vijf behandelt de verkoop van de VOC-thee in Europa. Een
vergelijking van de verkoop van thee in de Republiek der Nederlanden
door de VOC gedurende de volle tijd dat de Compagnie op China han-
delde toont aan dat de periode tussen 1757 en 1781 een uitzonderlijke
was, waarin elk seizoen gemiddeld 3.316.808 pond thee uit Canton werd
ingevoerd, waarop gemiddeld een winst van 94 procent werd behaald. De
binnenlandse distributie van de VOC-thee was een gecentraliseerd en
relatief eenvoudig netwerk, dat zeer voordelig voor de VOC uitviel.
Omdat de binnenlandse markt voor thee in de Republiek klein was, hielp
de heruitvoer van de VOC-thee door Nederlandse handelaren naar ande-
re Europese landen het overschot hierin wegwerken.
Hoofdstuk Zes vergelijkt de interne en externe factoren die aanvankelijk
de handel van de VOC in thee tot een groot succes maakten en vervol-
gens tot een abrupt einde brachten.
Na de reorganisatie trok de daaruit ontstane directe vaart op China
meteen voordeel van de directe betrokkenheid van het bestuur van de
Chinasche Commissie. De effectievere organisatie van de zaken door de
vertegenwoordigers van de Compagnie in China en de bemanning van de
schepen op de China-vaart had daar ook een goede uitwerking op. Alle
dienaren van de Compagnie werkten nauw samen met elkaar ten dienste
van deze specifieke handel en Batavia bleef bijdragen aan het succes van
de onderneming in Canton. De belangen van de Compagnie werden op
een buitengewoon bevredigende manier gediend door voldoende ver-
kopen van verse thee op de Compagnies veilingen in Nederland.
Deze fenomenale stijging in de Nederlandse handel in thee met China
was ook onlosmakelijk verweven met andere externe factoren die waren
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ingebed in specifieke politieke, sociale en economische ontwikkelingen
zowel in Europa als in China gedurende de tweede helft van de achttien-
de eeuw.
Hun politiek van neutraliteit in de Zevenjarige Oorlog (1756-1763)
gaf de Nederlanders de gelegenheid voordeel te trekken uit de gunstige
oorlogscondities en hun handel uit te breiden. Het nieuwe bestuur van de
China-handel werd tijdens de eerste jaren van deze oorlog in werking
gesteld. De handel van de VOC in thee steeg gestaag en bleef meer dan
twintig jaar bloeien.
Een steeds toenemend aantal van theedrinkers in de Republiek was
noodzakelijk voor een gestage groei in de theeconsumptie. Tegelijkertijd
stimuleerde en garandeerde de sterke demografische groei in de buurlan-
den de wederuitvoer van de VOC-thee.
De tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw was een tijdperk van opmer-
kelijke bloei in China. De handel van de Chinezen met de Westerlingen
in Canton profiteerde van de kracht van de Chinese economie. Tot de
vooravond van de Eerste Opium Oorlog (1839-1842) bleef Canton de
Westerse vraag naar thee voldoen.
In zijn ruim tienjarig bestaan vanaf 1760 functioneerde de Co-hang
niet altijd even goed, maar de theehandel van de VOC werd er niet echt
door gehinderd. Na zijn opheffing aan het begin van 1771 handelden de
Europese handelaren weer vrijelijk met hun Chinese handelspartners tot
de Co-hang in 1782 opnieuw werd ingesteld.
De desastreuze Vierde Engelse Oorlog (1780-1784) bracht de bloeien-
de Nederlandse theehandel in Canton echter tot een abrupt einde. De
VOC schepen op de Chinese vaart leden onder de aanvallen van de
Britten. Dit leidde tot een sterke achteruitgang van de export van thee uit
Canton voor de Nederlandse markt. In de jaren 1781-1782 arriveerden er
geen schepen uit de Republiek in Canton.
In de jaren tachtig van de achttiende eeuw werd de toestroom van con-
currenten naar Canton steeds groter. Zij vormden een ernstige bedreiging
voor de theehandel van de Compagnie, maar de positie van de VOC werd
onherstelbaar beschadigd door de invoering van de Britse Commutation
Act in 1784. Het doel van deze Act was het wegnemen van elke reden om
thee van het Continent naar Groot-Brittannië te smokkelen. Als gevolg
daarvan werd de Nederlandse inspanning om een aandeel te behouden in
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